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iABSTRACT
Value conflicts due to cultural differences are an increasingly pressing issue in
many societies. Because Old Testament texts hail from a very different milieu to our
own they may provide new perspectives upon contemporary conflicts and, in this
context, the present dissertation investigates one particular value clash in 1 Samuel.
Studies of Old Testament ethics have attended to narrative only relatively
recently. Although social-scientific interpretation has a longer pedigree, there are
important debates about how to employ the fruits of anthropology in biblical studies.
The first part of this thesis, therefore, attends to methodological issues, advancing four
main propositions. First, attention should be paid to the moral goods that feature in the
text. Second, the family, a central feature of Old Testament morality, should be
understood as a set of practices rather than an institution. Third, ‘models’ of social
action that purport to comprehend the social world of the Bible should be used only
cautiously. Finally, a modified version of Bakhtin’s theory of heteroglossic voices can
help readers appreciate how authors present a moral vision by approving some
characters’ actions whilst undermining others.
The second part of the thesis employs this methodology to examine 1 Samuel
19.10–18a. The discussion of the moral dilemma facing Michal adduces anthropological
theories and ethnographic data concerning violence, lying, and the relationship between
fathers and daughters. Given that the conflicts of moral goods are ‘resolved’ by
characters choosing to act in a certain way, the dissertation enquires after the author’s
assessment of each character’s moral choices, and hence their theological import. The
dissertation argues that Michal’s loyalty to David and deception of Saul was counter-
cultural, and by approving of her choice the author affirms the importance of loyalty to
the Davidic dynasty.
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1Introduction
Plaisante justice qu’une rivière borne!
Vérité au-deça des Pyrénées, erreur au-delà.
– Blaise Pascal, Pensées et opuscules
Blaise Pascal’s polemical response to Michel de Montaigne’s relativism asserts
universal moral standards exist, despite the fact of cultural plurality.1 Nevertheless, the
cultural differences that spurred Montaigne’s reflections are now more obvious than in
his day and, in an increasingly interconnected world, value conflicts due to cultural
differences more frequent and pressing. In an essay on cultural diversity Clifford Geertz
argues that they are “one of the major moral challenges we these days face”.2
Comprehensive Christian reflection about cross-cultural moral conflicts would
marshal the gamut of biblical, theological, philosophical and social-scientific resources.
This dissertation has more limited ambitions: I will investigate one particular value
clash within 1 Samuel. The task is important for two reasons. First, a thorough
examination of biblical sources is essential for a properly grounded theological ethic.
Second, because Old Testament texts hail from a very different cultural milieu to our
own, they may provide new perspectives upon contemporary conflicts.
The epigraph is from Blaise Pascal, Pensées et opuscules (20th ed. Paris: Librairie Hachette, nd),
paragraph 294.
1 Alan Gewirth distinguishes between positive morality (those rules for behaviour that exist) and
normative morality (those rules for behaviour that should exist). Positive plurality does not imply
normative pluralism, “Is cultural pluralism relevant to moral knowledge?” in Moral Disagreements:
Classic & Contemporary Readings (ed. C. W. Gowans; London and New York: Routledge, 2000),
181. I will follow the customary distinction between ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ (and their variants):
‘morality’ is actual behaviour and standards; ‘ethics’ is reflection about these practices.
2 Clifford Geertz, Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics (Princeton /
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), 86. David Attwood objects to the use of ‘value’ as a term
in ethical debate since it assumes that ‘value’ is a common denominator that allows ‘values’ to be
compared and traded, thus excluding objective (i.e. reasoned rather than simply chosen) morality:
‘non-negotiable values’ are oxymoronic, Changing Values: How to find moral truth in modern times
(Carlisle: Paternoster, 1998), 12–16. Whilst accepting his concerns I will continue to use ‘value’ as a
useful shorthand for moral goods.
2The ‘cultural distance’ between the biblical and modern worlds has led some
commentators to highlight what one might call the moral problem of the Old Testament.
Walter Kaiser, for example, observing a conflict between the behaviour of biblical
characters and modern sensibilities, seeks to explain actions that impugn God’s
character,3 or that of important persons,4 and morally offensive laws and sanctions.5
John Rogerson criticises this approach for supposing that the standard of morality is
modern moral sensitivity.6 Whether ancient biblical, modern European or some other
morality should be normative is not the concern of this dissertation: its focus is moral
conflicts within the Old Testament and the text’s own assessment of their resolution.
Rogerson identifies a number of passages where conflicts occur, noting that the “moral
dilemmas explored in these stories must have been credible to the presumed authors and
readers”.7 To appreciate these clashes contemporary readers must comprehend which
moral values are presented in the text, something that is not always obvious.
In Chapter 1 I begin my investigation by enquiring into whether the Old
Testament itself provides sufficient resources to address cases of conflicting moral
values, proposing that the issue should be approached by focusing upon moral goods.
Chapter 2 examines the nature of ‘the good’ and the ways in which it has been related to
‘the right’. Because this study is not an investigation in moral philosophy my aim is
simply to show the contested nature of ‘the good’ and ‘goods’, and the implications of
choosing a particular interpretation when seeking to comprehend Old Testament ethics.
One prominent Old Testament scholar, John Barton, advocates using Martha
Nussbaum’s work to study biblical narrative.8 Nussbaum uses studies of Greek tragedy
to argue that particular situations should take precedence over ethical rules; I shall argue
that rather than think in terms of rules or situations it is better to posit ‘the priority of the
good’.
3 Cf. Walter Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983), 247–83. God is
changeable (Gen 6.6), malevolent (Mal 1.2–3), deceptive (1 Kgs 22.2–23), approves of deception (Ex
3.18–20), and orders human sacrifice (Gen 22) and genocide (Deut 7.1–5).
4 Abraham lies (Gen 12.10–20), David commits adultery (2 Sam 11.2–5), Elisha curses (2 Kgs 2.23–
24), and Ehud and Jael commit murder (Judg 3.15–26; 4.17–20).
5 Cf. Kaiser, Toward, 284–304. E.g. treatment of women, slavery, the death penalty and eudaemonism.
6 John W. Rogerson, “Old Testament Ethics,” in Text in Context: Essays by Members of the Society for
Old Testament Study (ed. A. D. H. Mayes; Oxford: OUP, 2000), 116–37, especially 122.
7 Rogerson, “Old Testament Ethics,” 126. See Gen 18.22–33; Ex 1.15–20; 1 Sam 20.1–34; 2 Sam 14.1–
11; 2 Kgs 8.7–15. See also the dilemma in 1 Macc 2.32–41.
8 John Barton, “Reading for Life: The Use of the Bible in Ethics,” in Understanding Old Testament
Ethics: Approaches and Explorations (Louisville: Westminster / John Knox Press, 2003), 55–64.
3Since the ‘family’ has been identified as one of the most significant Old
Testament moral goods, Chapter 3 examines anthropological approaches to kinship and
the ethics of kinship, concluding the ‘family’ is not so much an institution as a
‘practice’. The analysis of ‘practice’ has typically been undertaken in terms of
‘structure’ and ‘agency’. Starting from Pierre Bourdieu’s seminal work on ‘Practice
Theory’ I examine these categories, paying particular attention to the importance of
accounting for ambiguity in interpersonal interaction.
The accounts of practice found in the Old Testament are to be read. Chapter 4
explains how a modified version of Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of heteroglossic voices
enables readers to appreciate how authors present a moral vision by promoting some
voices whilst undermining others. Because biblical texts hail from temporally distant
societies one can concur with Philip Esler that they “need to be investigated using
disciplines developed specifically to comprehend the social dimensions of human
experience”.9 I briefly discuss the use of anthropological resources in exegesis, before
summarising the methodology I will use to seek ‘interpretative understanding’ of
characters’ moral choices.
The study up to this point might be considered a methodological introduction.
Although relatively extensive, I consider it essential to show that each of the elements
that form part of my methodology are matters of dispute and debate, and that
interpreters who tread unwarily, perhaps ignorant of the complexities of ‘good’,
‘kinship’, or ‘practice’, to name just some of the more important facets of this study,
may produce explanations characterised more by their own context than that of the
text’s. So Chapters 1 to 4, whilst they may appear episodic, are necessary to delineate
an exegetical method and carefully to position my approach vis-à-vis those of other
commentators. In addition to the exegetical conclusions themselves the methodology
adopted here forms part of the original contribution of this thesis.
John Barton proposes that conflicts of moral values in the books of Samuel
might be especially illuminating because neither God nor a divine word are adduced as
literary deus ex machina. He suggests that they “could be read with an eye to the
complexity of human ethical dilemmas and to the need for ethical conduct even in the
9 Philip Esler, The First Christians in their Social Worlds: Social-Scientific Approaches to New
Testament Interpretation (London: Routledge, 1994), 2.
4midst of far too many constraints on human freedom”.10 For this reason Chapter 5
examines the moral conundrum facing Michal as she lies to save her husband against
her father, King Saul. I am interested in the moral goods presented or alluded to within
the text, and what happens when they conflict. Given that the conflict is ‘resolved’ by
characters choosing to act in a certain way, I enquire after the significance of this
resolution, and its theological import.
As an interdisciplinary study this project brings Old Testament studies,
anthropology and ethics into conversation—Figure 1 presents the matter graphically.
FIGURE 1 — An Interdisciplinary Conversation
Although each discipline can inform the others, limitations of space preclude a
systematic examination of, for example, how anthropology might interact with
ethics11—in the diagram such learning is shown by the un-capitalised letters. Instead, by
maintaining a focus on the interpretation of a particular text I seek conclusions that
involve all three disciplines, represented by the central space labelled ‘Michal’. In this
light, the conclusion provides answers to the key research questions, viz. what are the
moral conflicts faced by actors in these narratives?, how are the conflicts resolved?,
10 Barton, Understanding, 61.
11 Cf. the interactionist paradigm for interdisciplinary work (as opposed to exclusivist or inclusivist
approaches) proposed by Thomas Lawson and Robert McCauley, Rethinking Religion: Connecting
Cognition and Culture (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), 14–31, 170–72.
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5what is the author’s evaluation of their choices?, and why do these assessments matter?
6CHAPTER 1
Old Testament Morality
and Value Conflict
ֽ ָָׁשנ םֹוָׁלְשו קֶדֶצ ּׁוָּשגְִפנ תֶמֱֶאו־ֶדֶסחּ וק
– Psalm 85.11
The first outstanding 20th century attempt to investigate Old Testament morality
was by Walter Eichrodt.1 Despite problems with his analysis it is a convenient starting
point for the present investigation because he attempts to delineate a comprehensive
view.2 Eichrodt concludes his systematization of Old Testament ethics by declaiming:
It is the loftiness of the obligation, the spirituality of the central good,
the unconditional character of the Ought, and the perfect unity of these
three aspects of moral conduct in the divine Thou as known in the gift of
his favour, which give the ethics of the Old Testament their unique inner
greatness.3
His is a vision of a perfectly harmonious and divinely undergirded ethical scheme. The
‘unity’ Eichrodt ‘discovers’, however, is suspiciously well informed by Lutheran
systematic theology, and the disingenuity of his summary is evidenced by the sixty
pages Eichrodt spends discussing the foothills of popular morality, detours along
eudaemonistic trails, and the final plunge into a legalistic crevasse: respectively, either
precursors to, or deviations from, the summit of individual, spiritual morality
conforming to the divine will. Rather than marginalising the diversity of moral
perspectives within the Old Testament, Barton argues persuasively that exegetes should
acknowledge
1 Walter Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament (OTL; trans. J. A. Baker; 2 vols.; Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1961–67), 2.316–79. First German edition 1933. Prior monographs are listed in
Kaiser, Toward, 1.
2 On the difficulties with Eichrodt see especially John Barton, “Understanding Old Testament Ethics,”
in Understanding Old Testament Ethics: Approaches and Explorations (Louisville: Westminster /
John Knox Press, 2003), 15–31. These include: (1) a tendency to systematise even where diversity is
apparent; (2) an assumption that the biblical texts reflect the values of actual historical Israelites; (3) a
lack of sociological depth; and (4) a belief that the basis for morality is obvious. Note that this
dissertation does not attempt to reconstruct ancient Israelite morality but identify normative Old
Testament ethics.
3 Eichrodt, Theology 2.379.
7‘Popular morality’ exists in all societies at all times: it is hard not to think
that people were still vaguely saying, ‘Such things are not done in Israel’
even as the priestly author was putting the finishing touches to the
perfectly theonomous Moses. If one is to attempt an analysis of ethics in
ancient Israel, one cannot safely ignore ‘popular morality’ in any period.4
Barton’s approach quite properly eschews shoehorning the ethics of the Old Testament
into a single mould, yet this does raise the question about how different perspectives
might be reconciled. The matter is further complicated if, pace Eichrodt, who supposed
the basis of ‘true’ morality was God’s demand, one does not make an a priori
assumption in favour of a single source for Old Testament ethics—Barton, for example,
supposes there are others: obedience to God’s will, imitation of God, and ‘natural law’.5
One may suppose, however, that the writers of the Old Testament were themselves
cognisant of this issue, envisaging both situations in which moral values could conflict,
and ways in which these clashes might be resolved. In this chapter I investigate the Old
Testament’s own contribution to the resolution of value clashes, structuring my
discussion by employing Eichrodt’s taxis of moral norms, moral goods and moral
motives.
1.1 MORAL NORMS
The most obvious source of moral norms within the Old Testament is the law,
either, as some writers have suggested, a ‘natural law’, or stipulations contained in the
law codes. In addition, the imitation of God has been considered a source of ethics.
Each will be examined for clues that may help resolve value conflicts.
1.1.1 Natural Morality
When the prophet Amos asks the rhetorical questions ‘Do horses run on rocks?
Does one plough the sea with oxen?’ he assumes the answer is obvious.6 This is what
gives the following phrase its force: ‘But you have turned justice into poison and the
fruit of righteousness into wormwood’. The sins enumerated by Amos are presented as
obviously unnatural, and the rejection of justice and righteousness as simply perverse, a
4 Barton, “Understanding,” 19. Cf. Henry McKeating, “Sanctions Against Adultery in Ancient Israelite
Society, with some Reflections on Methodology in the Study of Old Testament Ethics,” JSOT 11
(1979): 57–72. Although not the focus of this study it is important to note that diversity of perspective
per se need not be a problem: see the typology analysed by John Goldingay, Theological Diversity
and the Authority of the Old Testament (2nd ed.; BTCL; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995).
5 Barton, “Understanding,” 21, 29. On ‘natural law’, see below.
6 Amos 6.12. All English language biblical quotes NRSV unless otherwise indicated.
8“cosmic nonsense” or “reversal of a sane way of viewing the world”.7 The right ‘order
of things’ might be called ‘natural morality’: “the view that there are certain precepts or
norms of right conduct, discernible by all men”.8 One must look quite closely for
evidence of natural morality in the Old Testament.9 Nevertheless, there is no necessary
conflict between it and the obligations of revealed law.10 As Jon Levenson notes, the
sovereignty of God is larger than his suzerainty…biblical Israel believed
the will of God to be known not only through history, but also through
what we moderns call nature, and not only through the word proclaimed,
but also through thought and cognition.11
James Barr, observing that biblical law shares affinities with other ancient Near Eastern
law codes, even suggests Old Testament ‘revealed’ law has a ‘natural’ basis.12
What could natural morality contribute to the resolution of value conflicts?
Three observations are possible. First, the matters in question are what one might call
‘goods’ and ‘evils’. In general it is a good thing that justice abounds; it is an evil thing
that people exploit others. Thus when Isaiah pronounces ‘Woe to those who join house
to house’ he specifies the goods in peril as a result of avaricious property speculation,
viz., agricultural productivity and ‘fairness’ with respect to the enjoyment of the fruit of
7 John Barton, “Natural Law and Poetic Justice in the Old Testament,” in Understanding Old Testament
Ethics: Approaches and Explorations (Louisville: Westminster / John Knox Press, 2003), 32–44,
quote 38.
8 Barton, “Natural Law,” 33, quoting V. J. Bourke, “Natural Law,” in Dictionary of Christian Ethics
(ed. J. Macquarrie; London: SCM, 1967). Barton originally used the term ‘natural law’ but in the
reprint accepts John Rogerson’s ‘natural morality’. See Rogerson, “Old Testament Ethics,” 128;
Barton, Understanding, 179, n.16. For other definitions of ‘natural law’ see Alan Johnson, “Is There a
Biblical Warrant for Natural-Law Theories?” JETS 25 (1982): 185–99, especially 198–99.
9 Lists of texts can be found in John Barton, “Amos’s Oracles Against the Nations,” in Understanding
Old Testament Ethics: Approaches and Explorations (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press,
2003), 77–129; Johnson, “Biblical Warrant”; Cyril Rodd, Glimpses of a Strange Land: Studies in Old
Testament Ethics (OTS; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 59–64; Markus Bockmuehl, “Natural Law in
Second Temple Judaism” VT 45 (1995): 17–44, especially 18–28; Jon Levenson, “The Theologies of
Commandment in Biblical Israel,” HTR 73 (1980): 17–33; Carol Newsom, “The Moral Sense of
Nature: Ethics in the Light of God’s Speech to Job,” PSB 15 (1994): 15–27. On ‘Abraham’s question’
see Nathan MacDonald, “Listening to Abraham—Listening to Yhwh: Divine Justice and Mercy in
Genesis 18:16–33,” CBQ 66 (2004): 25–42. For the debate about whether the wisdom literature is
natural morality or merely accumulated experience see Levenson “Theologies of Commandment,” 26.
On ‘natural theology’ in the Old Testament see James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology—
The Gifford Lectures for 1991 (Oxford: OUP, 1994), 81–101.
10 See Terence Fretheim, God and the World in the Old Testament: A Relational Theology of Creation
(Nashville: Abingdon, 2005), especially 140–44; James Bruckner, Implied Law in the Abraham
Narrative: A Literary and Theological Analysis (JSOTSup 335; London: Sheffield, 2001), 44–50.
11 Levenson, “Theologies of Commandment,” 32; cf. John Barton, Ethics and the Old Testament
(London: SCM. 1998), 72–76.
12 Cf. Barr, Biblical Faith, 97–98; Ex 18; Hos 4.1–3, a text usually associated closely with the
Decalogue. Levenson notes the “easy juxtaposition of Torah and creation” in Psalm 119, “Theologies
of Commandment,” 28. For a contrary view see Joseph Jensen, Ethical Dimensions of the Prophets
(Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2006), 2–6.
9the land.13 Second, this text presents a view of the prioritisation of goods, asserting that
‘large and beautiful houses’ or feasting should be less important than justice to the
Judahites. Third, the identification of things as goods or evils, and their prioritisation, is
either not always obvious or, if it is, people do not behave as they should.14 Perhaps the
opacity of natural morality is what led the biblical writers to specify in more detail what
sort of comportment was appropriate, most clearly in the ‘law’.
1.1.2 Old Testament Law
Christian writers have traditionally emphasised law as a source for ethics; and in
cases of conflict have searched for a hierarchy of values. Norman Geisler calls his
scheme ‘graded absolutism’.15 It is based upon three premises: the fact of higher and
lower moral laws; the existence of unavoidable moral conflicts; and the absence of guilt
for the unavoidable. Using the analogy of two cars simultaneously approaching a
junction Geisler suggests that “when a person enters an ethical intersection where two
laws come into unavoidable conflict, it is evident that one law must yield to the other”.16
He offers three signposts: love of God over love for people; obedience to God before
government; and mercy before veracity.17 Despite Geisler’s assertion that this scale is
divinely ordained,18 weaknesses include its very high level of abstraction, and the
assumption that these pairings are themselves unproblematic, for example, that mercy
and truth are mutually exclusive categories in situations of value conflict.
In terms of Old Testament ethics, Christopher Wright offers a more
sophisticated proposal, arguing the law codes contain an implicit scale of values.19
13 Isa 5.8–12.
14 Daniel Carroll R. cautions that Barton does not take into account the difference between the existence
of a consensus regarding moral convictions and natural law as philosophical or theological category,
Contexts for Amos: Prophetic Poetics in Latin American Perspective (JSOTSup 132; Sheffield: JSOT
Press, 1992), 131. This is an important point, although for appeal to ‘natural morality’ to be successful
it must be widely recognised as an objective norm. Accepting Carroll’s distinction means the opposite
may also be true: moral consensus can err—something with which Old Testament prophets would
have concurred.
15 Norman Geisler, Christian Ethics (Leicester: Apollos, 1990), 113–32.
16 Geisler, Christian Ethics, 120.
17 Geisler, Christian Ethics, 121–22. Thus the deception by the midwives of the Hebrews was justifiable.
18 Geisler, Christian Ethics, 124–25. Geisler thinks that the hierarchy of laws does not emanate from
God’s essence, but is simply an expression of God’s moral law, i.e. God is internally consistent.
19 Christopher Wright, “Ethics,” NIDOTTE 4.585–94, especially 593; idem, Living as the People of
God: The Relevance of Old Testament Ethics (Leicester: IVP, 1983), 163–68; idem, “Old Testament
Ethics,” NDCEPT 48–55, especially 54; idem, Old Testament Ethics for the People of God (Downers
Grove: IVP, 2004), 305–14. Cf. Gordon J. Wenham, “Law and the legal system in the Old
Testament,” in Law, Morality and the Bible (ed. B. N. Kaye and G. J. Wenham; Leicester; IVP, 1978),
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According to Wright, the following ordering (in descending importance) is visible in the
Decalogue: God, Sabbath for the good of the whole community, authority and integrity
of the family, human life, sex and integrity of marriage, property, and judicial
integrity.20 Although YHWH is obviously the foundation and most important ‘value’,
this ordering is problematic. Wright himself recognises that given the centrality of the
‘father’s house’ in the Old Testament its
strict sexual ethic must be seen in the context of [the] primary concern for
preserving the stability of the larger family structure, since that in turn
was an essential part of Israel’s understanding and experience of the
covenant relationship between the nation and Yahweh.21
Furthermore, judicial integrity is connected both to individual wellbeing and justice
within the community; and whilst the individual appears to be inferior to the family and
community in Wright’s prioritisation, there are laws protecting the wellbeing of the
individual from communal and familial tyranny.22
Wright considers other laws also reveal a scale of values: life matters more than
property; persons matter more than punishments; and needs matter more than rights and
claims.23 The justification of this ordering is based upon the fact that capital punishment
is not prescribed for property and could not, according to Wright, be commuted for
murder;24 an interpretation of the lex talionis as restricting punishment along with
limitations to judicial beating and the absence of bodily mutilation;25 and the placing of
human physical need above property rights.26 Although significantly more nuanced and
textually founded than Geisler, Wright’s scheme is insufficient for two reasons. First, on
a technical level, although it is possible that Old Testament law reflects a scale of
values, a finer tool is necessary to sketch it with sufficient precision for it be useful in
more than a handful of straightforward cases. Second, legal values are not the only
relevant ones for Old Testament ethics.27 Gordon Wenham highlights the important,
24–52, especially 29.
20 Wright, “Ethics,” 593.
21 Wright, “Old Testament Ethics,” 54.
22 E.g. Deut 19.15–21; 21.18–21.
23 Wright, “Ethics,” 593.
24 On whether capital punishment was always executed see also McKeating, “Sanctions”; Kaiser,
Toward, 297–99; Gordon Wenham, Leviticus (NICOT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), 281–86.
25 With the single exception of Deut 25.11.
26 Deut 23.24–5; 24.19–22.
27 Something Wright would not contest. See also Gordon Wenham, Story as Torah: Reading the Old
Testament Ethically (OTS; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 2, where he criticises Otto for an exclusive
focus upon law, cf. Eckhart Otto, Theologische Ethik des Alten Testaments (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer,
11
albeit not absolute, difference between law and ethics.
In most societies what the law enforces is not the same as what upright
members of that society feel is socially desirable, let alone ideal. There is
a link between moral ideals and law, but law tends to be a pragmatic
compromise between the legislators’ ideals and what can be enforced in
practice.28
Although Old Testament ‘law’ is frequently paraenetic, this difference means that even
if were possible exactly to delineate the law’s scale of values it may prove insufficient
to resolve particular value conflicts. Wright himself observes that narratives might shed
light on cases of moral conflict since “actors in a story have to make choices according
to some implicit prioritizing even of the Ten Commandments”.29 This is suggestive,
although I propose it is unnecessary to suppose either that law always precedes
narrative, or that the matter need be restricted to the Decalogue.
Despite these cautions it is possible that law does assist the resolution of value
clashes. I remarked above that natural morality can be conceived as an expression of the
way moral goods should be organised. It is possible to view revealed law in the same
way. Consider, for example, Exodus 22.2–3: ‘If a thief is found breaking in, and is
beaten to death, no bloodguilt is incurred; but if it happens after sunrise, bloodguilt is
incurred’. The two moral goods in view are human life and property. The law states that
life is more important than belongings, refusing to exculpate the daytime killing of an
intruder when, one assumes, the owners of the house could both see and overpower the
thief. At night, however, the risk to the lives of household members is heightened, since
a ruckus in the dark could easily lead to injury to the residents themselves, and so there
is no culpability should the trespasser be bludgeoned to death. In both cases the good of
human life is preferred: during the day, life is preferred to property; during the night, the
life of the innocent to that of a guilty intruder. Three observations are in order. First, I
propose that the fundamental issue at stake in law is the desirability of a moral good or
evil vis-à-vis other moral goods or evils. Second, laws can indicate the prioritisation of
goods to be adopted in particular cases. Third, the prioritisation reflected in these laws
may depend upon the circumstances of a situation. This is obviously so with casuistic
laws, but even apodictic decrees must be employed in concrete circumstances. In this
1994); idem, “Of Aims and Methods in Hebrew Bible Ethics,” Semeia 66 (1994): 161–172.
28 Gordon Wenham, “The Gap between Law and Ethics in the Bible,” JJS 48 (1997): 17–29, quote 18.
29 Christopher Wright, Walking in the Ways of the Lord: The Ethical Authority of the Old Testament
(Leicester: Apollos, 1995), 143.
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respect, it is important to observe that Old Testament codes were not used in the same
way as modern laws, which are applied by a judge to specific cases. If a similar
approach is taken to Old Testament law it can lead to questions like: ‘What if a son is
rebellious but not a drunkard?’.30 Bernard Jackson argues that the “modern model of
law, based upon the ‘application’ of statutes in court, is not applicable to the ancient
Near East. The ‘codes’ have a different purpose – didactic, sapiential, monumental.”31
‘Law’, therefore, had a similar function to the wisdom literature, but in a different
environment: the wisdom sayings provided guidance for the young whilst the law codes
were to educate adults, perhaps especially elders.32 In neither case were either wisdom
or legal stipulations ‘applied’, but used to inform individuals’ judgments in particular
situations.
It seems Old Testament legal texts may provide some help in the resolution of
value conflicts, but that they do not tell the whole story. It is necessary to look at other
sources of norms for moral living, starting with God himself.
1.1.3 Imitation of God
Several scholars suggest that imitation of God is a vital premise of Old
Testament ethics.33 Cyril Rodd, however, is sharply critical, branding the concept of
30 Cf. Deut 21.18–20; Jonathan Burnside, The Signs of Sin: Seriousness of Offence in Biblical Law
(JSOTSup 364; London: Continuum, 2003), 16.
31 Bernard Jackson, “Ideas of Law and Legal Administration: a Semiotic Approach” in The World of
Ancient Israel: Sociological, Anthropological and Political Perspectives (ed. R. E. Clements;
Cambridge: CUP, 1989), 185–202, quote 186. For a more extensive justification of this thesis see
idem, “Models in Legal History: The Case of Biblical Law,” JLR 18 (2002–2003): 1–30; idem,
Wisdom—Laws: The Mishpatim of Exodus 21:1–22:16 (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 3–76. On ANE judicial
procedure see Franco Pintore, “La Estructura Jurídica,” in El Alba de la Civilización: Sociedad,
economía y pensamiento en el Próximo Oriente Antiguo (ed. S. Moscati; trans. J. L. Albizu; Madrid:
Ediciones Cristiandad, 1987), 430–523, especially 499–518.
32 Cf. Jackson, “Ideas of law”; James Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction (London:
SCM, 1982). For the Old Testament’s own presentation of the use of law see James Watts, Reading
Law: The Rhetorical Shaping of the Pentateuch (BS 59; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999),
15–31.
33 See Barton, “Understanding,” 29–30; idem, “The Basis of Ethics in the Hebrew Bible,” in
Understanding Old Testament Ethics: Approaches and Explorations (Louisville: Westminster/John
Knox Press, 2003), 45–54, especially 50–54; Eichrodt, Theology 2.373; Otto, Ethik, 185; Wright,
Living, 26–28; Kaiser, Toward, 143; Verne Fletcher, “The Shape of Old Testament Ethics,” SJT 24
(1959): 47–73, especially 57–61; Eryl Davies, “Walking in God’s Ways: The Concept of Imitatio Dei
in the Old Testament,” in In Search of True Wisdom (ed. Edward Ball; JSOTSup 300; Sheffield:
Sheffield University Press, 1999), 99–115, especially 100–101, where he notes the importance of
‘imitating God’ within the rabbinic tradition. Barton is more cautious in his subsequent article,
“Imitation of God in the Old Testament,” in The God of Israel (UCOP 64; ed. R. P. Gordon;
Cambridge: CUP, 2007), 35–46. For a though survey of the evidence and measured discussion see
also Walter Houston, “The Character of YHWH and the Ethics of the Old Testament: Is Imitatio Dei
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imitatio Dei, “a scholarly wish”.34
The clearest indication of imitatio Dei is usually thought to be Leviticus 19.2:
‘You shall be holy, for I the LORD your God am holy’.35 Wenham considers this not
merely the levitical motto, “but the key to biblical ethical theory”.36 According to
Wright, the text declares that Israel’s “quality of life…must reflect the very heart of
God’s character”.37 Waldemar Janzen disagrees. He opines that ‘holiness’ speaks of
‘otherness’ and questions whether the same standard of perfection can be applied to
Creator and created, before concluding that it is impossible for humans to imitate God’s
perfection.38 A key issue is the nature of holiness.39 Mary Douglas argues holiness
signifies completeness and the normal order of things.40 Given that God is ‘normally’
holy, Isaiah describes God as the ‘Holy One of Israel’ and Hosea uses the title ‘Holy
Appropriate?,” JTS 58 (2007): 1–25.
34 Rodd, Glimpses, 73.
35 Cf. Lev 11.44; 20.7, 26; 21.8.
36 Wenham, “Gap,” 27.
37 Wright, Living, 27; cf. Matt 5.48.
38 Waldemar Janzen, Old Testament Ethics: A Paradigmatic Approach (Louisville: Westminster John
Knox, 1994), 115–16. He allows a formal comparison only: God perfectly fulfils his expectations of
himself; humans should do perfectly what God expects them to do. Rodd asserts that the imitation of
God “rests ultimately on the belief in a God who has been brought down to the human level, and this
God is never found in the Old Testament”, Glimpses, 76. In other words, the fact that God is holy
precludes imitative human holiness. This is problematic for two reasons. First, Janzen appears to
depend upon Rudolf Otto’s attenuated concept of the holy as the numinous other in The Idea of the
Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the
Rational (2nd ed.; trans. J. W. Harvey; New York: OUP, 1950), especially, 25–30; for a critique see,
inter alia, Walter Moberly, Bible, Theology and Faith (CSCD; Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 88–96.
Second, excluding imitation on these grounds thereby disallows all talk of God, since if the deity’s
ways are so far beyond human comprehension no theological can reflection occur, and even the
affirmation that God’s ways are far above human ways would be impossible—hence Isa 55.8–9 does
not support Rodd’s case.
39 For a survey of views see Philip Jenson, “Holiness in the Priestly Writings of the Old Testament” in
Holiness: Past & Present (ed. S. C. Barton; London: Continuum, 2003), 93–121.
40 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 53–54: “Holiness
requires that individuals shall conform to the class to which they belong. And holiness requires that
different classes of things shall not be confused.” For a critical summary of Douglas see Walter
Houston, Purity and Monotheism: Clean and Unclean Animals in Biblical Law (JSOTSup 140;
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 93–114, 120–22. Wenham observes that movement
between classes is sometimes possible, subject to ritual restrictions, especially sacrifice, Leviticus, 18–
29. He presents his schema in diagrammatic form:
profane pollute
sanctify cleanse
holy clean unclean
Jackie Naudé notes, “there is a dynamism associated with those objects typified by the adj. …all
possess the ability to move things or people into, or at least toward, the realm of the divine”, “ׁשדק,”
NIDOTTE 3.877–87, quote 881.
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One’.41 Whilst Isaiah employs some of the Old Testament’s most exalted language to
describe God, he also proclaims that, “holiness calls”.42 Although God’s holiness should
evoke human holiness, is this the same as imitation? Rodd asserts that to, “imitate God
is to attempt to recreate in the life of Israel and the activities of the individual the virtues
and actions of God”.43 He claims that this is distinct from merely ‘mirroring’ God by
obeying commands or natural law. Rodd overreacts, first, because God’s character is
frequently linked to human conduct. In Deuteronomy, for example, the attributes of
love, mercy, compassion and justice are highlighted, and the authors expect these
virtues to be evident in his people.44 A similar perspective is found in the prophetic
literature, where God’s will is related to his character as well as the law. As Eryl Davies
comments, “[s]ince the ethical behaviour of the people was to flow naturally from the
apprehension of God’s character, it was clearly a matter of grave concern for the
prophets that there appeared to be no ‘knowledge of God’ in the land”.45 Similarly,
mention of moral virtues in the Psalms was “designed to inculcate the same ethical
values in the worshipper”.46 Narratives are more problematic, however, because the
deity sometimes acts in ways that are thought inappropriate for imitation.47 The second
reason for thinking Rodd overreacts is that the behaviour demanded of Israelites
emulates God’s actions. Deuteronomy 10.12–19 exhorts imitation of God by Israel
41 Isa 1.4; 10.20; 17.7; 30.12; 40.25; 43.14–15; 45.11; 50.5; cf. 2 Kgs 19.22; Jer 50.29; 52.5; Ezek 39.7.
Note also the description of God as holy without using this phrase in Isa 6.3–5; Hos 11.9; 11.12[12.1];
cf. 1 Sam 2.2; 6.19–20; Ps 22.3[4]; 99.3; Hab 1.12.
42 John Gammie, Holiness in Israel (OBT; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 96. Gammie identifies
various ways in which the Old Testament presents Israel’s response to God’s holiness: priests
considered the demand of holiness to be ritual purity and separation, prophets called for the purity of
social justice and sages advocated individual right living, although he recognises that these categories
are more heuristic than hermetic. This approach is more sophisticated than the standard dictionary
articles which emphasise holiness as purity or consecration, although Naudé provides a more nuanced
analysis, noting that the noun and adjective, “have linguistic ranges that do not overlap significantly”,
“ׁשדק,” 881; cf. David Wright, “Holiness (OT),” ABD 3:237–49; Helmer Ringgren, “ׁשדק, qdš,”
TDOT 12:527–43;
43 Rodd, Glimpses, 73.
44 See Deut 4.31; 6.5; 7.7–8; 14.28–29; 16.19–20; 30.3; 32.4.
45 Davies, “Walking,” 106; cf. Mic 6.8; Hos 4.1; 5.4; 6.6; Jer 4.22; 5.4–5; 9.3, 6.
46 Davies, “Walking,” 106. See also Houston, “Character of YHWH,” 13–14; Wright, Living, 28;
Wright, Walking, 139–40; Gammie, Holiness, 129–33; Ps 25.6; 33.5; 37.28; 119.156; 146.6–9. The
parallel acrostic Psalms 111 and 112 are especially illustrative: the righteousness of both God and the
upright endures forever (Ps 111.3; 112.3), both are gracious and merciful (Ps 111.4; 112.4); God gives
food to his worshippers the godly give to the needy (Ps 111.5; 112.9) and both act justly (Ps 111.7;
111.5). Thus there is no reason to limit moral action by ‘those who fear the LORD’, the subjects of
Psalm 112, to ‘mirroring’ divine attributes, perhaps by obeying the law. This is one way of doing so
but, pace Rodd, deliberate imitation is another. Indeed, this appears to be enjoined by the
juxtaposition of the psalms.
47 On 1 Sam 26.19 Barton comments that “God may persecute David if God chooses, even through the
agency of Saul; humans following their own volition may not”, “Basis,” 51. See also Houston,
“Character of YHWH,” 42–45; Barton, “Imitation,” 20–25.
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based upon the paradigmatic event of the exodus, but Wright astutely observes that
whilst God’s “action for Israel was paradigmatic for them…it was also paradigmatic of
God”, that is, it revealed what God was like.48 The fact that the response demanded of
Israel is not labelled ‘imitation’ is besides the point.49 Barton concludes that the “sense
of community of moral perception between God and humanity, which seems inherent in
the idea of imitating God, takes us well beyond the few texts which in so many words
tell their readers to behave as God does”.50
To conclude, although imitation of God is a facet of the Old Testament’s moral
programme, its importance can be over-pressed.51 In terms of resolution of value
conflicts it does not seem to offer anything distinctive. The laws that comprise the
literary context of Leviticus 19.2, for example, are elsewhere enjoined.52 This
48 Christopher Wright, Deuteronomy (NIBC 4; Peabody: Hendrickson, 1996), 150. Emphasis original.
Note Ze’ev Falk’s comment that “God is not only the commander but also the paradigm of all moral
conduct”, “Law and Ethics in the Hebrew Bible,” in Justice and Righteousness: Biblical Themes and
their Influence (ed. H. G. Reventlow and Y. Hoffman; JSOTSup 137; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992),
83. Deut 10.12–19 is adduced by several writers, e.g., Wright, Living, 27–28; Davies, “Walking,”
102–103; Barton, “Basis,” 51; Fletcher, “Shape,” 58. Rodd accepts that this passage might support
imitatio Dei, but denies other instances of ‘walking in God’s ways’ endorse the concept, strictly
defined, Glimpses, 330–33. He is correct. Within Deuteronomy all other occurrences elucidate the
phrase with reference to commandments (Deut 8.6; 11.22: 19.9; 26.17; 28.9; 30.16 and, negatively,
Deut 13.5[6]). Incidences within the Deuteronomistic History associate walking in God’s ways with
law, both positively (Josh 22.5; 1 Kgs 3.14; 8.58; 11.38 and 1 Kgs 2.4, in which the walking is to be
‘in faithfulness with all their heart and with all their soul’, a clear reference to the Deuteronomic law)
and negatively (Judg 2.17–22; 1 Kgs 11.33; and 1 Kgs 15.26, 34; 16.2, 19, 26; 22.52; 2 Kgs 8.18, 27.
‘Sin’ is a synonym for not walking in God’s way, cf. 2 Kgs 16.3; 21.21–22), rather than imitating his
character or action. The Chronicler fuses the two, speaking of Jehoshaphat as having ‘walked in his
commandments’ (2 Chr 17.4; cf. 2 Chr 6.16, 27, 31; 11.17; 17.3; 20.32; 21.6, 12–13; 22.3; 28.2; 34.2).
The psalmist predicts judgment upon ‘those who walk in their guilty ways’; and presents a strong
contrast with ‘the way that is blameless’, that is, ‘the law of the LORD’ (Ps 68.21; 119.1). It is
significant that this way is taught, since this strengthens the link between ‘walking in the way’ and
law, rather than imitation (Ps 86.11, cf. Ps 81.13). Instruction in the way is central to the wisdom
literature (Prov 4.10–27; 8.32); and, among the prophets, Isaiah’s eschatological vision has many
peoples voyaging to Zion so that God can teach them his ways (Isa 2.2–3, cf. 30.21; 42.24 and,
negatively, 8.11; 59.8; 65.2. Note also the similar vision in Micah 4.2). In the meantime Jeremiah
notes a more typical response: God’s people refuse to walk in his ways, that is, they reject his teaching
(Jer 6.16–19, cf. Jer 7.23; Hos 14.9). It appears, therefore, that ‘walking in the ways of the LORD’
speaks more of obedience than imitation as commonly conceived.
49 In terms of methodology, Rodd demands too much when he requires the biblical text to offer a “clear
and categorical” statement of Old Testament ethics as imitation of God, Glimpses, 72. A better
standard is adequate evidence, which should, of course, be properly grounded, Barton, “Imitation,” 39.
50 Barton, “Basis,” 52. Barton argues the vocation of particular individuals also witnesses to “the
possibility of the divine life and human life running in parallel”, “Basis,” 53. Whether this is, as
Barton claims, a special sort of imitation demanded only of selected individuals is debateable; it is
equally possible that these characters are notable for living the life to which all should aspire.
51 Barton probably overstates the case when he posits that imitation of God is, “a potentially unifying
theme for much that the Hebrew Bible has to say about ethics”, “Basis,” 52. He is more measured in
“Imitation,” 45–46. See also Houston’s nuanced conclusion, “Character of YHWH”, 25.
52 Davies states that “the kind of holiness here envisaged was thoroughly practical in its orientation, for
it entailed the fulfilment of specific social obligations, such as filial respect towards parents (19.3),
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assessment is not entirely negative, however, for if, as suggested above, laws are
statements about moral goods then the link to God’s character might give these goods a
degree of objectivity. The next section investigates moral goods in more detail.
1.2 MORAL GOODS
The Old Testament declares God to be unambiguously good,53 and it is
unsurprising, therefore, that Kaiser should assert the “standard of the good, the right, the
just, and the acceptable is nothing less than the person of the living God”.54 Despite the
promise that an imitative ethic coupled with the goodness of God might appear to offer,
few scholars have considered ‘being good’ an important focus for the study of Old
Testament ethics.55 On the contrary, commentators are often more impressed by
mundane ‘goods’. Note, for example, the remarks of Newman Smyth:
the idea of the highest good which is to be derived from the prophetic
literature of the Old Testament is the summation…of all those material
goods—such as plentiful harvests, springs of water, increase of cattle, a
vine and fig tree for every man, peace and prosperity within all the
borders of a land flowing with milk and honey,—which make a people
contented and prosperous.56
In this section I will ask what is ‘good’ according to the Old Testament, and how an
understanding of goods might aid resolution of value conflicts.
generosity to the poor at harvest (19.9–10), compassion towards the infirm (19.14), integrity in the
judicial process (19.5) and honesty in commercial transactions (19.35–36)”, “Walking,” 101; cf.
Wright, Living, 26–27; Deut 5.16 (filial respect); Deut 10.19 (generosity); Deut 19.15–21 (judicial
integrity); Deut 5.19–20 (honesty).
53 See H. J. Stoebe, “בֹוט tôb Bueno,” DTMAT 1.902–918. E.g. Ps 31.19; 86.5; 100.5; 106.1; 107.1;
118.1, 29; 145.7, 9; also 1 Chr 16.34; Ezra 3.11; Jer 33.11: Nah 1.7; cf. Mk 10.18. Note the
parallelism of seeking God and seeking good in Amos 5.4, 6, 14–15 and the rejection of good as
rejection of God in Hos 8.3. God’s name is good in Ps 52.9 [11]; and he is ‘good to Israel’ Ps 73.1.
Further, in Ex 33.19 God tells Moses that he will make his goodness pass before him, cf. Ex 31.6–7.
54 Kaiser, Toward, 6.
55 Two exceptions are Wright, Old Testament Ethics, 368–74; Bruce Birch, “Moral Agency,
Community, and the Character of God in the Hebrew Bible,” Semeia 66 (1994): 23–41; idem, “Divine
Character and the Formation of Moral Community in the Book of Exodus,” in The Bible in Ethics:
The Second Sheffield Colloquium (ed. J.W. Rogerson, M. Davies and M.D. Carroll R.; JSOTSup 207;
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 119–135. Note also the recent interest in virtue ethics in
the Old Testament: John Barton, “Virtue in the Bible,” in Understanding Old Testament Ethics:
Approaches and Explorations (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 2003), 65–74; M. Daniel
Carroll R. and Jacqueline E. Lapsely, eds., Character Ethics and the Old Testament (Louisville:
Westminster John Knox, 2007); M Daniel Carroll R., “La ética de los profetas y su relevancia para
América Latina hoy: La contribución de la ética filosófica,” Kairós 35 (2005): 7–30.
56 Newman Smyth, Christian Ethics (3rd ed.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1892), 92. Cf. George Berry, “The
Ethical Teaching of the Old Testament,” BW 21 (1903): 108–18, especially 111–12.
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1.2.1 Good in the Old Testament
In a canonical context the first thing described as ‘good’ is creation itself.57
Gerhard von Rad thinks that טֹוב “contains less an aesthetic judgment than the
designation of purpose, correspondence”.58 According to Norman Whybray it is
creation’s usefulness to people that is in view.59 This coheres with the general usage of
‘good’ identified by Robert Gordon: “a state or function appropriate to genre, purpose,
or situation”.60 Thus it is ‘not good’ that animals are unable to be a companion for
Adam, that is, they cannot serve this function. Christopher Wright, however, sees in the
creation narratives a description of “a place of order, system and structure. We live in a
cosmos, not a chaos…[which] provides an objective basis and authority for the exercise
of moral freedom and sets limits to moral relativism.”61 He continues
There is a basic shape to that world which we did not invent, and
therefore a corresponding shape to the moral response required of us if
we are to live within it with the kind of freedom which, by God’s so
ordering, it authorizes. Morality, in biblical terms, therefore, is
preconditioned by the given shape of creation, which underlies the
relativity of cultural responses to it within history.62
Similarly, Walter Houston argues that if the Old Testament writers “perceive that they
do not live in a just society, at least they live in a just world. The world, or to put it in
57 Gen 1.4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31. Moral goods are not always described using טֹוב , which is used as
both verb and adjective, the difference not always easily distinguishable, cf. Robert Gordon, “ טבו ,”
NIDOTTE 2.353. See also I. Höver-Johag, “בֹוט tôb; ּבוט tûb; טיב ytb,” TDOT 5.296–317; Luis
Alonso Schökel,“בֹוט,” DBHE 291–93; Stoebe, “בֹוט tôb Bueno,” 902–918; BDB 373–75. I take the
ּ ִכי in Gen 1.4 et passim to be emphatic, so Victor Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1–17
(NICOT 1; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 118; J. Gerald Janzen, “Kugel’s Adverbial kî tôb: An
Assessment,” JBL 102 (1983): 99–106; pace James Kugel, “The Adverbial Use of KÎ TÔB,” JBL 99
(1980): 433–35.
58 Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary (OTL; trans. J. H. Marks; Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1961), 50.
59 Norman Whybray, “Genesis,” in The Oxford Bible Commentary (ed. J. Barton and J. Muddiman;
Oxford: OUP, 2001), 38–66, especially 42. Contrast the translations ‘God was pleased with what he
saw’ (Speiser), or ‘God saw how beautiful it was’ (Hamilton), which point to some sort of intrinsic
goodness, cf. E. A. Speiser, Genesis (AB 1; New York: Doubleday, 1964), 3, 5; Hamilton, Genesis,
118, 124. Wenham thinks that both ‘fitness for purpose’ and a reflection of the goodness of God in
his works is meant, cf. Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1–15 (WBC 1; Waco: Word, 1987), 18.
60 Gordon, “ טבו ,” 353; cf. Höver-Johag, “בֹוט tôb,” 304. The Old Testament frequently highlights
instrumental, rather than intrinsic, goodness with the construction טֹובל  , ‘good for’ or ‘good to’,
Alonso Schökel, “בֹוט,” 291–93.
61 Wright, “Old Testament Ethics,” 49. cf. Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An
Outline for Evangelical Ethics (2nd ed.; Leicester: Apollos, 1994), 31–52.
62 Wright, “Old Testament Ethics,” 49. On the priestly vision of natural order in the first chapters of
Genesis see William Brown, Structure, Role, and Ideology in the Hebrew and Greek Texts of Genesis
1:1–2:3 (SBLDS 132; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), 214–20. Note discussion of the contention that
such an orderly view is hegemonic, utopian ‘royal’ ideology, pages 225–29.
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theological terms, God’s creation, is ordered and therefore exhibits justice”.63 That
Wright and Houston are correct to identify an ethical and not merely functional created
order is confirmed by the biblical author’s evaluation of the immoral behaviour of
humankind in Genesis 6.5, which mirrors God’s initial positive appraisal. Whilst ‘God
saw everything that he had made, and indeed, it was very good’, post-Fall, ‘The LORD
saw that the wickedness of humankind was great in the earth, and that every inclination
of the thoughts of their hearts was only evil continually’.64 Furthermore, it is
unnecessary to drive a wedge between creation as instrumentally good and creation as
good because it possess a moral order, for one aspect of this ordering is teleological.65
Genesis 3 attributes the Fall to the primeval couple’s consumption of fruit of the
tree of the knowledge of good and evil.66 Scholars debate whether this knowledge is
moral awareness or a totality of knowledge inappropriate for humans,67 but the
important aspect of this phrase for our purposes is that good and evil are a contrasting
pair.68 The impossibility of achieving both at the same time explains Amos’ injunction
to ‘seek good and not evil’, a text that has a clear covenantal matrix.69 Amos rails
against Israel’s unjust practices on the understanding that the reconciliation of justice
and other goods is straightforward. In other places, however, the Old Testament is
aware that moral living is more complicated. For example, Psalm 85.10[11], this
chapter’s epigraph, envisages a time when ‘faithfulness and truth meet; justice and well-
63 Walter Houston, Contending for Justice: Ideologies and Theologies of Social Justice in the Old
Testament (LHB / OTS 428; London: T&T Clark, 2006), 15.
64 Gen 1.31; 6.5.
65 The other is generic. On whether a Platonic (A ordered to serve B) or Aristotelian (A ordered to
flourish as A) conception of teleological ordering is to be preferred see O’Donovan, Resurrection, 34.
66 Gen 2.9, 17.
67 For a summary of the debate see Gordon, “ טבו ,” 354–55. A moral interpretation of the idiom ‘good
and evil’ is suggested by 1 Kgs 3.9; Isa 7.15, 17; Deut 1.39, but it does not fit 2 Sam 19.35[36], cf.
Speiser, Genesis, 26. Von Rad is unequivocal when he states that ‘good and evil’ is “a formal way of
saying what we mean by our colorless ‘everything’ ” Genesis, 86–87. ‘Everything’ could, of course,
include a moral evaluation, and it is certain that some instances of the expression do refer to ethical
discernment; for references and discussion see Höver-Johag, “בֹוט tôb,” 309–11.
68 Gordon calls the need to choose between good and evil a “two-way theology”, “ טבו ,” 354. Cf. Deut
30.15; Jer 21.8.
69 Amos 5.12. ‘The good’ is occasionally a synonym for the covenant, see Antonio González Lamadrid,
“Pax et Bonum: «Shalôm» y «tôb» en relación con «berit»,” EstBib 28 (1969): 61–77; idem, “Apuntes
sobre בוט / בטי y su traducción en las Biblias modernas,” EstBib 50 (1992): 443–56; Michael Fox,
“Tôb as Covenant Terminology,” BASOR 209 (1973): 41–42; Michael Barré, “The Formulaic Pair
  בוט)ו(דסח in the Psalter,” ZAW 98 (1986): 100–105, cf. Höver-Johag, “בֹוט tôb,” 309. On the
dynamics of good and evil, i.e. whether good always produces good, etc., see Mignon Jacobs, “The
Conceptual Dynamics of Good and Evil in the Joseph Story: An Exegetical and Hermeneutical
Inquiry,” JSOT 27 (2003): 309–38.
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being kiss’.70 These goods are often difficult to achieve simultaneously because, for
instance, being loyal to one person can mean deceiving another, therefore concurrent
realization of loyalty and truth, or justice and peace, is God’s gift. Thus the psalmist
sums up his vision of people acting morally with the phrase ‘the LORD will give the
good’.71 This ample conception of the good is juxtaposed with a productive land.
Kirkpatrick offers a pithy summary: “Material prosperity will go hand in hand with
moral progress. Earth responds to the divine blessing.”72 Psalm 85, therefore, presents a
vision not only of individual goods, but recognises that they are often difficult to
achieve at the same time: only with divine blessing can a conflict of moral values be
overcome.73
Many other things are considered ‘good’ in the Old Testament. Furthermore, the
comparative construction ִמ בֹוטן points to a suggested prioritisation of goods, although
many of the sayings are general.74 Norman Whybray, in the only sustained study of
goods in the Old Testament, collates them into twelve categories, suggesting that
together they comprise a vision of ‘the good life’.75 It is instructive to examine his work
in more detail.
1.2.2 The ‘Good Life’
Whybray defines the good life as “a desirable state of happiness and prosperity”
70 JPS Tanakh (1985); MT ֽק ָָׁשנּ ו (qal), without object, although many translations read ֽק ִָּׁשנ ּו (niphal),
‘kiss each other’; Kraus argues ּ ּוקַָׁשנ (niphal of קׁקש, ‘rush together’) would be a better emendation,
thus ‘embrace each other’, cf. Hans-Joachim Kraus, Los Salmos II: Salmos 60–150 (trans. C. Ruiz-
Garrido; Salamanca: Sígueme, 1995), 262; also Arnold Anderson, Psalms (73–150) (NCBC; London:
Marshal, Morgan & Scott, 1972), 612. Notwithstanding emendations the meaning is clear: these goods
will be realised together, regardless of the usual difficulties of doing so. Kidner expresses it thus: “The
prevailing concept…is that of concord: vast, unspoilt and rich with life” Derek Kidner, Psalms 73–
150 (TOTC; Leceister: IVP, 1975), 309 (although without accepting his view that verse 10 speaks of
atonement); pace Marvin Tate, who sees no conflict between the goods, Psalms 51–100 (WBC 20;
Waco: Word, 1990), 366. A. F. Kirkpatrick asks whether these are divine attributes or human virtues,
concluding, with many commentators, that these goods are personifications of YHWH’s agency in the
world. He recognises, however, that there is no need to exclude human virtue, indeed, this is the
prominent thought in the next verses, cf. The Book of Psalms (Cambridge: CUP, 1902), 513–14; Prov
3.3; Isa 32.16; Tate, Psalms, 371; Kraus, Salmos II , 268–69.
71 My translation.
72 Kirkpatrick, Psalms, 514.
73 Verse 13[14] frames the question in terms of walking in God’s ways, and hence obedience to the law,
see above.
74 Especially in Proverbs: 12.9; 15.16–17; 21.9, 19; 25.7; 27.5, 10; Eccl 4.6, 9; 5.4[5]; 7.10. See also the
goods listed in reply to the question ‘what is good?’ in Eccl 1.3; 2.3, 22; 3.9; 5.15[16]; 6.8, 12; 10.10–
11; for comprehensive lists see Gordon, “בֹוט”; Höver-Johag, “בֹוט tôb,”. There are similar rhetorical
statements in prose e.g., 1 Sam 1.8; 15.28. For other frequent constructions with בֹוט see Alonso
Schökel, “בֹוט,” 291–93.
75 Norman Whybray, The Good Life in the Old Testament (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2002).
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and “a life of entire contentment with things as they are”.76 He reviews the elements that
comprise this ideal state by biblical book.77 What each good signifies depends upon the
text being examined, or even the development of the plot within a book. For example,
within the Old Testament canon, possession of the land is presented as first a promise,
then a reality, and then ‘paradise lost’; and within the former prophets there is relative
insecurity under Saul, security under David and Solomon, and eventual exile. Despite
these vicissitudes the land, the first element of the good life described by Whybray, is
an integral part of the vision of the ideal.78 It is a place of security, which, he posits, is
“the most fundamental of human goods”.79 He argues that it is the good of power that
enables secure possession of the land. Who exercises power is a theme of 1 Samuel 8.
The prophet cautions that the pressing need for national restoration should not lead to
precipitate decisions, painting a picture of ‘the bad life’ under an ancient Near Eastern
monarch as a reversal of what YHWH had given Israel.80 Note that injustice forms a key
part of this portrayal: the king would enjoy the good life, but at the expense of his
subjects. Apart from the very worst times, however, Israel is presented as benefiting
from strong leaders possessing divinely endowed authority as they attempt to obtain
peace and security for the people. One benefit of a securely held land is the produce or
food it yields. ‘A land flowing with milk and honey’ is the epitome of this aspect of the
vision of the good life.81 In the face of the danger of famine regular harvests are a
blessing from God, and the Old Testament asserts that the rains necessary for the land’s
fecundity are under his control.82 A long life is a further characteristic of the blessed
good life. Whybray summarises
The precariousness of life with the possibility of serious illness or death
76 Whybray, Good Life, 4. He acknowledges that ‘the good life’ is not a biblical expression.
77 Excepting Obadiah, Nahum, Zephaniah and Habakkuk, which, Whybray maintains, do not contain
information about the good life, Good Life, xi. In the following discussion I will illustrate, where
necessary, by reference to the books of Samuel, since the moral conflict I examine later in the
dissertation is found in 1 Samuel.
78 On the land as good gift see Norbert Lohfink, “God the Creator and the Stability of Heaven and
Earth,” in Theology of the Pentateuch: Themes of the Priestly Narrative and Deuteronomy (trans. L.
M. Maloney; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994), 116–35, especially 126–27.
79 Whybray, Good Life, 4.
80 Cf. Whybray, Good Life, 72–77. On the religious justification for social stratification in the ANE see
Norman K. Gottwald, The Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated Israel 1250–
1050 B.C.E. (London: SCM, 1979), 498–554.
81 Cf. Ex 3.8, 17; 13.5; 33.3; Lev 20.24; Num 16.13; Deut 6.3; 11.9; 26.9, 15; 27.3; Jos 5.6; Jer 11.5;
32.22; Ezek 20.6, 15
82
טֹוב is sometimes a euphemism for ‘rain’, cf. Höver-Johag, “בֹוט tôb,” 305; but not, in my view, in Ps
85.12[13], pace Gordon, “בֹוט,” 356. On the theological importance of YHWH’s control of the
elements see Iain Provan, 1 and 2 Kings (NIBC 7; Peabody: Hendrickson, 1995), 132–34.
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by violence led the Israelites also to place great emphasis on long life,
and especially on the ideal of a ‘good old age’ – a long life lived to the
full in peace and prosperity.83
In the books of Samuel, for example, David and Barzillai are credited with advanced
years. Old age is not unambiguous, however, since Eli is old, but enfeebled.84
Nevertheless, a prophetic anticipation of premature death can signify divine judgment.85
Material prosperity is regarded as a natural consequence of these goods. Although
riches are associated with wickedness, especially in the latter prophets, wealth is not
intrinsically evil, but is more often associated with divine blessing.86 Indeed, poverty is
viewed negatively,87 and the misery caused by Philistine aggression is portrayed as a
negation of the good life.88 The family is the arena in which food and material goods are
enjoyed, and throughout the Old Testament the continuity of the kin group, conceived in
terms of male heirs to inherit patrimony and continue the ‘family line’, is a prominent
preoccupation. Harmonious family and communal living is summed up by Whybray
under the rubric of justice, for which end many of the Old Testament’s laws, are
formulated. Wisdom is another aspect of the good life he identifies, as is the good of
pleasure. Finally, Whybray finds that living with reference to God himself is a key
component of the Old Testament’s view of the good life. He contends that the “idea that
people could enjoy the good life without reference to the gods would have been
unthinkable in the ancient world”.89
Are the broad categories of goods that comprise the good life prioritised in the
text? A preliminary observation is that the answer to this question will depend upon the
passage being examined and, therefore, the context of the authors and their theological
concerns. Overall, Whybray plumps for security expressed as possession of the land as
the chief good.90 In the books of Samuel, however, he thinks the principle of family
continuity is especially prominent, echoing Smyth’s conclusion (under the sub-title of
83 Whybray, Good Life, 5. Emphasis original. E.g. 1 Kgs 3.11; 2 Chr 1.11; Ps 91.16; Prov. 3.16; 28.16.
84 1 Sam. 4.15; cf. David’s final state 1 Kgs 1.1–4.
85 2 Sam 12.13–19. Note the contrary activity of prophetic healing: 1 Kgs 17.17–24; 2 Kgs 4.18–37;
5.1–19; 20.1–7.
86 See Nabal in 1 Sam 25.
87 E.g. David’s description of himself as ‘poor and insignificant’ (1 Sam 18.23), the poor shepherd in
Nathan’s parable (2 Sam 12.1–6), cf. the risk of debt slavery for a poor woman’s child in 2 Kgs 4.1–7.
88 1 Sam 13.6, 19–22.
89 Whybray, Good Life, 6.
90 Cf. Whybray, Good Life, 288.
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‘The Old Testament conception of the supreme good’)91 that “family life and its
blessing came first in the divine order of blessing”.92 Perhaps the crux of the matter is
the definition of each good. Whybray defines ‘family life’ as “the sense of an intimate
community in which husband and wife, parents and children and brothers lived
together”, so it is unsurprising that he thinks it “is depicted only comparatively
rarely”.93 I propose that a different understanding of this good may lead interpreters to
perceive it as more widespread, and thus more influential in terms of the moral actions
portrayed in the text. Understanding Old Testament ethics, therefore, necessitates an
adequate comprehension of the nature of the moral goods presented in the text.
The benefit of seeking particular goods, or observing laws that are statements
about the limits to achieving goods, is sometimes advocated by reference to their
consequences. In the next section I examine the motives for moral behaviour found in
the Old Testament, and the extent to which they provide resources for the resolution of
value conflicts.
1.3 MORAL MOTIVES
Eichrodt considered ‘the fear of God’ the dominant motive for moral
comportment.94 Johannes Hempel concurred, suggesting that divine power was
moderated by love.
Behind all sayings of Yahweh there is the same authority of his
tremendous power, shown first of all in the liberation from Egypt, and of
his anger, shown in his punishing the people in the wilderness. From this
authority the two main motives of Israel’s ethics gained their historical
and not at all dogmatic reason: to fear and to love him.95
The emphasis upon YHWH as the sole source of motivation is followed by other
authors.96 Theodore Vriezen, while perceiving both a divine and cultural source, views
91 Here supreme is used as synonym for ‘highest’, as evidenced in the section title ‘The Biblical
Doctrine of the Highest Good’, Smyth, Christian Ethics, 88; Whybray, Good Life, 88.
92 Smyth, Christian Ethics, 89. Although Smyth contends that this later became a national good, and
then a vision of “social welfare to be realized in righteousness in the reign of the Holy One of Israel”,
Smyth, Christian Ethics, 92. It is not necessary, of course, to think that family and national concerns
are mutually exclusive.
93 Whybray, Good Life, 290.
94 Eichrodt, Theology 2.368.
95 Johannes Hempel, “Ethics in the Old Testament,” IDB 2.157.
96 E.g, Fletcher, who considers his four patterns (responding to divine deeds, reflecting the diving nature,
living as a people under a divine ruler and obeying the divine command) perspectives upon a single
phenomenon, “Shape,” 52; and Wright, who proposes Old Testament ethics are God centred in origin,
history, content and motive, Living, 21.
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the distinctive feature of Old Testament ethics as its origin in YHWH, who alone knows
what is good.97 Whilst one can concur that ethical motivation within the Old Testament
is often related to God, various other motives are also evident. Following Barton, they
can be conveniently presented as past, present and future motivations.98 Many scholars
note the importance of historical events, particularly the exodus, as a motivation for
moral living.99 In Deuteronomy 15.13–15, for example, Israel is instructed to treat
captives justly since having “experienced God’s justice and compassion themselves, the
Israelites could only properly express their gratitude by showing a similar concern for
the weak and underprivileged in their midst”.100 Covenant relationship as the motivation
for ethical behaviour is highlighted by James Muilenburg.
[The Israelite] knew perfectly well that he had not been confronted with
ethical abstractions, but rather had been addressed by One who had
spoken to him in the events of the great tradition of which he was a part,
to which he inwardly belonged, and which described him as a person.101
Ingratitude and indifference to the covenant are two reasons why the prophets railed
against Israel’s rebellion.102 Present motivation includes the reward for keeping the laws
intrinsic to the regulations themselves: keeping them should be a delight.103 Barton
notes that the law was conceived as revealing God, which “implies a very high
evaluation of the expressed will of God as the way by which people are meant to live,
and which will be their whole and only good, whatever consequences may or may not
follow”.104 Future motivations are the most frequent, comprising conditional promises
and threats against disobedience. The intertwining of act and consequence means that to
desire the one is to will the other. This perspective is so pervasive that Barton suggests
the Old Testament is not the paradigm case of deontological ethics is it usually
presumed to be.105
97 Theodore Vriezen, An Outline of Old Testament Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), 315–17. His
point is that neither reason nor conscience are the source of Old Testament morality.
98 Barton, Ethics, 82–95.
99 E.g, Barton, Ethics, 91; Wright, “Old Testament Ethics,” 54; Fletcher, “Shape,” 52–57.
100 Davies, “Walking,” 103; cf. Wright, Living, 40.
101 James Muilenburg, The Way of Israel: Biblical Faith and Ethics (New York: Harper & Row, 1961),
15.
102 Cf. Micah 6.3–4; Isa 63.7–64.12; the idea is not found in the wisdom literature.
103 Cf. Deut 4.5–8; Ps 19; 119.
104 Barton, Ethics, 96; cf. Rodd, Glimpses, 120.
105 Pace, e.g., Thomas Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell. 1984), 48:
“Consequentialist thought in the modern sense does not appear at all, that is, the weighing of possible
courses of action in terms of the impact of their probable consequences on critically assessed value
priorities”.
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A teleological element in ethics seemed simply common sense to ancient
Israelites, who acted so as to obey God, of course, but in the belief that he
had promised good things to those who did obey him and threatened with
misfortune those who left his ways. To say that we should be moral, but
not for the sake of gaining anything, would have struck them as an
unrealistic refinement of piety.106
1.3.1 Motive Clauses
Motivations for moral living are particularly visible in biblical motive clauses.107
Rifat Sonsino distinguishes between exhortations independent of the legal codes, and
motive clauses proper attached to individual commands, which he classifies.108 On the
basis of this classification, could one seek a hierarchy of motivations? Perhaps, for
example, motivations linked to God are more pressing than the promise of well-being?
Taking the goods of honour, truth and loyalty one observes that commands relating to
these values are variously motivated.109 ‘Honour’ features in Exodus 20.12: ‘Honour
your father and mother, so that your days may be long in the land that the LORD your
God is giving you’.110 Leaving to one side what ‘honour’ might mean, the injunction is
motivated by reference to YHWH’s acts and the eudaemonistic incentive of longevity.
This is conceivably a baser motive than that attached to Exodus 23.8: ‘You shall take no
bribe, for a bribe…subverts the cause of those who are in the right’. Should someone
need to decide between honouring parents and not taking a bribe, perhaps the latter duty
should trump the former? Matters are complicated by Leviticus 19.3. The command
‘You shall each revere your mother and father, and you shall keep my sabbaths’ is
immediately preceded by the phrase ‘You shall be holy, for I the LORD your God am
holy’, and succeeded by the refrain ‘I am the LORD your God’. Thus both of these
commands are unequivocally tied to the deity, which is more important? Furthermore,
106 Barton, Ethics, 90.
107 In an early, influential study Berend Gemser defined motive clauses as “grammatically subordinate
sentences in which the motivation for the commandment is given”, “The Importance of the Motive
Clause in Old Testament Law,” in Congress Volume: Copenhagen 1952 (VTSup 1; ed. G. W.
Anderson, et al; Leiden: Brill, 1953), 50–66, quote 50. Rifat Sonsino notes that motive clauses feature
in many literary genres, being especially numerous in law and wisdom, Motive Clauses in Hebrew
Law: Biblical Forms and Near Eastern Parallels (SBLDS 45; Chico: Scholars Press, 1980), 117–120.
108 Sonsino, Motive Clauses, 66–69. For the full list of texts see Sonsino, Motive Clauses, 106–17. He
observes that motive clauses are attached to 30% of laws in the main collections, the majority (268) to
the apodictic form. The collections with the highest percentage of laws are the Holiness Code (51% of
214 laws) and Deuteronomy (50% of 225 laws), Motive Clauses, 98–100. For five alternative
classificatory schemes and a comparative summary of motive clauses in other ANE texts see Rodd,
Glimpses, 110–13.
109 If they are motivated at all: compare Ex 20.12 with Lev 19.3; and Ex 20.16 with Lev 19.11.
110 Cf. Deut 5.16, where the motivation is similar.
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Deuteronomy 25.13–16 contains two motivations for transacting honest commerce: ‘so
that your days may be long in the land that the LORD your God is giving you’ and ‘all
who act dishonestly, are abhorrent to the LORD your God’. A further, prominent
example is the Sabbath command in Exodus and Deuteronomy, which are motivated by
creation and Egyptian slavery, respectively.111 One observes that different texts supply
disparate motives for very similar commands, and that the same law can be variously
motivated. Finally, Sonsino remarks that the motivations actually attached to individual
laws are not the only ones that could have been used.
The same law could very well have been motivated by another kind of
motive clause (e.g., Exod 20:9–11 and Deut 5:12–15) or, if it does not
already have it, by a multiple motive clause. Probably the intention was
not to provide a motivation that would justify the law from all
perspectives but to select from among all the possible rationales the one
that would denote best the law’s appropriateness in the eyes of the people
to whom it was addressed.112
It would seem that comparison of motivations as the basis for addressing value conflicts
is a stony and unfruitful path.
This approach, however, does not exhaust the usefulness of motive clauses.
Sonsino observes that the choice of motive clauses reveals a particular mode of
thinking.113 This may be clear from the clause, or it may be necessary to understand
some of the context to know why an action is considered wrong. For example, a series
of prohibitions of sexual relations simply state that the action is forbidden because it is
that relation. Leviticus 18.14 is illustrative: ‘You shall not uncover the nakedness of
your father’s brother, that is, you shall not approach his wife; she is your aunt’.114 To
discern the force of the motivation, it is necessary to understand relevant cultural
assumptions. Even in the case where the motive is ostensively transparent, knowing the
cultural outlook can add richness to one’s reading. For example, Deuteronomy 25.3
deals with flogging: ‘Forty lashes may be given but not more; if more lashes than these
are given, your neighbour will be degraded in your sight’. Most commentators talk of
‘protection of human dignity’ and the like,115 but comprehending the place of ‘shame’
111 Ex 20.8–11; Deut 5.12–15.
112 Sonsino, Motive Clauses, 116.
113 Sonsino, Motive Clauses, 116–17.
114 Cf. Lev 18.3, 8, 16.
115 E.g., Gerhard von Rad, Deuteronomy: A Commentary (OTL; trans. D. Barton; London: SCM, 1966),
154; Gary Millar, Now Choose Life: Theology and ethics in Deuteronomy (NSBT; Leicester: Apollos,
1998), 141; Gordon McConville, Deuteronomy (AOTC 5; Leicester: Apollos, 2002), 368.
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in ancient Near Eastern culture enables readers to perceive an added dimension to the
law’s concern.116 In fact, motive clauses can be important clues to key moral goods. In
Leviticus 18.14 knowing something of ancient Near Eastern family structure enables
readers to appreciate that the good of harmonious internal family relations is in view;
whilst Deuteronomy 25.3 attests to the goods of personal honour and appropriate
punishment for misdemeanour, conceiving of situations in which they might be in
conflict by setting a limit to the number of lashes that can be administered. Thus whilst
it is impossible to deduce a hierarchy of motives, and thus ethical obligations, from
biblical motive clauses, they may yet serve, in conjunction with other data, to address
our problem.
1.3.2 Sanctions
Having considered the carrot of positive motivation for ethical living, I turn to
the stick of sanction. Gordon Wenham discerns five principles of punishment within
Old Testament law: the offender must receive his legal desert, which is not equal to
revenge; to purge guilt from the land and its inhabitants; deterrence; atonement for the
offender, with no subsequent loss of civil rights; and recompense by the offender to the
injured party.117 There are three main types of penalty: capital punishment (as a
maximum penalty); ‘cutting off’;118 and restitution.
One approach to value conflicts might be to examine the punishments that
accrue to individual commands, and order ‘crimes’ accordingly. Appendix A contains a
table of ‘Crime and Punishment’ in the Book of the Covenant. Supposing that death is
the most severe penalty it is clear that murder, for example, is more serious than assault.
This level of detail, however, is not especially useful in most cases. Furthermore, given
116 Craigie speaks of the fellow Israelite not being “publicly humiliated” but does not mention ‘shame’ as
a cultural value, Peter Craigie, Deuteronomy (NICOT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), 312. Wright
notes both the covenant and human dignity as reasons for the limit of 40 strokes, observing that qll is
the verb used for dishonouring parents in Deut 27.16, cf. Wright, Deuteronomy, 264–65. Only Lyn
Betchel points to the importance of ‘honour and shame’ for understanding the text, cf. “Shame as a
Sanction of Social Control in Biblical Israel: Judicial, Political, and Social Shaming,” in Social-
Scientific Old Testament Criticism: A Sheffield Reader (BS 47; ed. D. J. Chalcraft; Sheffield:
Sheffield University Press, 1997), 232–58; repr. from JSOT 49 (1991): 47–76; for a summary see
Rodd, Glimpses, 19–27.
117 Wenham, Leviticus, 282–84.
118 Although sometimes synonymous with the death penalty (cf., e.g., Ex 12.15, 19; Lev 7.20–27; 17.4;
18.29; 19.8; Num 15.30–31) in Lev 20.2–5 ‘cutting off’ is contrasted with execution. However, since
both Lev 13.45–46 and Num 5.1–4 refer to animals it probably does not mean ‘excommunication’.
Wenham concludes it speaks of premature death by divine intervention, cf. Leviticus, 285; Rodd
agrees, listing proponents of alternative views, Glimpses, 127.
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that capital punishment is stipulated for murder, kidnap, bestiality, sorcery, and striking
or cursing parents, the method does not even prioritise these crimes (even though it is
difficult to imagine situations in which this might be problematic). Appendices B and C
contain similar tables for the Holiness and Deuteronomic Codes, respectively. Two
issues are worthy of mention. First, the slight differences between the codes, for
example, Exodus 22.18 prescribes death for the female sorcerer whilst the sanction in
Lev 20.27 applies to mediums of both sexes, point to the need for interpretation of the
laws, they cannot be applied automatically. The need for interpretation is evident also
from a comparison of Leviticus 18.16 and Deuteronomy 25.5.119 In the Holiness Code
sexual relations between a man and his brother’s wife are prohibited on pain of being
‘cut off’ from the people, whilst in Deuteronomy not having sexual relations with the
same woman is sanctioned by ‘shaming’.120 The juxtaposition of these laws within the
canon raises issues of possible contradiction. S. R. Driver thought that the Leviticus text
was the general rule and the Deuteronomic an exception.121 It is better, however, to
interpret them both with respect to the moral goods they have in view rather than as a
qualification of the other. This reveals that both laws, although differently motivated,
strive to protect the same thing. The Leviticus text seeks intrafamilial harmony,
expressed in terms of taboo, whilst the Deuteronomic teaching aims to protect the
patrimony of the ‘father’s house’. Both have in mind the good of family continuity
(conceived as male heirs farming their own land), but this is expressed and motivated
differently according to the specific context in mind.
The second issue is which punishments were considered more severe. Whilst
modern people might not think that ‘shaming’ is especially severe, Lyn Betchel’s
analysis of the function of ‘shame’ reaches the opposite conclusion, arguing that this
lies behind the seriousness of the offence in Deuteronomy 25.5–10.122 Thus, regardless
of whether this punishment was ever applied, the threat of shame will have added to the
persuasive power of the sanction.123 Similarly, Henry McKeating argues that law can
still affect behaviour even though transgressed: a 30mph sign (and related sanction) will
119 Cf. Lev 20.21.
120 Cf. McConville, Deuteronomy, 369–70.
121 S. R. Driver, Deuteronomy (ICC; 3rd ed.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1901), 285.
122 Betchel, “Shame as Sanction,” 47–76; cf. Rodd, Glimpses, 29, 130.
123 If punishments could be transmuted into cash payments then the threat may have been diminished for
the rich.
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induce few to drive at that speed, but will prevent many from accelerating to 50mph.124
In this way Old Testament sanctions can illuminate ethical dilemmas, even though they
do not provide sufficient evidence on their own to enable prioritisation of moral values.
Apart from the legal sanctions the wisdom literature points to a natural order of
penalties. For example, regarding adultery, Proverbs 6.27–35, “has a whole battery of
discouragements to offer”,125 from general hints of consequences, ‘Can one walk on hot
coals without scorching one’s feet?’ to intimations of more specific ramifications, ‘For
jealousy arouses a husband’s fury, and he shows no restraint when he takes revenge’.126
Although by examining the cultural background one could conceivably present these
‘natural sanctions’ in rough order of perceived severity the same problems are faced as
with legal sanctions. In short, it would appear that sanctions offer a similar assistance to
the resolution of value conflicts as motivations.
To conclude, whilst prioritising ethical obligations on the basis of sanctions’
severity alone is insufficient to resolve values conflicts in most cases, sanctions are an
important element of the overall picture of Old Testament ethics because they provide
information about moral goods.
1.4 CONCLUSION: CONFLICTING MORAL GOODS
In this chapter I have examined what Old Testament moral norms, goods and
motives might contribute to the resolution of value conflicts. Several conclusions are
possible. First, it is important to recognise the great variety of resources for moral
reflection in the Old Testament. At times this may result in prima facie contradictions,
but in place of over-precipitous attempts at harmonisation it is necessary to understand
moral injunctions, et cetera on their own terms in the first instance.
A second conclusion is that whilst moral norms and motivations can provide
useful information about Old Testament morality they are not themselves foundational.
Rather, moral goods are basic. On this view legal stipulations or sapiential aphorisms,
for example, are statements about configurations of particular goods. Approaching Old
124 McKeating’s example, “Sanctions,” 70.
125 McKeating, “Sanctions,” 59.
126 McKeating opines that the text means the offended spouse may press for the most severe legal
punishment, even if it did not happen frequently, “Sanctions,” 59; I think it is more likely the text
speaks of the risk of being murdered as vengeance for dishonouring the husband.
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Testament morality in this way provides new possibilities for understanding its view of
value conflicts, for rather than centring upon ostensibly incompatible laws, the task
becomes one of understanding the moral goods that they seek to protect.
Third, there are indications that moral goods are prioritised within the Old
Testament. Slightly different orderings are discernable depending upon whether one
examines moral norms, goods, or motivations, and, indeed, within these categories.
These scales of values, however, are rather general and do not work at the level of detail
necessary to inform value conflicts that people might ordinarily face. This is not to say
that the biblical text could not provide this guidance, but that looking at resources other
than those surveyed will be necessary. A lacuna in the field of Old Testament ethics is
evidenced by the paucity of extant studies attending to narrative. Recently, some
scholars have suggested biblical story be mined for its ethical import;127 I propose that
researching clashes of moral goods in narrative could be especially fruitful, and shall
take up the challenge by focussing upon one particular value conflict in 1 Samuel.
Finally, when considering moral goods a proper understanding of their nature is
required. Thus, for example, whilst there is some evidence that the family is near the top
of the Old Testament’s scale of values further work is necessary to define this
institution before any definitive evaluation of its importance is possible.
I have proposed that the problem of value conflict in the Old Testament is one of
conflicting moral goods. The task of the next chapter is to explain what this innovative
approach means for Old Testament ethics.
127 Cf. Barton, “Reading,” 55–64; idem, “Disclosing Human Possibilities: Revelation and Biblical
Stories,” in Revelation and Story: Narrative Theology and the Centrality of Story (ed. J. Barton and G.
Saute; Burlington: Ashgate, 2000), 53–60; Wenham, Story; Bruce Birch, “Old Testament Narrative
and Moral Address,” in Canon, Theology and Old Testament Interpretation (ed. G. M. Tucker, D. L.
Petersen and R. R. Wilson; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), 75–95; Robin Parry, Old Testament Story
and Christian Ethics: The Rape of Dinah as a Case Study (PBM; Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2004).
On the relationship between law and narrative see the typology in Pamela Barmash, “The Narrative
Quandary Cases of Law in Literature,” VT 54 (2004): 1–16.
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CHAPTER 2
The Priority of the Good
[The] question, how ‘good’ is to be defined,
is the most fundamental question in all Ethics…
a mistake with regard to it entails a far larger number of
erroneous ethical judgements than any other.
– George Moore, Principia Ethica
A danger of investigating biblical texts for their ‘ethics’ is that one may force a
modern concept upon documents to which systems of rules or right action are foreign,
and potentially in opposition.1 The previous chapter concluded that a focus upon moral
goods as they are presented in narrative may be a fruitful approach to investigating
value conflicts within the Old Testament. This chapter’s epigraph suggests a particular
conception of ‘good’ has far reaching consequences; it is the task of the following pages
to delineate a view in harmony with the Old Testament’s own.
2.1 MORAL GOODS
This section commences with a brief discussion of the nature of moral good and
the relationship between good and right. It then examines how moral goods could relate
to moral rules and the moral order, before refuting the contention that attempting to
resolve ‘moral dilemmas’ is futile.
2.1.1 The Nature of Moral Goods
The study of ‘the good’ has a long history, although perhaps the most influential
analysis remains Aristotle’s.2 He uses ἀγαθός in three ways.3 First, ‘the good rationally
The epigraph is from George Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: CUP, 1959 [1907]), 5.
1 Paraphrase of Philip Esler, “Social Identity, the Virtues, and the Good Life: A New Approach to
Romans 12:1–15:13,” BTB 33 (2003): 51–63, especially 52. See also Peter Paris, “An Ethicist’s
Concerns about Biblical Ethics,” Semeia 66 (1995): 173–79.
2 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (2nd ed.; trans. T. Irwin; Indianapolis / Cambridge: Hackett, 1999),
1094a17–24, 1097a24–37. For surveys of philosophical thought concerning ‘the good’ see Robert
Olson, “Good, The,” EP 3.367–70; Christine Korsgaard, “Good, theories of the,” REP; Alasdair
MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the
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aimed at’. Since there are many rational aims there are many goods, although there can
also be a rational balance of multiple goods.4 Second, goods that are ‘good for’
something else, for example, exercise as good for health.5 Third, ‘a good something’,
for example, ‘a good horse’ as a good specimen of horses, where goodness is
determined by the function of horses. These uses are related:
What makes a knife a good knife (3), depends on what good (1) we want
the knife to achieve, and that will depend on what the knife is good (2)
for. Similarly a good (3) person will be able to achieve goods (1) that
depend on what is good (2) for a person—his final good or happiness.6
Goods have been classified either as being means or ends, or as having intrinsic or
extrinsic value. Aristotle thought that the attributes of intrinsic goodness were
completeness and self-sufficiency, proposing that εὐδαιμονία was the highest good,
since it is chosen only for itself.7 The centrality of intrinsic good was maintained by
Aquinas, who argued that the “very nature of good is that something flows from it, but
not that it flows from something else”.8 Thus the good for a thing depends upon the
nature of that thing: the human moral good is behaviour in accordance with human
nature.9
The modern era saw a break with claims for the natural basis of goodness.
George Moore, for example, argued that ‘good’ is simply an evaluative expression that
cannot be defined with descriptors; it “is incapable of any definition”, but is known
intuitively.10 R. M. Hare, on the other hand, considered that the problem is not that the
good cannot be defined but that in different contexts it is used in different ways.11 So
Twentieth Century (2nd ed; London: Routledge, 1998), especially 5–13, 42–44, 57–63, 249–66.
3 Cf. Terence Irwin, Introduction, Notes and Glossary to Nicomahcean Ethics by Aristotle (2nd ed.;
trans. T. Irwin; Indianapolis / Cambridge: Hackett, 1999), 332.
4 EN 1097a15–22.
5 There is also a contrast between unqualified goods that are good for everyone and those goods ‘for
someone’ in a specific situation, cf. EN 1113a22, 1129b2, 1152b26, 1155b24, 1157b26.
6 Irwin, “Introduction,” 332. Without original emphasis. Cf. EN 1098a8–12, 1106a15.
7 EN 1097a15–b21. εὐδαιμονία is often rendered ‘happiness’, but MacIntyre cautions that to change
the language is to alter the concept, cf. Short History, 59; I leave it untranslated.
8 Summa I-II q.1 a.4 r.1. On Aquinas’ general theory of good see Summa Theologica (2nd ed.; trans.
Fathers of the English Dominican Province; London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1920), I q.5 a.1–
6; Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics (Louisville:
Westminster / John Knox Press, 1990), 34–68.
9 On Aquinas’ theory of the human good see Summa I-II q.1; Porter, Recovery, 69–99. Perfect
happiness, according to Aquinas, is contemplation of God, Summa I-II q.1 a.8.
10 Moore, Principia Ethica, 9. Note that Moore did not say that the good was unknowable or obscure,
only indefinable: it is itself the ultimate term of reference by which other things must be defined,
Principia Ethica, 10–12, 35.
11 R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: OUP, 1964), 137–50.
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although ‘good’ means ‘better’ than others in a class of things this set is not fixed but
dependent upon context, and statements about the good are simply commendations
according to a person’s chosen criteria.12 Alasdair MacIntyre criticises both Moore’s
intuitionism and Hare’s prescriptivism, arguing it is insufficient to think of ‘good’ as
merely evaluative, “a status symbol for expression of choice”.13 MacIntyre asks,
why should it carry this type of prestige? The answer can only be that it
carries with it a distinction derived from its past, that it carries a
connection between the speaker’s individual choices and preference and
what anyone would choose, between my choice and the choice which the
relevant criteria dictate.14
These ‘relevant criteria’ are learnt and, therefore, conceptions of ‘the good’ change
through time.15 Traditional aristocratic values, for example, considered thrift a vice and
conspicuous consumption a virtue, whilst Puritanism thought the opposite was true.
MacIntyre uses the example of Homeric ἀγαθός, with its ideal of warrior bravery, to
question whether it is necessary or possible to distinguish between evaluative and
descriptive uses of ‘good’.
[T]hat a man has behaved in certain ways is sufficient to entitle him to be
called ἀγαθός. Now, assertions as to how a man has behaved are
certainly in the ordinary sense factual; and the Homeric use of ἀγαθός is
certainly in the ordinary sense evaluative. The alleged gulf between fact
and appraisal is not so much one that has been bridged in Homer. It has
never been dug. Nor is it clear that there is any ground in which to dig.16
The descriptive basis of evaluation is taken further by Philippa Foot. She argues that
calling someone ‘daughter’ or ‘father’ indicates what ‘goodness’ in each case means,
and that the variety of cultural practice must occur within certain limits for it to be
described as ‘good’.
If it were expected, as in Nazi Germany, that a daughter (like a son)
should denounce disloyal parents to the police, this still could not be part
of being a good daughter; a word which combined with ‘good’ to give
this result would be closer to our word ‘citizen’ or ‘patriot’.17
12 Cf. Hare, Language, 183.
13 MacIntyre, Short History, 254–62, quote 92.
14 MacIntyre, Short History, 92.
15 Cf. MacIntyre, Short History, 266.
16 MacIntyre, Short History, 7. See Philippa Foot’s discussion of rudeness: if ‘rude’ is a lack of respect,
this can be conventional (e.g., a man keeping his hat on indoors) or naturally disrespectful (e.g.,
pushing someone out of the way); the point is that it is possible for a descriptive term to be evaluative,
Virtues and Vices - And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 133–35.
17 Foot, Virtues and Vices, 137. Emphasis original.
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According to Foot, the ‘nature of things’ determines the range of permissible meanings
of ‘good’, however, as the Puritan and aristocratic attitudes to money demonstrate, such
appeals to nature do not mean people from different historical or cultural contexts agree
about goods; indeed, they may be incompatible.18 Although this is conceivably an
epistemological problem, the difficulty of determining a cross-culturally valid content to
the category ‘good’ remains one of the greatest challenges facing those who would
employ nature in ethics.
For those who do accept natural foundations there arises the question of how the
multiplicity of goods may be prioritised. John Finnis wrestles with this question,
identifying seven basic human goods, but arguing that they are equally fundamental and
cannot be ordered.19 This contrasts with Aquinas’ contention that goods do possess a
hierarchical ordering, viz. self preservation, procreation, life in society, and knowledge
of the truth about God.20 He states that living things incline to goods desired by lower
creatures as well as to goods appropriate to their own nature. This raises the question of
why some people do not seek the highest goods. Porter, in conversation with Aquinas,
makes two observations. First, a person’s prioritisation of lower goods may exclude the
possibility of achieving higher ones because human life is limited by time and place.21
Second, that something is a higher good may not be obvious. Indeed, the contested
nature of goods—occasionally people need to be convinced that some things are
good—demonstrates that their relative desirability is not always self-evident.22
In the light of these observations and the discussion in Chapter 1 it is possible to
make four points about the Old Testament’s view of the nature of the good. First,
although the functional usage is prominent, all three of Aristotle’s uses of good can be
identified in the biblical text: one must not opt exclusively for any single one.23 Second,
18 In fact, Foot rather vitiates her argument when she continues the quote above with: “Only in the
context of a belief that denunciation would lead to regeneration could this be seen as one of the things
by which the goodness of a daughter could be judged”.
19 John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 1983), 51.
Finnis’ basic goods are: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical
reasonableness and religion. For other lists of basic goods and discussion see Sabina Alkire, “The
Basic Dimensions of Human Flourishing: A Comparison of Accounts,” in The Revival of Natural
Law: Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses to the Finnis-Grisez School (ed. N. Biggar
and R. Black; Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 73–110.
20 Summa I-II q.94 a.2.
21 Porter, Recovery, 90; cf. Summa I-II q.10 a.1, 3; q.94 a.2.
22 Porter, Recovery, 88.
23 In addition to the discussion above the following examples might be provided from 1 Samuel: Good
aim 1 Sam 15.22; 20.12; 25.15, 30, 36; Functional good 1 Sam 1.8; 16.16, 23; 19.4; 27.1; Good
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whilst it is clear that the ethical concerns of Old Testament writers changed over the
centuries, several texts appeal to the ‘nature of things’ as the basis for right behaviour.
In other words, they do not seem to have conceived a breach between descriptive and
evaluative uses of good. Third, contrary to a simple view that would categorise each
good as a member of a species and then sub-species, Old Testament goods can pertain
to more than one category.24 Finally, it is very obvious, especially in the prophets, that
some configurations of goods are considered better than others; indeed, some are
condemned as sinful.
Though our analysis of the Old Testament’s resources for resolving value
conflicts revealed that there were few detailed ‘scales of values’ there was an
assumption that one ought to seek higher goods. It is usually thought that there is
difference between a theory of obligation, concerning right and wrong, and a theory of
value, of good and evil. Charles Larmore affirms that the “idea of right refers to what is
obligatory, to a prescription to which we ought to conform…The idea of good, by
contrast, refers to what is desirable; it applies to whatever is worth having or doing and
enhances the life of which it is a part”.25 This is a very neat division. The relationship
between the good and the right, however, is normally considered to be rather more
complicated, even “obscure”.26
2.1.2 Good and Right
Any attempt to illuminate good and right must account for the radical change in
the way their relationship has been perceived over the centuries. Henry Sidgwick warns
that ancient ethical controversy employed a generic notion of the good, in
contradistinction to the more specific judgements of action found in modern ethics.27
Sidgwick contends that it is not simply that what is thought of as good has altered, but
that there has been a transformation from an attractive view of the good to an imperative
one. Ancient ethics, therefore,
specimen 1 Sam 8.14, 16; 15.28; 16.12; 25.8. Note also the constrasting pairs 1 Sam 24.18; 25.21 and
the comparative forms 1 Sam 15.22, 28.
24 Cf. O’Donovan, Resurrection, 34.
25 Larmore, “Right and good,” REP.
26 Nicholas J. H. Dent, “Good,” in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (ed. T. Honderich; Oxford:
OUP, 1995), 322. For a summary of views of the right in general see Michael Slote, “Right Action,”
in Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: OUP, 1995), 744–46.
27 Paraphrase of Henry Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics (7th ed.; London: MacMillan, 1907), 105. On the
relationship of the right and good see also Richard Kraut, What is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-
Being (Cambridge / London: Harvard University Press, 2007), 21–28.
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can scarcely be understood by us unless with a certain effort we throw the
quasi-jural notions of modern ethics aside, and ask (as they did) not
‘What is Duty and what is its ground?’ but ‘Which of the objects that men
think good is truly Good or the Highest Good?’28
Although ‘ancient’ in this context is normally understood to mean Greek and Roman, it
is suggestive to consider whether it could also include the Old Testament. If so, modern
(Western) readings that take its numerous rules as evidence for the primacy of the right
over good misrepresent the order assumed by original authors and readers.
The issues can be broached with a very brief statement of three common views
of the relationship between good and right. I start with the position expounded by
deontological theories, viz. “there are some basic moral principles and rules in terms of
which acts can be judged right and wrong and which can be justified independently of
any developed idea of the good”.29 To give an example of such reasoning: I should keep
my promises because it is an act of fidelity, even if fidelity is not efficiently produced,
that is, my keeping a promise causes others to break theirs.30 The deontological
approach is typically exemplified by Immanuel Kant, who argues that the right can be
deduced from a formal primordial ‘ought’, the categorical imperative, and that the only
unqualified good is a ‘good will’ that chooses the right. “A good will is not good
because of what it effects or accomplishes—because of its fitness for attaining some
proposed end: it is good through its willing alone—that is, good in itself”.31 MacIntyre
observes that Kant’s imperative, being solely formal, can be given content by any moral
tradition. Problematically, however, because
it detaches the notion of duty from the notions of ends, purposes, wants,
and needs it suggests that, given a proposed course of action, I may only
ask whether, in doing it, I can consistently will that it shall be universally
28 Sidgwick, Methods, 106. Cf. the thesis of MacIntyre, Short History. With respect to the good and the
right Plato is not a precursor to Kant. Plato thought that the basis of obligation was conformity to an
ideal Form, which is the criteria for right action. Thus the ideal governor is “occupied with the sight of
things which are organized, permanent, and unchanging, where wronging and being wronged don’t
exist, where all is orderly and rational; and he makes this realm the model for his behaviour, and
assimilates himself to it as much as is feasible.” Plato, Republic (trans. R. Waterfield; Oxford: OUP,
1993), 500c.
29 Peter Byrne, The Philosophical and Theological Foundations of Ethics: An Introduction to Moral
Theory and its Relation to Religious Beliefs (2nd ed.; Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1999), 86. Rosalind
Hursthouse, in a nuanced discussion of the issues, argues against the bold proposition that
deontological theories presume the priority of the right whilst utilitarian and aretaic theories the
priority of the good, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 1999), especially 25–31. For our purposes,
however, the contrast is clear.
30 Cf. Korsgaard, REP.
31 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Harper & Row, 1948 [1785]),
61–62. He compares this to talents or gifts of fortune, which may be directed to bad ends.
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done, and not ask what ends or purposes it serves.32
In contrast to the construction of good and right in deontological ethics, consequentialist
moral theories make the ends of action the criteria of the right. For classic utilitarianism,
right actions are those that maximise social wellbeing, and other goods are good to the
extent that they promote such happiness. Although the simplicity of consequentialism is
attractive, it has been criticised on three main fronts. First, it fails to allow questions of
justice or, indeed, of any other consideration apart from outcomes of action. Second, it
is impossible to know in advance all the consequences of an action.33 Third, the
incommensurability of goods precludes execution of the required calculations.34 A final
approach, aretaic moral theory, is not consequentialist in the traditional sense because
right action does not merely lead to the good, it manifests it; acts are ‘constitutive
means’ to good.35 However, the right is predicated on the good, and in this respect it
differs from deontology. The essential insight is that right acts are those that are good
for something: aretaic moral theories allow for actions that are wrong ‘by reason of their
object’.36 A prominent representative of the approach asserts that “the basic goodness of
a moral act is provided by the befitting objective in which it is set: hence some moralists
refer to an act as being ‘good of its kind’i”.37 In this scheme the object of an act leads to
classification of species of acts, for example, charity, lying, or killing. Peter Byrne
summarises that
Aquinas’ general teaching is that such classification begins the work of
deciding whether individual acts are choiceworthy. If an act falls into a
good species by virtue of its objective, consideration of its end and
32 Short History, 198. MacIntyre highlights the ease with which people can be educated into conforming
to malevolent authority.
33 Philippa Foot raises another epistemological problem, viz. whether it is possible to evaluate the final
‘states of affairs’ produced by consequences apart from some other measure of good, cf.
“Utilitarianism and the Virtues,” Mind NS 94 (1985): 196–209, especially 199.
34 Thus, even if J. S. Mill’s principle of justice is used to soften Bentham’s original proposal,
utilitarianism in particular, and consequentialism in general, cannot provide an adequate view of the
right. For a helpful, if trenchant, critique of consequentialism that also highlights the dangers of
exegetes unwittingly assuming its precepts see Michael Banner, Christian Ethics and Contemporary
Moral Problems (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 272–78.
35 Byrne, Foundations, 108.
36 Virtue ethics has usually considered moral motivation decisive, but recent approaches have attempted
to avoid positing right as solely determined by “inner properties of a virtuous agent”, Christine
Swanton, “A Virtue Ethical Account of Right Action,” Ethics 112 (2001): 32–52, quote 32. On virtue
ethics in general see Stephen Darwall (ed.), Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); Christine
Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: OUP, 2003); Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics.
37 Aquinas I-II q.18 a.2 as translated by Byrne, Foundations, 44. He follows Aristotle, who maintained
that the criteria of right is the good of human εὐδαιμονία, EN 1122b29.
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circumstance will establish whether it is finally good.38
Objects are also the basis of moral rules that sum up the rationale for the classification
of acts into good and bad, for example, ‘do not kill’.39 Moral rules, therefore, are
adduced to protect moral goods, thus saving agents the effort of reinventing morality in
every situation they face, since it is necessary only to identify the object of action.40
How might the Old Testament’s view of the relationship between right and good
be informed by these schemes? Three aspects of the discussion in Chapter 1 may be
highlighted. First, it was clear that the basis of many affirmations of what is good or
right is God. So, for example, because he is good both the things he has created and
those that he commands share this characteristic.41 Second, although divine commands
are prominent I have argued that they should be considered statements of how to
configure particular goods, that is, commands themselves do not make something good,
but arise from the need to prescribe or proscribe the seeking of specific goods or evils,
often in particular situations. Furthermore, appeals to ‘natural morality’ reveal that the
Old Testament indicates certain things are wrong because they are ‘not good’. Third,
discussion of the goodness of the created order highlighted not only its functional
goodness but also that the structure of creation invites a morally good response from its
inhabitants. In short, although opting for any one deontologic, teleologic or aretaic
theory would be reductionist, when considering Old Testament ethics it does appear
wise to heed Sidgwick’s advice and, contrary to much modern ethical thinking, posit
‘the priority of the good’.
Accepting this stance, however, does not exhaust the discussion. Even if one
acknowledges the existence of a moral order of goods this is distinct to knowledge of
that order.42 It is obvious people can configure goods differently, in some cases to such
an extent that one person can consider another’s arrangement not good, but evil. In any
38 Byrne, Foundations, 45.
39 The difference between moral rules and principles in Aquinas is that moral rules relate to species of
act.
40 So also Kraut, What is Good, 29–34. Note that rules can favour particular groups and are thus not
ideologically neutral, see Friedrich Nietzsche’s first thesis in On the Genealogy of Morality: A
Polemic (trans. M. Clark and A. J. Swensen; Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998 [1887]), 9–33.
41 Some modern divine command theorists also attempt to push the start point back beyond the
command itself to the nature of God, see, e.g., Philip L. Quinn, “Divine Command Theory,” in The
Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory (ed. H. LaFollette; Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 53–73.
42 That is, questions of ontology are different to those of epistemology, cf. O’Donovan, Resurrection,
76–97.
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case, the complexity of circumstances means that conflicts between goods, or the rules
that describe them, are ubiquitous. Sidgwick is correct, therefore, to observe that simply
identifying goods is insufficient, for even “when we have judged conduct to be good, it
is not yet clear that we ought to prefer this kind of good to all other good things: some
standard for estimating the relative values of different ‘good’ has still to be sought”.43
Martha Nussbaum, a philosopher in the Aristotelian tradition, has suggested that the
grounds for deciding between goods can be found in the particular situations in which
they are in view, and maintains that it is necessary to attend to the particularity of each
case. Since John Barton has invited biblical scholars to consider Nussbaum’s studies of
Greek tragedy as suggestive for Old Testament ethics it is important to examine her
proposal in more detail.44
2.1.3 Moral Goods, Moral Rules and Moral Order
Nussbaum’s thesis is that the form of Greek tragedy is intrinsic to its message.
“Conception and form are bound together…Certain truths about human life can only be
fittingly and accurately stated in the language and forms characteristic of the narrative
artist.”45 Nussbaum contrasts the ethics of narrative and that of moral rules. In The
Fragility of Goodness she frames this distinction in terms of Platonic deductive
philosophy, which operates from first principles, and Aristotelian inductive
empiricism.46 Nussbaum observes that at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle asserts that “the educated person seeks exactness in each area to the extent that
the nature of the subject allows”.47 Nussbaum takes this proposition and argues that
moral principles “fail to capture the fine detail of the concrete particular, which is the
subject matter of ethical choice”.48 Narrative, in contrast, can explore moral problems in
more depth than aphorism or legal stipulation. It is “unlikely to conceal from view the
vulnerability of human lives to fortune, the mutability of our circumstances and our
43 Sidgwick, Methods, 106.
44 Barton, “Reading,” 55–64. Barton refers to two of Nussbaum’s books: The Fragility of Goodness:
Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (2nd ed. Cambridge: CUP, 2001) and Love’s
Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford / New York: OUP, 1990). See also her
“Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,” in The Quality of Life (ed. M. Nussbaum and A.
Sen; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 242–269.
45 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 4–5.
46 In Love’s Knowledge Nussbaum extends her insights to modern literature.
47 EN 1094b24.
48 Nussbaum, Fragility, 301.
39
passions, [and] the existence of conflicts among our commitments”.49 For Nussbaum it
is the idiosyncrasy of every moment that renders prefabricated rules inadequate. Instead,
she contends, moral reasoning must attend first to the particular situation, and then see
what rules might contribute, not vice versa.
Nussbaum argues that it is always impossible to give a general account of moral
action that can be encapsulated in a set of laws, since rules can never become
sufficiently detailed to accommodate all situations. This, she claims, is due to three
features of practical situations: mutability, indeterminacy and particularity.50 The
mutability of the practical derives from its historical rooted-ness. Even justice is
mutable, thus, she claims, “a kind of improvisatory conjectural use of reason” is
required rather than a thoughtless application of rules.51 Indeterminacy derives from the
fact that different people find different things attractive or repellent. The example she
gives is of humour, concluding that “excellent choice cannot be captured in universal
rules, because it is a matter of fitting one’s choice to the complex requirements of a
concrete situation”.52 Finally, particularity or non-repeatability is an inherent feature of
many situations, above all personal relationships.
Despite her view of the limitations of general rules Nussbaum does allow them a
role in moral deliberation as part of the perception of a situation: “Perception, we might
say, is a process of loving conversation between rules and concrete responses, general
conceptions and unique cases, in which the general articulates the particular and is in
turn further articulated by it”.53 It is important to realise what Nussbaum means by
‘rule’. She rejects the idea of rules as ultimate authorities against which to judge the
particular. Instead, she views principles as summaries or rules of thumb derived from
previous ‘good’ decisions. “Principles are perspicuous descriptive summaries of good
judgments, valid only to the extent to which they correctly describe such judgments”.54
Even so, their strength, their simplicity, is also their weakness, they cannot adapt to
complex cases. Rules, therefore, may be guidelines for growth in moral perception for
those not yet fully equipped with practical wisdom, but they are not the culmination of
49 Nussbaum, Fragility, 13.
50 Nussbaum, Fragility, 302–4.
51 Nussbaum, Fragility, 303. Cf. EN 1109a23, 30; 1106b15, 28; 1134b18–33.
52 Nussbaum, Fragility, 303. Cf. EN 1128a27.
53 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 95.
54 Nussbaum, Fragility, 299; cf. Love’s Knowledge, 69.
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moral understanding: the rule is a falling away from fully fledged practical reason, not
its fulfilment. Regarding the authority of rules Nussbaum states:
Rules are authoritative only insofar as they are correct; but they are
correct only insofar as they do not err with regard to the particulars. And
it is not possible for a simple universal formulation intended to cover
many different particulars to achieve a high degree of correctness.55
In other words, rules are not prior to practical perception but subject to it. In this way
she aims to avoid the “ethical crudeness” of morality based exclusively upon general
rules.56 Rules, in summary, are only prima facie obligations.57
Hilary Putnam has chided Nussbaum for her “derogatory attitude towards rules”
and suggested that her ethics veers towards “an absolutely empty ‘situation ethics’ ”, in
which everything is a “matter of trade-offs”.58 Although she protests that she allows
rules an important place in her ethics, Nussbaum has attempted to assuage some of this
criticism by appealing to Aristotle’s idea of ‘spheres of experience’, each of which
possesses a corresponding virtue.59 This, she avers, means one can speak of non-relative
virtues. She is careful to distinguish between the formal definitions of each virtue and a
more complete ‘thick’ description, asserting that “we can understand progress in ethics,
like progress in scientific understanding, to be progress in finding the correct fuller
specification of a virtue, isolated by its thin or nominal definition”.60 Nussbaum adopts
this approach because she, like Aristotle, wishes to ground her ethics in experience
rather than deducing it from first principles. Nevertheless, by appealing to “grounding
experiences”61 as the basis for fixed spheres of experience she appears to be implying
some sort of foundational order. Is this the case?
Despite Nussbaum’s explicit rejection of a teleological moral order,62 she seems
to depend upon it in other places. At one point, discussing relations between the
55 Nussbaum, Fragility, 301; cf. Love’s Knowledge, 69, where ‘principles’ replace ‘rules’ in the same
quotation.
56 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 37.
57 Nussbuam, Love’s Knowledge, 156. Although Nussbaum is no intuitionist see Ross’ claim that his
prima facie duties rest on definite circumstances, The Right and the Good (ed. P. Stratton-Lake;
Oxford: OUP, 2002), 21.
58 Hilary Putnam, “Taking Rules Seriously: A Response to Martha Nussbaum,” NLH 15 (1983): 193–
200, quote 193.
59 Cf. EN Book VI; Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues,” 263–64. She suggests the following features of
common humanity as spheres: morality, body, pleasure and pain, cognitive capability, practical
reason, early infant development, affiliation, and humour.
60 Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues,” 248, cf. 249–50.
61 Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues,” 262.
62 Cf. Fragility, xv.
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particular and general, she asserts that the general should be governed by the particular.
However, “particular human contexts are never, if seen well, sui generis in all of their
elements, nor divorced from a past full of obligations. And fidelity to those, as a mark of
humanity, is one of the most essential values of perception.”63 But what is a ‘mark of
humanity’ except a description of a generic order?64 And one which would seem to have
some authority over the particular. In fact, she makes this very point, but does not
reconcile her different statements:
Aristotelian particularism is fully compatible with the view that what
perception aims to see is (in some sense) the way things are…surely the
use of the concept ‘human being’ will play an important role in suiting
the conception to make cross-cultural judgments.65
Nussbaum also argues that moral agents come to situations with a history of ethical
predispositions and obligations, perhaps expressed in rules of thumb, and that they have
to be faithful to both these and the particulars of the situation. This does not mean that
agents can do anything as long as they wrestle sufficiently with the situation. Instead,
they must improvise, which may be difficult.66 “An improvising actress, if she is
improvising well, does not feel that she can say just anything at all. She must suit her
choice to the evolving story, which has its own form and continuity”.67 But what is the
‘evolving story’ if everything is particular? It is necessary to have a stage as well as the
63 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 95. My emphasis. Barton makes a similar move, promoting
particularity but also appealing to ‘human affinities’, “Reading,” 59.
64 Note that Nussbaum rejects a teleological ordering, but I identify her references to a generic ordering.
O’Donovan explains why the created order must possess both, cf. Resurrection, 31–54; my discussion
of Nussbaum is not capricious.
65 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 96.
66 Nussbaum follows Aristotle, who asks regarding anger with respect to his concept of the golden
mean: “How far, then, and in what way must someone deviate to be open to blame?” His answer is
that it “is not easy to answer in a [general] account; for the judgment depends on particular cases, and
[we make it] by perception”, EN 1126b3–4. Nussbaum defines perception as “the ability to discern,
acutely and responsively, the salient features of one’s particular situation”, Nussbaum, Love’s
Knowledge, 37; cf. her other definition: “seeing a complex, concrete reality in a highly lucid and
richly responsive way; it is taking in what is there, with imagination and feeling”, Love’s Knowledge,
152. Nussbaum recognises that different people perceive things differently, although she may have an
overly ‘thin’ account of the process of perception. Lawrence Blum, for example, describes a process
of moral deliberation comprising seven stages: accurate recognition of a situation’s features, to
recognise these features as morally significant, the raising of the question as to whether one should act
in this situation, then judging whether one should in fact take action, the selection of a rule that one
takes to be applicable to the situation, determining the act that best instantiates the selected principle,
and performing this action, Moral Perception and Particularity (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 57–59.
Thus an observer of a situation must perceive that it involves promise-keeping, not just taking a walk,
to be able to begin the process of moral judgment, cf. Moral Perception, 5. Blum argues that because
different people perceive differently and see, or don’t see, the moral significance of situations to
varying degrees it is obvious that perception is not a unified, intuitive capacity, and may be more
difficult for some than others, cf. Moral Perception, 30.
67 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 94. My emphasis.
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individual acts, and it is the context (in the metaphor the play, in reality the moral order)
that both authorises particular acts and constitutes the grounds for typifying other acts as
‘unethical’.
In the previous chapter I observed that the Old Testament, both in its appeal to a
‘natural morality’ and within the creation narratives, assumes a moral order. It is
necessary, therefore, to ask how this order relates to particulars. O’Donovan’s analysis
of the relationship is compelling.
Even unlike things can be seen as part of the same universe if there is an
order which embraces them in a relation to one another. The plurality of
situations and events which characterizes the experience of history, the
fact that every event is ‘new’ and different from every other, can be seen
as a pluriformity in the world-order, which is a capacity for different
things to transpire and succeed one another within a total framework of
intelligibility which allows for their generic relationships to be
understood. Without a generic order new things would indeed be
incomprehensible, for they would be absolutely particular, which is
beyond the power of human thought to grasp.68
Thus people see things within the framework of what they already know. This applies to
knowledge in general, and moral knowledge in particular. So an individual has already
learnt what is good, because she has an understanding of the moral order, before she
appraises X in order to understand whether X is morally desirable.69 What role should
rules play in this evaluation?
Nussbaum commends Aristotle’s depiction of the rule used by the builders at
Lesbos as encapsulating her vision of rules in ethics. The Lesbian rule “does not assume
that the form of the rule governs the appearances; it allows the appearances to govern
themselves and to be normative for correctness of rule”.70 Aristotle thought that laws
could not be formulated to apply to every situation, and that occasionally a decree
addressed to a particular situation should be issued. “For the standard applied to the
indefinite is itself indefinite, as the lead standard is in Lesbian building, where it is not
fixed, but adapts itself to the shape of the stone; similarly a decree is adapted to fit its
objects”.71 What, exactly, does this mean? The Oxford English Dictionary defines a
Lesbian rule as “a mason’s rule made of lead, which could be bent to fit the curves of a
68 O’Donovan, Resurrection, 189.
69 This is not the whole story, see below.
70 Nussbaum, Fragility, 301.
71 EN 1137b30.
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moulding”, and thus, figuratively, “a principle of judgement that is pliant and
accommodating”. This encompasses two attributes of the rule, its descriptive role and
its prescriptive function. I suggest that the difference between these attributes is at the
heart of a significant confusion regarding Nussbaum’s (rhetorical) appropriation of the
Lesbian rule. Irwin, in notes to his translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, comments
that
Aristotle refers to a flexible lead ruler that could be made to fit the shape
of an irregular stone, and hence could be used to find a second stone to fit
next to the first in a dry stone wall. For this purpose, having a rigid ruler
would be useless for building. The point is that the rule or standard
should be adaptable to fit the specific circumstances.72
It is essential to recognise that here the situation determines the ‘rule’: the rule is a
description of the situation. But description is not prescription. If the former is meant it
would be better to say ‘measure’, one function of the rule, rather than ‘rule’. However,
Nussbaum treats ‘rule’ and ‘principle’ as synonyms, thus demonstrating that she has in
mind the latter, prescriptive, function of the rule. This creates some fundamental
problems for her position, above all with respect to the authority of the (prescriptive)
rule. When employed to ‘get the measure’ of a new stone, it is not the rule that is
‘authoritative’, but the shape of the original stone, for which the Lesbian rule is merely
a proxy. The Lesbian rule, having described one stone, is not then used to describe
another stone in all its marvellous complexity, but prescribe which stone should be
selected to adjoin the first. By analogy, therefore, it would not be a flexible rule that is
authoritative when confronted by a new moral situation but another particular situation.
In short, the proposal that a Lesbian rule be governed by the situation refers to the
descriptive moment and not its prescriptive use, for which the rule is not governed by
appearances. Nussbaum’s appeal to the Lesbian rule, therefore, performs a solely
rhetorical function and does not illuminate how rules, in the prescriptive sense, can aid
ethical reflection.73 A better view of rules, I have suggested, is to consider them
descriptions of aspects of the moral order. The multitude of biblical moral rules,
therefore, can be viewed as attempts to grasp something of the proper order of moral
goods.
To answer the question concerning the role of rules in ethical decisions, one can
72 Irwin, “Introduction,” 238.
73 This criticism can be levelled as much at Aristotle as Nussbaum.
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distinguish between comprehension of principles and their application in particular
situations. Thus agents must know before they take a decision about a particular case
whether X is right or wrong: pondering the particular concrete situation confronting the
agent does not add to knowledge about whether X is morally good, only whether this is
a situation in which X is at issue, that is, whether rules concerning X are at all relevant.
‘Do no steal’, for example, places limits upon the achievement of other goods because
people have learnt that the protection of a person’s possessions is fundamental for
socially harmonious existence. In other words, the moral order, as they perceive it,
demands this rule, and the relevant question in any particular situation is whether an
action is ‘stealing’. If it is, then the rule applies. Of course, this is not quite the whole
story since comprehension and application occur simultaneously: the perception of the
particular situation and the application of the rule are two processes that take place in
conversation with each other. O’Donovan concludes his discussion of a particular case
by observing that the “engagement with the case showed up a measure of haziness and
ill-definition in our understanding of the moral principle; the particular acted as a kind
of magnifying glass through which the generic appeared with more clarity”.74 However,
neither this dialectic nor the a priori force of moral rules as descriptions of a moral
order is what Nussbaum has in mind.
A further observation concerning the priority of the particular and moral rules
can be made. Aristotle thought that because the mean was a fine edged ridge, falling
away on both sides to ever greater depths of error, there were numerous ways of doing
something wrongly, but few right ways. Using the idea of hitting a target, he maintained
that “there are many ways of missing to be in error…But there is only one way to be
correct. That is why error is easy and correctness is difficult”.75 If one accepts a created
moral order of the type envisaged by the Old Testament, however, Aristotle’s stance
cannot be accepted. Instead, there will be many possible ways of responding well to the
moral order, including in situations of moral conflict.76 Just as Grotius suggested that
justice cannot be defined, but that just ways could be known only via negativa, by
observing injustice, so a negative decree, for example ‘do not murder’, sets a limit but
leaves plenty of scope for perfectly moral human behaviour that values the good
74 O’Donovan, Resurrection, 195.
75 EN 1106b30–32.
76 The contrast between Aristotle and this notion could be illustrated by pinnacled mountains and Table
Mountain, South Africa. See also the discussion of ‘good’ dilemmas in Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics,
66–67.
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protected by the rule.77
To conclude, Nussbaum argues for the priority of the particular but, for the
reasons I have outlined, her thesis cannot be accepted without qualification and Barton
is overly enthusiastic about the potential contribution of her approach. A better strategy
is to approach Old Testament ethics thinking of the ‘priority of the good’, where rules
reflect an understanding of goods in their generic and teleological relations. Thus
although rules are not final—that status belongs to the moral order—neither are they
rootless ‘rules of thumb’, and must have a fuller authority than allowed by Nussbaum.
Nevertheless, because moral rules must remain provisional for epistemological reasons
attention to the particular can produce greater moral understanding, especially by
illuminating how moral rules, and the goods that they protect or promote, are to be
understood.78 With respect to the interpretation of the ethics of the Old Testament such
a view allows one to take seriously both law and narrative without collapsing the one
into the other.
Particular goods, however, may clash, indeed, may be expected to clash. Before
proceeding further it is necessary to consider whether such conflicts are sometimes
irresolvable.
2.1.4 Incommensurability and Moral Goods
In The Fragility of Goodness Nussbaum describes two very different approaches
to ‘luck’, conceived as the vicissitudes of human existence. Plato argued technē could
form a bulwark against luck, proposing a system of commensurable values in which
differences between goods were quantitative, not of kind.79 According to Nussbaum, the
basic assumptions underpinning this scheme are: metricity, that there is a measurable
value common to all goods; singleness, that only one metric exists; and
consequentialism, that choices and actions have no intrinsic value but are purely
77 Thomas Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (trans. A. C. Campbell; Kitchener: Batoche Books,
2001), 7. It might be objected that ‘do not murder’ is also positive law, but one would expect
important features of the moral order, like protection of human life, to be codified.
78 On the epistemological question see Gene Outka, Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven / London:
Yale University Press, 1972), 96–97; O’Donovan, Resurrection, 76–97. Outka observes that it is one
thing to say that there are laws that cohere with a moral order but another to claim that (1) they are
adequately known, or (2) given that they are known they have been formulated in sufficient detail so
that they are binding as stated, and (3) that the rules or laws that fulfil (2) may be indisputably
identified. It is obvious that we do not possess a complete and infallible knowledge of the rules
corresponding to the moral order.
79 Cf. Nussbaum, Fragility, 108, 110; Love’s Knowledge, 106–24.
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instrumental means for procuring good consequences. Combining metricity and
consequentialism produces the idea of maximisation. This, when combined with
singleness, produces the idea of one value that is the point of rational choice.80
Nussbaum rejects this calculus in its entirety. Following Aristotle, she asserts that the
good life consists of various elements, each separate from the others and with its own
intrinsic worth. To
effect the commensurability of [these] values is to do away with them all
as they currently are, creating some new value that is not identical to any
of them. The question will then be whether his single-valued world can
possibly have the richness and inclusiveness of the current world. A
world in which wealth, courage, size, birth, justice are all put into the
same scale and weighed together, made in their nature functions of a
single thing, will turn out to be a world without any of these items, as
now understood.81
This does not mean that non-metric choice must be arbitrary: Nussbaum rejects the
opposition of quantitative versus ignorant choice as false. The alternative is
qualitative and not quantitative, and rational just because it is qualitative,
and based upon a grasp of the special nature of each of the items in
question. We choose this way all the time; and there is no reason for us to
let the rhetoric of weighing and measuring bully us into being on the
defensive here, or supposing that we must, if we are rational, be
proceeding according to some hidden metric.82
Incommensurability, however, leaves open the door for insoluble ‘moral dilemmas’,
situations in which it is not just difficult to give reasons for choosing between
competing obligations, but impossible.83 It is inappropriate to say that one ought is not
relevant because one of the grounds for action trumps the other; nor can one affirm that
both obligations are oughts, but that in this situation one takes precedence,84 which
80 Cf. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 56. In Fragility Nussbaum traces the development of Plato’s
thought concerning commensurability, noting that his later work seems to move away from the
advocacy of technē found in Protagoras and The Republic.
81 Nussbaum, Fragility, 296.
82 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 61. For an argument for this approach in Christian ethics see Banner,
Contemporary Moral Problems, 136–203.
83 “A moral dilemma is a situation in which an agent S morally ought to do A and morally ought to do B
but cannot do both, either because B is just not-doing-A or because some contingent feature of the
world prevents doing both”, Christopher W. Gowans, “The Debate on Moral Dilemmas,” in Moral
Dilemmas (ed. C. W. Gowans; New York / Oxford: OUP, 1987), 3.
84 Cf. Gowans, “Debate,” 17–18. The second strategy may produce feelings of guilt, which are the basis
of one argument for the existence of moral dilemmas: guilt shows that the obligation remained even
though the agent was not able to fulfil it. See Philippa Foot, “Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma,” in
Moral Dilemmas (ed. C. W. Gowans; New York / Oxford: OUP, 1987), 250–70; Christine Trappolet,
“Dilemas Morales,” DEFM 1.437–42; Alasdair MacIntyre, “Moral Dilemmas,” PPR 50 (1990): 367–
82, especially 370.
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seems to be the solution Nussbaum herself envisages.
Thomas Nagel identifies five types of values between which there can be such a
conflict,85 and is unwilling to prioritise these values for theoretical reasons.
I do not believe that the source of value is unitary—displaying apparent
multiplicity only in its application to the world. I believe that value has
fundamentally different kinds of sources, and that they are reflected in the
classification of values into types. Not all values represent the pursuit of
some single good into a variety of settings.86
Nagel sees the fundamental conflict as that between personal and impersonal values.
Conflicts between personal and impersonal claims are ubiquitous. They
cannot, in my view, be resolved by subsuming either of the points of view
under the other, or both under a third. Nor can we simply abandon any of
them. There is no reason why we should. The capacity to view the world
simultaneously from the point of view of one’s relations to others, from
the point of view of one’s life extended through time, from the point of
view of everyone at once, and finally from the detached viewpoint often
described as the view sub specie aeternitatis is one of the marks of
humanity. This complex capacity is an obstacle to simplification.87
Thus, argues Nagel, whilst people still need to make decisions, the fact that action must
be unitary does not mean that the justification for action can be similarly distilled.
Whilst concurring that there can be good action without total justification there
are several problems with Nagel’s thesis. First, it is not certain that there are multiple
sources of value. The biblical tradition claims a single source, God, and it is usually
assumed that although there are different ethical obligations ultimately there are ways of
resolving apparent contradictions between them because they are related to one,
internally consistent, deity.88 Whether this stance can be maintained with respect to the
Old Testament is an empirical question and not to be decided a priori, although
diversity of perspective per se may not be a problem.89 O’Donovan suggests that
85 Thomas Nagel, “The Fragmentation of Value,” in Moral Dilemmas (ed. C. W. Gowans; New York /
Oxford: OUP, 1987), 175–76. They are: (1) specific obligations to other people, institutions or
community; (2) constraints on action deriving from universal rights, e.g. not to assault or coerce; (3)
utility: the effects of one’s actions upon the welfare of all; (4) perfectionist ends or values – those
things with intrinsic value rather than utility; and (5) commitment to one’s own undertakings,
regardless of initial motives.
86 Nagel, “Fragmentation of Value,” 178.
87 Nagel, “Fragmentation of Value,” 180.
88 Other traditions also look to this sort of resolution. Aristotle’s doctrine of the unity of the virtues
implies there can be no conflict between them, and Gowans notes that both Kantian and utilitarian
theories of obligation are monist, “Debate,” 10.
89 In addition to Goldingay’s typology note Leander Keck’s suggestion that the perspectives of
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uncertainly about moral judgements arises not because of multiple sources of value but
“because the moral field is pluriform”.90 Only a moral code with one principle could
avoid conflicting demands, but that would be of insufficient use to moral agents because
the moral field is complex. In his scheme individual moral injunctions are to the created
moral order as bricks to a building. Ethical thinking, therefore, should seek a
comprehensive moral perspective, a view of the whole edifice. Whilst not automatically
solving the problem of conflicts in moral perspectives, O’Donovan does point to a way
of accommodating different moral values without the need to posit multiple sources of
value.91
The second problem with Nagel’s position is that it assumes people’s
epistemological limitations vitiate arguments for a coherent moral order.92 Although I
have argued such an order may provide resources to resolve moral conundrums, it does
not mean one can avoid moral indeterminacy. Paul Ramsey acknowledges that whilst
moral goods are occasionally commensurable, in other instances moral choices involve
incommensurable conflicting values, either because there is no common scale, or
because there are gaps in the hierarchy of values. This means it is impossible to
compute morality, although it remains possible
that values are in some sense comparable, that some are higher than
others. Values may be comparable qualitatively, yet there may be no way
to measure addition to the one against subtraction from the other. Higher
and lower values, more worthy and less worthy goods, may be known to
us while still there may be gaps—incommensurability—in the scale, or
perhaps there may be no clear single scale on which to measure the lesser
or greater good or evil.93
individual books are to ‘New Testament ethics’ as archipelagos to the submerged mountain ranges to
which they attest, “Rethinking “New Testament Ethics”,” JBL 115 (1996): 3–16.
90 O’Donovan, Resurrection, 199.
91 Brian Hebblethwaite raises a slightly different objection from a Christian perspective, Ethics and
Religion in a Pluralistic Age (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 49–63. He argues that despite God being
one, there are varieties of goodness because people relate to God in various ways. One can agree that
relationship to God is morally important, but this does not preclude, as part of the relationship,
behaviour that conforms to some divine standard(s) and/or some divinely ordained end(s), themselves
part of the created moral order. In fact, O’Donovan reaches the opposite conclusion to Hebblethwaite:
there is a unity behind the many ways of being good based on the fulfilment of the moral law. “That is
what makes these differentiations of character good: they are true interpretations, each within a unique
vocational matrix, of the one moral life, the life which is given to all men to live”, Resurrection, 223.
92 Cf. O’Donovan, Resurrection, 19. This could be expressed in terms of Nagel’s non-realism, cf. Foot,
“Moral Realism,” 269; O’Donovan, Resurrection, 76–103; MacIntyre, “Moral Dilemmas”.
93 Paul Ramsey, “Incommensurability and Indeterminacy in Moral Choice,” in Doing Evil to Achieve
Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations (ed. R. McCormick and P. Ramsey; Chicago: Loyola
University Press, 1978), 69–145, quote 71. Emphasis original.
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In such a situation proportionate rather than commensurable reason is required.
However, when “human goods or evils differ from one another qualitatively and differ
qualitatively in such fashion that they are incommensurate on any single scale, then
choice is irreducibly ambiguous”.94 Are personal and impersonal values so separated? Is
it, for example, impossible to decide between ‘truth’ and friendship with a particular
individual? Even if no rule can be devised to determine this question, it is unnecessary
to conclude with Nagel that a conflict of these or similar values constitutes an
unsolvable moral dilemma. In the case of the Old Testament, for example, such
conundrums are presented in narrative contexts that may offer clues to their resolution.95
That there may be some moral loss in making the decision is obvious from genres such
as tragedy, but that is the significance of the moral distinction between desiring and
unwillingly permitting a particular outcome.96
A final criticism of Nagel is that he supposes the possession by a single
individual of myriad points of view means people can view the world from any place
other than where they are, a fact not altered by people’s conception of multiple
perspectives.97 One advantage of cross-cultural moral reflection is that it may stimulate
more accurate knowledge of the moral order since “[t]ruth may be one, but our
apprehension of it is limited and perspectival”.98
To conclude, whilst it appears that insoluble moral dilemmas are a spectre,
knowing how to choose rightly in some situations remains difficult and may be
indeterminate. In everyday situations, however, people do not seem to struggle to juggle
moral goods, but exhibit a fairly clear idea of which ones are more important. Douglas
Davies’ contrast between systematic and clustered convictions highlights how the
spatial and temporal constraints of real life mean everyday thinking and practice centre
around a dominant selection of goods.99 This explains how clashes of moral values
connected to this nexus are considered more significant than those that are not. The
94 Ramsey, “Incommensurability,” 88. Emphasis original.
95 Whilst Nussbaum’s emphasis upon narrative as a source of moral guidance is apt Pamela Hall
suggests her predilection for tragedy and Henry James obscures the fact that ethical solutions may be
more readily available than she would care to admit, “Limits of the Story: Tragedy in Recent Virtue
Ethics,” SCE 17 (2004): 8–9.
96 Cf. Ramsey, “Incommensurability,” 78.
97 O’Donovan, Resurrection, 80–81.
98 Janet Martin Soskice, “The Truth Looks Different from Here or On Seeking the Unity of Truth from a
Diversity of Perspectives,” in Christ and Context: The Confrontation between Gospel and Culture (ed.
H. D. Regan and A. J. Torrance with A. Wood; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 43–59, quote 57.
99 Cf. Douglas Davies, Anthropology and Theology (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 19–26.
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variety of moral goods and their relations to socially important nexus are important
factors to consider in cross-cultural comparisons. Because the social world depicted by
the Old Testament is so distinct from our own, the next section moves from theoretical
considerations of the good and right to how kinship has been considered a central
feature of Old Testament morality.
2.2 KINSHIP AS A MORAL GOOD
Gerstenberger argues that Old Testament morality was profoundly affected by
social location.100 He asserts that, “everything that we learn in the Old Testament about
interpersonal ‘loyalty to the community’ (hesed) and ‘trustworthiness’ (’emūnāh) has its
original setting in […] family existence, orientated on mutuality”.101 In other words,
what one might call the cluster of kinship forms the matrix of Old Testament morality.
2.2.1 Kinship as the Matrix of Old Testament Morality
Understanding the marked differences between the structure of contemporary
Western and ancient families is essential. It is a commonplace among commentators to
note the hierarchy טֵֶׁבש (tribe)–– הָחָּפְׁשִּמ (kin-group)–– ִתיַּב (house).102 Many suppose
the basic family unit in the Old Testament to be the בָא תיֵּב, “all the descendants of a
single living ancestor (the head, rō’š-bêt-’āb) in a single lineage, excluding married
daughters (who entered their husbands’ bêt-’āb) along with their families”.103 However,
whilst it may have been “the smallest, viably self-sufficient unit within Israel’s system
100 Erhard Gerstenberger, Theologies in the Old Testament (trans. J. Bowden; Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
2002). He analyses the following social locations: family and clan; the village and small town; tribal
alliances; monarchical state; and exilic parochial communities.
101 Gerstenberger, Theologies, 31.
102 I follow Wright in translating הָחָּפְׁשִּמ as ‘kin-group’, cf. God’s People in God’s Land: Family, Land
and Property in the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans / Exeter: Paternoster, 1990), 48;
Gottwald, Tribes, 301–305; note Carol Meyers’ suggestion that בָא תֵּיב should be translated “father’s
household”, “The Family in Early Israel,” in Families in Ancient Israel (ed. L. G. Perdue et al;
Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997), 1–47, quote 19. For discussion of the relationship between
these three groupings see Francis Andersen, “Israelite Kinship Terminology and Social Structure,”
The Bible Translator 20 (1969): 29–39; S. Bendor, The Social Structure in Ancient Israel: The
Institution of the Family (Beit ’ab) from the Settlement to the End of the Monarchy (JBS 7; Jerusalem:
Simor, 1996), 67–86; Gottwald, Tribes, 257–70, 287–314; Paula McNutt, Reconstructing the Society
of Ancient Israel (LAI; London: SPCK / Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1999), 66–70, 87–94;
Meyers, “Family,” 13–21; Karel van der Toorn, Family Religion in Babylonia, Syria and Israel:
Continuity and Change in the Forms of the Religious Life (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 183–205; Wright,
God’s People, 48–55; idem, “Family,” ABD 2.761–69.
103 Wright, “Family,” 762. Although generally applicable note Niels Lemche’s discussion showing  תֵּיב
בָא is used for the nuclear family, extended family and lineage, Early Israel: Anthropological and
Historical Studies on the Israelite Society Before the Monarchy (VTSup 37; Leiden: Brill, 1985),
251–59.
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of land division and tenure”, it was probably not the smallest discrete unit, which was
the individual household.104 Archaeological evidence reveals that the four roomed
pillared house with an average of four inhabitants was typical of highland dwellings.105
In many cases these were arranged around a common courtyard, and it is supposed that
several, related nuclear families residing in close proximity comprised the ָבא תיֵּב.106
A number of these, in turn, constituted a village.107 Membership of the בָא  תיֵּב is
suggested by Judges 17–18 where Micah, upon the death of his father, becomes head of
a household comprising himself, his widowed mother, his sons (and possibly their
families), and a Levite responsible for the family shrine.108 If, as Blenkinsopp proposes,
the forbidden degrees of consanguinity in Leviticus 18 are motivated by the need to
preserve order within the household these prohibitions also point to the structure of the
בָא  תיֵּב.109 Stager uses models of birth and death rates alongside building size to
calculate that each ‘joint family’ comprised 10–30 people.110 Meyers concludes that
104 Wright, God’s People, 1. Cf. van der Toorn, Family Religion, 194–99.
105 Lawrence. Stager, “The Archaeology of the Family in Ancient Israel,” BASOR 260 (1985): 1–35.
Further archaeological evidence is summarised in Ferdinand Deist, The Material Culture of the Bible:
An Introduction (BS 70; ed. R. P. Carroll; London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 195–209;
Amihai Mazar, “Three Israelite Sites in the Hills of Judah and Ephraim,” BA 45 (1982): 167–78;
Robert Miller II, Chieftains of the Highland Clans: A History of Israel in the Twelfth and Eleventh
Centuries B.C. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005); Jeffrey Zorn, “Estimating the Population Size of
Ancient Settlements: Methods, Problems, Solutions, and a Case Study,” BASOR 295 (1994): 31–8.
106 Cf. Judg 18.22: ֵּב־ִםע רֶׁשֲא  םִּיתָּבַּב  רֶׁשֲא  םִׁיָשֲנאְָהוהָכִימ תי . NRSV ‘the men who were in the
houses near Micah’s house’, but Gottwald is to be preferred: ‘the men who were in the houses
comprising the household of Micah’, Tribes, 291.
107 This configuration of dwellings continues to exist in the more densely populated settlements of IA II,
leading Bendor to conclude that the “structure absorbed the pressure of the monarchy and its
machinery, and adapted to it just as it adapted to other factors that determined its struggle for
existence”, Bendor, Social Structure, 32. Cf. Niels Lemche, “From Patronage Society to Patronage
Society,” in The Origins of the Ancient Israelite States (JSOTSup 228; ed. V. Fritz and P. R. Davies;
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 106–20.
108 A priest is allowed to defile himself for a similar range of kin, Lev 21.1–4.
109 Cf. Joseph Blenkinsopp, “The Family in First Temple Israel,” in Families in Ancient Israel (ed. L. G.
Perdue et al; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997), 48–103, especially 59; Bendor, Social
Structure, 57–66; Blenkinsopp also thinks economic concerns are important. Bendor suggests Lev 18
was composed during a period of settled agricultural society similar to the transition to monarchy
described in 1 Samuel; for a similar view see Meyers, “Family,” 17–18. Although this is plausible, if
the structure of the בָא תֵּיב remained constant through the monarchy it is not possible to provide such
a firm date. On the omission of the daughter from Lev 18 see Wenham: “it was already accepted that
such a union was illicit (Gen. 19:31ff). It is expressly forbidden both in the laws of Hammurabi (LH
154) and in the Hittite laws (HL 195)”, Leviticus, 254. In any case simultaneous relations between a
man and a living mother and her daughter are excluded, Lev 18.17. This rather cuts the ground from
under Illona Rashkow, “Daughters and Fathers in Genesis…Or, What is Wrong with This Picture?” in
A Feminist Companion to Exodus to Deuteronomy (ed. A. Brenner; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic
Press, 1994), 22–36.
110 Stager, “Archaeology,” 18–21. Meyers estimates that average size rarely exceeded 15 people,
“Family,” 18. Explicit mention of ָבא תֵּיב in Samuel indicates that it included sons and parents and
could be numerous—Ziba’s included 15 sons and 20 slaves, presumably with their families, and Doeg
the Edomite kills 85 priests of Nob, 2 Sam 9.10–12. Van der Toorn thinks that the 85 priests
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over 80% of the Iron I population inhabited villages of less than 100 people.111
Gerstenberger defines the family as a community in which all members shared
both work and possessions.112 He argues that disputes were resolved within the family
according to ancestral custom, postulating that the biblical records show special cases
concerning inheritance and power,113 rebellious sons,114 complaints about wives,115
sexual violence,116 and conversion to an alien cult.117 A key assumption is that families’
theological horizons are restricted by the need for survival and that wider concerns are
irrelevant. The dream is self-sufficiency.118 Internal relationships necessary for survival
of families came to be viewed as protected by deities, with attendant taboos. Thus the
precedence of parents over children is viewed as divinely ordained—part of the natural
order.119
In terms of a specific family morality, Gerstenberger looks to narrative sources,
wisdom, and legal prohibitions.120 He proposes that these reveal the content of
unconscious socialization. Regarding prohibitions, Exodus 21.13–17 twice forbids
cursing parents,121 and restrictions on sexual activity among those who live under same
roof, but who are not married, are prominent.122 Jokes, anecdotes and proverbial sayings
reinforce conceptions of proper behaviour whose telos is intra-familial harmony.123 For
example, the need to participate in agricultural tasks essential to family wellbeing is
reinforced by proverbial comments concerning the sluggard.124 Loyalty to the family is
an important value and behaviour to ‘outsiders’ (probably people from the same clan
comprised the entire adult male population of the settlement, and it is possible that they did not pertain
to the same father’s house but to the kin-group that occupied a village, cf. Family Religion, 191; 1
Sam 22.19, which reads םִיֲנהֹּכַה־רִיע בֹנ, although note 1 Sam 22.11: ־תֵא ּבוטִיחֲא־ֶּןב ךֶלֶמִיחֲאְ
ֹבְּנב רֶׁשֲא םִיֲנהַֹּכה ִוִיבָא תֵּיב־לָּכ תְֵאו ֵןהֹּכַה.
111 Meyers, “Family,” 12. See also Gunnar Lehmann, “Reconstructing the Social Landscape of Early
Israel: Rural Marriage Alliances in the Central Hill Country,” Tel Aviv 31 (2004): 141–93.
112 Cf. Gerstenberger, Theologies, 19–20.
113 Gen 27; Num 27.1–11; Judg 9.1–6; 2 Sam 13.
114 Deut 21.18–21.
115 Num 5.11–13.
116 2 Sam 13.
117 Deut 13.7–12.
118 Cf. Micah 4.4; 1 Kgs 5.5; Zech 3.10
119 Prov 15.20; 17.25; 19.26; 20.20; 23.25; 28.24; 30.17; Lev 19.3. Note also the role of the older brother
in 1 Sam 20.29.
120 Ex 20.12–17; 23.1–9; Lev 19.13–18. Cf. Elechi Amadi’s view that the notion of the good in Nigeria is
captured in proverbs, Ethics in Nigerian Culture (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1982), 50–64.
121 Verses 15, 17, cf. Deut. 27.16.
122 Lev 18.6–16, cf. Gerstenberger, Theologies, 69.
123 Gerstenberger, Theologies, 64, 71.
124 Prov 26.13–16.
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rather than non-Israelites) has to be learnt.125 Gerstenberger concludes that, “the core of
the matter is family solidarity”.126 It is instructive, therefore, that Micah’s vision of
disaster portrays dysfunction at this foundational level.
Put no trust in a neighbour, have no confidence in a friend; guard the
doors of your mouth from her who lies in your bosom; for the son treats
the father with contempt, the daughter rises up against he mother, the
daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; a man’s enemies are the men
of his house.127
Gerstenberger discusses other social locations, but in the ethical realm each builds upon
this base.128 Overall, he presents a cogent case for the centrality of the family for
understanding Old Testament ethics.129 Whilst Eichrodt and Hempel thought ‘popular
morality’ was an infant ethic, left behind as Israel matured, Gerstenberger allows the
concerns of ordinary people to have an enduring moral significance.130 Given that the
family was central to Old Testament life, alienation from it was an extreme recourse,131
and being apart from the family exposed one to danger and uncertainty.132 Whether this
necessitates Gerstenberger’s conclusion that moral goods were restricted to those that
fostered survival is moot. Such goods may have been important, but this does not
require an entirely pragmatic, ‘survival of the strongest’, since the text highlights
125 Gerstenberger, Theologies, 65, 74. The ‘one for all, and all for one’ attitude is apparent in Jacob’s
dismay at his sons’ actions yet unwillingness to publicly distance himself from them (Gen. 34); cf.
Saul’s expectation of loyalty from his son in 1 Sam 20.27–34.
126 Gerstenberger, Theologies, 75.
127 Micah 7.5–6; compare the positive vision of Ps 133.1b–3a.
128 In the village setting, with a wider body of neighbours, issues of property come to the fore but,
overall, he proposes that village morality is an extension of the family ethic. At the level of the tribal
alliance Gerstenberger claims little can be said, save the possible existence of norms for fighting
males for the duration of hostilities, for example, sexual abstinence and fasting. Despite an extended
discussion of the history and theology of the monarchy he does not highlight novel ethical
developments, although there were new ethical issues, e.g., hereditary succession and the status of the
king. Gerstenberger argues differentiation from other nations is the key to understanding exilic and
post-exilic ethics, and although family metaphors are used to describe exilic Israel moral concerns go
beyond the family since the horizons of faith were survival and being an “ecumenical community
under the one God Yahweh”, Theologies, 271.
129 See also Wright, God’s People.
130 Apart from Eichrodt, the other early distinguished work on Old Testament ethics was penned by
Johannes Hempel, Das Ethos des Alten Testaments (BZAW 67; 2nd ed.; Berlin: Alfred Topelmann,
1964 [1938]); idem, “Ethics”. Like Gerstenberger, Hempel thought that ethical concerns were
influenced by social and historical context. Barton levels similar criticisms at Hempel to those he
directed against Eichrodt’s pretensions to discover historical Israelite ethics, “Understanding,” 15–24.
Accepting these cautions, and rejecting Hempel’s evolutionary reconstruction, one notes the key
contention that ethical traditions originated in particular groups. Whilst it is unnecessary to suppose
they created particular moralities, it is true that some moral injunctions will have been more relevant
to certain people or circumstances. For a recent restatement of the importance of social location see
Andrew Mein, Ezekiel and the Ethics of Exile (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 5–39.
131 Although 600 were said to be with David, cf. 1 Sam 23.13.
132 Cf. Ps 120; Meshek and Kedar were in Asia Minor and Arabia, respectively.
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others.133 Further, any account that requires different moral standards according to
situation possesses an intrinsic instability. It is more plausible to suppose that virtues
were virtues and moral acts were moral regardless of social location, and then explain
why the good of ‘family solidarity’, an obviously important factor, might demand
ostensively amoral action. How this might be explained is a separate question. In terms
of socialization, what needs to be learnt is not behaviour to outsiders per se but all
moral conduct, including when not, for example, to be loyal or tell the truth. The
normative evaluation of these decisions requires their identification within the text.
2.2.2 A ‘Familial Paradigm’
Instead of attempting a historical reconstruction of lived morality, Waldemar
Janzen identifies several theological-ethical paradigms within the Old Testament, all
under-girded by an overarching ‘familial paradigm’. For Janzen, a paradigm is, “a
personally and holistically conceived image of a model (e.g., a wise person, good king)
that imprints itself immediately and nonconceptually on the characters and actions of
those who hold it”.134 With this definition Janzen seeks both to steer a path between Old
Testament ethics as law and as principle, and to appropriate stories about individual
characters in ways that do not assume they are always exemplary.135 For example, 1
Samuel 24 relates how David and Saul meet in a cave. In what sense did David act
morally? Was it is simply returning good for evil? Janzen suggests there is a deeper
dimension. David’s men remind him of God’s promise to judge Saul, and tempt him to
realise the promise himself: “David’s greatest claim to ethical modelling here…is his
refusal to diminish the sovereignty of God through his own autonomous action”.136
David, according to Janzen, models a royal paradigm. Similarly, Phinehas, Abigail and
Elijah model priestly, wisdom and prophetic paradigms of ethical behaviour.137 It is not,
in the case of wisdom, that the paradigmatic figure is equal to Abigail (or Job, Joseph,
or the Proverbial Woman), rather “ethical model stories flow together directly to form
133 E.g., at the most basic level, ‘Do not kill’, Gen 4.15, 24; 9.5–6; Ex 20.13; 21.12; 23.7; Lev 19.18;
24.17; Deut 5.17 ; 27.24.
134 Waldemar Janzen, Old Testament Ethics A Paradigmatic Approach (Louisville: Westminster John
Knox, 1994), 28.
135 Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, 8–9, notes that the tendency to view characters as exemplary has led in
two alternative directions: on the one hand the view that real ethical models are the prophets—earlier
characters were ethically ambiguous; and, on the other, the ‘Salvation History’ view—the texts deal
with God’s dealings with imperfect people, none of whom are necessarily role models.
136 Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, 16.
137 Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, 9–20. Cf. Num 25; 1 Sam 25; 1 Kgs 21.
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such a paradigm before the mental eye, as the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle fit together to
yield a picture”.138 This occurs in much the same way as people picture a ‘good driver’.
Janzen maintains these four paradigms feed into and are nourished by a familial
paradigm.139 He accepts that changing social contexts will have meant the familial
paradigm will not have been the same in, for example, semi-nomadic times and the late
monarchy, but argues that the ANE concern for family shalom is given special literary-
theological importance in biblical texts. Three stories exemplify the familial paradigm.
Genesis 13 considers family harmony the key moral good.140 The book of Ruth points to
other family orientated virtues, viz., care for the stranger and widow,141 redemption of a
kin’s inheritance142 and observance of levirate laws.143 Judges 19 speaks of models (the
concubine’s father and old man)144 and counter-models (the men of Gibeah) of
hospitality. Janzen contends the differences between the stories of Abraham, Ruth and
Judges do not derive from laws or general principles, but the various understandings (or
lack thereof) of the kinship context. Taken together he claims that they witness to a
three pronged familial paradigm which is concerned for life (understood as progeny),
land and hospitality.145
Janzen’s paradigmatic approach is potentially fruitful. It is not afraid of narrative
texts, nor of prima facie amoral behaviour like Phineas’. Especially important is his
emphasis upon the family as the context and end of moral action. Three important
criticisms, however, can be levelled. First, paradigms are a step away from the actual
stories. Despite Janzen’s avowed aversion to abstractions his paradigms are exactly that,
being deduced from model behaviour. Second, whilst the analogy of the ‘good driver’ is
suggestive, the idea that people piece together a mental image is problematic since we
need something to guide our puzzle construction; something prior to the puzzle.
138 Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, 27.
139 Janzen denies that the others can be subsumed into the familial paradigm, but does postulate that they
complete its ‘sub-structure’. If so, his criticism of Wright’s scheme is misplaced, since Janzen’s
proposal is also based upon a single paradigm, but with a life-land-hospitality matrix instead of
Wright’s God-Israel-land. My main problem with the non-familial paradigms is that they seem to
describe literary form rather than moral content, cf. Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, 85–86, 100.
140 The story has other functions in the context of the wider narrative, especially the promise of Gen
12.1–3.
141 Lev 19.9–10; Deut. 24.19–22.
142 Lev 25.25.
143 Deut 25.5–10.
144 Feminist scholars have severely criticised this interpretation, most convincingly Phyllis Trible, Texts
of Terror (OBT; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1984).
145 Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, 43.
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Christian ethics has often appealed to rules, in the form of either revealed or natural law.
Janzen demurs on this point, but at the very least a wider (meta)narrative that gives
appropriate signals as to the meaning of the stories is necessary to identify the import of
individual elements. Third, Janzen does not allow space for conflict between familial
values. This is especially important since ultimately he includes all moral action within
this paradigm.
2.3 CONCLUSION: THE PRIORITY OF KINSHIP
This chapter started with a discussion of the nature of the good, observing that it
has several possible meanings, including instrumental and intrinsic. Although intrinsic
goodness can be conceived as having a natural basis, what this might mean in practice is
difficult to identify. On the contrary, different historical and cultural understandings of
the good point to the varieties of goodness, and the need to delineate any particular
definition with care. I have particularly highlighted that this process must account for
the important change between ancient and modern ethics with respect to the relationship
between the good the right. This raises questions about the nature of moral rules,
apparently prominent within the Old Testament, and in conversation with Martha
Nussbaum I examined the relationship between moral rules, moral order, moral goods
and particular situations. This analysis has demonstrated that an exclusive focus upon
either rules or the particularity of individual situations is theoretically problematic. I
have argued that it is better to focus upon moral goods, which must be understood with
reference to their generic and teleological relations to other goods, that is, to the moral
order. Whilst this order may be partly delineated by rules, such description is not
exhaustive, so that studying the peculiarities of particular situations may lead to a fuller
understanding of goods themselves.
The primary observation regarding moral goods is that they are legion, which
means cases of conflict between them are inevitable. The ‘family’ has been identified as
a key nexus of moral goods within the Old Testament. Gerstenberger observes that
many rules and much moral guidance concern family activities, proposing that the
family was the matrix of Old Testament morality. Janzen perceives a ‘familial
paradigm’ as the foundational conception of Old Testament ethics. Notwithstanding
several criticisms, I judge the focus on kin relations of these authors to be extremely
suggestive and agree that the moral good of ‘family’ is fundamental for understanding
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Old Testament ethics. The task of the following chapter, therefore, will be to examine
kinship in more detail.
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CHAPTER 3
Anthropological
Approaches to Kinship
Kinship is to anthropology
what logic is to philosophy
or the nude is to art.
– Robin Fox, Kinship and Marriage
The epigraph indicates that ‘the family’ has been a traditional focus of
anthropology. For this reason the present chapter examines anthropological approaches
to kinship and the ethics of kinship in order to gain a fuller understanding of this
‘institution’.
3.1 KINSHIP
From the publication of L. H. Morgan’s Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of
the Human Family in 1871 until the 1960s the study of kinship could be described as
the basic discipline of anthropology, its “hard core”.1 Alan Barnard eulogises Morgan’s
classificatory system of relationship terminology as “the single most significant
ethnographic breakthrough of all time”.2 The significance of Morgan’s thesis is that he
offered reasons for kinship classification: that it is a cipher for acceptable behaviour
towards a particular group of relatives.3 So, for example, many societies distinguish
The epigraph is from Robin Fox, Kinship and Marriage (London: Penguin, 1967), 10.
1 Edmund Leach, “Brain Teaser,” NY Review of Books, Oct (1967): 10; cited in Michael G. Peletz,
“Kinship Studies in Late Twentieth-Century Anthropology,” ARA 24 (1995): 343–72, see 344. A
particularly useful survey of kinship studies is Peter Schweitzer, “Introduction,” in Dividends of
Kinship: Meanings and Uses of Social Relatedness (ed. P. P. Schweitzer; London and New York:
Routledge, 2000), 1–32.
2 Alan Barnard, “Rules and Prohibitions: The Form and Content of Human Kinship,” in Companion
Encyclopedia of Anthropology (ed. T. Ingold; 2nd ed.; London: Routledge, 2002), 783–812, quote 803.
The distinction is between a descriptive terminology, in which a term applies to a single individual in
a genealogy, and classificatory system, in which a term applies to a number of individuals.
3 Cf. Françoise Zonabend, “An Anthropological Perspective on Kinship and the Family,” A History of
the Family: Volume One: Distant Worlds, Ancient Worlds (ed. A. Burguière et al.; trans S. H.
Tenison, R. Morris and A. Wilson; London: Polity Press, 1996), 8–68, especially 21; and Alfred
Radcliffe-Brown, “Introduction,” in African Systems of Kinship and Marriage (ed. A. R. Radcliffe-
Brown and D. Forde; Οxford: OUP, 1950), 1–85, especially 11, where he identifies three facets to
kinship: affective relations, etiquette, i.e. norms for behaviour, and jural duties towards kin. He
distinguishes between the ‘performance’ of a positive duty and the ‘observance’ of a negative duty.
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between parallel and cross-cousins, and marriage ‘rules’ reflect this distinction. Further
significant studies of how social relations structured through descent and affinity enable
stable political interaction include that of Radcliffe-Brown, although within a
comparative and functionalist rather than evolutionary framework, Evans-Pritchard’s
enquiry into descent groups among the Nuer, and Meyer Fortes’ analysis of kinship
networks.4
In traditional conceptions of kinship theory the “atom of kinship”5 is the nuclear
family and descent from mother, father, or both. Claude Lévi-Strauss, however, argues
that the fundamental relationships are not parent—child, but brother—sister and sister’s
husband.6 Starting from the observation that the incest taboo is universal he contends
that the “prohibition of incest is less a rule prohibiting marriage with the mother, sister
or daughter, than a rule obliging the mother, sister or daughter to be given to others”.7
Alliance theory shifts the focus from group formation through descent to links formed
by marriage:8
The significance of terminology has been debated from the genesis of kinship studies—for a
convenient list of views see Robert Parkin, “Introduction: Terminology and Affinal Alliance,” in
Kinship and Family: An Anthropological Reader (ed. R. Parkin and L. Stone; Oxford: Blackwell,
2004), 121–35, especially 121–22.
4 See Radcliffe-Brown, “Introduction”; idem, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (New York:
Free Press, 1952); Edward Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and
Political Institutions of a Nilotic People (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963); Meyer Fortes, The Web of
Kinship Among the Tallensi (Oxford: OUP, 1949). The absence of strong central government was
considered to be the ‘problem’ requiring solution; a supposition now considered patently ethnocentric,
so Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, Social and Cultural Anthropology: The Key Concepts (London:
Routledge, 2000), 217–29, especially 218. Regarding descent, anthropologists have long recognised
the distinction between genitor (biological father) and pater (social father)—illustrated by the old
English proverb ‘Whoso boleth my kyne, ewere calf is mine’. The same distinction can be made on
the female side; and the further distinction between Genetrix I (the culturally defined genetic mother)
and Genetrix II (the bearing or carrying mother – the scientifically genetic mother) is proposed by
Alan Barnard, “Rules and Prohibitions,” 790; cf. J. A. Barnes, “Physical and Social Kinship,” PS 28
(1961): 296–299.
5 Zonabend, “Anthropological Perspective,” 24.
6 The Elementary Structures of Kinship (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1969). Cf. the ‘atom of
kinship’ diagrams in Fox, Kinship and Marriage, 236:
 =   =  
Traditional | Lévi-Strauss
  
7 Lévi-Strauss, Elementary Structures, 481, cf. 12–25.
8 Using illustration of European royal houses Fox expresses the distinction thus: “One sees marriage as
useful in providing royal heirs: the other sees royal heirs as useful in that they can be used in dynastic
marriages”, Kinship and Marriage, 23. Lévi-Strauss’ work refers to elementary marriage systems, i.e.
those with positive marriage ‘rules’: complex systems have only negative rules prohibiting whom one
can marry. Some forms of the latter encompass so many people that they appear almost elementary,
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the value of exchange is not simply that of the goods exchanged.
Exchange – and consequently the rule of exogamy which expresses it –
has in itself a social value. It provides the means of binding men together,
and of superimposing upon the natural links of kinship the henceforth
artificial links…of alliance governed by rule.9
It is precisely the ‘natural links of kinship’ that form the target of David
Schneider’s iconoclastic analysis of kinship theory, “a watershed in kinship studies”.10
He exposes anthropologists’ ethnocentric assumptions, for example, that ‘blood is
thicker than water’,11 and avers that ‘kinship’ is a Euro-American cultural construction:
“It is a non-subject. It exists in the minds of anthropologists but not in the cultures they
study”.12 Instead, claims Schneider, it is necessary to seek the emic perspective: “One
famously the Crow-Omaha system. Within elementary systems important distinctions are made
between restricted or direct exchange (wife givers and takers are the same) and generalised or
asymmetrical exchange (wife givers do not take wives from the same moiety to which they give
wives). A further division is made between immediate direct exchange and delayed direct exchange.
The following diagram is an amalgamation of those in Fox, Kinship and Marriage, 222 and Barnard,
“History,” 129, cf. Lévi-Strauss’ diagrams, Elementary Structures, 216, 464:
Elementary
Direct Asymmetrical
(MBD
marriage)
Immediate Delayed
(MBD/FZD
marriage)
(FZD marriage)
Further discussion of alliance theory can be found in Anthony Good, “Kinship,” ECSA, 311–18;
Barnard, “Rules and Prohibitions,” 802; Parkin, “Introduction,” 121–35.
9 Lévi-Strauss, Elementary Structures, 480. Loius Dumont’s work on Dravidian kinship also adopts a
structuralist, alliance perspective, see Affinity as Value: Marriage Alliance in South India, with
Comparative Essays on Australia (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983) and the evaluation in
Margaret Trawick, Notes on Love in a Tamil Family (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990),
128–31. Trawick’s concern is that the focus on categories eliminates the human, emotional dimension
of actual relationships.
10 Janet Carsten, “Introduction: cultures of relatedness,” in Cultures of Relatedness: New Approaches to
the Study of Kinship (ed. J. Carsten; Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 1–36, quote 25. Schneider’s thesis is
presented in: David M. Schneider, American Kinship (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968); idem,
A Critique of the Study of Kinship (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984); idem, “What is
kinship all about?” in Kinship and Family: An Anthropological Reader (ed. R. Parkin and L. Stone;
Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 257–74; repr. from Kinship Studies in the Morgan Centennial Year (ed. P.
Reining; Washington D.C.: Anthropological Society of Washington, 1972), 32–63. For a summary of
Schneider’s life and work see Richard Feinberg, “Introduction: Schneider’s Cultural Analysis of
Kinship and Its Implications for Anthropological Relativism,” in The Cultural Analysis of Kinship:
The Legacy of David Schneider (ed. R. Feinberg and M. Ottenheime; Illinois: University of Illinois
Press, 2001), 1–32.
11 See, especially, Schneider, Critique, 165–77.
12 Schneider, “What is kinship all about?,” 269. On problems with ‘Euro-American’ as a term of
reference see Linda Stone, “Introduction: The Demise and Revival of Kinship,” in Kinship and
Family: An Anthropological Reader (ed. R. Parkin and L. Stone; Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 241–56,
especially 253. Rodney Needham states that “there is no such thing as kinship” because ethnographic
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must take the native’s own categories, the native’s units, the native’s organization, and
articulation of those categories and follow their definitions, their symbolic and
meaningful divisions wherever they may lead”.13 Schneider’s culturalist approach has
been widely criticised for assuming that any given ‘culture’ is bounded and
homogeneous, and for divorcing ‘culture’ from actual social relations. 14 Two
interrelated aspects of Schneider’s thesis have prompted important debates concerning
the relationship between nature and culture, and kinship as a construction.
In American Kinship Schneider states there “are biological facts…There is also a
system of constructs in American culture about those biological facts”,15 and in A
Critique of the Study of Kinship he argues that “culture, even were it to do no more than
recognize biological facts, still adds something to those facts”.16 As Carsten observes,
Schneider actually maintains the very distinction he argues against, viz., the existence of
natural facts apart from cultural constructions of them.17 The more thoroughgoing work
of feminist anthropologists, particularly Sylvia Yanagisako and Janet Collier, on the
other hand, posits no universal biological given called ‘sex’, which is interpreted in
culturally distinct ways as ‘gender’.18 Instead, ‘sex’ itself is viewed as a construction
formulated in the context of competing hierarchies of power. This enables them to shut
the door more firmly on biological determinism in relation to gender.19 However, the
variation means kinship cannot be reified as a ‘thing’, not that kin relations do not exist. He thus
argues for more rigorous cross-cultural comparison rather than abandonment of kinship studies, cf.
“Remarks on the Analysis of Kinship and Marriage,” in Rethinking Kinship and Marriage (ed. R.
Needham; London, Tavistock Press, 1971), 1–34, quote 5.
13 Schneider, “What is kinship all about?,” 270.
14 Cf. Trawick’s comment that culturalist ethnographers “tend to escape the muddle that a plurality of
perspectives poses by being highly selective as to which ‘native point of view’ they listen to”, Notes
on Love, 132. This is the basis for Yanagisako’s criticism of American Kinship since she demonstrates
that even the grounds for comparison, i.e. individuals (in contradistinction to families), are affected by
which point of view is preferred, see Sylvia Yanagisako, “Variance in American Kinship:
Implications for Cultural Analysis,” AE 5 (1978): 15–29.
15 Schneider, American Kinship, 80.
16 Schneider, Critique, 199.
17 Carsten, “Introduction,” 5.
18 Sylvia Yanagisako and Janet Collier, “Towards a Unified Analysis of Gender and Kinship,” in
Gender and Kinship: Essays towards a Unified Analysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987),
14–50. See also Sylvia Yanagisako and Carol Delaney, “Naturalizing Power,” in Naturalizing Power:
Essays in Feminist Cultural Analysis (ed. S. Yanagisako & C. Delany. London & New York:
Routledge, 1995), 1–22; Sarah Franklin, “Re-thinking Nature-Culture: Anthropology and the New
Genetics,” AT 3 (2003): 65–85.
19 Cf. Carsten, “Introduction,” 22. The anthropology of non-traditional family structures and New
Reproductive Technologies have also been used to destabilise the natural basis for gender and kinship,
with the thesis is that biology is used to justify choices. Cf. Linda Stone, New Directions in
Anthropological Kinship (ed. L. Stone; Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Carsten,
“Introduction,” 11; Corinne Hayden, “Gender, Genetics, and Generation: Reformulating Biology in
Lesbian Kinship,” CA 10 (1995): 41–63.
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view that not only cultural symbols but also their referents are arbitrary and culturally
constructed has been criticised as too relativistic, handicapping cross-cultural
comparison.20 Carsten proposes enlarging the category of ‘kinship’ to ‘relatedness’ in
an attempt to recover comparative possibilities.21 This, however, does not solve the
cultural specificity of the nomenclature, and it is better to take her more recent
suggestion that instead of abandoning the nature—culture distinction
it is precisely the ways in which people in different cultures distinguish
between what is given and what is made, what might be called biological
and what might be called social, and the points at which they make such
distinctions, that, without preconceptions, should be at the center of the
comparative anthropological analysis of kinship.22
This is entirely compatible with Helle Rydstrøm’s observation that although there is
indubitably a natural basis for human existence, the irreducible element is not sex but
the human body; sex is merely one facet of embodied existence.23 Rydstrøm proposes
that anthropology should focus upon the whole person, which will include, but not be
limited to, sex and gender. In doing so she advocates taking into account the fourth
major movement in kinship theory, which examines how kinship is constructed
thorough everyday practice, rather than definitions.24
Bourdieu’s view of kinship as “an open-ended set of practices employed by
individuals seeking to satisfy their material and symbolic interests” is susceptible to the
20 A different criticism of Yangisako and Collier is advanced by Harold Scheffler, who argues that the
kinship universal is not biology but genealogy. Biology does play a part—it is women who have
children and form primary bonds with them—but it is the various uses of these givens to construct
genealogical relations that is important, regardless of any biological link between persons, see Harold
Scheffler, “Sexism and Naturalism in the Study of Kinship,” in Gender at the Crossroads of
Knowledge: Feminist Anthropology in the Postmodern Era (ed. M. di Leonardo; Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1991), 361–82. A strong biological base for kinship has not been abandoned by all
anthropologists, e.g. Maurice Bloch and Dan Sperber, “Kinship and Evolved Psychological
Dispositions: the Mother’s Brother Controversy Reconsidered,” Curr Anthropol 43 (2002): 723–48.
21 “ ‘Relatedness’ makes possible comparisons between Inupiat and English or Nuer ways of being
related without relying on an arbitrary distinction between biology and culture, and without
presupposing what constitutes kinship”, Carsten, “Introduction,” 5.
22 Janet Carsten, After Kinship (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 189. The title and thesis of her book reflect a
conversation with Marilyn Strathern, After Nature: English Kinship in the Late Twentieth Century
(Cambridge: CUP, 1992). See also Carsten’s comment that there are “good reasons why, rather than
abandoning biology, we need to subject its uses in different cultures to closer scrutiny”,
“Introduction,” 33. My emphasis—ignoring an apparent reification of ‘culture’.
23 Helle Rydstrøm, Embodying Morality: Growing Up in Rural Vietnam (Honolulu: University of
Hawai‘i Press, 2003).
24 See also Rapport and Overing, Anthropology, 227–28; Janet Carsten, “The Substance of Kinship and
the Heat of the Hearth: Feeding, Personhood, and Relatedness among Malyans in Pulau Langkawi,”
AE 22 (1995): 223–42. Trawick further proposes practice should be considered in the light of depth
psychology—an invitation I do not pursue here, see Notes on Love, 142–48.
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charge that he considers people rational economic actors.25 If one accounts for this
weakness, his work on kinship details the social uses of kinship and highlights the fact
that kinship requires work. Regarding affinal relationships, for example, Bourdieu
comments that “it is only when one records them as a fait accompli, as the
anthropologist does when he establishes a genealogy, that one can forget that they are
the product of strategies oriented towards the satisfaction of material and symbolic
interests”.26 In this process it is important to remember that not all kinship relations are
the same. Bourdieu refers to a “privileged network of practical relationships”, 27
including both genealogical and non-genealogical relationships, in contradistinction to
official kin. The respective roles of each sort of relationship are especially clear in
marriages: “Practical kin make marriages; official kin celebrate them”. 28 A similar
emphasis upon the importance of non-biological kin is found in the work of Janet
Carsten and Steven Hugh-Jones, who take forward Lévi-Strauss’ work on ‘house
societies’: groupings of corporate estates or ‘houses’ perpetuated through property,
names, and real or fictive descent. 29 “People of house societies have an emic
understanding of their houses in this sense and perceive their own identity and their
relationship with others in terms of their houses”.30 Such closeness does not signify
harmony but tension, for example, between brothers, and relationships require constant
work to maintain solidarity.31 This concern with agency takes us a long way from the
“bastard algebra”32 of early kinship studies with its preoccupation with terminology, to
the practice of becoming and staying ‘related’.
3.2 THE ETHICS OF KINSHIP
James Laidlaw claims that ‘the anthropology of ethics’ is non-existent. “There is
25 Good, “Kinship,” 316.
26 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (trans. R. Nice; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990),
167. These strategies do not have to follow any ‘rules’ of kinship. Note also the distinction between
prescription (formal relations between idealised categories of kin), preference (recognised jural rules)
and practice (actual social behaviour) in Rodney Needham, “Prescription,” Oceania 42 (1973): 166–
81.
27 Bourdieu, Logic, 168.
28 Bourdieu, Logic, 168, cf. the case study 168–69.
29 Janet Carsten and Steven Hugh-Jones, “About the House – Lévi-Strauss and Beyond,” in About the
House: Lévi-Strauss and Beyond (ed. J. Carsten and S. Hugh-Jones; Cambridge: CUP, 1995), 1–46;
Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Way of Masks (trans. S. Modelski; London: Jonathan Cape, 1983).
30 Stone, “Introduction,” 247.
31 Cf. also the view that constructing relatedness is ‘hard work’ in Carsten, “Introduction,” 26; Isabella
Lepri, “The Meanings of Kinship among the Ese Ejja of Northern Bolivia,” JRAI 11 (2005): 703–724.
32 Bronislaw Malinowski, “Kinship,” Man 30 (1939): 19–29, quote 19.
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no connected history we can tell ourselves about the study of morality in anthropology,
as we do for a range of topics such as kinship”.33 He laments that a Durkheimian view
holding morality is the product of social interaction is so pervasive that it has tended to
exclude work on ‘morals’ per se.34 Laidlaw’s judgment, however, is overly pessimistic:
although relatively limited, there is a corpus of anthropological reflection about ethics.35
There are two main foci. One concerns the morality of the anthropological endeavour
itself. Issues include the discipline’s colonial heritage, power relations between
anthropological observer and the people studied, and matters of confidentiality and
disclosure.36 In these debates anthropologists have wrestled with how to reconcile the
discipline’s key assumption of cultural relativity and substantive issues of human
dignity.37
33 James Laidlaw, “For an Anthropology of Ethics and Freedom,” JRAI 8 (2002): 311–32, quote 311.
Note D. Pocock’s quip: “ ‘Morals’, ‘morality’, ‘ethics’ are not words commonly found in the indices
of anthropological monographs and, if they are found, they are not commonly followed by many page
references”, D. F. Pocock, “The Ethnography of Morals,” IJMSS 1 (1986): 3–20, quote 7. This despite
some of the anthropological ‘classics’ attending to ethical issues, e.g. Evans-Pritchard, Nuer, 257–66;
Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (1934. Repr., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989).
34 See the critical exposition of Durkheim in Sybil Wolfram, “Anthropology and Morality,” JASO 13
(1982): 262–74, especially 266–73. A similar caution about conflating the social and moral is made by
David Parkin, “Introduction,” in The Anthropology of Evil (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 1–25,
especially 3–5. Most anthropological studies refrain from defining ‘morality’; the situation has not
changed much since Edel and Edel affirmed that anthropology “has no established definitions of the
moral, nor even any body of common ascriptions”, May Edel and Abraham Edel, Anthropology &
Ethics: The Quest for Moral Understanding (1968; repr. New Brunswick: Transaction Press, 2000), 7.
Indeed, seeking a definition is probably a fruitless task since, in the words of Rasanayagam and
Heintz, “morality is always in a dynamic state of negotiation and flux as people relate to wider societal
norms in the context of everyday practical action”, Johan Rasanayagam and Monica Heintz, “An
anthropology of morality,” in Max Plank Institute for Social Anthropology Report 2004–2005 (Halle:
Max Plank Institute for Social Anthropology, 2005), 51–60, quote 53. My emphasis. Parkin considers
the wide scope of the word ‘evil’ an advantage: “It is precisely because the term has been so loose
analytically that it has been able to reveal so much empirically”, “Introduction,” 2.
35 For surveys of ‘the anthropology of ethics’ see Pocock, “Ethnography of Morals”; Klaus Hoeyer,
“Ethics Wars: Reflections on the Antagonism between Bioethicists and Social Science Observers of
Biomedicine,” HumStud 29 (2006): 203–27; Signe Howell, “Introduction,” in The Ethnography of
Moralities (ed. S. Howell; London: Routledge, 1997), 1–22; Jarrett Zigon, “Moral Breakdown and the
Ethical Demand: A Theoretical Framework for an Anthropology of Moralities,” AT 7 (2007): 131–50,
especially 131–34. For discussion of the relationship between philosophical ethics and
anthropological studies see Edel and Edel, Anthropology and Ethics; Wolfram, “Anthropology and
Morality”; Hoeyer, “Ethics Wars,” who identifies deficit, replacement and dismissive models.
36 For a survey of anthropologists’ moral questioning of their task and the development of professional
ethical standards see Pat Caplan, “Introduction: Anthropology and Ethics,” in Ethics and
Anthropology: Debates and Dilemmas (ed. P. Caplan; London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 1–
33; David Mills, “ ‘Like a Horse in Blinkers’?: A Political History of Anthropology’s Research
Ethics,” in Ethics and Anthropology: Debates and Dilemmas (ed. P. Caplan; London and New York:
Routledge, 2003), 35–55.
37 Note the rejection of ethical relativity as an inappropriate response to injustice, and the call for a
politically committed and morally engaged anthropology of the ‘other’ in Nancy Scheper-Hughes,
“The Primacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a Militant Anthropology,” Curr Anthropol 36 (1995):
409–40. Nigel Rapport develops a liberal ethic by maintaining a focus upon the individual human
agent, Transcendent Individual: Towards a Literary and Liberal Anthropology (London and New
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Whilst these concerns are important, it is the second focus, the study of the
‘moralities’ of others, that is of direct interest to this study. Several distinct emphases
may be discerned. Early research, as in kinship studies, examined the vocabulary of
moral appraisal, an approach that has not been entirely abandoned.38 A more holistic
approach is represented by the first monograph on the anthropology of ethics, which
defined the task as seeking to identify patterns or systems of moral behaviour.39 Another
tack is taken by those who study aspects of cultural life. Carmelo Lisón-Tolosana’s
ethnography of the ethics of inheritance, for example, highlights conflicts of moral and
other goods, the variety of ways in which they can be configured, and the various
justifications for these arrangements.40 It is notable that no single construction is free of
problems or fails to create other conflicts. Nevertheless, some arrangements may be
defended as more ‘natural’ than others; indeed, it is the natural basis of the family that
leads Pitt-Rivers to state that it is a moral unit.41
A key theoretical issue in the ‘anthropology of ethics’ concerns the working
assumption of cultural, and hence ethical, relativity, and the possibility of cross-cultural
comparison, and thus universal ethical standards.42 Bradd Shore observes that the terms
of this discussion have tended to hide complexity within both societies and individuals.
On the one hand, homogenising generalisations of a particular society’s morality,
exemplified in work directed at identifying ‘moral systems’, can point only to different
emphases vis-à-vis other societies; it cannot explain how particular people behave. On
the other, if people are merely vehicles for “the simple mobilization of values” there is
no theoretical space for those who, sometimes, at least, view ethics in terms of moral
York: Routledge, 1997), 180–201.
38 E.g. Clyde Kluckhohn, “Some Navaho Value Terms in Behavioural Context,” Language 32 (1956):
140–45. Christopher Boehm contends that the advantage of semantic analyses is that they are
anchored to observable data, “Exposing the Moral Self in Montenegro: The Use of Natural Definitions
to Keep Ethnography Descriptive,” AE 7 (1980): 1–26.
39 Edel and Edel, Anthropology and Ethics, 9, 108–147; cf. Rasanayagam and Heintz, “An anthropology
of morality,” 51–53.
40 Carmelo Lisón-Tolosana, “The Ethics of Inheritance,” in Mediterranean Family Structures (CSSA 13;
ed. Peristiany; Cambridge: CUP, 1976), 305–15.
41 See “The Moral Foundations of the Family,” in The Fate of Shechem, or the Politics of Sex: Essays in
the Anthropology of the Mediterranean (CSSA 19; Cambridge: CUP, 1977), 71–93. Note, however,
that Pitt-Rivers supposes that relations between the sexes are the basis for family organisation.
42 Cf. Edel and Edel, Anthropology and Ethics, 19–33; Clyde Kluckhohn, “Ethical Relativity: Sic et
Non,” JP 52 (1955): 663–77; Bradd Shore, “Human Ambivalence and the Structuring of Moral
Values,” Ethos 18 (1990): 165–79, especially 166–67; Richard Shweder, “Ethical Relativism: Is There
a Defensible Version?,” Ethos 18 (1990): 205–18. Pocock provocatively suggests that claims for
ethical relativity hide a proposal for the normativity of subjectivism, “Ethnography of Morals,” 9.
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dilemmas.43 Shore goes further, arguing that ethical discourse is a means of justifying
action in the light of conflicting moral imperatives. He contends, therefore, that
generalisations “squeeze life out of…reality…by treating human action as if it proceeds
from a simple activation of cultural values rather than from the problematical and
always partial resolution of dilemmas”.44
It is instructive to note the specifically ethical categories (as practised in Western
ethics) used by anthropologists. Pitt-Rivers argues that “[m]oral values are best
examined through the sanctions that operate against their violation”.45 He attends to the
‘norms’ of honour and shame, observing that sanctions are often informal, for example,
gossip about infractions of socially expected behaviour. Although much Western ethical
discourse conceives of moral norms as universal, K. E. Read observes that among the
Gahuku-Gama of New Guinea compliance is not even expected of everyone within
society, for a person’s moral obligations depend upon relationships with particular
individuals.46 An awareness of the duties established by personal relationships enables
Daniel Smith, in a study of ‘corruption’ in Nigeria, to appreciate that the public and
private are not discrete domains, and that “much of what critics might floss as
‘corruption’ can look like moral behavior from local perspectives”. 47 Paulo Sousa
suggests that a reason for such misunderstandings can be that what is discretionary in
one society, for example, caring for an elderly parent in one’s own house, might be
considered normative in another.48 The very idea of ‘norms’, however, may itself be
culturally specific. In her ethnography of Mongolia, Caroline Humphrey proposes that
43 Shore, “Human Ambivalence,” 168.
44 Shore, “Human Ambivalence,” 172. Without original emphasis. Shore argues that it is the
contradictions inherent to the human condition that enable one to transcend ethical relativism. In this
context I concur that “cultural systems do not invent values so much as they orchestrate rhetorical
strategies, organizing the perception of value-laden situations with standardized and culturally
acceptable formulations”, cf. Shore, “Human Ambivalence,” 174–76, quote 175. Without original
emphasis.
45 Pitt-Rivers, “Moral Basis,” 83.
46 K. E. Read, “Morality and the Concept of the Person Among the Gahuku-Gama,” Oceania 25 (1955):
233–82, especially 260: “Stated as sharply as possible, moral obligations are primarily contingent on
the social positioning of individuals”. These ‘norms’ might be expressed in proverbs, e.g. “Instead of
saying it is ‘good’ or ‘right’ to help others, they state quite simply that ‘if you don’t help others, others
won’t help you’ ”, “Gahuku-Gama,” 255. Note that Read, as might be expected from the date of his
study, seeks to uncover ‘moral systems’. A ‘person orientated’ morality is also identified by Dan
Rosengren, “Matsigenka Myth and Morality: Notions of the Social and the Asocial,” Ethnos 63
(1998): 249–72.
47 Daniel Smith, “Kinship and Corruption in Contemporary Nigeria,” Ethnos 66 (2001): 344–64, quote
345. He also notes, in line with the argument of this thesis, that people often recognise a conflict of
moral goods and are ambivalent about the practices in which they feel (morally) obliged to engage.
48 Paulo Sousa, “On Folk Conceptions of Mind, Agency and Morality,” JCC 6 (2006): 1–25, especially
7–8. Compliance, of course, is separate matter.
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an ‘ethics of exemplars’ is a better description of Mongolian morality.49 Yet another
challenge to assuming the applicability of Western notions of moral reasoning comes
from Signe Howell, who questions whether choices are inevitably reflexive, advocating
comparative study of the processes of moral choice.50 In contrast to a focus upon norms,
sanctions, or even exemplars, Thomas Widlock advocates concentrating upon moral
virtue, asserting that ‘ethos’ “in the anthropological sense relates above all to everyday
customs and to practical needs, and not to aloof concepts of right or wrong and good or
bad”.51 The anthropology of ethics, says Widlock, should attend to how basic human
goods feature in moral practices, claiming that a focus on how societies conceive of
‘virtuous agency’ would enable anthropologists both to account for the particularity of
moral practices and to engage in cross-cultural comparison.52 Like Shore, Widlock
highlights the multiplicity of goods and goals: moral decisions take place in a complex
environment.53
A growing awareness of the limitations of Western categories of ethical
reflection, in particular of the emphasis upon rules, has led the recent major monographs
on the anthropology of ethics to focus upon the practice of morality. Although few
authors describe their work as ‘the anthropology of the ethics of kinship’, their focus
upon individuals in family contexts means that this is, de facto, what they produce.54
49 Caroline Humphrey, “Exemplars and rules: Aspects of the discourse of moralities in Mongolia,” in
The Ethnography of Moralities (ed. S. Howell; London: Routledge, 1997), 25–47, especially 34–38.
Note that although “[f]inding exemplars is part of discovering and cultivating oneself”, that is,
potentially individualistic, there are commonalities in different people’s chosen exemplars because
they tend to originate from the same societies: Genghis Khan is a popular exemplar, Humphrey,
“Exemplars,” 36.
50 Howell, “Introduction,” 14–15. In this respect David Crandall observes that neither self-absorbed
reflection nor experiential testing of convictions produce moral certainty but ‘epiphany’, that is, “a
deeply subjective conviction” that the moral tenets one holds are universally true, “Knowing Human
Moral Knowledge to be True: An Essay on Intellectual Conviction,” JRAI 10 (2004): 307–26, quote
314. Jarrett Zigon is to be commended for explicitly delineating the philosophical underpinnings of
his proposal that “a distinction must be made between the unreflective moral dispositions or everyday
life and the conscious ethical tactics performed in the ethical moment”, “Moral Breakdown,” 148. He
claims that an anthropology of morality is only possible to the extent to which attention is paid to the
latter, the moment of ‘moral breakdown’. However, this seems unnecessarily restrictive; and in the
following section it will become clear why I think it is important to attend to both un-reflexive and
reflexive moral action.
51 Thomas Widlock, “Sharing by Default?: Outline of an Anthropology of Virtue,” AT 4 (2004): 53–70,
quote 57. James Faubion also proposes that the anthropology of ethics should focus upon virtue,
although, following Foucault, his scheme pays more attention to the unmasking of power relations, cf.
“Toward an Anthropology of Ethics: Foucault and the Pedagogies of Autopoiesis,” Representations
74 (2001): 83–104, especially 90–92.
52 Widlock, “Sharing by default?,” 57–59.
53 Cf. Widlock, “Sharing by default?,” 64.
54 Although Faubion’s subtitle, ‘Toward an Anthropology of the Ethics of Kinship’, entitles a section of
his article, he simply summarises the methodology he proposes in “Introduction: Toward an
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Each, naturally, has its own emphasis. Margaret Trawick writes a ‘thick description’ of
the dynamics of a single Tamil family.55 Unni Wikan describes in fine detail the life and
choices of a single individual, ‘Suriati’.56 Laura Ahearn’s longitudinal study of love
letters tells how this innovative practice affects selected couples in Nepal.57 Italo Pardo
investigates how people negotiate paths through conflicting obligations and desires in
the context of multiple relationships with family and friends in inner city Naples.58
Steven Parish illuminates moral formation through both everyday and ritual practices in
the Kathmandu Valley. 59 And Helle Rydstrøm examines practices of moral
socialisation, highlighting gender differences in socially acceptable behaviour.60 In all
these writings the authors seek to avoid assuming both that ‘culture’ is equivalent to
‘morality’ and that social context is irrelevant for personal action. It is noteworthy that
they achieve this objective only by focusing upon individuals in concrete social
contexts: rather than seeking generalisations these anthropologists are highly responsive
to both patterns and idiosyncrasies.61
The survey of the anthropology of kinship with which I commenced this chapter
outlined how anthropologists have theorised kinship relations, concluding that ‘the
family’ was not essentially a matter of descent, nor marriage alliance, nor even cultural
Anthropology of the Ethics of Kinship,” in The Ethics of Kinship: Ethnographic Inquiries (ed. J. D.
Faubion; Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 1–28. Other authors actually produce ethnographies
of family morality.
55 Trawick, Notes on Love.
56 Unni Wikan, Managing Turbulent Hearts: A Balinese Formula for Living (Chicago / London:
University of Chicago Press, 1990).
57 Laura M. Ahearn, Invitations to Love: Literacy, Love Letters, & Social Change in Nepal (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2001).
58 Italo Pardo, Managing Existence in Naples: Morality, action and structure (CSSCA 104; Cambridge:
CUP, 1996).
59 Steven M. Parish, Moral Knowing in a Hindu Sacred City: An Exploration of Mind, Emotion, and Self
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
60 Helle Rydstrøm, “Like a White Piece of Paper. Embodiment and the Moral Upbringing of Vietnamese
Children,” Ethnos 66 (2001): 394–413; idem, Embodying Morality. It is notable that the majority of
this learning occurs within family, and that the traditions children learn to embody are frequently
opposed to official rhetoric. Heidi Fung examines the socialisation of shame, paying particular
attention to ‘opportunity education’ by means of story-telling, so that young children develop a
heightened sense of shame ‘naturally’, “Becoming a Moral Child: The Socialization of Shame among
Young Chinese Children,” Ethos 27 (1999): 180–209. Fung argues that parents teach ‘discretion
shame’ so children learn to avoid situations in which they experience ‘disgrace shame’, “Moral
Child,” 202–3.
61 See also Rasanayagam and Heintz’s observation that an individual’s personal freedom is constrained
by the power relations in the context of which they act (or choose not to act), “An anthropology of
morality,” 56. Andrew Walsh puts the matter more positively arguing that people operate within
‘systems of responsibilities’, “Responsibility, Taboos and ‘The Freedom to do otherwise’ in
Ankarana, Northern Madagascar,” JRAI 8 (2002): 451–68, especially 465. Walsh avers that actors
make choices in the context of multiple responsibilities, which, he argues, stimulates creativity.
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understandings of gender, but rather a constellation of practices. Similarly, this review
of the anthropology of ethics finds that scholars have most profitably analysed morality
in terms of practice. But what is ‘practice’? How does one person’s practice relate to
that of others? And how can patterns of practice be explained alongside the observation
that people do new things? These are the questions I will address in the following
section.
3.3 THE PRACTICE OF THE ETHICS OF KINSHIP
In the anthropological and sociological literature the debate about practice is
usually framed in terms of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’. Indeed, the tension between them
has been called “a leitmotiv in the history of the social sciences”.62 What is at issue is
the nature of the source or prompt for action. Is it social structure, that is, the ‘context’
of action? Or is it agency, that is, the acting subject, the individual who decides to act?
Or is it a mixture of the two?
3.3.1 ‘Practice Theory’
One school of thought that attempts to hold structure and agency together is
‘practice theory’.63 Sherry Ortner notes that this is not really a theory, since it lacks an
underlying conception of the social order. “There is only as it were an argument—that
human action is made by ‘structure’, and at the same time always makes and potentially
unmakes it”.64
The best known advocate of practice theory is Pierre Bourdieu. In Outline of the
62 Caroline B. Brettell, “The Individual/Agent and Culture/Structure in the History of the Social
Sciences,” SSH 26 (2002): 429–45, quote 442.
63 One cannot strictly speak of ‘practice theory’, for there are various versions. The foundational texts
are Bourdieu, Logic; idem, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: CUP, 1977); Anthony
Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis
(Berkeley: University of Los Angeles Press, 1979); Marshall Sahlins, Historical Metaphors and
Mythical Realities: Structure in the Early History of the Sandwich Islands Kingdom (ASAOSP 1; Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981); Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Trans.
S. Rendall; Berkley: University of California Press, 1984); and Sherry Ortner, High Religion: A
Cultural and Political History of Sherpa Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
Andreas Reckwitz explains that they have in common a dismissal of the ‘blind spot’ of both rational
choice and norm-orientated theories of social action, viz. the implicit knowledge “which enables
symbolic organization of reality”, “Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in
Culturalist Theorizing,” EJST 5 (2005): 243–63, quote 246.
64 Sherry Ortner, Making Gender: The Politics and Erotics of Culture (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 2.
Chris Shilling explains that practice theory avoids giving either structure or agency “explanatory
priority” since this fails to examine the interplay between them, “Towards an embodied understanding
of the structure / agency relationship,” BJS 50 (1999): 543–62, quote 544.
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Theory of Practice and The Logic of Practice he seeks to bridge the ‘ruinous divide’
between objectivism and subjectivism. 65 Objectivism argues social practices derive
from social structure. It cannot, however, account adequately for different acting
subjects making distinct choices in identical situations: the charge is that objectivism is
too deterministic. Subjectivism explains social practices as the aggregate of individual
choice. But it cannot account adequately for regularity of behaviour: the charge is that
subjectivism is too voluntaristic. Attempting to overcome the dichotomy between
objectivism and subjectivism Bourdieu argues that both acting subjects, themselves the
product of past practices, and social structure, which is (re)produced by actors, are
necessary to explain practice. A key concept is habitus:
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles
which generate and organize practices and representations that can be
objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious
aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order
to attain them. Objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any
way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively
orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a
conductor.66
The habitus is the product of history, that is, the consequence of subjects’ actions, and
yet, because it is interiorised, it constrains (in both senses of the word) their actions.
Although there may be a strategic response to habitus, even this is defined with
reference to the possibilities inherent in the habitus itself.67 Bourdieu claims he avoids
both a mechanistic derivation of practice from habitus, and the inertia-less, free subject
of voluntarism.68
The orchestration provided by the habitus produces an objective commonsense
world, doxa. Bourdieu remarks that “[b]ecause the subjective necessity and self-
65 See Bourdieu, Outline, 1–22; idem, Logic, 25–51; cf. Enrique Martín Criado, “Habitus,” DCCS n.p.
66 Bourdieu, Logic, 53. Cf. another of Bourdieu’s definitions: “the durably installed generative principle
of regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in
the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands
inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating
structures making up the habitus”, Outline, 78. For a summary of Bourdieu’s habitus see Derek
Robbins, Bourdieu and Culture (London: SAGE, 2000), 26–29. On the etymology of the term from
Aristolian hexis, through Thomistic habitus, to Bourdieu’s usage see Loïc Wacquant, “Habitus,” IEES
315–19.
67 Bourdieu, Logic, 53.
68 Bourdieu, Logic, 56. Bourdieu notes that if “agents are possessed by their habitus more than they
possess it, this is because it acts within them as the organizing principle of their actions, and because
this modus operandi informing all thought and action (including thought of action) reveals itself only
in the opus operatum”, Outline, 18.
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evidence of the commonsense world are validated by the objective consensus on the
sense of the world, what is essential goes without saying because it comes without
saying”. 69 And those who share a habitus, for example those of the same class,
understand each other’s practices. None of this disposes with acting subjects, but the
habitus provides the basis for actors’ “intentionless invention of regulated
improvisation”. 70 Wacquant proposes that the habitus is analogous to ‘generative
grammar’, which enables proficient speakers to use a language unthinkingly “in
inventive yet predictable ways”.71
Bourdieu’s work has been thoroughly analysed. In the following sections I
discuss some major criticisms in order to highlight issues pertinent to this study.
3.3.2 Agency
One objection to Bourdieu’s thesis comes from phenomenologists like Jason
Throop and Keith Murphy, who argue practice theory fails to account for an
individual’s consciously perceived goals.
[W]hile it may often be the case that a number of our personally, socially
and culturally patterned responses to perceptual, sensory and conceptual
stimuli are habitual, it is also the case that these habitual responses can
often be immediately available to conscious reflection in their real-time
occurrence. In other words, just because a particular response, behavior,
thought pattern, evoked emotion, feeling or sensation is habitual or
69 Bourdieu, Outline, 167. Emphasis original. See Bourdieu, Outline, 80, where he presents the
relationship between doxa and opinion diagrammatically:
universe of the undiscussed
(undisputed)
opinion
hetero-
–
doxy
ortho-
+
doxy
doxa
universe of discourse
(or argument)
70 Bourdieu, Outline, 79. Emphasis original. Cf. Bourdieu’s assertion that it is not possible to work back
from practice (opus operatum) to motive (modus operandi), Logic, 59.
71 Wacquant, “Habitus,” 316. Cf. Jazz improvisation, an observation I owe to Nathan MacDonald.
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automatic, this does not in itself perforce entail that individuals are not to
some degree aware of these habitual responses as they occur.”72
If people are aware of what they are doing the potential consciously to manipulate or
manage responses is real. Nigel Rapport is especially critical of Bourdieu’s habitus.
Durable, transposable, cognitive, and behavioural, habituses [sic]
function to generate an homogenous social conventionality, while
subjects remain unconscious of the consequences of the actions and
‘misrecognize’ the objectivity of the social relations that these
reproduce.73
His argument is that socialization does not lead to patterns of behaviour becoming
‘things-in-themselves’. The habitus, therefore, can never become a verbal subject; it has
no agency. Interpretation remains the task of individuals, and although people may use
learned conventions, these “will be animated by purposes that are individual and
ultimately indeterminate”.74 Given his insistence that social relations are an aggregation
of individuals’ purposes Rapport objects to the analytical separation of intention and
action.75 He asserts that simply because “the consequences of individual’s actions are
not always (or even not often) as intended does not make those consequences any less
personal or individual in their nature”.76 To illustrate his thesis Rapport compares the art
and letters of Stanley Spencer. He opines it is not possible to understand Spencer’s
relations with others without appreciating Stanley’s own, at times contradictory,
understanding of those same relationships.77 Rapport conceives an elevated role for
individual creativity, which he defines as “the novel individual use of collective cultural
forms”.78 This is because
72 Jason Throop and Keith Murphy. “Bourdieu and Phenomenology,” AT 2 (2002): 185–207, quote 199.
73 Nigel Rapport, “Envisioned, Intentioned: A Painter Informs an Anthropologist about Social
Relations,” JRAI 10 (2004): 861–81, quote 862.
74 Rapport, “Envisioned, Intentioned,” 864.
75 Cf. Rapport, “Envisioned, Intentioned,” 863–64. Note his summary of Bourdieu’s position: “In regard
to their social significance, their social role, individuals’ actions do not belong to them, for social-
scientific generalization comes to apprehend the socially caused reproductions of institutional
relations by way of individual actions’ unintended consequences”, “Envisioned, Intentioned,” 865.
My emphasis.
76 Rapport, “Envisioned, Intentioned,” 877.
77 Rapport, “Envisioned, Intentioned,” 877–78. See Rapport’s citation of Spencer’s explanation of his
art: “all I am wishing to do is to enable anyone to stand on the exact spot in my mind and see what I
see”, “Envisioned, Intentioned,” 871.
78 Nigel Rapport, The Prose and the Passion: Anthropology, Literature and the Writing of E. M. Forster
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 260. The novel use could be novel combinations,
novel constitution of forms or novel meanings. His vision of creative agency is “breaking the teacup
of conventional experience”, which can be done in five ways: composition and decomposition –
division and re-building of old forms; weighting – accentuating certain elements of culture;
reordering; deletion and supplementation – exclusion of some elements; and deformation – distorting
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the world is not organized into neat pieces of information merely waiting
for human retrieval, what the brain is doing in interacting with an
environment is actually structuring its life-world. The environments in
which human beings find themselves are open-ended and ambiguous, and
their order, their codification into distinct, bounded and labelled things
and relations, derives from human organisms engaged in acts of
perceiving.79
Rapport’s concern is to rescue individual agency and avoid an image of people as
passive victims of historical, social and cultural vicissitudes.
The thesis that conscious individual action is the source of all practice, however,
is too bold. 80 First, since “agency is merely a potential (capacity) which must be
developed through social intercourse into a specific form”,81 its shape will depend upon
an agent’s position in a particular society, including her power. Declan Quigley astutely
remarks that “not all individuals live in historical conditions where their opportunities to
express their individuality bear much resemblance to each other…no individual lives in
a society where s/he can express his or her individuality in any way s/he pleases”.82 This
is not necessarily a negative thing, for social constraint is not always wrong: it can
prevent or stop evil as well as curtail legitimate individuality. Second, it may be
impossible to know about an individual’s intentions. Indeed this knowledge may be
unavailable even to the acting subject. What is observable, however, is socialised
behaviour. This means that an account of practice must include social context, even if it
is not a personal subject in itself. Third, individualistic approaches over-emphasise
or elaborating certain cultural elements, Prose, 261.
79 Nigel Rapport, “Random Mind: Towards an Appreciation of Openness in Individual, Society and
Anthropology,” AJA 12 (2001): 190–208, quote 194. Whilst Rapport considers that the source of
creativity is the mind’s random generation of ideas and images of the world, this has political
consequences: “It is the anthropological responsibility to explain that individuals make communities
and create traditions: also to champion those social environments in which such individuality is
recognised and respected, and to declaim against those which bury individual worth under a weight of
so-called traditional or revelational or institutional knowledge and practice”, “Random Mind,” 203–4.
80 Although there is truth in the assertions of Carl Ratner and Philip Esler that the emphasis upon
individual agency is itself a cultural phenomenon, I maintain that individual agency is an essential
analytical category, if only because human beings are singularly embodied. I do not, therefore,
consider Rapport’s concern with agency an inherent weakness of his argument, Carl Ratner, “Agency
and Culture,” JTSB 30 (2000): 413–34, especially 424–27; Philip Esler, “Models in New Testament
Interpretation: A Reply to David Horrell,” JSNT 78 (2000): 107–113, especially 110.
81 Ratner, “Agency and Culture,” 424.
82 Cf. Declan Quigley, “Anthropology in Disneyworld: Rapport, Gardner, and the ‘Discipline’ of Social
Anthropology,” AJA 12 (2001): 182–89, especially 184–85. Cf. Bourdieu, Logic, 64: “Only in
imaginary experience (in the folk tale, for example), which neutralizes the sense of social realities,
does the social world take the form of a universe of possibilities equally possible for any possible
subject”. Quigley observes, therefore, that individuals’ creativities are only formally, not substantially,
the same.
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individuals’ predilection for change whilst downplaying how personal psychology is
organised by culture.83
To summarise, it seems that one should follow Ortner in supposing that it is
important “to articulate a position in which there is some distance between actor and
culture, and yet which does not postulate a culturally unconstrained actor rationally
manipulating cultural imagery and options”.84 She proposes a ‘loosely structured’ actor
who is prepared—but not more than that—to find most of his or her
culture intelligible and meaningful, but who does not necessarily find all
parts of it equally meaningful in all times and places. The distance
between culture and actor is there, but so too is the capacity to find
meaning, in more than a manipulative way, in one’s own cultural
repertoire.85
3.3.3 Structure
Omar Lizardo argues Bourdieu’s habitus is used in two ways, viz., a “perpetual
and classifying structure” and “a generative structure of practical action”.86 The latter
occurs because the external habitus is internalized, which means the stimulus for action
“lies neither in structures nor in consciousness, but rather in the relation of immediate
proximity between objective structures and embodied structures-in-habitus”. 87 This
careful reading, however, does not return to Bourdieu’s theory an adequate view of
agency. Ortner notes the internalized habitus is “a virtual mirror of external limits and
possibilities”.88 In other words, it is the combination of things received that produces
action, not individual intentions. At the point of decision the structuring aspect of
habitus determines action; it is too static, too objective. Whilst Bourdieu and Giddens
emphasise structural reproduction, conceiving practice as a loop, Ortner maintains this
neglects slippage, where agents do not reproduce but change patterns, or rebel.89 These
83 Cf. Gannath Obeyesekere, Medusa’s Hair (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
84 Ortner, High Religion, 198.
85 Ortner, High Religion, 198.
86 Omar Lizardo, “The Cognitive Origins of Bourdieu’s Habitus,” JTSB 34 (2004): 375–401, quote 379.
Without original emphasis.
87 Bourdieu, The State Nobility (trans. L. C. Clough; Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 38. Andrew
Rawnsley finds in Bourdieu’s later work a similar openness to change and individual reflexivity, see
“From Roots to Rites: Practice Logics and the ‘Heir’ to Metaphysics” (Ph.D. diss., St Andrews
University, 2006), 122–35; Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations (trans. R. Nice; Cambridge:
Polity, 2000), especially 145–54; idem, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Cambridge:
Polity, 1998); idem, Science of Science and Reflexivity (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).
88 Ortner, Making Gender, 11. De Certeau makes a similar charge, Everyday Life, 59.
89 Ortner, Making Gender, 17.
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slippages may be intentional or unintentional. It is a “version of practice theory, with
everything slightly—but not completely—tilted toward incompleteness, instability, and
change”.90
Ortner makes this proposal because of a fundamental insight. She observes that
structures, habitus, and ‘cultures’ are not monolithic but contain many elements, some
of which contradict each other. This forces actors to choose between cultural goods or
aspects of the habitus. “The point here is that structure does not just sit there,
constraining actors by its formal characteristics, but recurrently poses problems to
actors, to which they must respond”.91 Ortner complements this observation with a
second concept of structure, that of a ‘cultural schema’, a standard, socially acceptable,
even laudable, way of resolving the structure’s inherent contradictions.92 These moves
provide Ortner with the theoretical space to account for subversions of the dominant
paradigm from within, and thus to explain why individual actors sometimes choose to
act outside the schema, for example, by eloping to marry for love, or forgiving a slight
to honour. Thus “structure is practiced, it is lived, it is enacted, but it is also challenged,
defended, renewed, changed”. 93 Ortner develops the resultant possibilities into a
typology of practice, each with a different relation to ‘structure’. ‘Ordinary practice’ is
repetitive or everyday action, which leads to internalization of structure. ‘Intentional
action’ concerns the pursuit of individual goals and desires; an important question is
how structure constitutes these desires—in her study of Sherpa Buddhist monasteries
Ortner argues that various historical factors pushed individuals in certain directions
because of their extant cultural structures and that, concurrently, actors used historical
circumstances in ways that made sense given their cultural milieu. ‘Extraordinary
praxis’ is sustained activity based upon a culturally alternative logic.
Changes to dominant schemata may arise not only from extraordinary praxis, but
also unintentionally when ordinary practice does not lead to reproduction of cultural
structure. A classic study is Marshal Sahlins’ evaluation of how selected practices
among Hawaiian society changed as distinct classes engaged differently with
90 Ortner, Making Gender, 18. Ortner labels her vision a ‘subaltern practice theory’. On changes to the
habitus in Bourdieu’s theory see Pascalian Meditations, 159–63.
91 Ortner, High Religion, 196.
92 These answers are the fruit of Foucaultian power plays between agents over time, and thus amenable
to ideological criticism.
93 Ortner, High Religion, 196.
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Europeans. 94 Lower class women, with the support of their husbands and acting
according to cultural presuppositions, sought to conceive children with superior mana
through sexual relations with British sailors. The consequences went beyond ‘blessed’
offspring. Ortner argues the women became “agents of the spirit of capitalism in their
society”,95 since in return for their services the women received iron nails and other
‘trinkets’. The iron, in particular, was highly valued, and chiefs manipulated ritual tabu
in order to purloin the women’s ‘payments’ and to restrict access to trade with
Europeans. The result of this abuse of tabu was both its denigration and eventual
abrogation, and the advent of a freer ‘capitalistic’ form of exchange distinct from
‘communion’. 96 The chiefs instigated another example of unexpected change by
attempting to preserve social structure by killing the god Lono, Captain Cook, which
precipitated the overthrow of both their deities and themselves as chiefs. Although
Ortner is polemical, her observations are apposite: “To say that society and history are
products of human action is true, but only in a certain ironic sense. They are rarely the
products the actors themselves set out to make.”97
3.3.4 Ambiguity
The differences of perception between Cook’s sailors and the Sandwich
Islanders might be expected, but Nigel Rapport argues they occur not only between
people from very different backgrounds, but also among those who share cultural
understandings. His ethnographic research in the English village of ‘Wanet’ highlights
the ubiquity of varying interpretations, and, consequently, the ambiguity of all social
interaction. Reflecting upon his fieldwork experience Rapport submits that social life
could not be neatly classified. Rather, it was “farcical, chaotic, multiple, contradictory;
it was a muddling-through, which turned on the paradoxical distinction between
appearance and actuality”. 98 Rapport contends the picture of Wanet as ‘rural idyll’
represents the town as a single culture, “consensually shared, homogeneous and
94 Sahlins, Historical Metaphors. For a summary and bibliography of the ensuing debate between
Sahlins and Obeyesekere see Geertz, Available Light, 98–107.
95 Sheryl Ortner, “Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties,” in Culture/Power/History: A Reader in
Contemporary Social Theory (eds. N. B. Dirks, G. Eley and S. B. Ortner; Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1994), 372–411, quote 401.
96 Sahlins, Historical Metaphors, 37–66.
97 Ortner, “Theory in Anthropology,” 401.
98 Nigel Rapport, Diverse World-Views in an English Village (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1993), ix. Contrast Rapport’s use of ‘chaos’ and Malinowski’s imposition of an ordered functional
scheme, Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: Routledge, 1922); idem,
A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term (New York: Harcourt, 1967).
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uniform”. 99 This conception obscures diversity. In fact, he argues, whatever social
structure there may have been was manifest in various ways; hence the necessity of
examining particular examples.100
Rapport observed the relationships between two farming families, the Rowlands
and Whitehouses. A number of considerations affected their interaction, including
familial, occupational, neighbourly, economic and spiritual, but none of these was of
consistently overriding importance.101 It was “individual interpretation of the relations
of the moment which determine[d] which consideration [was] pertinent, and which
construction [was] salient, when”.102 A further observation complicates matters even
more: individual interpretation is contradictory, changing according to the moment.
Rapport claims that some anthropological thought represents contradiction as a problem
and equates social order to the eradication of “symbolic contrarieties”.103 In contrast, he
avers that social order “is predicated not upon the absence of contradiction but upon its
co-presence: the cognitive co-presence of the contradictory, of both/and, together with
the classificatory order of either/or”.104 Rapport asserts that ‘both/and’, as well as being
a cognitive norm, is the cognitive reality behind the social reality of either/or
classifications.105 Although he errs in placing all his eggs in the cognitive basket, one
can concur that Rapport correctly highlights the inherent contradictions ordered (and
ordering) cultural schemata seek to resolve in either/or terms.
Rapport uses three informants to investigate when contradictions surface:
Rachel, in Mitzpe Ramon, Israel, and Sid and Doris, in Wanet. Rachel admitted and
even celebrated contradiction within moments, describing herself as ‘a bit schizo’.106
Doris and Sid, though, experienced no contradiction within any one moment, just
between moments.
99 Rapport, Diverse, 32.
100 Rapport, Diverse, 40. “In a compendium of such cases, moreover, one should not expect a gluey
coherence or neat integration (any more than an assemblage of unique isolates). Rather, from case to
case there will be an overlapping of behavioural samenesses and differences...In short, far from simple
dichotomies and continua, from generalisable categories of behaviour in village community or town, a
compendium of cases of social life in Britain will consist of an aggregation of partially
(polythetically) connected behaviours.” Rapport, Diverse, 41.
101 Rapport, Diverse, 50.
102 Rapport, Diverse, 51.
103 Nigel Rapport, “The ‘Contrarieties’ of Israel: An Essay on the Cognitive Importance and the Creative
Promise of Both/And,” JRAI 3 (1997): 653–72, quote 657.
104 Rapport, “Contrarieties,” 657–58. Emphasis original.
105 Rapport, “Contrarieties,” 654.
106 Rapport, “Contrarieties,” 665.
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Being for Doris, Sid, et al., turned on momentary thoughts, feelings,
apprehensions, emotions, on discrete experiential units of time and place,
of self, of individuality. And while the momentariness of their lives
formed a constant, while their moments were ‘for ever’, between
moments there was need for no consistent cognitive connexion.107
It is important to assess these distinct observations of when contradiction occurs.
Although I do not wish to re-evaluate Rapport’s field notes it is significant that Rachel
recognised her experience of simultaneous “contradictory cognitions”108 as problematic:
schizophrenia is not culturally ‘normal’. Thus although people’s ability to generate
multifaceted perspectives is part and parcel of life, the inability to select or perceive as
dominant a single perspective at any one time is not, and the observation does not
advance our discussion significantly.109 Rapport’s observations regarding Doris and Sid
are more pertinent for social-scientific study of biblical characters’ interactions. They
underscore the potential for actors to behave differently according to the person with
whom they are interacting, not just some amorphous ‘cultural context’.
In his article comparing the art and letters of Stanley Spencer, Rapport asks how
and why an actor’s conception of his or her social relations affects those relations.110 He
asserts that a “routine and shared form to social life, an apparent patterning to social-
relational habitude, actually disguises depths and diversities of articulate
consciousness”,111 and his analysis of Spencer evinces that individuals both participate
in and manipulate routine discourse for their own ends. 112 Although a radical
voluntarism is untenable, Rapport does demonstrate there may be a gulf between shared
discourse and shared understanding. The point is that different people do not inhabit the
same ‘world-views’, and even when there are shared views they only partially overlap.
Rapport suggests that people construct identities in relation to a range of other people,
objects and events. 113 Doris and Sid assumed different personae according to the
107 Rapport, “Contrarieties,” 667.
108 Rapport, “Contrarieties,” 665.
109 Rapport advocates Rachel’s, schizophrenic, sort of contrariety as an anthropological project, but I
think it falls foul of Quigley’s objections noted above.
110 In contrast to Rapport I am not concerned about why different perceptions arise, only how they affect
relations.
111 Rapport, “Envisioned, Intentioned,” 865.
112 Rapport claims that “discursive exchange is never unmediated by a creative individual improvisation
of its forms and conventions”, “Envisioned, Intentioned,” 865. I would question the categorical
‘never’.
113 Rapport, Diverse, 152. See also his “Context as an Act of Personal Externalisation: Gregory Bateson
and the Harvey Family in the English Village of Wanet,” in The Problem of Context (ed R. Dilley;
New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 187–211, especially 207.
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various social interactions in which they were involved. 114 Nine personae are
enumerated for Doris: farmer, English, wife, villager, middle class, a neighbour, a
friend, as aggrieved, as a mother. Sid has seven personae: craftsman, a local, husband,
pal, father, a man, and English. The views expressed by each different persona were
both contradictory and predictable. Thus “diversity and inconstancy of opinion was
swallowed up by the regularity of moving from one habitual interactional routine to
another, and the habituality once one was ensconced in each”.115 The different personae
derive, “from individuals defining their own stimuli in a social situation and
constructing their own responses”.116 In each discourse the actor affirms some identities
and negates other potential personae. Although people seek “the security of habitual
meanings”,117 this does not mean that when two people converse they use the same
conventions. “The words they exchange prove ambiguous enough for each to impart to
them their own meanings, for each to aggregate them together as part of different
associational sets to form different cognitive contexts”.118 Thus although individuals do
acquire an ability to read others’ behaviour this is not by learning a communal cognitive
map of the world, but by coming to appreciate that under certain circumstances others’
actions are predictable, and thus able to be correlated with one’s own.119
3.4 CONCLUSION: CHOOSING KIN
So far this study has examined whether the Old Testament contains resources
necessary to address moral dilemmas, proposing a focus upon moral goods. Given ‘the
family’ is a central moral good within the Old Testament it proceeded to examine
114 Cf. Rapport, Diverse, 81.
115 Rapport, Diverse, 123. It is significant that only strangers have to deal with “the incoherence,
partiality and contradictoriness inherent in the assumptions of people’s everyday commonsensical
knowledge”, Diverse, 123. Rapport further argues that by representing themselves as different
personae they thereby realise these identities, cf. Diverse, 152. In the light of the discussion of
structure and agency, above, one can accept that this will be partially true.
116 Rapport, Diverse, 152.
117 Rapport, Diverse, 153.
118 Rapport, Diverse, 155. Rapport recognises that he highlights the differences in perspective between
Sid and Doris, not their shared grammar, but, he argues, the latter is mere form, not meaning. Rapport
further notes that standardized communication on acceptable topics can limit personal and uncommon
information, cf. Diverse, 164.
119 Cf. Rapport, Diverse, 184. I would dispute whether these constructions are random, as proposed by
Rapport, “Random Mind,” 198. In reducing all perception and the entirety of justification for action to
the cognitive he minimises the role of both cultural structure (the existence of which he denies) and
(culturally, not merely personally, perceived) physical constraints and stimuli. Thus his astute
observation that Doris construes situations in ways that relate more to her perceptions and
preoccupations than any ‘objective’ reading of life in Wanet does not necessitate his assertion that
these conceptions are random.
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anthropological perspectives upon the family and the ethics of kinship. Because both
have been approached using the categories provided by practice theory I have briefly
analysed important aspects of the theorising of practice. Two observations are now
required. First, my aim has not been to present a definitive genealogy of practice, nor to
defend all versions of practice theory from the gamut of possible criticisms, only to
commend it as a way of understanding social action with sufficient subtlety that it does
not ride roughshod over the essential components of situated individual agency. In
addition, I have highlighted a frequently overlooked feature of social interaction, its
ambiguity. Second, I have not proposed that practice theory is more ‘true’ than other
potential ways of explaining human action. Andreas Reckwitz explains that social
theories are underdetermined by empirical data; and that the key questions are ones of
utility.120 This does not mean that important consequences do not follow from choosing
one sort of social theory rather than another; or that my choice has been arbitrary.
Practice theory invites interpretations of embodied practices rather than mental maps or
spheres of discourse.121 Just as anthropologists have found it to be a profitable means of
understanding their data about ‘others’ in more nuanced and compelling ways than a
focus upon forms of thought or patterns of behaviour only occasionally reproduced on
the ground, so I propose that it will aid this investigation by maintaining open the
possibility of a variety of possible reactions to particular stimuli. Having made these
observations it is now possible to enumerate three features of how goods and practices
may be related as the basis for entering the world of my chosen text.
First, the context for practice includes the existence of multiple, contradicting
and potentially mutually exclusive moral goods. Following Rapport’s lead we may
suppose that clashes and contradictions are ‘normal’ and that order is as much
constructed as observed. In terms of moral goods I have already insisted upon actors
continually facing a plurality of moral goods, and upon the inevitability of value
clashes. But alongside this observation one can follow Ortner in proposing that there are
also culturally acceptable ways of resolving putative dilemmas so that moral choices in
favour of some goods seem natural or commonsensical. Note, however, that “[c]ommon
sense is the world-classifying face of power; the social dramas of everyday life forever
120 Reckwitz, “Toward,” 257.
121 Reckwitz, “Toward,” 258.
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oscillate between reproducing and disputing its authority”.122 There is no automatic
preference for cultural schemata: the possibility remains that another choice of moral
goods be realised.
Second, the variety of perception of any particular situation or action in which
moral goods are in play. One consequence is that stimuli can be variously interpreted,
producing idiosyncratic responses, thus even though there may be culturally informed
norms, including moral standards, it cannot be assumed that these are perceived in the
same way by all actors. Bourdieu noted different perceptions and justifications of the
same event in relation to parallel cousin marriage among the Kabyle.123 He observed
that it could be viewed simultaneously as an ideal, rarely achieved, an ethical norm
(derived from a duty of honour), which can be broken, and a pragmatic move.124 The
polysemous nature of this particular type of union means it is a good example of how
interpretation of practice is open to manipulation despite being constrained. Constraints
in general include both physical limitations and social expectations which place limits
upon the attainability of moral goods.125 In cases of value conflict, therefore, not all
choices are equally possible, although variety of perception may mean that people view
constraints differently—some might even fail to see a problem that vexes another:
David and Michal themselves would be a good example.
A related issue is the perception of action that does not fit the cultural schema.
Signe Howell, concludes her ethnography of Lio ritual with two important observations.
First, “it is possible to identify certain general patterns of maleness and femaleness
without thereby applying these to all men and to all women, to the corresponding sexes,
122 Michael Herzfeld, Anthropology: Theoretical Practice in Culture and Society (Oxford: Blackwell,
2001), 72.
123 I.e. a cousin related through a same-sex sibling: the child of either the father’s brother or mother’s
sister, cf. Alan Barnard and Jonathan Spencer, Encyclopedia of Cultural and Social Anthropology (3rd
ed.; ed. J. Spencer and A. Barnard; London / New York: Routledge, 2002), 616.
124 Bourdieu, Outline, 43. Note that there is nothing mutually exclusive about these interpretations; I am
not contradicting my observations regarding Rachel’s ‘schizophrenia’, above.
125 The very fact of face-to-face interaction has been proposed as a limiting factor, see Erving Goffman,
“The Interaction Order,” ASR 48 (1983): 1–17; cf. Shilling, “Embodied,”; Marshall Sahlins’ proposal
that action has its own structure, the ‘structure of the conjuncture’, Historical Metaphors, 35. Against
structuralist approaches, the interaction order explains how the presence of others may limit the
efficacy of institutional norms. Unlike individualist theories it explains why agents’ creativity is
restricted by the need to maintain relationships. Shilling lists five characteristics of the interaction
order: (1) it is grounded in ‘universal preconditions of social life’, e.g. need to care for infants; (2) it
has its own prerequisites, e.g. face saving, taking turns; (3) it makes demands upon society, e.g.
personal interaction is still required in business meetings; (4) the meanings produced by interaction
are not reducible to a society’s ideologies, nor merely to the activities of individuals; and (5) “this
order makes moral, not structurally coercive, demands on people”, Shilling, “Embodied,” 546.
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to all contexts and to all socialities”.126 Second, the “fact that kin, affinal or ritual status
may, in some instances, overshadow the simple duality of men and women does not
necessarily mean that maleness and femaleness are not conceptualized”.127 In other
words, there are both general norms and individual acts, yet from the fact that norms are
not always followed one cannot deduce they fail to influence behaviour. I submit that
although acts may not cohere with the norms, for example, of maleness or femaleness,
the interpretation of them by other actors will be guided by the socially accepted
standards. We shall see that this has important implications for the interpretation of
biblical characters’ actions.
Third, the necessarily personal, and thus open, nature of practice, which
nevertheless can exhibit regularity. Because the acts of practice are personal the
selection of moral goods can be variously classified. It could be quasi reflexive, for
example, the removal of one’s hand from a flame to avoid pain. Or it could simply
cohere with learnt behaviour, for example, someone offers a handshake simply because
he ‘always’ does. Or, because one person finds another odious, he consciously decides
not to offer a handshake in order to offend by slight. The point is that not all acts of
practice are the same. Because practice is personal and people can act and react in a
great variety of ways there is a similarly wide range of possible actions involving moral
goods. Yet because people learn which selections of moral goods are acceptable within
the society within which they find themselves practice can also exhibit regularity.
I have related Ortner’s typology of practice to the ideas of multiple cultural
goods and dominant cultural schemata in conversation with Louise Lawrence.128 She
discusses shame and desire in the Song of Songs, arguing that the ‘shameful’ behaviour
envisaged by the lyricist reinforces the honour paradigm.129 It is unnecessary to say
cultural values negate their opposites, since the goods of romantic love and duty,
modesty and desire are perceived simultaneously. 130 The dominant cultural schema
126 Signe Howell, “Many Contexts, Many Meanings? Gendered Values Among the Northern Lio of
Flores, Indonesia,” JRAI 2 (1996): 253–69, quote 256.
127 Howell, “Many Contexts,” 261.
128 My correspondence is cited in Louise Lawrence, Reading with Anthropology: Exhibiting Aspects of
New Testament Religion (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2005), 182.
129 Lawrence, Reading, 181: “The patriarchal order is not physically overthrown; indeed the status quo’s
power to regulate love bonds and its aim to preserve agnatic power is actually enforced”.
130 And are in conflict, both in the story world of the Bible (e.g. 1 Sam 18.20, 28) and societies studied by
anthropologists. I ignore the issue of whether binary opposition is always the best way to present these
conflicts—the relationships between goods are probably more complex.
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encapsulated in the modesty code provides one way of ordering these goods that
‘works’. Ordinary practice, routine responses to situations, would include adherence to
this schema. This is not much in evidence in the Song of Songs, which is better
considered as envisaged extraordinary praxis, action that changes the ordering of these
cultural goods: a vision of love unencumbered by duty.131 Returning to the importance
of kinship, ordinary practice in this context means habitually ‘choosing kin’, that is,
prioritising their interests over that of others, including, at times, one’s own desires. Yet
the frequency of this ‘pattern’ of practice, which gives an aura of normality and
naturalness to, for example, family loyalty as a moral good, should not hide the fact that
this ordering of goods is a personal choice. Thus although people habitually choose kin,
it is their status as choosing subjects that leaves open the possibility they may not, a
prospect that means cold draughts of ambiguity continually threaten family cosiness.
The Old Testament text I have chosen to examine concerns Saul’s daughter, who
chooses in the context, one may suppose, of others who often choose kin.
Understanding kinship and the ethics of kinship as the practice of choosing moral
goods, including kinship itself, enables new interpretations of her choice. Yet Michal is
a literary character in a narrative that makes theological assertions. Before turning to an
interpretation of the stories it is necessary to examine how one might understand the
account of her practice contained in 1 Samuel. This is the task of the next chapter.
131 It is noteworthy who subverts the cultural schema. Although older women will not have had
comparable status to men, they would normally have attained an interest in the cultural schema, i.e.
support from appropriately married sons. I maintained, therefore, that it would be the young who
would be more likely to envisage an alternative world, one in which their concerns take precedence,
Lawrence, Reading, 182.
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CHAPTER 4
Understanding
Moral Choice in 1 Samuel
Good general diagnosticians are rare,
not because most doctors lack medical knowledge,
but because most are incapable of taking in all the possible relevant facts—
emotional, historical, environmental as well as physical.
They are searching for specific conditions
instead of the truth about a man
which may then suggest various conditions
– John Berger, A Fortunate Man
Since Robert Alter’s The Art of Biblical Narrative many scholars have used
literary theory to elucidate how biblical narratives can be understood, and to expose the
theoretical issues behind the reading strategies they propose. 1 However, despite its
preponderance the relevance of narrative for ethics has received surprisingly little
attention until recent years.2 In this chapter I will explain how I will approach the
interpretation of Old Testament narrative with respect to how it presents its author’s
The epigraph is from John Berger, A Fortunate Man: The Story of a Country Doctor (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1967), 72.
1 Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York: Basic Books, 1981). Some of the ‘classic’
texts are: Shimon Bar-Efrat, Narrative Art in the Bible (JSOTSup 70; Sheffield: Almond Press, 1989);
David Gunn and Danna Fewell, Narrative in the Hebrew Bible (Oxford: OUP, 1993); and Meir
Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). For convenient summaries of the issues see, e.g.,
Yairah Amit, Reading Biblical Narratives: Literary Criticism and the Hebrew Bible (Minneapolis:
Fortress, 2001); Mark Powell, What is Narrative Criticism? (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990); Tremper
Longman III, Literary Approaches to Biblical Interpretation (FCI 3; Leicester: Apollos, 1987); Jan P.
Fokkelman, Reading Biblical Narrative: An Introductory Guide (trans. I. Smit; Louisville:
Westminster John Knox / Leiderdorp: Deo, 1999); and D. Marguerat and Y. Bourquin, Cómo leer los
relatos bíblicos: Iniciación al análisis narrativo (trans. J. P. Tosaus Abadía; Santander: Sal Terrae,
2000). Works discussing 1 Samuel in particular will be cited later.
2 I take as axiomatic that narrative can contribute to moral understanding. This is because human
existence has a narrative quality, Stephen Crites, “The Narrative Quality of Experience,” JAAR 39
(1971): 291–319. And because it is situated in an ongoing communal narrative. Alasdair MacIntyre
asserts that “I can only answer the question, ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question, ‘Of
what story or stories do I find my self a part?’ ”, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (3rd ed.;
London: Duckworth, 2007), 216. Of course, any particular narrative can function ideologically to
reinforce or subvert the original community narrative: I will argue that Old Testament texts do just
that, cf. Houston, Contending. For a detailed discussion of how Paul Ricoeur’s work can provide the
foundations for a narrative hermeneutic see Parry, Old Testament Story, 4–27.
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vision of ethics.
The most obvious way in which stories, inevitably bound to particular
characters, settings and moments, provide a guide to behaviour is by exemplifying
virtues or general principles. Lawrence Blum’s discussion of moral exemplars enables
exegetes to avoid a superficial evaluation of the merits of ‘model morality’.3 Blum
identifies two sorts of moral models, the moral hero, who acts rightly in a specific, risky
situation, and the moral ‘saint’, who exhibits a virtuous character over time. At times
these categories may be mutually exclusive.4 Even if this is not normally the case, only
three of the five criteria for a moral hero are shared by the moral ‘saint’.5 Blum argues it
“is the greater absence of unworthy or suspect elements of consciousness, not a greater
remoteness from the world, which distinguishes the saint from the hero”.6 Within each
of these categories agents may be idealists or responders. An idealist has a prior ideal to
which he aspires and that guides his actions; a successful idealist can be a moral
exemplar. A responder does not choose an ideal that she wishes to actualize, but
responds to situations as they present themselves to her. 7 Blum asserts that to be
“morally excellent, both idealists and responders must act from dispositions, sentiments,
and [character] traits”.8 Looking at moral exemplars in this way means that interpreters
need not be fazed by what Birch terms “the ambiguities of righteousness”.9 It does not
3 Parry’s phrase. Blum, Moral Perception, 65–97.
4 Referring to Oskar Schindler: “Although all would agree that even paragons of honesty ought to lie to
Nazis if this is necessary to save lives, only certain kinds of personalities could have pulled off the
sort of vast and intimately maintained deception that Schindler did; and a person considered to be
devoted to truthfulness would probably not have been such a one”, Blum, Moral Perception, 72.
5 The criteria are: (1) bringing a great good (or preventing a great evil); (2) acting to a great extent from
morally worthy motives; (3) substantial embeddedness of those motives in the agent’s psychology; (4)
carrying out one’s moral project in the face of risk or danger; and (5) relative “faultlessness,” or
absence of unworthy desires, dispositions, sentiments, attitudes. Of which the saint shares attributes 2,
3 and 5. Blum, Moral Perception, 75–77.
6 Blum, Moral Perception, 77.
7 The gender of the pronouns in the last two sentences has been chosen to reflect a further debate about
whether there are peculiarly male and female modes of moral reasoning. Part 3 of Blum’s book
explores these issues; for a critical evaluation see Byrne, Foundations, 163–90.
8 Blum, Moral Perception, 85. Emphasis original.
9 Bruce Birch, Let Justice Roll Down: The Old Testament, Ethics, and the Christian Life (Louisville:
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991), 64. Parry, for example, finds the following difficulties with
biblical ‘model morality’, Story, 32–33: (1) it only works well with clear-cut goodness or evil, but
many biblical characters are ambiguous; (2) models do not comprise the totality of biblical ethical
behaviour, and concentrating solely on them is reductionist, oversimplifying the complexity of moral
living; (3) there is a danger of extracting too strong a principle from a story, since “[a]bsolute rules
cannot be inferred from particular narratives even if general principles can”, Story, 33; and (4) a
reader may identify with the ‘wrong’ character traits, or only partially, in some of his roles but not
others. I sense that the problem lies in Parry’s conception of model. He posits that to “function well as
a prescriptive model an act must be fairly clear-cut as far as its morality is concerned. The more
ambiguous acts complicate the judgment of the reader and make simple imitation or avoidance
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take a reader long to appreciate that the Bible describes “a world where there are few
perfect saints and few unredeemable sinners: most of its heroes and heroines have both
virtues and vices, they mix obedience and unbelief”.10 In fact, this might be part of their
pedagogical value. “Their stories reflect all the ambiguities and complexities of human
experience and the struggle to find and live out faith relationships to God in the midst of
life”.11 Readers have to think and reflect upon the stories, rather than consume the
‘moral lesson’ and dispose with the narrative wrapper.12 In this way stories come to
have “an existential force”.13
Wenham argues that despite the ostensive didactic handicap of morally
ambiguous characters, biblical narratives, like all literary works, possess an ethical point
of view, and that authors attempt, explicitly or implicitly, to convince readers of its
merits.14 Although a narrative may not appear to moralise, for readers to understand the
implied author’s tale they have to share her perspectives and values; to use Booth’s
metaphor, the author and reader must be ‘friends’.15 Characters’ complexities are then a
challenge to avoid arbitrary or mundane readings. Wenham seeks to acknowledge both
diversity and unity of presentation by proposing biblical narrative is ‘scenic’,
dramatising the action like a film and thus allowing presentation of different points of
impossible.” Story, 32. Parry is looking for a clear cut exemplar. However, assertion (1) is only true if
moral exemplars must be ‘clear cut’ and patently either wholly good or bad in order to be understood:
Blum’s typology shows that such simplification is not necessary, and I would argue that moral
ambiguity can be a means of drawing readers into a narrative so that the moral lessons it wishes to
impart are more completely appropriated by readers. Assertions (2) and (3) are uncontentious, but
hardly problematic for those who would engage with the whole Old Testament corpus. Assertion (4)
has to do with readerly competence rather than any problem with the model as such. Nevertheless, I
concur with Parry that the value for moral instruction of any individual narrative calls for attention to
its particularity.
10 Wenham, Story, 15. On the character of David, for example, see Richard Bowman, “The Complexity
of Character and the Ethics of Complexity: The Case of King David,” in Character and Scripture:
Moral Formation, Community and Biblical Interpretation (ed. W. P. Brown; Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2002), 73–97.
11 Birch, Justice, 53.
12 Cf. Barton, Ethics, 20. Cultural distance may mean that stories are more obtuse to modern Western
readers that to the implied readers—hence the value of social-scientific criticism.
13 Barton, Ethics, 32. Barton argues that the genre of tragedy portrays how protagonists are overcome by
an admixture of their own errors, others’ malice, and chance. “It is through analysing all these factors
that the commentator can articulate the way in which the tragedy can be fruitful for us, as we seek to
discover how we ought to live in a world where the same three factors will always operate”, Barton,
Ethics, 24. For discussion of definitions of the ‘tragic vision’ see Cheryl Exum, Tragedy and Biblical
Narrative (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), 1–15.
14 Cf. Wenham, Story, 11–13 following Wayne Booth, The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1988). See also R. Hare’s quip (recorded in Nussbaum,
Love’s Knowledge, 166), “What are novels anyway but universal prescriptions?”
15 Booth, Company, 169–224.
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view.16 This is different from the dialogical perspective of Michal Bakhtin, the 20th
century Russian literary philosopher whose ideas have enjoyed considerable currency in
biblical and theological studies since the 1980s, having been appropriated for Old
Testament studies, in the field of ethics and by one scholar who combines both a literary
and social-scientific approach to the text. 17 Moreover, two recent monographs by
Barbara Green read 1 Samuel through the lens of Bakhtin’s ideas concerning
dialogism.18 It is necessary to consider his approach in more detail.
4.1 UNDERSTANDING DIALOGICAL VOICES
Clark and Holquist offer a helpful characterisation of Bakhtin’s view of the
location of meaning.19 In contradistinction to both personalists, who hold that I hold
meaning, and to deconstructionalists, who hold that no one owns meaning, Bakhtin
argued we possess meaning. The underlying philosophical justification for his position
is the denial of absolute truth.20 Even if one is unprepared, for example, on theological
grounds, to accept this starting point it is possible, on the same grounds, to maintain that
knowledge of truth is partial and, therefore, that Bakhtin’s argument concerning
dialogism has potential merit.21
16 Wenham, Story, 15, cf. Genesis 27. Bruckner argues that although the terms ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’
are rarely used for references to right or wrong behaviour, narratives use such devices as dialogue and
plot development, to indicate ethical requirements, Implied Law, 11. Bruckner overemphasises law (he
looks for judicial language and contexts in the Abraham narrative), which is not the only sort of ought,
although as a project within a wider examination of narrative and ethics his study is extremely
valuable.
17 See, respectively, Robert Polzin, Moses and the Deuteronomist (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1980), 20–24; Esther Reed, The Genesis of Ethics: On the Authority of God as the Origin of
Christian Ethics (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2000); Louise Lawrence, An Ethnography of
the Gospel of Matthew: A Critical Assessment of the Use of the Honour and Shame Model in New
Testament Studies (Tübingen: Mohr Stiebeck, 2003).
18 Barbara Green, Mikhail Bakhtin and Biblical Scholarship: An Introduction (Atlanta: Society of
Biblical Literature Press, 2000); idem, How Are the Mighty Fallen?: A Dialogical Study of King Saul
in 1 Samuel (JSOTSup 365; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2003).
19 Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin (Cambridge, Mass. / London: Belknap, 1984),
11–12, 348. See the critical introductions for full bibliographies of Bakhtin’s work. The essay that
deals most directly with my concerns is “Discourse in the Novel,” in The Dialogical Imagination:
Four Essays (ed. M. Holquist; trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist; Austin: Texas University Press,
1981), 259–401.
20 Importantly, this observation was made in the totalitarian political context of Stalinist Russia, cf.
Clark and Holquist, Bakhtin, 348.
21 Since the translation of Bakhtin into English the secondary literature on Bakhtin has burgeoned and all
sorts of text critical, translation, historical and interpretative issues have been raised. On the one hand
the initial sympathetic appropriation of Clark and Holquist has been strongly challenged by Ken
Hirschkop, Mikhail Bakhtin: An Aesthetic for Democracy (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 3–49. On the other,
Ruth Coates argues that Orthodox theology permeates Bakhtin’s thought, see Christianity in Bakhtin:
God and the Exiled Author (Cambridge: CUP, 1998).
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There are three key components to Bakhtin’s thesis: heteroglossia, dialogism and
polyphony. Bakhtin identifies several elements of language, the most basic of which are
words and utterances. An utterance pertains to a peculiar ‘language’, a form of
discourse shaped by the social reality of the speaker at that moment, for example, a
male peasant dealing with a state bureaucrat.22 Given the fact of social stratification
various socially positioned ‘languages’ exist simultaneously, even though there is only
one national language. This is heteroglossia.23 Heteroglot ‘languages’ take different
perspectives on the world, abut and clash, interact and, affirms Bakhtin, ‘dialogue’. He
asserts that
all languages of heteroglossia, whatever the principle underlying them
and making each unique, are specific points of view on the world, forms
for conceptualizing the world in words…As such they all may be
juxtaposed to one another, mutually supplement one another, contradict
one another and be interrelated dialogically.24
The environment into which a particular utterance is projected is thus “dialogized
heteroglossia”.25 The meaning of the utterance is not objectively fixed, but evolves in
dialogue with its heteroglossic context, ‘negotiating’ its meaning. Without this process
words “will not sound”.26 Bakhtin offers a suggestive metaphor for such dialogism.
If we imagine the intention of such a word, that is, its directionality
toward the object, in the form of a ray of light, then the living and
unrepeatable play of colors and light on the facets of the image that it
constructs can be explained as the spectral dispersion of the ray-word,
not within the object itself…but rather as its spectral dispersion in an
atmosphere filled with alien words, value judgments and accents through
which the ray passes on its way toward the object; the social atmosphere
of the word, the atmosphere that surrounds the object, makes the facets of
the image sparkle.27
Bakhtin further contends that words are directed towards an answer, that is, the
involvement of the interlocutor. “Understanding and response are dialectically merged
22 Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” 295–96.
23 Polyglossia is the obverse of heteroglossia, i.e, two or more national languages interacting in a single
cultural system, see the glossary prepared by Michael Holquist in Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination (ed.
M. Holquist; trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist; Austin: Texas University Press, 1981), 428.
24 Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” 291–92.
25 Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” 272. Bakhtin asserts: “With each literary-verbal performance,
consciousness must actively orient itself amidst heteroglossia, it must move in and occupy a position
for itself within it, it chooses, in other words, a ‘language’ ”, “Discourse in the Novel,” 295.
26 Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” 278.
27 Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” 277. Emphasis original.
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and mutually condition each other; one is impossible without the other”.28 Dialogism is
thus an essential process in a world of heteroglossia, and dialogue, conceived as an
exchange between simultaneous differences, is the context of all socially derived
‘languages’.
Bakhtin theorised about the novel employing these insights, positing two sorts of
novelistic works, the sophistic and dialogic.29 The former is essentially monologic.
Although it may reflect heteroglossia the voices are not equally significant. Instead, the
non-authorial ‘language’ “appears, in essence, as a thing, it does not lie on the same
plane with the real language of the work: it is the depicted gesture of one of the
characters and does not appear as an aspect of the word doing the depicting”.30 This is
the case, for example, with the rhetorical genre, which instead of accepting dialogism
intents “to outwit possible retorts to itself”.31 The dialogic novel, in contrast, lets all
voices be heard not solely the author’s. The plot, for example, “serves to represent
speaking persons and their ideological worlds. What is realized in the novel is the
process of coming to know one’s own language as it is perceived in someone else’s
language”.32 It is fallacious to suppose that this variety of literature is
just chaotically multi-voiced; it is art, and its special artistic province is
dialogized heteroglossia: different points of view embodied in “voice
zones” and intentional hybridizations that test one another and question
each other’s boundaries and authority.33
Bakhtin labelled this authorial strategy ‘polyphony’.34 Polyphony is not heteroglossia,
28 Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” 282.
29 Bakhtin used the terms First Line and Second Line. He used the epithet ‘sophistic’ of the former, I
supply ‘dialogic’ for the latter. Bakhtin enquires after the sociological preconditions for the dialogic
novel, observing that its advent occurred at the same time as the monologic shackles of medievalism
were being challenged by the Renaissance and Protestantism, Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” 414–
15.
30 Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” 287. Emphasis original.
31 Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” 353.
32 Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” 365.
33 Caryl Emerson, “Theory” in The Cambridge Companion to the Classic Russian Novel (ed. M. V.
Jones and R. F. Miller; Cambridge: CUP, 1998), 271–92, quote 286–87. Emphasis original.
34 Bakhtin’s imprecision concerning nomenclature has generated debate around this issue. Polyphony
and heteroglossia are treated as synonyms by Clark and Holquist who declare that the “phenomenon
that Bakhtin calls “polyphony” is simply another name for dialogism”, Bakhtin, 242, cf. 129, citing in
support Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (trans. C. Emerson; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1984), 32: “Every thought of Dostoevsky’s heroes…senses itself to be from the very beginning
a rejoinder in an unfinalized dialogue…It lives a tense life on the borders of someone else’s thought,
someone else’s consciousness.” Yet at another point they assert that “Dostoevsky’s polyphony must
be conceived against the larger meaning of dialogue in human existence” seeming to indicate that the
two are not synonyms, cf. Bakhtin, 251. Although the words are different in the Russian, not all
translators render them consistently. James Zappen sounds a realistic note arguing that polyphony,
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rather
polyphony is a way of realizing heteroglossia in the novel, without being
identical to heteroglossia. ‘Polyphony’ means ‘multi-voicedness’, while
‘heteroglossia’ means ‘multi-languaged-ness’, and this apparently small
difference in meaning is very significant. Polyphony refers to the
arrangement of heteroglot variety into an aesthetic pattern. One of the
principal ways of ensuring the presence of the different voices of
heteroglossia in the novel is the creation of fictional characters.35
Thus polyphony concerns the relationship of the author to the text. In the polyphonic
novel she does not have the final word, but is a participant who lets herself be guided by
dialogues that emerge from her characters. Bakhtin does not thereby negate authorial
activity for the
authorial emphasis is present, of course, in all these orchestrating and
distanced elements of language, and in the final analysis all these
elements are determined by the author’s artistic will—they are totally the
author’s responsibility—but they do not belong to the author’s
language.36
It is necessary to consider several criticisms of Bakhtin’s thesis before
concluding what he can contribute to this study. First, he restricts himself to spoken
discourse. Only thus can he assert that Adam alone, who “approached a virginal and as
yet verbally unqualified world with the first word, could really have escaped from start
to finish this dialogic inter-orientation with the alien word that occurs in the object”.37
Even allowing that Bakhtin uses the creation accounts rhetorically, a pertinent
observation is that both Genesis 1.28 and 2.18–20 conceive human action as a response
to God’s prior communication, which includes both word (‘be fruitful and multiply’)
and act (creation, bringing the animals to Adam), and are not necessarily limited to the
verbal. Emerson argues this has implications for Bakhtin’s interpretation of Dostoevsky.
“The possibility that verbal dialogue might actually drain away value or flatten out a
subtlety or be so subject to terror and constraint that it depreciates into outright fraud is
heteroglossia and carnival are all “dialogic interrelations”, but that Bakhtin uses each in different
places. “Each of these terms captures, though each with a different emphasis, the dialogic
interrelationship of utterances as a complex unity of differences”, “Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975)” in
Twentieth-Century Rhetoric and Rhetoricians: Critical Studies and Sources (ed. M. G. Moran and M.
Ballif; Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), 7–20, quote 11. In any case it is clear that polyphony can
be linked to the polyphonic novel.
35 Sue Vice, Introducing Bakhtin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 113.
36 Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” 416. Emphasis original.
37 Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” 279.
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not for Bakhtin a theoretically serious issue”.38 Second, it is not certain that polyphony
is an adequate description of Dostoevsky’s authorial strategy because he patently
intended to transmit Christian truth.39 Third, dialogue may be ‘unnatural’, not the way
utterances actually work in practice, since it usually takes a considerable effort to effect
real dialogue. Fourth, Natalia Reed argues dialogism is inherently hostile to others. “It
might welcome them for a moment, as a temporary stimulus or trigger, but it rarely has
the patience to orient outwardly toward another person’s words and acts over time”.40
The charge is that dialogism is attractive because it resonates with the values of Western
liberalism rather than being derived from the ‘fact’ of social heteroglossia.41 Fifth, the
language of characters, especially major characters, has an effect upon other actors in
the narrative. In other words, the space surrounding them is dialogized, but not neutrally.
And it is plain that dialogue can be coercive, not only by itself but also in tandem with
forms of non-verbal communication. Finally, it is intuitively true that a single person
can create a novel with two or more voices, but not that she can possess two
consciousnesses.42
If his thesis must be modified, how far can Bakhtin be appropriated for a study
of Old Testament ethics? One issue is whether the Bible is polyphonic literature. Green
answers in the negative, opining that “polyphony as Bakhtin develops it does not really
function substantially in 1 Samuel and that Saul cannot accurately or fairly be called a
polyphonic hero”.43 But the two issues are separate. Even if biblical heroes are not
polyphonic, they are multifaceted, complicated moral agents. And the biblical text could
well juxtapose differing perspectives ‘pseudo-polyphonically’ and without explicit
evaluation, which readers then invited to appraise for themselves in the light of other
biblical texts and cultural expectations. In such a case it will be profitable to read with
an eye for multi-voicedness, not merely the narrator’s tune.44
38 Caryl Emerson, The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1997), 132–33.
39 Emerson, First Hundred Years, 133–34.
40 Emerson, First Hundred Years, 139. Emphasis original. Emerson summarises the unpublished work
of Reed, which she discusses on pages 132–52.
41 Heteroglossia in the novel is actually dependent upon a specific historical situation, viz. the printed
work. Note Ken Hirschkop’s caustic comment: “To stumble upon a theorist who claims that language
itself is inherently ‘dialogical’ and that ‘a living utterance cannot avoid becoming a participant in
social dialogue’ is therefore an irresistible windfall for the liberal consciousness”, Aesthetic, 9.
42 Ken Hirschkop, “Bakhtin, discourse and democracy,” NLR 160 (1986): 92–111.
43 Green, Mighty, 273.
44 Bakhtin argues in the first chapter of Dostoevsky’s Poetics that a polyphonic narrative can be misread
as monologic. Green helpfully suggests that inverting the concept may mean “a monologic work may
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Esther Reed has drawn upon Bakhtin to expound a particular view of authority
in ethics. She argues that (Christian) ethics is not monologic, but is a polyphonic, free
response to God’s Word that avoids ready-made answers.45 She cautions that one should
“[b]eware of identifying authority with monologism and polyphony with relativism”.46
This coheres with my argument above that there are many ways of responding morally
well to situations, including moral dilemmas. In this regard Bakhtin’s observations
concerning the hero of a novel may have particular relevance for my investigation. He
claims that the testing of a character is a fundamental means of organising the narrative,
because it provides an arena in which to examine that actor’s discourse.47
To conclude, although 1 Samuel is probably not polyphonic literature in
Bakhtin’s sense, it is quite possible that the author employs different voices as vehicles
for presenting different perspectives upon the moral conflicts presented in the text. An
important step in my exegesis, therefore, is the identification of these voices, the
discernment of what they are saying—both verbally and in their actions—, and the
evaluation of them found in the text itself, in order to ascertain how action by the
narrative’s ‘heroes’ is viewed.
Discerning what voices say is complicated by the cultural distance between text
and modern day readers. Proponents of social-scientific criticism in biblical studies
argue that the breach entailed by temporal distance can be traversed by studying
contemporary, spatially separate, pre-industrial societies. 48 Before advancing to
flower a bit if we read it with some awareness of polyphonic strategies”, Mighty, 275. Compare Carol
Newsom’s more definite claim that Job and Genesis—2 Kings are polyphonic literature, “Bakhtin, the
Bible, and Dialogic Truth,” JR 76 (1996): 290–306, especially 297–304.
45 Cf. Reed, Genesis, 58–118.
46 Reed, Genesis, 133. She proceeds to contrast an ethic of polyphony and an ethic of heteroglossia,
asserting that the former relates to the truth of a person and the latter to individualism: the Tower of
Babel depicts the punishment upon sin as forced mutation of polyphony into heteroglossia, cf. Reed,
Genesis, 152–53. It seems to me, however, that the equations ‘polyphony = acceptable difference =
good’ and ‘heteroglossia = relativism = bad’, although decidedly more elegant and heuristically
helpful than Bakhtin himself, are rhetorical. Although Bakhtin thought that all Dostoevsky’s
polyphonic voices were valid (cf. Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 6) the fact that characters hailed from distinct
social milieu meant that they spoke different ‘languages’: polyphonic voices within the novel are also
heteroglossic voices. Thus the neat distinction she offers cannot be derived from Bakhtin. Reed may
acknowledge this in her qualification of the definition of polyphony: “Polyphony – in the particular
sense of different voices speaking a single language and using the same words”, Genesis, 152. A
separate, although fundamental issue, is whether all (polyphonic) voices are of equal moral value,
which could be implied from Bakhtin, but not Dostoevsky.
47 Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” 388–96.
48 Social-scientific study of the Old Testament has a long pedigree. Stephen Carter and Carol Meyers
date its terminus a quo to W. Robertson Smith’s Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, published in
1889, cf. Community, Identity and Ideology: Social Science Approaches to the Hebrew Bible (SBTS
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summarise my exegetical methodology, I defend an anthropologically informed
interpretative understanding of the text.
4.2 INTERPRETATIVE UNDERSTANDING
The discussion from Chapter 2 onwards has not only served to present the
material I believe is necessary to perform an adequate exegesis of my chosen texts, but
also to situate my approach vis-à-vis that of other commentators. This section will make
patent what until now has been only implicit. The epigraph alludes to two ways in
which the interpretative task can be undertaken. The first is to have in mind a model of
behaviour, then seek to confirm the presence of this particular pathology. The second is
to appreciate the whole, which might then suggest a particular interpretation. They
could be termed, respectively, ‘scientific’ and ‘interpretative’ approaches.
A prominent advocate of social-scientific criticism, John Elliot, defines it as
“that phase of the exegetical task which analyzes the social and cultural dimensions of
the text and of its environmental context through the utilization of the perspectives,
theory, models and research of the social sciences”.49 Starting from the observation that
all knowledge is culturally conditioned he argues that exegetes must clarify differences
between the social locations of authors and contemporary readers. This is because
the meanings communicated by the author(s) of these texts to their
intended hearers or readers and the texts’ persuasive power are
determined by the social and cultural systems that author(s) and
audiences inhabited and that enabled meaningful communication in the
first place.50
Several critics, however, argue it is anachronistic to assume models developed during
6; ed. S. Carter and C. Meyers; Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1996), xiii. For an up-to-date survey of
social-scientific study of the Old Testament see Philip Esler and Anselm Hagedorn, “Social-Scientific
Analysis of the Old Testament: A Brief History and Overview,” in Ancient Israel: The Old Testament
in Its Social Context (ed. P. F. Esler; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 15–32. It is important to note that
most social-scientific work has focused on the society of ‘Ancient Israel’ rather than its culture. That
is, scholars have investigated social structure and institutions, and their historical development, or the
roles of prophets and priests, for example, rather than how individuals might have reacted to everyday
situations. ‘Culture’ has been investigated from relatively early on, but it is only recently that a
concern with behaviour has gained prominence, cf. Johannes Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture (4
vols.; Oxford: OUP, 1926); Betchel, “Shame as Sanction”; Ken Stone, Sex, Honor, and Power in the
Deuteronomistic History (JSOTSup 234; Sheffield. Sheffield Academic Press, 1996). Works of this
type have generated some reflection concerning methodology in ‘culture’ orientated social-scientific
criticism of the Old Testament, e.g. Johanna Stiebert, The Construction of Shame in the Hebrew Bible:
The Prophetic Contribution (JSOTSup 346 Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002).
49 John Elliot, What is Social-Scientific Criticism? (GBS; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 7.
50 Elliot, Social-Scientific Criticism, 50.
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the twentieth century can be applied to the social world of people living millennia
previously. There is a danger that “the data from antiquity, while they are becoming
intelligible and accessible to the modern reader, are also becoming fundamentally
distorted into just another instance of what we know about already”.51 In similar vein,
Edmund Leach argues that there is “no case for reading biblical texts as if they were a
record of remote history which, by some happy accident, becomes more intelligible if
referred to the present!”52 A straightforward response to the charge of anachronism, as
one manifestation of incommensurability, is to admit its potential ubiquity, yet observe
that it is not a problem with social-scientific criticism per se but all historical
investigation. Furthermore, the danger of anachronism should not delude interpreters
into thinking that they themselves possess some neutral vantage point—a historical
version of cross-cultural superiority. For this reason I concur with Esler that explicit
assumptions are to be preferred to implicit suppositions, for they enable other
interpreters to assess the fruits of one’s exegetical labours more accurately.53
The impossibility of an impartial perspective means that all exegesis comprises
interpretative, rather than ‘scientific’, understanding of the text. The latter—like
Berger’s doctor seeking a specific condition—purports to make an explicit attempt to
verify that behaviour suggested by modern social-scientific resources is also exhibited
in the Bible. An interpretative approach, however, supposes both ancient and modern
texts describe an ‘ethnographic present’,54 and maintains that the interpretative objective
is not verification but plausible suggestion. In the words of Mario Aguilar “there are no
51 Stephen Barton, “Historical Criticism and Social-Scientific Perspectives in New Testament Study,” in
Hearing the New Testament: Strategies for Interpretation (ed. J. B. Green; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans /
Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1995), 74.
52 Edmund Leach, “Anthropological approaches to the study of the Bible during the twentieth century,”
in Structuralist Interpretations of Biblical Myth. (ed. E. Leach and D. A. Aycock; Cambridge: CUP,
1983), 20.
53 Cf. Philip Esler, “Review of D.G. Horrell, The Social Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence” JTS
49 (1998), 253–60, especially 254. Another general criticism of social-scientific criticism of the Bible
is that more context is read back into the biblical texts than is justified by them. According to one
sceptic there is “too much theory chasing too little data”, R. P. Carroll, “Prophecy and society,” in The
World of Ancient Israel: Sociological, Anthropological and Political Perspectives. (ed. R. E.
Clements; Cambridge: CUP, 1989), 219; cf. Cyril Rodd, “On Applying a Sociological Theory to
Biblical Studies,” in Social-Scientific Old Testament Criticism. A Sheffield Reader. (ed. D. J.
Chalcraft; BS 47; Sheffield: Sheffield University Press, 1997; repr. from JSOT 19 (1981): 95–106),
22–33. By justifying their readings with detailed appeals to theory exegetes can certainly give the
impression that explicit conceptual schemes dominate texts, but this may be a necessary corrective to
the use of unrecognised, implicit perspectives. Whether the theory coheres with the data is a separate
matter, which must be tested empirically.
54 “A hypothetical time frame, characterized by the use of the present tense, employed in ethnographic
writing. Normally it coincides with the time of fieldwork, which is not necessarily the time of writing,
or indeed of reading.” Barnard and Spencer, Encyclopedia, 604.
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discoveries but insights, no explanations but interpretations, and an absence of
hypotheses but the presence of argumentations”.55
By adopting this position I have plunged into a sometimes vitriolic debate about
the use of anthropology in biblical studies and, in particular, whether ‘models’ of
behaviour are appropriate exegetical tools. Although it is unnecessary to rehearse the
arguments in detail I do need to justify my methodology. The advantage of having
already outlined an understanding of social practices is that I can do so positively by
affirming my stance in relation to those of others.
My first affirmation is that human practice often exhibits a regularity amenable
to summary in models of typical action. Bruce Malina, the foremost advocate of the use
of models in biblical interpretation, offers the following definition:
A model is an abstract, simplified representation of some real world
object, event, or interaction constructed for the purpose of understanding,
control, or prediction. A model is a scheme or pattern that derives from
the process of abstracting similarities from a range of instances in order
to comprehend.56
In ethnographic research a model comprises “a researcher’s attempt to simplify,
generalise or abstract their findings”.57 It looks backwards, offering, for example, a
statistical summary of behaviour patterns or a descriptive framework. This is different
from the proactive use of models envisaged by Malina. He contends that people “cannot
make sense of their experiences and their world without making models of it, without
thinking in terms of abstract representations of it”.58 In Malina’s view, therefore, the
task of biblical scholars is to offer potential domains of reference, that is, models of the
biblical social world.59 The difference between the two sorts of models has been the
55 Mario Aguilar, “Changing Models and the Death of Culture,” in Anthropology and Biblical Studies:
Avenues of Approach (ed. L. J. Lawrence and M. I. Aguilar; Leiden: Deo Publishing, 2004), 299–
313, quote 307.
56 Bruce J. Malina, “The Social Sciences and Biblical Interpretation,” Interpretation 36 (1981): 229–42,
quote 231.
57 David Horrell, The Social Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence: Interests and Ideology from 1
Corinthians to 1 Clement (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 11. My emphasis. See also Stanley Barrett,
Anthropology: A Student’s Guide to Theory and Method (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996),
216: “The model is neither valid nor invalid; it is useful or not, in the sense of providing an overall
picture of the central features of a research project”.
58 Malina, “Social Sciences,” 232.
59 Malina lists six characteristics of a good social-science model for biblical studies: it should be a cross-
cultural model accounting for both interpreter and interpreted; it should be at a level of abstraction that
allows for similarities to surface; it should cohere with a sociolinguistic approach; it should match
what we already know of ‘biblical culture’; it should generate meanings that are “irrelevant but
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subject of a debate concerning terminology; but in my view which meaning of ‘model’
is intended is usually clear from the context of its use.60 The key question is what
models are assumed to describe when they are employed in exegesis. There are several
possibilities: models could purport to be predictions of actors’ behaviour, they could
describe a necessary action in a given situation, or they could outline typical behaviour.
I perceive no difficulty with models as a description of typical observed behaviour, and
thus an explication of the social context of any particular action. However, they can
only ‘predict’ actors’ choices in a statistical sense, and given that the Old Testament
does not provide sufficient information to develop such mathematical constructs
‘predictive’ modelling is inappropriate.61
The second affirmation is that models of typical action can be compared. The
paucity of biblical ethnographic data leads Esler to contend that the comparative use of
models is essential to highlight the different assumptions of modern readers and ancient
authors and their implied audiences.62 Although there is a risk that models will lead
researchers to assume patterns of conduct are present even when they are not, once
assumptions are made explicit whether this has occurred can become a matter of
debate.63 Crucially, however, one must be cognisant that comparison of models does not
mean ‘cultures’ are being compared. Aguilar is correctly unequivocal: “Cultures do not
exist. Instead, groups of human beings that share some common understanding, but also
fight for their own identity…interact within larger contested worlds”. 64 When an
exegete employs a model, therefore, she does not utilise a proxy for ‘culture’ but merely
a summary description of typical behaviour.65 Whether any particular model is adequate
understandable to us and our twentieth century United States society”, “Social Sciences,” 241; and the
application of the model should be acceptable to the social sciences.
60 Esler, “Review of Horrell,” 254; David Horrell, “Models and Methods in Social-Scientific
Interpretation: A Response to Philip Esler.” JNTS 78 (2000), 85–105; Esler, “Reply to Horrell,” 108–
12. For a recent defence of ‘modelling’ see Philip Esler, “Social-Scientific Models in Biblical
Interpretation,” in Ancient Israel: The Old Testament in Its Social Context (ed. P. F. Esler;
Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 3–14. Despite their differences both Horrell and Esler seek a corrective
to ethnocentric theological or ecclesiastical readings centred upon ideas unconnected to social context.
61 Cf. Horrell, Social Ethos, 21. All one can say is whether the behaviour ‘predicted’ by the model is
found, or not. But this tells us nothing about the text, which already contains the ‘results’ of actions.
62 Esler, “Review,” 254.
63 Cf. this objection to ‘modelling’ in Horrell, “Models and Methods,” 91.
64 Aguilar, “Changing Models,” 307
65 There is no need for the model to be ‘true’. Esler remarks that they are “heuristic tools, not ontological
statements. Accordingly, they are either useful or not, and it is meaningless to ask whether they are
‘true’ or ‘false’.”, “Introduction: Models, context and kerygma in New Testament interpretation.” in
Modelling Early Christianity: Social-scientific studies of the New Testament in its context (ed. P. F.
Esler; London / New York: Routledge, 1995), 1–20, quote 4. Although this pragmatic test might
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even for this purpose is an empirical matter; but it can never be a description of
‘culture’.
Third, human action is personal and open, that is, it does not have to cohere with
that summarised in a model. According to Herzfeld’s ethnography, any one society,
village or family possesses “[e]mbarrasments of ambiguity”66 so that even between
conventional interpretations there is “an expressive play of opposition”. 67 Herzfeld
labels this ‘disemia’, claiming it speaks not of contradiction but tension. He offers the
example of the diabolical and virginal aspects of women’s sexuality in Greek and Indian
contexts where “the sweetness of domestic intimacy and the fear men have of their
wives’ and daughters’ defilement by other men” are simultaneous concerns.68 As I have
already affirmed, the plurality of moral goods is a fundamental social reality, and any
adequate interpretive method must be able to account for this variety, in part because
agency will never completely mirror generalised abstractions; it may have very little to
do with them.69
Fourth, human action is ambiguous. Bourdieu shows why this affirmation is
important. Highlighting the distinction between observer and observed, he argues that
observers, lacking emic mastery of situations, “provide themselves with an explicit and
at least semi-formalized substitute for it in the form of a repertoire of rules”.70 The
problem is that observers frequently forget this is an etic, summary, view of behaviour.
To slip from regularity, i.e. from what recurs with a certain statistically
measurable frequency and from the formula which describes, to a
consciously laid down and consciously respected ruling (règlement), or
to unconscious regulating by a mysterious cerebral or social mechanism,
are the two commonest ways of sliding from the model of reality to the
reality of the model.71
Thus, even when a series of actions and reactions are predictable from outside, the
appear to beg certain questions (see Horrell, “Models and Methods,” 88 n.13), there is no way of
avoiding this situation—that is why one can only achieve interpretative, not scientific, understandings.
66 Michael Herzfeld, Anthropology through the looking-glass: Critical ethnography in the margins of
Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1987), 104.
67 Herzfeld, Looking Glass, 114.
68 Herzfeld, Looking Glass, 99. Both of which, of course, are ‘models’. See also Michael Herzfeld,
“Disemia,” in Semiotics (ed. M. Herzfeld and M. D. Lenhart; New York: Plenum, 1980), 205–15.
69 Cf. Lawrence, Ethnography, 3. Note the differences between Malinowski’s neat (functionalist)
anthropological assessment of the Trobianders and the ignoble morass of human life revealed in his
diaries, Argonauts; Diary.
70 Bourdieu, Outline, 2. Emphasis original.
71 Bourdieu, Logic, 39. Emphasis original.
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subjective view remains uncertain. Bourdieu claims reification of practice by ignoring
temporality “is never more pernicious than when exerted on practices defined by the
fact that their temporal structure, direction, and rhythm are constitutive of their
meaning”.72 Illustrating this contention by reference to gift-giving he notes that what
from the outside, and post factum, might appear to be an ordered cycle of reciprocity,
can be interrupted at any stage, and thus lose its intended meaning. 73 In fact, the
difference between the observed and subjective appreciation of gift giving is essential to
the essence of this practice:
even if reciprocity is the ‘objective’ truth of the discrete acts that
ordinary experience knows in discrete form and associates with the idea
of a gift, it is perhaps not the whole truth of a practice that could not exist
if its subjective truth coincided perfectly with its ‘objective’ truth.74
‘Objective’ models, by turning observers’ de facto exclusion into a methodological
preference, can mask both the reality of practice and interpreters’ assumptions.
My final affirmation is that dominant constructions of power relations can be
both contested and accepted. Herzfeld explains that the ‘honour-shame’ model of male-
female relations suppresses alternative views, “not simply of the women, but of most
villagers when discussing intimate situations with those whom they regard as intimate
friends”.75 That is, the situation affects behaviour. If dirt, in this case inappropriate
deportment, is ‘matter out of place’, then what changes is not the matter but the place:
what is acceptable in one situation is not in another, and vice versa. Thus
in speaking of the symbolism of a given community, we too easily play
into the hands of the dominant groups, those who define propriety. What
we are then discussing is an official praxis; we ignore interpretations that
may reverse the system by redefining, not matter, but place.76
It is necessary, therefore, to attend to the distribution of power and resources and the
manipulation of symbolic meanings by individuals as they seek their own advantage.77
72 Bourdieu, Outline, 9. Emphasis original.
73 Bourdieu, Logic, 105.
74 Bourdieu, Logic, 105.
75 Herzfeld, Looking Glass, 99. Emphasis original.
76 Herzfeld, Looking Glass, 99. Emphasis original.
77 Cf. Horrell, “Models and Methods,” 96, following Giddens. Esler agrees that power relations are
important, “Reply to Horrell,” 107. Horrell also contends that the implicit assumptions entailed in
using models comprise a second important issue relating to power because models are not merely
heuristic, but shape observers’ perceptions; they do not simply make explicit interpreters’
perspectives, but reflect and contain their own implicit suppositions. This means that ‘goodness of fit’
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These five affirmations summarise the theoretical underpinnings of my approach
to the use of anthropology in exegesis. They enable use of ethnographic and
anthropological resources in creative ways to suggest understandings of the context of
biblical characters’ practices whilst allowing theoretical space for consideration of
idiosyncratic acts that do not cohere with cultural schemata, acts which may contest
dominant relations of power yet remain ambiguous. It is now possible to summarise my
interpretative methodology.
4.3 CONCLUSION: INTERPRETING VOICES
I commenced this dissertation by examining the Old Testament’s own resources
for resolving value conflicts, arguing that moral goods are more foundational than laws
or their motivations. Within the biblical text the ‘family’ is prominent both as the matrix
and end of moral action. An investigation of kinship as variously understood by
anthropologists revealed that it is most appropriately considered a field of practices.
Within anthropological theorising, indeed the social-sciences in general, ‘practice’ has
been conceived as arising from structure and/or agency. Rather than elucidate a
genealogy of practice I sought to expose important questions of interpretation,
identifying three key issues. Given that the ambiguity of social interaction is reflected in
the Old Testament, especially its characterisation of ‘heroes’, I have proposed that
reading narrative with an ear to a text’s ‘voices’ might reveal how the author uses value
conflicts to establish a debate between different perspectives; and that by affirming
some voices whilst undermining others the biblical writers present a view of moral
goods and their prioritisation for consideration by readers.
The following chapter contains an interpretation of the voices in 1 Samuel
19.10–18a.78 The first step, naturally, is to identify the voices. There appear to be two:
those of Michal and Saul. The next move is to identify the moral goods in view and the
perspective upon them presented by each voice. To do this I identify themes that feature
prominently in the narrative, viz. violence, marriage and lying. My method then
comprises three elements. First, I highlight how the Old Testament exhibits a variety of
of data is an insufficient test of a model’s validity. It is also necessary to enquire “how the model has
shaped, prioritised and interpreted the evidence”, Horrell, Social Ethos, 15–16. Emphasis original.
78 Although I intend to work with the final form of the narrative important text critical issues will be
discussed in the footnotes. Key historical-critical themes that have interested previous commentators
will be discussed in detail only where issues of interpretation are at stake.
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perspectives upon the theme to alert interpreters to the complexities facing them in this
particular narrative. Second I present anthropological perspectives upon the theme.
Rather than simply describing models, which would ignore the fact that anthropology
(the supposed source of such models) is itself an arena of contested meanings, I follow
Aguilar who suggests that “the use of a social author within a biblical paper needs
always to be supported by some discussion on the author’s context of writing”, that is,
the wider anthropological work relating to a particular theme.79 Third, I employ these
materials to suggest new interpretations of relevant aspects of the passage. Having
interpreted the voices I then assess how they are either subverted or approved. This is
important in order to be able to identify the theological import of the chosen texts and
their value for readers’ ethical reflection. For the present it is sufficient to say that the
complexity of the narrative points to the author’s desire that readers should become
involved with its characters. This is an essential didactic move, since he wishes to
propose novel solutions to the moral dilemma he describes, one that implied readers
would have found counterintuitive, even shocking.
79 Aguilar, “Changing models,” 310. A problem with model use occurs when the model substitutes for
anthropological or sociological data: cognisance of first hand studies, not merely secondary level
theorising, is required. This is one difficulty with the ‘abductive’ use of models proposed by Elliot,
Social-Scientific Criticism, 48–49. Whilst it is true that there must be movement between text and
anthropological resource, confining the latter to ‘models’ is inadequate.
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CHAPTER 5
Michal:
Lying Through Her Teraphim
I wished to tell the truth,
for truth always conveys its own moral
to those who are able to receive it.
– Anne Brontë, The Tenant of Wildfell
Hall
At first blush the pericope in 1 Samuel 19.10–18a is a straightforward account of
how Michal aided David’s flight from a spear-wielding maniac and his henchmen. The
moral questions touched upon by the text, though, are more complex. The prima facie
problem concerns Michal’s lie to facilitate David’s escape. A number of commentators
suggest that Michal ought to have had the strength of character exhibited by her brother
Jonathan who, they maintain, unflinchingly declared the truth to Saul instead of
dissembling.1 However, given that the passage’s quest is David’s escape from Saul’s
unambiguously murderous intentions most commentators excuse Michal’s lie as the
lesser of two evils.2 I propose that such conclusions are precipitate and that ancient
(implied) readers would not have considered her untruth intrinsically problematic.
Instead, I suggest that the moral dilemma presented by the author is to whom she should
be loyal, and that once the decision had been made this would naturally have involved
lying. Familiarity with the David tradition leads many modern readers to assume
Michal’s decision was straightforward. I shall argue that it was not, and that her choice
was startlingly unexpected, a fact replete with theological import.
A close analysis of the passage’s structure reveals it comprises three sections
plus an introduction and conclusion.3 The scene is set by the narrator describing Saul’s
The epigraph is from Anne Brontë, The Tenant of Wildfell Hall (2nd ed.; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979
[1848]), 29.
1 Cf. 1 Sam 20.32. So David Eerdman, The Books of Samuel (LC 5; trans. C. H. Toy and J. A. Broadus;
New York: Scribner, Armstrong and Co., 1877), 255; Hugenberger, “Michal,” ISBE 3.348.
2 For discussion of narrative ‘quest’, in this passage highlighted in the inclusio, verses 10 and 18, and
verses 12 and 17, see Fokkelman, Reading, 73–96.
3 Verses 10 and 18 clearly indicate the limits of the passage by the phrases  ִדוְָדוִּ ַיו ָסנָּמטֵל and ִדוְָדו
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cordoning of David’s dwelling. In the first section Michal orchestrates David’s escape
then, in the second, she executes a ploy to deceive Saul’s messengers. In the final
section Saul confronts Michal, demanding a reason for her deception, in response to
which she blames David. The conclusion re-emphasises that David escaped Saul’s
clutches. The whole displays a chiastic structure:
FIGURE 2 – Structure of 1 Samuel 19.10–18a
Introduction
A David flees, but Saul corners him (10c–11a)
First Section
B Michal tells David he will be killed if he doesn’t save himself (11b)
C David escapes (12)
D Michal disguises teraphim (13)
Second Section
E Saul sends messengers (14a)
F Michal says ‘David is sick’ (14b)
E’ Saul sends the messengers (15a)
F’ Saul says ‘bring him to me in order to kill him’ (15b)
Third Section
D’ Teraphim’s disguise is discovered (16)
C’ Saul demands to know why Michal let his enemy escape (17a)
B’ Michal says David threatened to kill her; she had to save herself (17b)
Conclusion
A’ David flees, and escapes (18a)
If this structure is considered in terms of characters’ moral choices a pattern contrasting
truth and lying, loyalty and deception is observed:
ִּ ַיו חַרָּבָּמֵטל , cf. H. Rouillard and J. Tropper, “TRPYM, Rituels de Guérison et Culte des Ancêtres
d’après 1 Samuel XIX 11-17 et les Textes Parallèles d’Assur et de Nuzi,” VT 37 (1987): 340–61,
espcially 342–43. On the importance of section limits see Amit, Reading, 14–21. LXXB starts verse 11
with καὶ ἐγενήθη ἐν τη̩̑ νυκτὶ ἐκείνη̩ | = אוהה הלילב יהיו, ‘and it happened that night’, whilst MT
attaches the defective form אוה הלילב (also at Gen 19.33; 32.23) to the end of verse 10, cf. Kyle
McCarter, 1 Samuel: A new translation with introduction, notes and commentary (AB 8 ; Garden City:
Doubleday, 1980), 325; Anthony Campbell, 1 Samuel (FOTL 7; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 203.
Frank Moore Cross contends that one cannot argue from space requirements in 4QSamb for either
reading, “The Oldest Manuscripts from Qumran,” JBL 74 (1955): 147–172, especially 167. Each of
the panels contains a self contained narrative in which Michal interacts with different characters. Few
commentators suggest detailed structures. Fokkelman is the only other exegete to suggest 1 Sam
19.11–17 is structured chiastically, dividing it into two sequences, deception (11–14) and discovery
(15–17), cf. J. P. Fokkelman, Narrative Art and Poetry in the Books for Samuel. A full interpretation
based on stylistic and structural analyses. Vol. II: The Crossing Fates (1 Sam. 13-31 and II Sam 1)
(SSN 23; Assen: Van Gorcum, 1986), 266. Campbell proposes a twofold framework: problem (11a)
and solution (11b–17); the latter comprising three sections: the escape (11b–12), delaying tactics (13–
16) and confrontation (17), cf. 1 Samuel, 203.
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B True words to David: the situation as it is
C Loyalty to David: aiding his escape
F A lie: ‘he is sick’
F’ The truth: ‘in order to kill him’
C’ Deception of Saul: the reverse of her loyalty to David
B’ Lying words to Saul: dissembling to portray her disloyalty as a last resort
It is clear that ethical behaviour is central to the interpretation of this text. There seem to
be two voices offering distinct moral perspectives: Michal lies, but to save a life; Saul
tells the truth, but with murderous intent. Thinking in Bakhtinian terms I suggest each
voice offers a vision of the world that readers are invited to assess. Although there is no
explicit evaluation of these voices one cannot talk of polyphony, for the writer leaves
plenty of clues as to which voice he prefers. Instead, readers hear heteroglot voices, one
of which receives the author’s approbation.
5.1 THE VOICES: MICHAL AND SAUL
The first ‘voice’ is Saul’s. I argued above that it is necessary to go beyond
Bakhtin’s restriction to the spoken word and include behaviour when considering a
character’s ‘voice’. Thus although Saul only speaks in verse 17, he is also heard in
verses 11, 14 and 15, where his actions, which truly speak louder than words, are
revealed by the narrator. His first deed responds to David’s successful evasion and
return to his house.4 Saul sends, ׁלשח , messengers to watch the house, presumably to
ensure that David does not evade him again, and to kill him the following morning.
The scene set, readers hear Michal’s voice, which warns David of mortal danger
and urges him to flee. David remains mute throughout this passage, an object acted
4 Which night ּאוה הְָלַּילַב refers to has been the subject of some speculation. According to George
Caird ‘that night’ cannot be the night of the spear throwing in verse 8–10 “since there David is said to
have fled and escaped, which must mean more than that he went home to his wife”, “The First and
Second Books of Samuel,” in IB 2.986–87. Ηe concludes (858, 986) that this text speaks of the
wedding night and follows directly from 1 Sam 18.27. So also Roland de Vaux, Les Livres de Samuel
(2nd ed.; Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1961), 102; R. W. Klein, 1 Samuel (WBC 10; Waco: Word
Books, 1983), 194; McCarter, 1 Samuel, 325; S. R. Driver, Notes of the Hebrew Text and the
Topography of the Books of Samuel (2nd ed.; Oxford: OUP, 1913), 156; Henry Smith, Samuel (ICC;
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1899), 178–79. However, ‘from that time’ in 1 Sam 18.29 is against such an
interpretation and Campbell calls the assumption that the reference is to the wedding night
“unsupported”, 1 Samuel, 203. Robert Gordon notes it “has the curious side-effect of making Michal
pretend that David is ill on his wedding night!”, 1 and 2 Samuel (Exeter: IVP, 1986), 164. Gino
Bressan thinks that David could well have returned home thinking that Saul’s anger would blow over,
as on previous occasions, Samuele (Rome: Marietti, 1960), 317. See also 1 Sam 20.33, where there is
no indication Jonathan left court; C. F. Keil and F. Delitzsch, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, I & II Samuel,
(trans. J. Martin; Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1980), 195. I concur that the night in question follows the
spear throwing incident.
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upon by Michal and whose escapades are noted by the narrator; his only role is
acquiescence. Michal, however, speaks loudly and clearly, not only facilitating his
descent through the window but confectioning a dummy using teraphim to replace
David’s prone frame.5
In verse 14 Saul’s voice is heard in refrain: he sends, ׁלשח ,6 messengers, this
time to take David prisoner. Michal’s lie7 delays the action for a single line before Saul
is heard once more: he sends, ׁלשח ,8 so that his emissaries can verify Michal’s excuse
for themselves.9 Not satisfied with a mere report he continues by instructing they bring
5 There is unanimity among commentators that the plural represents a single image, cf. de Vaux,
Samuel, 102, who compares the plural with םיִּרוא and ֻּתםִּימ , and more cautiously, םִיֹהלֱא. As to size
Keil and Delitzsch argue their dimensions must have been appropriate to serve as a human dummy, cf.
Samuel, 195; although apart from the lack of archaeological evidence for objects of this size, the
teraphim in Judg 18 are associated with the ephod and could be carried by priests, and those of Gen
31.34 were hidden in a camel saddle. Gordon cautions that they “were not invariably large”, Samuel,
164. Regarding use McCarter suggests teraphim had a role in divination “and can perhaps be
identified with the “gods” which adjudicate in clan or household law”, 1 Samuel, 326; cf. Ezek
21.21[26]; Zech 10.2. Gordon proposes they were possibly figurines venerated in the manner of
Roman lares and penates, cf. 1 Samuel, 164. Rouillard and Tropper, however, contend that teraphim
were used in ancestor worship and in magical healing rituals. Kirkpatrick speculates that healing
properties explain their surreptitious use by the barren Michal, The First Book of Samuel with Map,
Notes and Introduction (Cambridge Bible. Cambridge: CUP, 1890), 172; also Keil and Delitzsch,
Samuel, 195. Finally, although this does not exhaust the suggestions, von Rad thinks teraphim could
have been a cultic mask, cf. Old Testament Theology (trans. D. M. G. Stalker; New York: Harper &
Row, 1962–65), 1.216. Obviously, translation of teraphim is problematic. Smith suggests that the
LXX’s κενοτάφια implies ancestral images, cf. Samuel, 180; “a contemptuous designation of the
vanity of the idols”, Eerdmann, Samuel, 249. NRSV has ‘household gods’ in Gen 31, but opts for
transliteration in Judg 17.5; 18; Kgs 23.24; Ezk 21.21[26]; Hos 3.4, Zech 10.2, and ‘idol’/‘idolatry’ in
1 Samuel. Given the difficulties of defining teraphim and that they are described both positively (Hos
3.4) and negatively, the more neutral rendering ‘image’ would appear most satisfactory, although I
have chosen to transliterate.
6 In fact, the whole phrase is identical: םִיכָאְלַמ ּלואָׁש חַלְִּׁשַיו
7 Julius Wellhausen follows LXX, which states that when Saul sent messengers to take David,
λέγουσιν ἐνοχλει̑σθαι αὐτόν, and reads ורמאיו for the MT’s אתומר . He concludes that “Die
Worte „er ist krank” sind nicht Worte der Michal — die sagt nichts, sondern zeigt den Boten ihre
Puppe —, sondern sie sind der Bescheid”, Der Text der Bücher Samuelis (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
und Ruprecht, 1871), 113. Cross et al. posit that the lectio difficilior fits the space in 4QSamb well and
that Jerome may refer to a correct Old Latin understanding (et responsum est), Qumran Cave 4.XII: 1–
2 Samuel (DJD 17; Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), 229. Accepting this reading would create a problem for
my interpretation of this passage—although not an insuperable one given the wider issues of
deception I will discuss. However, apart from Cross and Smith (Samuel, 180—on the basis that
otherwise the dummy is unnecessary, a claim I will refute below) I have found no other commentator
or Bible version that follows Wellhausen on this point, probably for the good reason that the majority
of authorities support the MT, see Cross for a comprehensive list. Indeed, the parallelism of verses 14
and 15, ‘Saul sent…she said’ // ‘Saul sent…he said’, counts against such an emendation.
8 This time םִיכָאְלַּמַה־תֶא ּלואָׁש חַלְִּׁשַיו, which may indicate a different sort of messenger.
9 There is no need to follow LXXB here since by omitting ַה־תֶאַּמ תֹואְרִל םִיכָאְל . Cross argues the
Greek text exhibits “a transparent haplography by homoioarkton (תא…תא)”, and that space
requirements in 4QSamb are evidence for the originality of the longer reading, “Oldest Manuscripts,”
167. ‘He’ would replace ‘Saul’ if one prefered LXXB on text critical grounds as the shorter reading,
despite the overwhelming majority reading, cf. McCarter, 1 Samuel, 325; Klein, 1 Samuel, 193; DJD
17.229.
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David to him from his bed.10 On discovering Michal’s ploy Saul confronts her with a
question, to which Michal, uttering the passage’s final word, responds with a counter
question.
One can imagine that characters in a situation like that of this passage would
question each other extensively. This text, however, contains only two questions, both
in verse 17. Each is introduced by הָָמל. ‘Why?’ is an ethical interrogative enquiring
after motive and reason. It is important for my argument to observe that Michal’s הָמָל
is different from Saul’s. Michal’s is a rhetorical question justifying her action.11 Saul’s
question, however, arises from a perceived slight. I propose that studying it as a
question allows us to delve behind Saul’s protest to the nature of the ethical dilemma
facing Michal. The text is clear that Saul considered Michal’s wrong her preference of
David, believing himself to have been deceived. At this point modern readers, perhaps
over-familiar with hoary conundrums about whether one should lie when a would be
murderer knocks on the door, are prone to skate over the moral significance of Saul’s
protest. That is, what grounds could Saul have had for supposing Michal should not
deceive him? Why should she not have ‘let his enemy go’? Given that both Saul and
Michal seem to accept that she should not have acted as she did—Michal lies again to
defend her action—what ethical mores might lie behind their supposition? To answer
these questions requires investigation of the practice of violence against enemies, the
relationship between Michal and Saul as father and daughter, and the ethics of truth-
telling. Only then will it be possible to discern what each voice is actually saying, and
thus perceive how the author of Samuel simultaneously approves one and undermines
the other.
5.2 VIOLENCE AGAINST ENEMIES
Neil Whitehead observes that “[v]iolent actions, no less than any other kind of
10 McCarter argues English idiom requires ‘from’ for ְּב with verbs of motion, thus ‘from the bed’, 1
Samuel, 326.
11 For discussion and classification of interrogative clauses see also WO’C 315–16; James Barr, “Why?
in Biblical Hebrew,” JTS 36 (1985): 1–33. Not all questions require interrogative markers, see GKC
150 for examples in Samuel. On whether Michal’s הָמָל does in fact indicate a question see Driver
who argues the “use of המל is thoroughly idiomatic”, meaning ‘lest’, Notes, 158. He is followed by
van der Merwe, Naudé and Kroeze who provide Michal’s riposte as an example of when הָמָל
“[f]unctions as an introduction to an alternative posed with a negative tenor: otherwise, or else”, MNK
325. Without original emphasis. Regardless of the translation the point here is that Michal attempts to
justify her behaviour.
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behavioral expression, are deeply infused with cultural meaning and are the moment for
individual agency within historically embedded patterns of behavior”.12 Throughout 1
Samuel 19.10–18a Saul attempts to kill David; and in the climatic confrontation with
Michal, angry that his machinations had come to naught, he wants to know why she has
‘let my enemy go’. In this section I use these textual data as clues to start investigating
Saul’s stance, particularly asking how his actions might relate to a dominant cultural
schema regarding violence towards enemies.
5.2.1 Enemies in the Books of Samuel
Enemies play a significant role in the Samuel narrative, not merely in terms of
lexical occurences but their theological importance.13 Fokkelman argues that the songs
of Hannah and David are key structural devices with thematic links. Their
preoccupation with enemies is noteworthy: Hannah commences her praise with an
affirmation that because of YHWH’s intervention she can deride her enemies, and the
theme of YHWH’s deliverance from enemies echoes through David’s hymns.14
Both national and personal enemies are identified. Throughout Samuel the
Philistines are the national foe,15 although the author occasionally adds others including
Moab, Ammonites, Edom, kings of Zobah,16 and the Amalekites.17 Matters are more
pointed, however, when individuals’ enemies are identified. In the midst of battle Saul
rashly curses all those who eat food before he has been avenged on his enemies, in this
case the Philistines.18 They are also the enemy when Saul stipulates a bride price of a
hundred foreskins.19 As the narrative progresses one particular individual replaces this
amorphous mass of foreigners as Saul’s bête noire: David. He is called Saul’s enemy,
12 Neil L. Whitehead, “Introduction,” in Violence (SARASS; ed. N. L. Whitehead; Oxford: James Curry,
2004), 3–24, quote 10–11.
13 Of the 283 occurrences of the root ביא in the MT, 36 are found in Samuel; only the Psalms, with 74,
have more.
14 Cf. Fokkelman, Reading, 160; 1 Sam 2. 1–10; 2 Sam 1.19–27; 22.2–51. For a compelling social-
scientific reading of Hannah’s story see Philip Esler, “The Role of Hannah in 1 Samuel 1:1–2:21:
Understanding a Biblical Narrative in Its Ancient Context,” in Kontexte der Schrift. Band II: Kultur,
Politik, Religion, Sprache. Festschrift fur Wolfgang Stegemann (ed. C. Strecker; Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer, 2005), 15–36.
15 1 Sam 4.3; 2 Sam 3.18; 5.19–20; 19.9. Note also the prayer for rescue from those enemies whose gods
are the Baals and Astartes (1 Sam 12.10) and the recapitulation of how God sent judges to rescue
Israel from their enemies (1 Sam 12.11).
16 1 Sam 14.47.
17 1 Sam 30.26, who are at least enemies of David having plundered his camp at Ziglag, although he
describes them as ָהוְהי ֵיְבֹיא, cf. 1 Sam 15.2.
18 1 Sam 14.24, cf. Jonathan’s evaluation 1 Sam 14.30.
19 1 Sam 18.25.
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ֵביֹא, for the first time in 1 Samuel 18.29. The author makes it clear that David has done
nothing to provoke Saul’s evaluation, since it is that fact that God is with him and that
Michal loves him that causes Saul’s reaction. Although the narrative avoids attributing
the blame for his condition to David himself it does not follow that Saul’s actions
towards him as his enemy are incoherent. In fact, the books’ account of attitudes
towards David’s enemies reveals that Saul behaves according to shared assumptions.
David’s enemies are sometimes unspecified,20 but in two cases their referent is
unambiguous. When Jonathan makes a covenant with David he asks that ‘the LORD
seek out the enemies of David’, cutting them off from the face of the earth, but pleads
that David should not show enmity towards Jonathan’s descendants, since he is aware
that this will mean their elimination. 21 The books of Samuel present David as
(un)scrupulously compliant to this covenant, to the ‘benefit’ of Mephibosheth and
detriment of the unfortunate sons of Rizpah and Merab.22 Saul is David’s other enemy.
Whilst the text carefully evades portraying David himself describing Saul as such, other
characters do so vicariously. David’s men describe Saul as David’s enemy, and provide
evidence of the expectation that enemies should be killed. 23 Indeed, Saul’s own
incredulity that David should not do so points in the same direction: ‘For who has ever
found an enemy, and sent the enemy safely away?’24 David justifies his magnanimity by
arguing Saul continued to be YHWH’s anointed. 25 Abishai also describes Saul as
David’s enemy.26 Contrary to Abishai’s expectations, David refuses to countenance
Saul’s death—with the very spear he threw at David?—on the basis that no one can
‘raise a hand’ against the Lord’s anointed and remain guiltless. Obviously, this text
wishes to make a political point regarding the inviolability of the Davidic dynasty, but
for that very reason it evinces the ‘normality’ of killing one’s enemies. This is the
perspective of Rechab and Baanah, sons of Rimmon and erstwhile lieutenants to Saul’s
son, Ishbaal. Wishing to curry favour with the new regime they decapitate Ishbaal while
he reposes in his house. Arriving at David’s court they say ‘Here is the head of Ishbaal,
20 2 Sam 18.19, 32.
21 1 Sam 20.15–16.
22 2 Sam 21.7–8. Following LXXL; most MS read Michal, a lapsus calami for Merab according to
Driver, Notes, 352; cf. Smith, Samuel, 376; Arnold Anderson, 2 Samuel (WBC 11; Dallas: Word
Books, 1989), 247.
23 1 Sam 24.4.
24 1 Sam 24.19.
25 1 Sam 24.6.
26 1 Sam 26.8.
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son of Saul, your enemy, who sought your life’.27 It is inconceivable that they foresaw
David’s violent response,28 yet again confirming the logic of Saul’s protest to Michal in
1 Samuel 19.17.
Despite the indubitably mundane means by which enemies are deposed
throughout Samuel, the books’ theology is clear: it is God who vindicates, or does not
vindicate, people in confrontations with their foes. This is the force of Abigail’s
invocation that David’s enemies be like Nabal, and her contrast between God protecting
David and ‘slinging out’ the lives of his enemies.29 Indeed, rest from enemies forms part
of God’s promise to David.30 In this connection Pedersen’s observations concerning
םֹוָׁלש are pertinent. “In the olden time peace is not in itself the opposite of war. There
are friends and there are enemies; peace consists in complete harmony between friends
and victory in war against enemies.”31 Thus peace does not follow war, for then the
losers would also have peace, but victory. Niditch correctly summarises Pedersen’s
view of peace with enemies as “virtually equivalent to domination”.32 Thus it is possible
to assert that םֹוָׁלש “expresses every form of happiness and free expansion, but the
kernel in it is the community with others, the foundation of life”, 33 because it is
precisely who forms a part of that community that is at stake: the classification of ‘the
other’ has practical relevance for behaviour.
Most contemporary readers of 1 Samuel do not think that receiving favour from
God and love from Michal justify Saul’s extreme measures. Above, I defended the use
27 2 Sam 4.8.
28 2 Sam 4.9–12. David’s actions can be interpreted as both principled and pragmatic: killing Rechab
and Baanah both served as punishment for their assassination of Saul, thus demonstrating his virtue in
this respect, and eliminated his opponent’s potential military leaders in the case that they decided to
turncoat once again.
29 1 Sam 25.26, 29.
30 2 Sam 7.1, 9, 11. Note that this comes immediately after the report that Michal remained childless
until her death and may well allude to the house of Saul as David’s adversary.
31 Pedersen, Ancient Israel I–II, 311. On war in the Old Testament see Peter Craigie, The Problem of
War in the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978); T. R. Hobbs, A Time for War: A Study of
Warfare in the Old Testament (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1989); Sa-Moon Kang, Divine War in
the Old Testament and in the Ancient Near East (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989);
Tremper Longman III and Daniel G. Reid, God is a Warrior (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1995); Susan
Niditch, War in the Hebrew Bible: A Study in the Ethics of Violence (Oxford: OUP, 1993); Roland de
Vaux, Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961). A useful summary of
recent debates can be found in Rodd, Glimpses, 185–206. I concur with Hobbs and Rodd that war did
not pose the same difficulties to ancients as to modern readers.
32 Niditch, War, 135. She tries to argue against this, but all her counter examples are from within Israel,
cf. Rodd, Glimpses, 197.
33 Pedersen, Ancient Israel I–II, 313.
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of social-scientific resources to aid interpretation and I now consider whether the
anthropology of war and violence can offer clues for biblical exegetes.
5.2.2 Enemies and Violence—Anthropological perspectives
The definitions of violence and war are disputed; but the focus of
anthropological study of these topics has centred on their social reality rather than
semantics. 34 Early studies were unambiguously functionalist. Max Gluckman, for
example, highlighted the integrating and differentiating function of conflict.35 His thesis
was that conflicts between a person’s cross-cutting loyalties are the basis for societal
stability. So, for example, whilst members of a family who find themselves in different
tribes may be estranged, their kinship ties, although stretched, can ameliorate clan
violence as women, who reside with their husband’s family following marriage,
pressurise men to resolve conflict through compensation rather than warfare. 36
Structuralists have contrasted war and exchange. For Lévi-Strauss war was the opposite
of exchange, a means of establishing peaceful sociality; each was mutually exclusive.37
Klaus -F. Koch attributed war to the belligerence inculcated into children who, when
grown, encounter no political institutions to restrain them.38 Based on this premise
Napoleon Chagnon argues that war is the natural state for tribal groups. 39 Brian
Ferguson points out, however, that there is a logical error in this proposition: “it equates
the lack of formal institutions of conflict resolution with the absence of any means of
regulating conflicts other than the unstable ties of reciprocal exchange”.40 Chagnon’s
study of the Yanomamo portrays men striving to dominate females for reproductive
34 For a survey of definitions see Giulliano Pontara, “Violencia,” DEFM 2.1659–64; for reviews of the
anthropological literature on war see Anna Simons, “War: Back to the Future,” ARA 28 (1999): 73–
108; Jonathan Spencer, “Violence,” ESCA 559–60; Simon Harrison, “Warfare,” ESCA 561–62; Ingo
Schröder and Bettina Schmidt, “Introduction: Violent Imaginaries and Violent Practices,” in
Anthropology of Violence and Conflict (ed. B. Schmidt and I. Schröder; London / New York:
Routledge, 2001), 1–24.
35 Max Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1959).
36 Cf. Gluckman, Custom and Conflict, 20–22.
37 Cf. Claude Lévi-Strauss, “Guerre et commerce chez les Indiens de l’Amérique du Sud,” Renaisance 1
(1943): 122–39. Brian Ferguson summarises Lévi-Straus thus: “war is the other side of exchange
within a structure of relations—war is an exchange gone bad, and exchange is a war averted”,
“Introduction: Studying War,” in Warfare, Culture and Environment (ed. B. Ferguson; London:
Academic Press, 1984), 1–79, quote 17.
38 Klaus -F. Koch, War and Peace in Jalemo (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).
39 Napoleon Chagnon, “Life Histories, Blood Revenge, and Warfare in a Tribal Population,” Science
239 (1988): 985–92.
40 Ferguson, “Studying War,” 20. In addition, this explains only the potential for war, not its actual
occurrence.
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purposes. 41 Socio-biological interpretations of war as the product of innate drives,
however, are peculiarly culture specific. William Golding’s Lord of the Flies, for
example, presents people as merely animals, whose innate proclivity for violence must
be contained by external authority.42 Signe Howell and Roy Willis remark that it is a
“particular view of human nature…not one shared by many other societies. They may
attribute unattractive and negatively valued characteristics to their enemies or
neighbours, but most certainly not to themselves.”43 Furthermore, the assumption that
conflict is the ‘natural’ state has been challenged by Simon Harrison. Writing about the
Avatip of the Sepik River, he contends that the natural state of social relations is
peaceful.44 Ferguson adopts an ecological approach to communal violence, explaining
conflict as competition for scarce resources such as land and food.45 Howell and Willis,
however, argue that none of the above approaches account sufficiently for context.
“Violent behaviour, in the most general sense, can only be understood in association
with other behaviour within the same society. Behaviour is never culturally neutral, but
always embedded within a shared set of meanings.” 46 Nigel Rapport and Joanna
Overing concur that “violence must be seen in the context of socio-cultural interaction,
and defined in terms of all the complexities of particular situations”. 47 The need,
therefore, is to examine violence in the context of everyday practice rather than as a
discrete type of activity.48
41 Napoleon Chagnon, Yanomamo: The Fierce People (New York: Holt, Reinhardt and Winston, 1977).
42 William Golding, Lord of the Flies (London: Faber & Faber, 1954).
43 Signe Howell and Roy Willis, “Introduction,” in Societies at Peace: Anthropological Perspectives
(ed. S. Howell and R. Willis; London: Routledge, 1989), 1–28, quote 10.
44 Simon Harrison, “The Symbolic Construction of Aggression and War in a Sepik River Society,” Man
NS 24 (1989): 583–99. One consequence is that violence has to be created and sustained by ritual
action. See also Howell and Willis, “Introduction”.
45 Brian Ferguson, Warfare, Culture and Environment (New York: Academic Press, 1984). In more
recent work he attempts a synthesis of various materialist factors, cf. Ferguson, “Explaining War” in
The Anthropology of War (ed. J. Haas; Cambridge: CUP, 1990), 26–55.
46 Howell and Willis, “Introduction,” 7. Paul Richards is also sceptical about ecological factors, cultural
or political explanations for war, because they cannot explain ‘peaceful’ wars, e.g. Gandhi’s resistance
to the British Empire. “In other words, war does not break out because conditions happen to be ‘right’,
but because it is organised” Paul Richards, “New War: An Ethnographic Approach,” in No Peace No
War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (ed. P. Richards; Oxford: James Curry /
Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005), 1–21, quote 4.
47 Rapport and Overing, Anthropology, 382.
48 David Riches distinguishes between operational and representational models of violence, cf.
“Aggression, War, Violence: Space/Time and Paradigm,” Man NS 26 (1991): 281–97. Operational
models refer to the tacit meaning of violence at the moment it occurs, where responsibility for the
violent act lies with the acting agent. Representational models refer to judgements or commentaries
about violence; they are removed in space and time from the event, and responsibility is attributed to
others. Riches posits a universal experience of ‘contestably rendering physical hurt’ at the operational
level, but highlights multiple, distinct interpretations of war, aggression and so on at representational
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This brief survey of anthropological perspectives upon violence enables us to
situate a debate that is particularly pertinent to Saul’s actions, viz., the grounds upon
which boundaries between enemies and friends are drawn. Gluckman argued that
violent conflict is a factor of greater social distance. “Feud is waged and vengeance
taken when the parties live sufficiently far apart, or are too weakly related by diverse
ties”.49 Evans-Pritchard, pace Gluckman, argued that the logic of segmentation means
conflict increases with proximity.50 Harrison agrees, but contends social distance is not
a scale of ‘peace, amity and security’ versus ‘war, hostility and danger’, but rather one
of ‘alternating extremes of amity and enmity’ versus ‘uninvolvement, neutrality or
dissociation’.51 Harrison questions not that feuds are rare in societies with cross-cutting
ties, but that they are lower than would be the case in their absence. “[I]n arguing that
the interpersonal ties between groups serve to limit conflict, Gluckman is of course
assuming that the fundamental structures of tribal society are groups, and that these
groups could imaginably exist without their interrelations”.52 Harrison observes that in
Melanesian societies the a priori is interrelationships, upon which groups are
contingent.
A group is a provisional entity, its existence having constantly to be
accomplished against the claims which outsiders exercise upon its
members and which threaten perpetually to dissolve it. The interrelations
between groups, on the other hand, can never be abrogated. They are the
very conditions upon which it is possible for groups to come into
existence.53
That is, the fundamental problem is not ties between people but boundaries. Sociality is
levels. I find Riches exclusion of so called symbolic and structural violence as violence problematic
because these forms can be as prejudicial at a representational level as physical hurt. Riches’ concern
is to define violence; my focus is the role of violence in relations with enemies.
49 Gluckman, Custom and Conflict, 18.
50 Evans-Pritchard, Nuer, 150. Segmentation is “a tendency to segment into opposed segments, and also
for these segments to fuse in relation to other units” cf. 139–91, quote 190.
51 Simon Harrison, The Mask of War: Violence, Ritual and Self in Melanesia (Manchester & New York:
Manchester University Press, 1993), 20:
Peace, amity
and security
War, hostility
and danger
Social distance
Alternating
extremes of
amity & enmity
Uninvolvement,
neutrality or
dissociation
Social distance
52 Harrison, Mask, 13–14. Emphasis original.
53 Harrison, Mask, 9.
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given, but division into groups needs to be accomplished by prioritisation of particular
ties over the claims of others: “groups of men acting as if the only social relationships
they had were those that link them to each other”.54 Thus, in contrast to Gluckman’s
argument that violence reflects the existence of extant boundaries, Harrison maintains
that “violence is one of a range of symbolic practices by means of which groups act to
constitute themselves within the system of relationships encompassing them”.55 The
Gebusi tribe, for example, kills a suspected witch to redraw the community’s moral
boundaries as part of a continuous identification and expulsion of ‘the evil other’ in
their midst.56
Herzfeld proposes that the definition of ‘the other’ fluctuates according to
situation. That is, the “terms ‘outsider’ and ‘one of us,’ are signs whose meaning
depends both on the perspective of the speaker and on that of the people whose actions
are described”.57 Herzfeld points to the importance of defining ‘outsider’ and how
perspective affects this definition disemically. He claims it is characteristic of state
authority to fix the definition of ‘the other’, in Canutian defiance of the reality of
segmentation in which people constantly construct both ‘togetherness’ and ‘otherness’
not just at the level of national boundaries but in everyday interaction.
In his study of genocide Alex Hinton proposes that the construction of ‘the
other’ is the first ‘grammatical rule’ of genocidal practice. This entails “local
construction of group boundaries, a marking off of similarity from difference, of an ‘us’
from a ‘them’ ”.58
To facilitate violence against such newly marked enemies, perpetrator
regimes usually initiate a series of institutional, legal, social, and political
changes that transform the conditions under which the target victim
groups live and, ultimately, perish. The structural changes that underlie
54 Harrison, Mask, 10. Emphasis original. Harrison concludes that in Melanesian war “[w]hat a group is
fighting for is not the biological survival of its members but the survival of its socio-political
identity”, Harrison, Mask, 12.
55 Harrison, Mask, 14.
56 Cf. Harrison, Mask, 17; B. M. Knauft, “Reconsidering violence in simple human societies: homicide
among the Gebusi of New Guinea,” CA 28 (1987): 457–82. The practices of identity maintenance are
the focus of Kenneth George’s analysis of headhunting rituals, Showing Signs of Violence: The
Cultural Politics of a Twentieth-Century Headhunting Ritual (Berkley: University of California Press,
1996). George responds to the classic studies of Indonesian headhunting by Michelle Rosaldo,
Knowledge and Passion: Ilongot Notions of Self and Social Life (Cambridge: CUP, 1980); idem, “The
Shame of Headhunters and the Autonomy of Self,” Ethos 11 (1983): 135–51.
57 Herzfeld, Looking Glass, 154.
58 Alex Hinton, “The Poetics of Genocidal Practice: Violence under the Khmer Rouge,” in Violence (ed.
N. L. Whitehead; SARASS; Oxford: James Curry, 2004), 157–84, quote 162.
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this “organization of difference” create mechanisms, disciplines, and
social spaces for distinguishing, dividing, confining, and regulating the
target group...[although] [e]ven as they are asserted with conviction, the
categories that perpetrators manufacture are arbitrary constructions
imposed from above that never fully accord with the more fluid and less
rigid realities existing on the ground.59
If life is ‘chaotic and contradictory’, as Rapport suggests, these constructions can never
correspond with some ontological essence possessed by ‘the other’,60 which leads to the
second grammatical rule, viz., the bodily inscription of signs in order to overcome the
uncertainty that “threatens to shatter the crystallization of difference”. 61 Thus
“perpetrator regimes organize difference in ways that create mechanisms for sorting and
institutions for confining people in spaces that demarcate and affirm (by “their” very
location in a place like a ghetto or concentration camp) alleged identities”. 62 The bodily
inscription of difference is especially important when other markers are absent: one
must look for clues for who is ‘one of us’ from actions or opinions. A third grammatical
rule of genocidal violence is that “violence always contains an immediate, experiential
component that even the most powerful poetry, memoir, or analysis cannot convey”.63
That is, it is a concrete, physical action causing harm to others, which at the same time
possesses a performative aspect in the creation of ‘the other’.64
The performative element of violence has been observed in non-genocide
studies. Laurie Taylor’s ethnography of the London underworld linked the moral
assessment that something or someone was ‘out of order’ with consequent violence to
enforce ‘proper respect’. Being ‘out of order’ described diverse anti-social acts, as
defined by the criminal ‘micro-society’ that employed the phrase. “The violent acts
themselves, matter-of-fact and routine, were simply the instrumental means by which
departures-from-order were socio-culturally inscribed and overcome”.65 Note that the
59 Hinton, “Genocidal Practice,” 162–63.
60 Cf. Mario Aguilar, The Rwanda Genocide and the Call to Deepen Christianity in Africa (Eldoret:
AMECEA Gaba Publications Spearhead, 1998), 24.
61 Hinton, “Genocidal Practice,” 163. Simon Harrison observes that the construction of the Japanese
enemy as sub-human meant their body parts were ‘traded’ in ways that would have been deemed
inappropriate with European enemies, “Skull trophies of the Pacific War: transgressive objects of
remembrance,” JRAI 12 (2006): 817–36, especially 826.
62 Hinton, “Genocidal Practice,” 163.
63 Hinton, “Genocidal Practice,” 172.
64 Hinton, “Genocidal Practice,” 166–68.
65 Rapport and Overing, Anthropology, 382–83; cf. Laurie Taylor, In the Underworld (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1984).
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norms were also inscribed upon the enforcer as he embodied the socially acceptable
values.
The values to be embodied and inscribed in any given situation will be local
products, highlighting the importance of context. Maria Olujic observes that “war rapes
in the former Yugoslavia would not be such an effective weapon of torture and terror if
it were not for concepts of honor, shame, and sexuality that are attached to women’s
bodies in peacetime”.66 Thus the meaning of this sort of violence is predictable; it is not
simply explosive rage, but a strategy for human relationships of domination. Rapport
and Overing label this ‘democratic violence’, in contrast to ‘nihilistic violence’ that
“negates common forms of exchange”.67 In his ethnography of the Lebanese province of
Akkar Michael Gilsenan notes that cultural practice may often demand violence.68 In
Rapport and Overing’s terms the actions he discusses are clearly ‘democratic’, and
largely understood in terms of ordinary practice as responses to challenges to a man’s
honour. Bourdieu observes that the
point of honour is the ethic appropriate to an individual who always sees
himself through the eyes of others, who has need of others in order to
exist, because his self-image is inseparable from the image of himself
that he receives back from others. Respectability…is essentially defined
by its social dimension, and so must be won and defended in the face of
everyone.69
66 Maria B. Olujic, “Embodiment of Terror: Gendered Violence in Peacetime and Wartime in Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina,” MAQ NS 12 (1998): 31–50, quote 31–32.
67 Rapport and Overing, Anthropology, 383–86, quote 386.
68 Michael Gilsenan, Lords of the Lebanese Marches: Violence & Narrative in an Arab Society (London
/ New York: Tauris, 1996).
69 Pierre Bourdieu, Algeria 1960: Essays by Pierre Bourdieu (Cambridge: CUP, 1979), 113. One of the
most well known anthropological resources employed in biblical studies is the ‘model’ of ‘honour and
shame’. The relevant scholarly literature is substantial, which precludes a detailed discussion here,
although I think it is important to make the following six observations. (1) Honour and shame are not
a dyad; and shame may be more important than honour in everyday relations, see Unni Wikan,
“Shame and Honour: A Contestable Pair.” Man NS 19 (1984): 635–52; idem, “More on honour and
shame,” Man 23 NS (1988): 170; Gideon Kressel, “More on honour and shame,” Man NS 23 (1988):
167–70; idem, “Shame and Gender,” AQ 65 (1992): 34–46; Michael Herzfeld, “Honour and Shame:
Problems in the Comparative Analysis of Moral Systems,” Man 15 NS (1980): 339–51, especially
343–48; Carmelo Lison-Tolosana, Belmonte de los Caballeros: A Sociological Study of a Spanish
Town (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966), 314–16. (2) The materialist and non-materialist dimensions of
‘honour’ are often related, see Elvin Hatch, “Theories of Social Honor,” AA 91 NS (1989): 341–353;
John Davies, People of the Mediterranean: An essay in comparative social anthropology (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), especially 90–92; Anton Blok, “Rams and Billy Goats: A Key to the
Mediterranean Code of Honour,” Man NS 16 (1981): 427–40; Peter Schneider, “Honor and Conflict
in a Sicilian Town,” AQ 42 (1969): 130–54; Jane Schneider, “On Violence and Virgins: Honor,
Shame, and Access to Resources in Mediterranean Societies,” Ethnology 10 (1971): 1–24; Alice
Schlegel, “Status, Property, and the Value on Virginity,” AE 18 (1991): 719–34. (3) ‘Limited good’ is
an insufficient theoretical justification of agonistic competition for honour; ‘honour based’
antagonism does sometimes occur, see George Foster, “Peasant Society and the Image of Limited
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Defence of honour is something that a man must prosecute himself, since appeal to a
higher authority would be a sign of weakness. Julian Pitt-Rivers notes that the “ultimate
vindication of honour lies in physical violence”. 70 While the act of fighting is
deprecated as signifying lack of self control the potential for violence is frequently
communicated, because, as in the Spanish bullfight, it is important that a man “confront,
withstand and direct the physical force of his opponent”. 71 The extreme form of
violence is killing another. Campbell contends that “[a]lthough aimless violence is
dishonourable there is no missing the pleasure it gives when a man is forced to kill; nor
the prestige which it brings him. For there is no more conclusive way of showing that
Good,” AA NS 167 (1965): 293–315; idem, “A Second Look at Limited Good.” AQ 45 (1972): 57–4;
idem, “Reply,” Curr Anthropol 17 (1976): 710–13; idem, “Foster’s Reply to Kaplan, Saler, and
Bennett,” AA 68 (1966): 210–14; David Kaplan and Benson Saler, “Foster’s ‘Image of Limited
Good’: An Example of Anthropological Explanation,” AA 68 (1966): 202–206; Frans Schryer, “A
Reinterpretation of Treasure Tales and the Image of Limited Good,” Curr Anthropol 17 (1976): 708–
10; John Kennedy, “Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good: A Critique,” AA 68 (1966):
1212–25; James Gregory, “Image of Limited Good, or Expectation of Reciprocity?,” CA 16 (1975):
73–84; Steven Piker, “ “The Image of Limited Good”: Comments on an Exercise in Description and
Interpretation,” AA 68 (1966): 1202–11; Juliet du Boulay and Rory Williams, “Amoral Familism and
the Image of Limited Good: A Critique from a European Perspective,” AQ 60 (1987): 12–24; James
Acheson, “Limited Good or Limited Goods? Response to Economic Opportunity in a Tarascan
Pueblo,” AA NS 74 (1972): 1152–69. (4) The gendering of honour (and shame) is problematic since it
is a moral good for both sexes; whether it is the most important good at any particular moment is an
empirical question, see John Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Introduction,” Honor and grace in
Anthropology (ed J. G. Peristiany and J. Pitt-Rivers; Cambridge: CUP, 1992), 1–17; Wikan,
“Contestable Pair”; Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments, 110–112; du Boulay, Portrait, 104–5; Amanda
Weidman, “Beyond Honor and Shame: Performing Gender in the Mediterranean,” AQ 76 (2003):
519–30; Alison Lever, “Honour as a Red Herring,” CA 6 (1986): 86–106. (5) Honour precedence is
distinct from honour virtue; maintaining the appearance of attaining both may be important, see David
Gilmore, “Anthropology of the Mediterranean Area,” ARA 11 (1982): 175–205, especially 191; idem,
“Honor, Honesty, Shame: Male Status in Contemporary Andalusia,” in Honor and Shame and the
Unity of the Mediterranean (ed. D. D. Gilmore; AAASP 22; Washington, D.C.: American
Anthropological Association, 1987), 90–103, especially 92; Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers, “Introduction,”
4–5; Lison-Tolosana, Belmonte, 336–37; Charles Stewart, “Honour and sanctity: two levels of
ideology in Greece.” SA 2 (1994): 205–28; Michael Meeker, “Meaning and Society in the near East:
Examples from the Black Sea Turks and the Levantine Arabs (I),” IJMES 7 (1976): 243–70,
especially 261–64; Louise Lawrence, “ ‘For truly, I tell you, they have received their reward’ (Matt
6:2): Investigating Honor Precedence and Honor Virtue,” CBQ 64 (2002): 687–702. (6) The key
interpretative questions concern the uses of honour (and shame), which are often felt, see Wikan,
Managing, 66; Christian Giordano, “Mediterranean Honour Reconsidered: Anthropological Fiction or
Actual Action Strategy?,” AJEC 10 (2001): 39–58, especially 55; Mark Jamieson, “It’s Shame That
Makes Men and Women Enemies: The Politics of Intimacy among the Miskitu of Kakabila,” JRAI NS
6 (2000): 311–24; Roger Just, “On the ontological status of honour,” in An anthropology of indirect
communication (ed J. Hendry and C. W. Watson; London / New York: Routledge, 2001), 34–50;
Rosemary Coombe, “Barren Ground: Re-Conceiving Honour and Shame in the Field of
Mediterranean Ethnography,” Anthropologica 32 (1990): 221–38.
70 Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and social status,” in Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean
Society (ed. J. G. Peristiany; London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), 19–77, quote 29.
71 Cf. Garry Marvin, “Honour, Integrity and the Problem of Violence in the Spanish Bullfight,” in The
Anthropology of Violence (ed. D. Riches; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 118–35, quote 127. Marvin
contends that the bull is in a similar structural position as other males and that the “fact that one of the
contestants is an animal allows for the incorporation of acts of violence which would be intolerable in
a contest between men”, “Spanish Bullfight,” 129. It is the matador’s performance rather than the
death of the animal that is the focus of attention.
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you are stronger than by taking away the other man’s life.” 72 Gilsenan, however,
presents a more nuanced picture of the consequences of murder and the very long-term
difficulties it brings in its wake. In some cases status is gained. In others the killer may
be lauded for a time, perhaps because the murder was almost akin to an initiation rite
into manhood, but then becomes increasingly sidelined. By virtue of having shed blood
he becomes dangerous to others. Most obviously, he and his family are now a potential
target for retaliation. But the killer, having stepped outside the normal means of
defending honour at a less definitive level of violence, is also considered less
predictable and controllable by his own family. In Gilsenan’s narrative this frequently
leads to social marginalisation and an exclusion of the individual from the demands of
the honour code, in particular the demand for kin to respond to a slight to his honour, or
even his killing, with violence.
The avoidance of violence is an important theme in anthropological studies of
honour, although often overlooked by biblical scholars. That is, the application of
violent measures and the avoidance of violence are both properly considered as part of
the honour code.73 This ambiguity means that ‘challenge-riposte’ is not a mechanistic
scheme that can be used to interpret all practice; attention must be paid to individual
agency. At a fundamental level the reason for avoidance is that there are multiple
cultural goods—honour is not the only desirable object of existence; life itself is
another, for example—and these goods frequently conflict. But even at the level of the
honour code the avoidance of violence is a sign of honourable self control, and a desire
to present oneself appropriately is a curb upon violent excess.74 Instead, alternative
strategies, for example, joking and other ostensibly positive social activities, are laced
with an undercurrent of competition.75 This antagonism occurs between rivals, which
points to another key restraint upon violence: it is opponents who are the audience for
displays of honour as affirmations of self identity. “[S]ince social prestige requires the
favourable response of the community to a man’s qualities and actions after these have
been evaluated in terms of the accepted system of values, it depends overwhelmingly on
72 J. K. Campbell, Honour, Family, and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek
Mountain Community (New York and Oxford: OUP, 1964), 318.
73 Cf. Michael Herzfeld, The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 76.
74 E. C. Banfield labels this ‘vanity’, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press,
1958), 137. Abstaining from violence can also allow the stronger side to demonstrate moral
superiority, cf. Herzfeld, Looking Glass, 159.
75 Cf. Gilsenan, Lords, 206–30.
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the opinions of enemies”.76 According to Campbell, there is a symbiotic relationship
with enemies in all areas of life.
The position [any family] is able to occupy in public life, the quality of
the marriage alliances it establishes, depend entirely on its social
prestige, that is, they depend on the favourable response of enemies; or
more accurately, on the inability of enemies effectively to denigrate a
family’s reputation.77
In his ethnography Campbell observes that competitive behaviour such as reciprocal
trespass for grazing sheep is preferred to outright violence. Thus “in grazing disputes
shepherds are careful to fight with weapons which may cause unpleasant wounds but
are unlikely to kill. Wanton murders are discouraged through removal of the killer by
imprisonment, voluntary exile, or vengeance”.78
Gilsenan also observes that individuals’ violent acts are often part of wider
competition for control. So a powerful bey may oblige his client aghas and fellahin to
violate others’ property or persons as part of his claim to honour and power. And, of
course, other beys may respond not by direct personal retaliation but by ordering their
clients to perpetrate violent acts. The ability to order and control violence by others is a
sign of high social status. In 1 Samuel 19, the fact that Saul sends messengers is
significant. He is king and he acts accordingly—as another biblical text said he would—
ordering others to execute violent acts on his behalf, not for their own ends but those of
their patron.79
All these sorts of violence are ‘democratic’ in that they are understood by people
as part of the flow of ordinary practice. Nihilistic violence, on the other hand, is
unpredictable: it does not conform to established patterns of violent behaviour so
disturbs social relations by disorientating others. In general, it is not tolerated by
authority figures when practiced by inferiors, for it threatens the established order in
which they have a vested interest. Thus when individuals engage in non-democratic
nihilistic violence it is necessarily conceived as extraordinary praxis, that is, based upon
a culturally alternative logic not shared by others. Whilst nihilistic violence is usually
76 Campbell, Honour, Family and Patronage, 264. My emphasis.
77 Campbell, Honour, Family and Patronage, 265.
78 Campbell, Honour, Family and Patronage, 264.
79 Cf. 1 Samuel 8.11–16; 25.5. On the matter of recruitment for warfare see the summary of models in
Mario Aguilar, “Maccabees—Symbolic Wars and Age Sets,” in Ancient Israel: The Old Testament in
its Social Context (ed. Philip Esler; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 240–54.
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perceived as (undesirable) extraordinary praxis, if it is executed by the very powerful or
old it can be construed as intentional action. This is because by engaging in
unpredictable violence they affirm their personal transcendence of the ordinary code,
which is acceptable because their negation of democratic violence affirms their ability
to impose accepted norms upon others. For this reason it is only those who are clearly
superior because of age or acquired status that are allowed to act thus: pretension to this
status by those who are perceived as still needing to compete for honour and power will
receive a rapid riposte.80
5.2.3 Understanding David as ‘My enemy’
It is now possible to consider Saul’s actions towards David as his enemy. I
reiterate that I do not seek an essentialist understanding of ‘biblical culture’ with respect
to enemies, for the plurality of social and moral goods, and the complex, sometimes
contradictory and contested, nature of social life militates against such homogenising
conceptions. For this reason I have followed Aguilar’s injunction to consider the context
of particular interpretations, that is, wider anthropological work relating to enemies and
violence.81 Instead of seeking confirmation of a particular model of violent acts I use the
resources discussed above to suggest new interpretations of 1 Samuel 19.10–18a.
According to 1 Samuel Saul does not always consider David as his enemy. At
first unknown, 82 David is conscripted into Saul’s service where he enjoys notable
success, eventually being appointed leader of the fighting men.83 His loyalty to Saul is
80 James Watson posits another reason for accepting extreme violence. If aggression is both a fact of
sociality and key attribute of manhood then the demonstration of violence by the very powerful
without the constraints felt by others can mean that they are more fully men than others. Referring to
the violent Tairora despot, Matoto, Watson observes that he “is a fuller embodiment of the emphases
of the male cult than most apprentices can ever become. Hence he is logically a better man. He is no
bizarre phenomenon outside the system, but fulfils in unusual degree the teachings and exhortations
given to Tairora youths”, “Tairora: the politics of despotism in a small society,” in Politics in New
Guinea (ed. R. Berndt and P. Lawrence; Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1971),
224–75, quote 268; cited Harrison, Mask, 24. Emphasis original.
81 Cf. Aguilar, “Changing models,” 310.
82 1 Sam 17.58. The author probably wishes to make a theological point, cf. 1 Sam 2.7–8.
83 1 Sam 18.2, 5. LXXB omits 17.55–18.6a, cf. McCarter, 1 Samuel, 303–305; Driver, Notes, 149–51;
although remnants of 18.4–5 have been identified at Qumran, DJD 17.80. 1 Sam 17.1–18.5 has
appeared to many critics “impossible” (Driver, Notes, 149) to harmonise with 1 Sam 16.14–23, even if
one opts exclusively for LXXB (which omits 1 Sam 17.12–31, 41, 50, 55–18.5), cf. 1 Sam 17.33, 38–
39 with 1 Sam 16.18, 21. Modern literary approaches have suggested a way of reconciling these
chronological difficulties by conceiving these chapters as “a binocular vision by montage”
Fokkelman, Crossing, 203; for the original idea see Alter, Art, 147–54. That is, the various sources are
presented a-chronically in order to offer various perspectives upon the important event of David’s
introduction to Saul’s court. I am sympathetic to the literary resolutions of this problem; in any case I
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tested and proven, and ‘all the people, even the servants of Saul, approved’.84 David is
portrayed as an individual properly incorporated into Saul’s service, someone who is
personally powerful yet in a client relationship with the king. Despite this rosy picture
the text alludes to friction between the two men from the very beginning.85 Although
there is no suggestion that the victory parade upon returning from killing Goliath was
anything other than a celebration, Saul takes umbrage at the women’s exuberant singing
of ‘Saul has killed his thousands and David his ten thousands’.86 Saul perceives a slight
to his honour, which leads him to eye, ֵןיֹוע, David suspiciously from that day on.87 No
other motive than jealousy and fear for his throne is provided for Saul’s anxiety.88
Within the narrative he has known himself to have been rejected as king by God since
chapter 15, but is unaware of his replacement’s identity. Fokkelman proposes that Saul
has been tormented by continually looking around for his rival.
He has now reached the stage where he identifies him as David, and that
is correct despite the fact that he reaches this interpretation via false
contact with the poem. This moment is a milestone to Saul’s process: on
the one hand it denotes the start of a drastic reduction of tormenting
uncertainty…on the other hand the identification gives his jealous
aggression which has concentrated all the time without finding a way out,
an object at which to direct itself.89
Thus the following narrative details an attempt to place David closer to the firing line by
demoting him to commander and enticing him to take extreme risks by offering his
daughter’s hand in marriage.90 At this time Saul seeks to prejudice David alone and
wish to affirm that David is, at different times, both Saul’s friend and enemy. It is the construction of
each status that is important for my interpretation.
84 1 Sam 18.5.
85 1 Sam 18.6 dates the following narrative to ‘when David returned from killing the Philistine’.
Attempts to solve the chronological difficulties by supposing ִּיתְׁשִלְּפַה־תֶא is a general reference lack
textual support in Samuel: ִּיתְׁשִלְּפַה־תֶא always refers to Goliath; םִּיתְׁשִלְּפ are Philistines generally.
86 1 Sam 18.7–8. Stanley Gevirtz notes that the parallelism of ֶלֶאף and ָהבָבְר is not antithetical. He
maintains it is very unlikely the welcoming party of women should insult Saul on his return from
victory, concluding the song is lavish praise of both Saul and David, see Patterns in the Early Poetry
of Israel (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963), 24. The interpretation of their eulogy as an insult
is thus Saul’s alone. For a detailed analysis of the pericope and Saul’s ‘paranoia’ see Fokkelman,
Crossing, 210–21.
87 1 Sam 18.9. Following the Qere; for discussion see Driver who argues ִיְהַיו with participle “expresses
at once origin and continuance”, Notes, 151–52; cf. Gen 4.17; 21.20; Judg 16.21; 2 Kgs 15.5,
something made explicit by the phrase ָהְאלָָהו ּאוהַה םֹּוַיהֵמ. Philip Esler thinks the ‘eying’ is related
to the evil eye, see “The Madness of Saul: A Cultural Reading of 1 Samuel 8–31,” in Biblical Studies /
Cultural Studies (JSOTSup 266; ed. J. C. Exum and S. D. Moore; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic
Press, 1998), 220–62, especially 240.
88 Cf. 1 Sam 18.8.
89 Fokkelman, Crossing, 221.
90 This interpretation of 1 Sam 18.17–27 is well defended by David Clines, “Michal Observed: An
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covertly, perhaps because of the people’s adulation.91
The text lends support to the view that Saul appreciated multiple cultural goods,
not just the death of a personal foe. Indeed, these are the basis for Jonathan’s petition in
1 Samuel 19.4–5. He does not argue that Saul acts unreasonably if David is his enemy,
but offers a two pronged argument: that David has not harmed Saul, and that David has
been useful. He contends kings need competent military commanders, and should
maintain order by reciprocating respect and service. In other words, Jonathan argues for
democratic violence and the tangible good of military prowess. Saul recognises the
logic of Jonathan’s petition, of the need for these cultural goods even though they
competed with his desire to eliminate someone he considered as a competitor for the
throne, and restores David to court.92
I noted above that the existence of multiple cultural goods means that ‘the
other’, the differentiated individual or group, is a social construct, not an ontological
description. Saul constructs David as ‘the other’ when he speaks ‘with his son Jonathan
and with all his servants about killing David’.93 The point is that as the king’s enemy
David was deserving of death, regardless of whether Saul practices democratic or
nihilistic violence.94 There are two ways in which the inscription of David’s otherness
occurs in 1 Samuel 19.10–18a. First, Saul sends messengers to corral David in his
house. Although a temporary location, David’s ‘otherness’ is visible as one hemmed in
by the king’s forces and subject to his majesty’s pleasure. Second, Saul’s purpose
throughout is the ultimate inscription of power upon a body: David’s death. This
observation enables us to shed new light on the question of why Saul wanted to wait
until the morning in order to kill David. At a literary level the delay both creates
tension—what will happen in the morning?—and facilitates to the author the time his
characters need to make the subsequent moves in the story. But I suggest that this is not
a forced device. To date those commentators who speculate upon this ‘delay’ have made
two suggestions. First, Bressen argues “per gli antichi Semiti la notte era sacra: non era
Introduction to Reading Her Story,” in Telling Queen Michal’s Story: An Experiment in Comparative
Interpretation (JSOTSup 119; ed. D. J. A. Clines and T. C. Eskenazi; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic
Press, 1991), 24–63, especially 27–32.
91 Cf. 1 Sam 18.16, 30.
92 1 Sam 19.7.
93 1 Sam 19.1.
94 Cf. 1 Sam 18.29; 19.1.
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lecito uccider uno nel sonno”.95 However, the law allowing the killing of nocturnal
thieves indicates that although it may not have been licit, the practice of breaking and
entering certainly occurred, and darkness would have been no impediment to Saul’s
thugs. 96 Second, Eerdmann maintains that “[w]e may guess that only the fear of
alarming the town, and of rousing the populace to rescue their favourite hero, prevented
him from directing them to break into the house and slay David there”.97 But this does
not solve the problem, for presumably ‘rescue of their favourite hero’ could be
accomplished even more easily by daylight.
The supposition of these exegetes is that Saul’s action is an aberration: he has
become a ‘brazen murderer’ or a ‘mad king’. They assume that the ‘correct’ moral
behaviour is that sanctioned by the modern state, with its emphasis upon due process
and ‘impartiality’. I propose, however, that this supposition is unlikely and that Saul’s
action can be explained as culturally expected—not for everyone but certainly for a
powerful leader. I noted above that rulers exercise nihilistic violence in order to
demonstrate their superiority over others: as the guardians of order they show that they
can do as they please. Indeed, it is their ability to do so that reveals they are able to
impose order on others. So Gilsenan notes that “Abboud fulfilled the ‘character’ of the
‘great bey’, of the ‘one who goes to excess’ and becomes the supreme figure of order in
negating the order through which others imagine existence”. 98 This excess can be
wanton—Abboud smashes a man’s head against a wall ‘for nothing’, and shoots a boy
to test his new rifle—or by ignoring the ‘rules’ of honour and shame. In the biblical
narrative, for example, the latter occurs when Saul is magnanimous to ‘the worthless
fellows’ who initially refused to support him. 99 This was only possible because
overwhelming violence was a potential option. Whilst modern Westerners tend to read
this as ‘the right thing to do’, ‘the people’ were expressing the cultural expectation of
vengeance upon those who attempt to dishonour a powerful figure. In fact, the appeal to
95 Bressan, Samuele, 317. Cf. Smith, Samuel, 179: “to enter the house of another in the night is contrary
to oriental morals”. The Philistines waited until morning to attack and kill Samson, Judg 16.2.
96 Note that killing at night is also nowhere condemned: Jael probably kills Sisera during the hours of
darkness Judg 4.21. Night and day have received particular attention in relation to Gen 18–19, see
below.
97 Eerdmann, Samuel, 251, citing Kitto, a 19th century source unavailable to me; cf. Kirkpatrick, Samuel,
171, for the same quote. As an aside Eerdmann also suggests that the fear of harming Michal could
have been a motive.
98 Gilsenan, Lords, 35.
99 1 Sam 10.27; 11.12–13. On ְּבלַַּעִילְב ֵינ see Burnside, Signs, 55–58; Fokkelman, Reading, 151–53.
Saul’s was also a useful political move: ruthless leaders always have uses for ‘worthless fellows’.
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‘the right thing’ is an appeal beyond the person of the king. That God and not the
monarch is the ultimate authority is a constant Old Testament theme precisely because it
was counter-cultural. 100 When visible authority resides in a person and not a
bureaucratic state, however, that individual must continually reassert his right to
exercise power. Michael Foucault addresses this issue in Discipline and Punish by
contrasting medieval and modern economies of power with reference to penal styles. He
argues 19th century prison discipline aimed to control individuals, objectifying and
observing their ‘docile bodies’. 101 In monarchical law, however, both process and
punishment was simultaneously a restoration of order and a reaffirmation of the regal
claim to order. Thus a (perceived) crime against the monarch was defiance towards
sovereignty itself, requiring a kingly response to the personal affront in the form of
revenge. Furthermore, “[i]ts aim is not so much to re-establish a balance as to bring into
play, at its extreme point, the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate
the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength”.102 Foucault makes
much of the spectacle of torture and public execution:
punishment is a ceremonial of sovereignty; it uses the ritual marks of the
vengeance that it applies to the body of the condemned man; and it
deploys before the eyes of the spectators an effect of terror as intense as
it is discontinuous, irregular and always above its own laws, the physical
presence of the sovereign and of his power.103
I do not suggest that ancient Israelite monarchy shared the baroque execution practices
of medieval Europe. Nevertheless, it is possible to relativize the assumption that Saul’s
actions in seeking to detain David in his house at night, yet kill him ‘in the morning’,
that is, publicly, were somehow strangely inexplicable. The point of David’s house
arrest was to demonstrate that Saul dominated his enemy: he was able to restrict his
movements for as long as he pleased. His death, the ultimate inscription of regal power
upon the body of a subject, would have proclaimed the same thing. That no reason for
100 See, e.g., the deuteromomic injunctions about the king Deut 17.14–20. Regarding the temptation to
appoint a foreign king, without acquired loyalties to local people, see Roy Mottahedeh, Loyalty and
Leadership in an Early Islamic Society (2nd ed; London / New York: Tauris, 2001), 175–90.
101 Cf. Michael Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (trans. A. Sheridan: London:
Penguin, 1977), 188: “Discipline, however, had its own type of ceremony…the review, the ‘parade’,
an ostentatious form of the examination. In it the ‘subjects’ were presented as ‘objects’ to the
observation of a power that was manifested only by its gaze’.
102 Foucault, Discipline, 48–49. On the basis of works like Gilsenan’s I think it is unnecessary to
speculate that the transgression need always be against ‘law’. Any violation of the king’s will would
in principle be adequate, although conflicting demands upon him, e.g. the need for the transgressor’s
services against the violation of his desires, will mean the king will not always burn everyone who
crosses him at the stake.
103 Foucault, Discipline, 130.
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Saul’s enmity towards David is given in the text is, of course, significant—the books of
Samuel are an apology for David’s kingship 104 —but besides the point for ancient
implied readers with respect to Saul’s violence. Gilsenan and Foucault help us see that
whilst Saul’s behaviour could have been erratic in that David had not done anything
wrong, it could still have been, and perceived to have been, typical for kings and other
very senior authority figures in a context where the modern state apparatus of violence
did not exist.105 In this case Saul’s actions could be considered as acceptable practice for
a king.
The final aspect of Saul’s inscription of his power upon his subjects is the
performative obligations imposed upon his messengers to act violently in specific
situations. He commands them to go and watch David’s house: they obey. He sends
them to fetch David: they go. He resends them to check Michal’s story that David is ill:
they do so.106 At each point Saul reasserts his power to order. The messengers’ lack of
success will be discussed later, but it is not significant with respect to the performative
aspect of Saul’s inscription of his authority upon the messengers. This aids translation
of ַלֹותִמֲה in verse 15, which many authorities render ‘so I can kill him’.107 A more
literal translation is ‘in order to kill him’,108 but this begs the question as to who would
do so. It is possible to suppose that Saul wished to slaughter David personally, much as
Samuel executed Agag.109 There are two reasons, however, for thinking the messengers
were to be responsible for the killing. First, the identical verb, with the messengers as
the implied subjects, is found in verse 11. Second, the anthropology of violence and in
particular the performative aspect of ‘corrective’ violence suggests it would have only
been a failure of the messengers, that is an inability of Saul to oblige them to act as he
wished, that could have induced Saul to kill David directly.110 A more exemplary form
104 Kyle McCarter, “The Apology of David,” JBL 99 (1980): 489–504.
105 Here I do not fall into the evolutionary trap of defining the past with reference to the absence of some
facet of modern society, simply couch my argument in terms that contrast the suppositions of some
exegetes with my contention; cf. Herzfeld, Anthropology, 118.
106 See below for other instances of חׁלש indicating royal power.
107 E.g. Klein, de Vaux, Smith, Hertzberg, NRSV, NIV.
108 Cf. Fokkelman, Crossing, 267; David Alter, The David Story: A translation with commentary of 1 and
2 Samuel (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 120; McCarter, 1 Samuel, 324, has ‘so that he can be put
to death’.
109 1 Sam 15.33.
110 An interesting comparison can be made with Judg 8.20–22, where Jether’s reluctance to kill Zebah
and Zalmunna obliges Gideon to kill them himself. In these verses the author portrays Gideon as a
powerful figure accustomed to oblige others to do his bidding, then questions the reality of this
authority by having his son prevaricate. This failure of Jether and Gideon is excused  ִּיכ אֵָרי ִּיכ
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of violence, one that inscribed Saul’s authority in the messengers themselves, would
have been to command them to kill David in Saul’s presence. This is what seems to be
envisaged in verse 15.
Of course, Saul also intends that David should be affected by these acts of
violence. That he is not, beyond being forced to escape, is thanks to Michal, who does
not acquiesce to Saul’s attempt to impose regal power, but urges David to flee. At the
end of the scene when confronted by Saul she excuses her actions with the words
ךֵתיִמֲא  ָהָמל  ִינְִּחלַׁש  יַלֵא  ַרמָא־ּאוה
ְ . They constitute Michal’s reply to Saul’s
aggrieved query ָּמָליְִביֹא־תֶא יְִּחלַׁשְַּתו ִינִתיִּמִר ָהכָּכ ה , and, as readers are aware, are
no less a creative invention than the teraphim dummy.111 I highlight two elements of
Michal’s excuse. First, in the Masoretic tradition Michal underscores the fact that two
moral agents are acting and that David’s position is distinct from hers: ‘he said, to
me’.112 She thus distinguishes and separates herself from her husband by emphasising
the individual identity of them both. Second, Michal claims that David threatened her,
forcing her to facilitate his escape, with the words ‘Why should I kill you?’. Most
commentators reduce the significance of Michal’s utterance to a last ditch attempt at
saving her own skin. Thus Campbell argues that the “exchange with Saul is important
less for Michal’s lame excuse than for Saul’s characterization of David as ‘my
enemy’i”.113 In fact, Michal’s words carry more freight, and are successful—Saul does
not punish Michal 114 —precisely because of what they signify. We have seen that
רַָענ ּּונֶדֹוע. Then, however, the writer has the kings of Midian further question Gideon’s authority by
challenging him to kill them himself ֹותָּרוְבג ׁשִיאָכ ִּיכ—to demonstrate that he, too, is not simply a
lad, but a ‘real man’. The resolution, Gideon’s execution of his adversaries, reconfirms his authority,
something reiterated by the Israelites inviting him to rule over them in the next verse. In general, the
presentation of Saul as failing to conform to patterns of hegemonic masculinity is one way in which
the author undermines his voice, see Mark George, “Constructing Identity in 1 Samuel 17,” Biblia 7
(1999): 389–412; Herzfeld, Poetics of Manhood, 19; R. W. Connell and James Messerschmidt,
“Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept,” GS 19 (2005): 829–59; David Gilmore, Manhood
in the Making: Cultural Concepts of Masculinity (New Haven / London: Yale University Press, 1990);
Eduardo Archetti, Masculinities: Football, Polo and the Tango in Argentina (Oxford and New York:
Berg, 1999); Annie George, “Reinventing Honorable Masculinity: Discourses from a Working-Class
Indian Community,” MM 9 (2006): 35–52; Joanna Overing, “Styles of Manhood: an Amazonian
contrast in tranquillity and violence,” in Societies at Peace: Anthropological Perspectives (ed. S.
Howell and R. Willis; London: Routledge, 1989), 79–99.
111 This despite Edelman’s opinion that Michal’s words introduce the possibility that David did take the
initiative; the text says that Michal was the active agent, and a reading of the text must therefore
contrast the two statements and assume that the second is a lie. See Diana Edelman, King Saul in the
Historiography of Judah (JSOTSup 121; Sheffield: Sheffield University Press, 1991), 148.
112 LXXB omits ‘to me’, cf. McCarter, 1 Samuel, 325; Klein, 1 Samuel, 193.
113 Campbell, Samuel, 205.
114 Although he does inscribe his power in her body by giving her to another husband, Paltiel, cf. 1 Sam
25.44. This helps explain David’s claim for her restitution in 2 Sam 3.13–14, which is also an
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biblical narratives present the killing of enemies as normal. That is what Saul has been
attempting to effect throughout the passage. The reason for his actions is disclosed by
Saul himself in his accusing question to Michal in the first half of the verse: David is
‘my enemy’. By having David threaten to kill her, therefore, Michal takes up Saul’s
perspective and presents him not only as a violent husband but, much more importantly,
as her enemy. That is, Michal construes herself as having been construed by David as an
opponent, and herself as on Saul’s side. For the implied readers, Saul could be
understood to interpret the fact David did not kill her but sought to avoid violence not as
sage discretion but a sign of weakness. That is why he attempts to press home his
advantage in the following verses, pursuing David to Naioth and beyond.
Michal’s words suggest that she is in a similar position to Saul. They invite him
to believe, despite doubts about her loyalty to him in the matter of the teraphim, that she
remains a faithful daughter. This excuse often sounds hollow to modern Western
readers who assume that Michal’s natural loyalty would have been to her husband and
that Saul was demanding the unreasonable, viz. his daughter’s prioritisation of loyalty to
him over that towards her spouse. Fokkelman comments that Saul “maintained the
illusion that the bond of blood would be the decisive factor for her, and not the bond of
marriage”. That Saul appears to accept her explanation, however, indicates implied
readers could have been expected to view her excuse as entirely plausible. At the same
time it means Michal’s actions were problematic not just in terms of obedience to the
monarch but also in the context of the family. In order to justify such an interpretation I
now consider their relationship in more detail.
5.3 FATHERS AND DAUGHTERS
Michal is introduced to readers in a list of Saul’s relations in 1 Samuel 14.49,115
but her ‘voice’ is heard for the first time four chapters later when the narrator reports
that ‘Saul’s daughter Michal loved David’.116 Michal’s textual relationships are almost
entirely limited to those with her father and (future) husband.117 The task of this section
inscription of royal power in Paltiel himself and, performatively, in Abner and Ishbaal. See also Zafira
Ben-Barak, “The Legal Background to the Restoration of Michal to David,” in Studies in the
Historical Books (VTSup 30; ed. J. A. Emerton; Leiden: Brill, 1979), 15–29.
115 MT and 4QSama; LXX reads Μελχολ, cf. McCarter, 1 Samuel, 254.
116 1 Sam 18.20.
117 Or their proxies, cf. 1 Sam 18.20–28; 19.11–17; 25.44; 2 Sam 3.13–16; 6.16–23.
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is to examine how Michal might have been expected to behave as Saul’s daughter and
David’s wife.
5.3.1 Michal: Saul’s Daughter / David’s Wife
In the books of Samuel being given or taken as a bride is a daughter’s most
important social role.118 Perhaps the most obvious difference between modern Western
marriages and those described in the Old Testament is that the latter are arranged by
fathers or their representatives.119 Although love may influence a parent’s decision, as it
does when Michal is the object of Saul’s matrimonial strategies,120 the institution of
marriage fundamentally involved the transfer of rights between families. The
bridegroom’s family paid the ‘bride-price’ to her relations, whilst the bride and the right
to any children of the union went in the opposite direction.121 A bride-price of several
year’s wages may have been distributed among kin, perhaps explaining why Rebekah’s
brother negotiated eagerly with Eliezer.122 The bride herself could receive a portion of
the bride-price as dowry. “Only the stingy father keeps all the bride price for himself
and uses it for his own purposes—‘eats it up,’ as both the modern Arabic and Biblical
phrases (Gen. 31:15) have it”.123 The dowry comprised moveable possessions, possibly
including slave girls,124 and remained the property of wives not the husband.125
118 1 Sam 17.25; 18.17, 19, 27; 1 Sam 25.44. Other roles include being perfumers, cooks, bakers (1 Sam
8.13), and a prized prisoner of war (1 Sam 30.3, 6; rescued 1 Sam 30.19), mourning the death of her
father (2 Sam 1.24), celebrating military victories (2 Sam 1.20), and of being a mother in a genealogy
in order to specify a relationship between men (1 Sam 14.49–50; 2 Sam 17.25; 21.8. The identity of a
woman is sometimes established in relation to her male relatives, e.g. 2 Sam 3.3, 7; 21.10–11; and,
especially, ‘Saul’s daughter Michal’ 2 Sam 3.13; 2 Sam 6.16, 20, 23; 2 Sam 11.3).
119 E.g., Gen 26, cf. Deut 7.2–3. Raphael Patai asserts: “Only the disobedient son, the recalcitrant and
rebellious one, would marry a woman of his own choice without the prior consent of his father”,
Family, Love and the Bible (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1960), 44, citing Gen 26.34–35 where
Esau’s taking of Judith and Basemath ‘makes life bitter’ for Isaac and Rebekah.
120 See also Gen 29.20; 34.3; Judg 14.1–3; the further examples of David and Bathsheba, and Adonijah
and Abishag proposed by Patai, Family, 42, are debatable. That the woman had the right of refusal
may be indicated in Gen 29.51, 57–58.
121 See Robin Wakely, “ַרהֹמ,” NIDOTTE 2.859–63. Wright demonstrates that neither the bride nor
children were ‘property’, God’s People, 183–238. Instead, the issue concerns the group with which
they will live, and thus the family that will benefit from their presence.
122 So Patai, Family, 54; cf. Gen 24.29, 31–50, 55.
123 Patai, Family, 54. For detailed discussion of dowry see Raymond Westbrook, Property and the
Family in Biblical Law (JSOTSup 113; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991), 142–64.
124 Cf. Gen 29.24, 29.
125 See Jonathan Paradise, “A Daughter and her Father’s Property at Nuzi,” JCS 32 (1980): 189–207.
Although there is no biblical evidence of the practice, note Patai’s contention that the bride price is not
normally paid in full, so that about a third remains to be paid upon divorce, a powerful disincentive to
overly precipitous action, cf. Family, 52.
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There are several indications that the preferred Old Testament marriage is
endogamous to the kin group,126 although leaders often marry exogamously.127 The
advantage of endogamous marriage is patrimonial cohesion, 128 whilst exogamous
alliances facilitate political cooperation between kin groups, tribes or nations. Thus,
affirms Deist, the “choice of marriage partners depends, among other things, on
whether, given the environment and economic system, intra- or inter- group relations
are more important for a group’s survival”.129 The books of Samuel contain data about
Saul and David’s families’ marriages only (see Appendix D). Sometimes details are
scanty, for example, readers know only that Saul’s wife Ahinoam was daughter of
Ahimaaz, and his concubine, Rizpah, daughter of Aiah.130 Other passages provide clues
that he married his daughters to notables of strategic towns within Gibeah’s sphere of
influence. The father of Merab’s husband, Adriel, was Barzillai the Gileadite from
Rogelim. Barzillai was a local notable, a ‘very wealthy man’. 131 His town was a
dependency of Abel Meholah, in Gilead,132 and this marriage was designed to cement
an alliance with towns to the east of Gibeah.133 David’s marriages also appear to be
contracted with political alliances in mind. His first, Ahinoam is from Jezreel, a town to
126 Cf. Gen 11.27–29; 28.9; 29; 36.3; 50.23; Ex 6.20; Num 26.59; Chr 2.4–5, 21. For the emotional aspect
of the parallel-cousin marriage ideal note 2 Chr 11.20–21: “Rehoboam loved Maacha the daughter of
Absalom above all his wives and concubines” (a total of 78 women!). Further examples of romance
are listed in Victor Matthews and Don Benjamin, eds. Social World of Ancient Israel 1250–587 BCE
(Peabody: Hendrickson, 1993), 13; pace Blenkinsopp, who opines that a whole battery of factors
“discouraged emotional warmth and intimacy”, “Family,” 77. On romantic emotion in the Old
Testament and its relationship to other values see Lawrence, Reading, 131–51; for comparison with
other ANE literature see Hennie Marsman, Women in Ugarit and Israel: Their Social and Religious
Position in the Context of the Ancient Near East (OS 44. Leiden: Brill, 2003), 73–84.
127 Especially from the time of the monarchy, cf. Hermann M. Neimann, “Choosing Brides for the
Crown-Prince. Matrimonial Politics in the Davidic Dynasty,” VT 56 (2006): 226–38. Exogamous,
alliance orientated union is characteristic of ‘ןתח-type’ marriages, cf. Allen Guenther, “A Typology
of Israelite Marriage: Kinship, Socio-Economic, and Religious Factors,” JSOT 29 (2005): 387–407,
especially 390–96.
128 Cf. Num 27.1–11; 36.1–12.
129 Deist, Material Culture, 239. He argues that the “amount of attention devoted to Jacob’s marriage and
his relation to Laban in the patriarchal narratives holds up this kind of marriage [mother’s brother’s
daughter] as the ideal solution for marriages in ‘Israelite’ society”, Material Culture, 246. Emphasis
original. Cf. Robert Oden Jr, “Jacob as Father, Husband, and Nephew: Kinship Studies and the
Patriarchal Narratives,” JBL 102 (1983): 189–205, especially 198–99.
130 1 Sam 14.50; 2 Sam 3.7.
131 NRSV; 2 Sam 19.32[33]: ‘ֹדאְמ ּאוה לֹוָּדג ׁשִיא’. On the identity of Barzillai see Baruch Halpern,
David’s Secret Demons: Messiah, Murderer, Traitor, King (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 84–85.
132 Cf. 2 Sam 17.27; 19.32; 21.8. ‘Gilead’ is used as a geographical reference to the (Israelite)
Transjordan not simply the Gileadite clan of the tribe of Manasseh, cf. Kenneth Kitchen, “Gilead,”
NBD 421.
133 2 Sam 17.27; 19.31–9 record that these territories shifted their loyalties to David. Halpern concludes
that David’s war against Israel and the eclipse of Jabesh Gilead, which “vastly enhanced the status of
Abel Meholad”, outweighed a marriage alliance with Saul and compensated for the massacre of his
grandsons (2 Sam 21), Secret Demons, 301–302; for maps see, e.g., Luc Grollenberg, Atlas de la Bible
(trans. R. Beaupère; Brussels: Elsevier, 1954), 66.
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the south of Hebron.134 According to the chronology of the text David resided in the
Wilderness of Ziph at this time and took advantage of the death of one Nabal, a leading
Carmelite farmer, to establish another alliance with his widow, Abigail. It is possible
that David’s fourth, fifth and sixth wives, Haggith, Abital, and Eglah, also hailed from
towns to the south of Hebron. The text describes David settling the families of himself
and his men ןֹורְבֶח יֵרָעְּב,135 obviously extant towns. It is likely that David married the
daughters of local notables to strengthen ties with nearby population centres, a strategy
that may be inferred in 2 Samuel 3.2–6 where David’s wives and their sons are listed
followed by the editorial note ‘These were born to David in Hebron”.136 David’s third
wife was the daughter of King Talmai of Geshur, a town to the north of Israel on the
Golan Heights. Here, David formed an alliance with another king who shared antipathy
towards Saulide regional hegemony.
It appears that residence following marriage was usually patrilocal, although
there are biblical examples of residence with the wife’s kin.137 Von Rad thought there
was a discrepancy between patriarchy and ֹומִא־ֶתְאו ויִבָא־תֶא ׁשיִא־ָבזֲַעי in Genesis
2.24.138 Those unwilling to postulate, with von Rad, an original ‘matriarchal culture’
interpret this text as speaking of interpersonal priorities. Wenham, for example, argues
that ‘leave’
was not meant so much literally as emotionally. In traditional societies,
the most important social obligation is to one’s parents. “Honor your
father and mother” is the first of the commands in the Decalogue
regarding obligations to other people. But Genesis is saying that when a
man marries, his order of responsibilities changes: though his parent’s
needs are still important, his wife’s needs are even more important.
Responsibility for her welfare now must take priority even over care for
his parents.139
I doubt that this text enjoins such a psychological volte-face at marriage. Von Rad
134 Josh 15.56. The exact site is unknown, although Kh. Terrama has been accepted by some cf.
Grollenberg, Atlas, 60; pace Melvin Hunt, “Jezreel,” ABD 3.850.
135 See Andersen, 2 Samuel, 24 for discussion of the phrase and rejection of possible emendations.
136 The strengthening of Judean alliances coheres with the placing of this biographical note directly after
the comment about war between the houses of David and Saul, and that David gradually gained the
upper hand. On the villages around Hebron as a ‘80%-endogenous’ grouping see Lehmann,
“Reconstructing,” 164–67.
137 Cf. Gen 29–30; Judg 8.31; 14; 15.1; 2 Sam 17.25; Ezra 2.61; 1 Chr 2.16–17; 34–35.
138 Cf. von Rad, Genesis, 82–83.
139 Gordon Wenham, “Family in the Pentateuch,” in Family in the Bible: Exploring Customs, Culture,
and Context (ed. R. S. Hess and M. D. Carroll R.; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 17–31,
quote 18.
129
himself notes that it is aetiological, an explanation for the mutual attraction of the sexes,
and, in my view, there is no reason to suppose that Genesis 2.24 affirms anything other
than that the man leaves his parents’ house upon marriage in order to live in another
dwelling within the compound of the בָא תיֵּב.
Very few clues are available as to the social role of wives in the books of
Samuel, which restrict themselves to references to ‘knowing’ or lying with a wife,140
specifying the relationship of a woman to a man in order to identify the woman,141 and
being given to a man as a wife.142 The regulations in Numbers 30, however, seem to
have been conceived for a situation in which the status of wife comes into conflict with
that of daughter since the teaching assigns the right to determine the ongoing validity of
a woman’s vow to either her father or husband.143 This guidance is surprising if one
simply assumes a husband’s authority over his wife, and points to the ongoing influence
of a father in the life of a married woman. Indeed, a new residence at marriage does not
seem to have been the end of a wife’s links with her natal kin, and widows or divorcees
usually returned to their original בָא תיֵּב.144 A view from the husband’s perspective is
reflected in Samson’s objection to telling his wife the secret of his strength. It suggests
caginess towards the newcomer, a sign that she was not yet considered a full member of
the family.145
Marriage also has implications for relationship between a woman’s father and
her husband, his son-in-law. Early anthropological kinship studies focused upon the
classification of relatives through kinship terms. Radcliffe-Brown asserts that the
general rule is that the inclusion of two relatives in the same
terminological category implies that there is some significant similarity
in the customary behaviour due to both of them, or in the social relation
in which one stands to each of them.146
140 1 Sam 1.19; 2 Sam 11.11.
141 E.g. ‘his daughter-in-law, the wife of Phinehas’ or ‘Saul’s wife was Ahinoam’. 1 Sam 1.4; 4.19;
14.50; 19.11; 25.3, 14, 37; 25.44; 2 Sam 3.5, 14; 11.3; 12.9–10, 15, 24; 17.19.
142 1 Sam 18.17, 19, 27; 25.39–40, 42; 2 Sam 11.27.
143 For the distinction between legal and personal responsibility, and the view that this text does not
signify personal oppression of women see Grace Emmerson, “Women in ancient Israel,” in The World
of Ancient Israel: Sociological, Anthropological and Political Perspectivas (ed. R. E. Clements;
Cambridge: CUP, 1991), 371–94, especially 380–82.
144 Cf. Gen 31.30; 38.11; Lev 22.13; Judg 19.2. Ruth was a rare case of a woman cleaving to her
husband’s family rather than to her own.
145 Judg 14.16.
146 Radcliffe-Brown, “Introduction,” 9.
130
In biblical Hebrew a daughter’s husband refers to her father with a word that has the
same root, ןתח, as that which the latter employs to address his son-in-law. In other
words, the term is used for male relationships of affinity like those of Saul and David.147
The most likely explanation for their being classificatory kin is their obligation to
protect the same woman, and possibly the duty of the father-in-law to protect the son-in-
law.148 If this is the case, both men failed to fulfil the stereotype. In any case I have
argued that social structure is an insufficient guide to individuals’ actual practice. It is
essential, therefore, to examine marriage and its implications in more detail.
5.3.2 Marriage—Anthropological Perspectives
Constructing a universal definition of marriage is problematic. Stone comments
that “[e]very society in the world has something we might roughly recognize as
“marriage.” But beyond this, little can be said of marriage that holds cross-
culturally.”149 Barnard suggests it is usually considered “the mechanism which provides
for the legitimation of children and defines their status in relation to the conjugal family
and the wider kin group”.150 That is, marriage is a rearrangement of social structure, a
new relationship between families, not merely individuals, that confers rights and
establishes duties.
Stone remarks upon the “basic tension between marriage as a social, political, or
economic strategy and marriage as an institution involving individuals in intimate
interpersonal relations”.151 Although the emotive element of the union is not normally
neglected, different contexts treat it differently. In particular, it may not be the basis for
147 And thus also indicates brother-in-law, certainly in other Semitic languages and possibly Hebrew, cf.
E. Kutsch, “ןתח htn,” TDOT 5.270–77, especially 71–72; Robert H. O’Connell “ןתח,” NIDOTTE
2.325–28, especially 326; Deist, Material Culture, 246–47.
148 O’Connell outlines the debate about whether the Hebrew has a semantic connection to the Akkadian
hatānu, ‘to protect’. Although Kutsch rejected a link some studies adduce Old Testament examples
that appear to support it, e.g. S. Rattray, “Marriage Rules, Kinship Terms and Family Structure in the
Bible,” SBLSP 26 (1987): 537–44.
149 Linda Stone, Kinship and Gender: An Introduction (3rd ed; Boulder: Westview, 2006), 191.
150 Barnard, “Human Kinship,” 798. Fox notes that the bride price is often conceived as giving the man’s
family rights over any children, citing a Bantu proverb: ‘Cattle beget children’ Kinship and Marriage,
119. See also Radcliffe-Brown: “Marriage is a social arrangement by which a child is given a
legitimate position in the society, determined by parenthood in the social sense”, “Introduction,” 5.
For difficulties of this definition in polyandrous societies see Edmund Leach, “Polyandry, inheritance
and the definition of marriage,” Man 55 (1955): 182–86. On the practice of ghost and woman
marriage among the Nuer see Evans-Pritchard, Nuer, 29–123.
151 Stone, Kinship and Gender, 203.
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either the coming together of the couple or of their personal loyalty to each other.152 In
some cases ‘love’ is perceived as a threat to the family’s control of female sexuality.
Abu-Lughod argues that among the Egyptian Bedouin the acceptance of love matches
“would be to legitimate as a force in social life passion that does not derive from
relationships of kinship”.153 This does not obliterate pre-matrimonial ‘love’. Instead, the
emotion is expressed in ways that do not directly challenge the social status quo, such
as poetry. The fact that marriages are arranged enhances the authority of the family.
Indeed, the girl’s paternal first cousin can be understood to have the ‘right’ to marry her
should the wider kin group need to arbitrate in the matter. The existence of such
‘norms’, however, is evidence for a father’s discretion to negotiate with the families of
other potential partners. It is this freedom of choice that undermines the use of
categories in alliance theory. According to Trawick, the exclusion of real people draws
attention to the fact that it is the idea of affinity rather than affinity itself that is at stake:
“the cultural relationship linking this pair of individuals is a matter of the categories
they belong to and has nothing to do with the relationship of each…to the other”.154 For
this reason she prefers Bourdieu’s portrayal of marriage practices as relating to, but not
determined by, dominant preferences. He recognises that although the preferred match
for a man might be his Mother’s Brother’s Daughter (MBD), actual marriage contracts
can be very different, whilst being associated with, or even justified by, this scheme.155
Trawick notes that in South India there is a distinct preference for known non-kin or
close cross-cousins over distant cross-cousins in actual marriage practice. She claims
this “hints at the way in which the institution of cross-cousin marriage is taken as an
affirmation of personal ties, more than just a reproduction of categorical affinities”.156
Indeed, she continues, if “you marry a stranger that stranger becomes your cross-cousin.
The kinship system, unlike caste, bends to accommodate the heart’s desire, or seems so
to bend, promises the hope of joy, or seems so to promise”.157
152 The latter may be a function of social identity, for example, ‘husband’, cf. Yanagisako, “Variance,”
21.
153 Lila Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society (2nd ed.; Berkley:
University of California Press, 1999), 210.
154 Trawick, Notes on Love, 129.
155 Bourdieu, Outline, 58–71.
156 Trawick, Notes on Love, 151.
157 Trawick, Notes on Love, 151. Emphasis original. She discusses cross-cousin marriage as a romantic
ideal.
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The father’s strategies are illuminated by Martha Roth’s observations about age
at marriage. She adduces three models,158 concluding that the typical model of marriage
in Neo-Assyria and Neo-Babylonia approximated to that of ‘Mediterranean marriage’.
Husbands married aged 26–32 whilst new wives were aged 14–20. This means a man
would marry at about the same time as he received his patrimony. Roth remarks:
When the new husband begins his economic independence and sets up
his own household he will have the economic and social advantages of
his association with his father-in-law. The father-in-law in turn can
utilize his son-in-law in the economic arena in ways in which his own,
younger, sons cannot be utilized.159
The father’s ‘use’ of his daughter for his chosen purposes can result in a certain
conditionality in their relationship. I will discuss the woman’s perspective shortly, but
regarding the father Campbell’s comments are instructive of an extreme possibility: “If
the girl’s reputation for virtue remains unblemished, she receives his favour; if it does
not, she may suffer the ultimate sanction of death at the hands of her own father”.160
Although many matches may conform to the parallel or cross-cousin ideal
(where this exists), this is less likely to hold for higher ranking families. Bourdieu
states:
In accordance with the general law of exchanges, the higher a group is
placed in the social hierarchy, and hence the richer it is in official
relationships, the greater the proportion of its work of reproduction that is
devoted to reproducing such relationships. It follows that the poor, who
have little to spend on solemnities, tend to settle for the ordinary
marriages that practical kinship provides for them, whereas the rich, that
is, those richest in kinsmen, expect more from – and sacrifice more to –
all the more or less institutionalized strategies aimed at maintaining
social capital, the most important of which is undoubtedly the extra-
ordinary marriage with prestigious ‘strangers’.161
158 See Martha Roth, “Age at Marriage and the Household: A Study of Neo-Babylonian and Neo-
Assyrian Forms,” CSSH 29 (1987): 715–47, especially 720–22: (1) Western – marriage late, narrow
age difference, low proportion of people marrying ever, low proportion of multi-generational
households; (2) Eastern – marriage early, narrow age difference, high proportion of people marrying
ever, high proportion of multi-generational households; and (3) Mediterranean – marriage late for
men, early for women, wide age difference, high proportion of people marrying ever, high proportion
of multi-generational households.
159 Roth, “Age at Marriage,” 747. The wife, aged mid-teens, will have a mother aged 40 and father about
50; the husband, aged late 20s, will have mother aged 50 and father either in his 60s or deceased. Roth
continues: “Many wives will outlive their husbands, and society will have a high number of widows,
relatively young and economically independent. As a widow, such a woman might live in her son’s
house along with his young bride, just as her own mother-in-law had done.”
160 Campbell, Honour, Family, and Patronage, 172.
161 Bourdieu, Logic, 180.
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The prestige of marriage with a stranger is a function of the difficulty of its
arrangement: assessing distant families over a long period is costly, involving
‘payment’ of intermediaries162 and the expenditure of symbolic capital in the form of
marshalling notable kinsmen of affines as guarantors.163 Bourdieu claims that prestige
marriages are high risk adventures aimed at turning strangers into relatives for political
ends. Because of this the dowry is transformed from a means of passing on the
daughter’s share of the family’s wealth into a statement of honour.164 There is a similar
inflation of the bride price. Abu-Lughod mentions the case of Fāyga and Rashīd:
because both were from “high-status families that were unrelated, the negotiations had
been long and the bride-price was high. There was a big wedding.”165
Residence patterns after marriage can take a number of forms. 166 When
residence is patrilocal and descent patrilineal there is a convergence of authority
structures. However, even in this situation a new wife inevitably disturbs established
familial practices, for marriage gives younger men a domain of their own. Indeed,
incoming wives may be catalyst for younger brothers to split from the father’s or elder
brother’s household. In such cases the wife is then more independent, nearer the top of
the familial hierarchy. Abu-Lughod records wedding songs that recognise these
conflicting bonds.
When he shuts the door behind him
he forgets the father who raised him.
He reached your arms stretched on the pillow
forgot his father, and then his grandfather.167
Abu-Lughod concludes that the “challenge to the hierarchical relationship between
providers and dependents, or elders and juniors, is at the heart of Bedouin attitudes
about sexuality”.168 The need to secure descendents conflicts with the desire to maintain
162 One of Bourdieu’s examples is reimbursement of the priest through gifts at major religious feasts, cf.
Logic, 182–84.
163 Cf. the discussion of the marketplace and marriage contracts in Bourdieu, Logic, 114–16.
164 The dowry, as an indication of the bride’s value to her natal family, may be means of acquiring
honour—even a lower status son-in-law can enhance his father-in-law’s status by enlisting his family
as clients, cf. Alice Schlegel and Rohn Eloul, “Marriage Transactions: Labor, Property, Status,” AA 90
(1988): 291–309, especially 301.
165 Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments, 216. Cf. Bourdieu, Logic, 183–84. In a system of MBD preference it
is customary to note that wives pass ‘down’ and wealth moves ‘up’, although since exchange is
generalised there is overall equality between moieties.
166 For a typology see Barnard, “Human Kinship,” 795.
167 Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments, 147.
168 Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments, 147.
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control, one reason why senior men arrange but refrain from celebrating young men’s
weddings. This perception, however, is not the only point of view. Many ethnographies
of Mediterranean societies note that a wife is only gradually accepted into her husband’s
family. Campbell argues that conjugal solidarity on the part of the husband is
subordinate to sibling solidarity until the birth of the first child. Nadia Abu-Zahra thinks
progression is even more protracted: the “social incorporation of a married woman into
her husband’s dār is a very slow process…only completed when the wife has grown-up
sons”. 169 Kathey-Lee Galvin’s theoretical work shows why this is so. 170 Whilst
Schneider argued that the orders of law and nature were uniquely American and thus not
cross-culturally valid, Galvin enlarges the categories. On the basis of case studies from
places as diverse as Ecuador, Nepal and Malaysia she contends that there are two
orders: of sharing and ratification. She further distinguishes between tangible and
intangible sharing and explicit and implicit ratification.171 Figure 3 shows how the
orders are related.
FIGURE 3 – A Cross-Cultural Model of Relatedness172
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Employing these insights to elucidate the ethnographic data one can see that a new wife
169 Nadia Abu-Zahra, “Family and kinship in a Tunisian peasant community,” in Mediterranean Family
Structures (ed. J. G. Peristiany; Cambridge: CUP, 1976), 157–71, quote 165.
170 Kathey-Lee Galvin, “Schneider Revisited: Sharing and Ratification in the Construction of Kinship,”
in New Directions in Anthropological Kinship (ed. L. Stone; Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001),
109–24.
171 Ratification “refers to processes that legitimize relationships through social convention (which might
be codified in written language and law) rather than the sharing of substances”. Galvin, “Schneider
Revisited,” 121.
172 Adapted from Galvin, “Schneider Revisited,” 119.
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is incorporated into her husband’s family by explicit ratification (the formal or legal
aspect of marriage) and implicit ratification over time. Yet full assimilation also
depends upon sharing, for example, food or pollution, and progeny. Until this
combination of orders is effected brides remain outsiders, “worms within the apple of a
patrilocal domestic group”,173 and husbands are likely to champion their mothers in
preference to spouses.174
The gradual incorporation of a wife into their husband’s family also affects the
woman’s view of to whom she should naturally be loyal. Rudolph Bell argues that
although modern people start with an ancient paterfamilias and work down, this is the
opposite to the perception of the family held by the Italian peasants that he studied.
They started with ego and conceived of the family as four spirals emanating towards
parents, siblings, spouse and children.175 Since the woman is an independent ego it is
important to consider where her loyalties might lie. Several ethnographies record
contingency in the relationship between father and daughter. The attitude of a daughter
can depend upon her assessment of her father’s choice of husband. Is he, for example, a
good man from an honourable family? Campbell comments upon one woman who
disparaged her father’s selection:
The daughter of a rich and powerful family, forced against her will to
marry her second cousin, swore to her father as she left her home that she
would never set foot in it again. Such a case of complete breach of trust
and mutual esteem between father and daughter is rare; but there are also
women who harbour resentment against their fathers because, as they
allege, they were given to indifferent husbands in order to avoid the
payment of a substantial dowry.176
173 Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments, 148, quoting Jane Collier, “Women in Politics,” in Women, Culture,
and Society (ed. M. Z. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), 89–96,
quote 92.
174 Cf. John Peristiany, “Introduction,” in Mediterranean Family Structures (CSSA 13; ed. J. G.
Peristiany; Cambridge: CUP, 1976), 1–23, especially 13.
175 Rudolph Bell, Fate and Honor, Family and Village: Demographic and Cultural Change in Rural Italy
since 1800 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 76. This is a slightly different, although
related, point to that which Caroline Brettell argues: “once male and female roles are given equal
analytical focus, the multidimensional meanings of kinship, family, and descent are revealed”, “Not
That Lineage Stuff: Teaching Kinship into the Twenty-First Century,” in New Directions in
Anthropological Kinship (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 48–70, quote 59. Not that doing so
is without its problems, cf. Karen Field on Ivan Illich’s thesis regarding the differences between
ancient and modern family roles: “while it is true that women in preindustrial societies enjoyed forms
of power and prestige denied them in the modern West, they also encountered some very real
restrictions, to which Illich, in his enthusiasm for a temps perdu, seems blind”, “Review of Ivan
Illich’s Gender,” JMF 45 (1983): 710.
176 Campbell, Honour, Family and Patronage, 172.
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Lloyd and Margaret Fallers comment that since the responsibility for finding a husband
lies with others, the woman does not accept full responsibility for the outcome of her
marriage. 177 “She has a sense of fate about it – and resignation”. 178 Instead, she
identifies with her patrikin, especially her brothers. The expectation that a woman will
take this view can be shared by her husband’s family. Abu-Lughod comments that a
woman retains her tribal affiliation throughout her life and should side
with her own kin in their disputes with her husband’s kin; I heard many
stories of women who left for their natal homes, abandoning children,
under such conditions. In her marital camp people refer to her by her
tribal affiliation, and she may refer to herself as an outsider even after
twenty years of marriage.179
The identification of the woman with her patrikin provides her with some backing
during the years of integration, and protection against abuse by her husband’s family.
“When mistreated or wronged, she argues that she need not put up with such treatment
because ‘behind me are men’ ”.180 On the other hand the woman remains responsible to
her agnates for her behaviour. In particular, “they, and not her husband, kill her if she
commits adultery, in order to preserve their honour”. 181 The ambivalence of the
husband—wife relationship contrasts with the close ties between brother and sister
highlighted in many studies. Women, peripheral to their husband’s father’s household,
depend upon brothers for assistance. Peristiany observes that this “permits the brother of
a marginally–integrated woman to meddle in her affairs. A man wishing to be in full
control of his home should be careful to choose a wife whose father and/or brother are
not powerful and overbearing enough to interfere in its administration.”182
This discussion leads us to conclude, with Peletz, that “[t]otal assimilation of
177 Although it is often the father’s obligation to find a spouse for his daughters, to whom this is an
obligation is not necessarily obvious. It could be to his daughter, the wider family, the descent line, or
even himself, cf. the Kabyle proverb ‘He who has a daughter and does not marry her off must bear the
shame of it’, Bourdieu, Logic, 177.
178 Lloyd Fallers and Margaret Fallers, “Sex roles in Edremit,” in Mediterranean Family Structures
(CSSA 13; ed. J. G. Peristiany; Cambridge: CUP, 1976), 243–60, quote 253.
179 Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments, 54. Peristiany comments upon the consequences of an acute case of
such identification among the Gheg of Albania: “Never integrated into their husband’s clan, as only
patrilineal links are valued, Gheg women remain through life closely attached to their brothers. In rare
instances, when the conflict of allegiances was extreme, women killed their children as a desperate
outlet to their predicament”, “Introduction,” 11.
180 Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments, 54. Note also the tale of a woman who justified her threat to leave
her husband after the latter had slurred her father with the appeal: ‘Would you stay if anyone said that
about your father?’, Veiled Sentiments, 65.
181 Ladislav Holy, Kinship, honour and solidarity: Cousin marriage in the Middle East (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1989), 123. My emphasis. Holy argues that the practice of bride capture
also symbolises a woman’s continuing attachment to her natal relations, cf. 121–22.
182 Peristiany, “Introduction,” 9.
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women into their husband’s kin groups (like the notion of their complete severance
from natal kin) is…a Western fiction informed by market metaphors and economistic
thinking”.183 It is worth repeating that the
bond between generations, the bond between siblings, and the bond
between spouses, are likely to come in conflict with each other in any
kin-based society…The trick is to have as many bonds as possible and
keep them all in harmony with each other, not let any of them break.184
Did Michal (and for that matter Saul and David) manage to achieve this? It is time for a
conversation between biblical text and ethnographic data.
5.3.3 Understanding Michal’s Excuse
The context for Michal’s excuse in 1 Samuel 19.17 is Saul’s arrangement of her
marriage to David. This tale commences when, having promised his first daughter,
Merab, to the vanquisher of Goliath, Saul instead gives her to Adriel.185 David Clines
summarises a number of interpretations of 1 Samuel 18.17–27, concluding that virtually
all commentators fail to produce a coherent reading of the text without making
unwarranted suppositions. 186 A satisfactory account must explain all the following
points and their interrelations:
(i) Saul’s offer of Merab to David (verse 17)
(ii) David’s protestation of his ‘unworthiness’ to be Saul’s son-in-law (18)
(iii) Saul’s decision to give Merab to Adriel (19)
(iv) Saul’s subsequent decision to offer Michal to David (21)
(v) Why Michal’s love for David pleased Saul (20)
(vi) The persuasion required to convince David to accept Michal (22–26)
(vii) The nature of the bride-price (25, 27)
183 Peletz, “Kinship Studies,” 356–57. It also explains why the preferred partner for a man in many
Middle Eastern societies is his Father’s Brother’s Daughter (FBD), because there is a coincidence of
interests: “a father’s brother’s daughter cares about you and your things because they are hers”, Abu-
Lughod, Veiled Sentiments, 58. Quoting an informant. A common patrimony also means a FBD has a
right to support from the patriline independent of her ability to bear children. For the argument that
FBD is not primarily a means of protecting family property interests but a statement of family
solidarity see Ladislav Holy, Kinship, honour and solidarity: Cousin Marriage in the Middle East.
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), especially Chapter 5 ‘Preference for FBD marriage
in context’.
184 Trawick, Notes on Love, 157.
185 The text of 1 Sam 18.17–19 is found in MT and LXXAL but not LXXB, leading some commentators to
suppose the account has been interpolated with “a minimum of redactional harmonization”, see
McCarter, 1 Samuel, 306–309, quote 308. I follow MT because, pace McCarter, there are both lexical
and thematic links between these verses and the ongoing narrative.
186 Clines, “Michal Observed,” 27–32.
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(viii) David’s pleasure at becoming Saul’s son-in-law (26)
(ix) Saul’s decision to give Michal to David despite not having given Merab (27)
The verses immediately preceding the pericope portray Saul being offended by the
praise heaped upon David by the people, and his attempts against David’s life, both
personally and by placing him in the line of fire as a battle commander. The end of
verse 17 make it clear that Saul’s offer of Merab is a continuation of this quest. He is
motivated by the desire to encourage David to take military risks with the hope that he
fall in battle. David’s answer is entirely conventional in that he came from a perfectly
suitable family, but within this narrative the expression ‘Who am I and who are my
kinfolk…?’ is a form of refusal.187 It is possible that David is negotiating: Fokkelman
suggests he enquires after advantages for his family, for example, exemption from
taxes, if he agreed to becoming Saul’s son-in-law.188 If so, the reason why David did not
marry Merab was because Saul decided not to give her to David rather than because of
the latter’s refusal.189 However, David’s words do constitute a refusal; whether as the
first stage in a process of negotiation cut off by Saul’s decision, or not, is impossible to
say. That David repudiates Saul’s offer in this way explains why he has to be persuaded
to accept Michal’s hand in marriage in verse 25 when he makes a similar protestation.190
The NRSV translates verse 19 ‘But at the time when Saul’s daughter Merab should
have been given to David, she was given to Adriel the Meholathite as a wife’. Taking
187 MT ָּיַיה, ‘my life’, a gloss for the original ִּ ַיהי , ‘my kinsfolk’, subsequently explicated by the addition
of ִיבָא תַחַּפְׁשִמ, cf. Driver, Notes, 153; McCarter, 1 Samuel, 303; Klein, 1 Samuel, 189; pace Smith,
Samuel, 172, who follows LXXL in omitting the explanation and reads יבא יח ימו. David is not an
insignificant nobody: his protestations in 1 Sam 18.18 are entirely conventional, cf. George Coats,
“Self-Abasement and Insult Formulas,” JBL 89 (1970): 14–26. Although Saul used the prospect of
marriage to his daughters as a trap, it would have been entirely natural for Saul to seek an alliance
with someone like ‘Jesse the Bethlehemite’. To judge from the size of his family Jesse was the head of
a significant house in a potentially strategic Israel-Philistine border region and, further, one that had
already provided Saul with military assistance (1 Sam 17.13). Saul probably follows the same strategy
in marrying Michal to Paltiel of Gallim (1 Sam 25.44, which reads Palti for Paltiel. Gallim: MT;
LXXB reads Ρομμα, which McCarter explains as a corruption of the Greek majuscules; LXXL, OL
reads ‘Goliath,’ a gloss dismissed by McCarter with an exclanation mark, 1 Samuel, 369. The location
of Gallim is unknown, although probably north of Jerusalem, possibly 1km west of Anatoth, see Isa
10.30; Duane Christenson, “The March of Conquest in Isaiah X 27c-34,” VT 26 (1976): 385–99;
Jefferies Hamilton, “Gallim,” ABD 2.901).
188 Fokkelman, Crossing, 232; cf. 1 Sam 17.25.
189 So Clines, who argues, correctly, that Saul never intended to marry Merab to David—he planned that
he should die before the time came, cf. “Michal Observed,” 30.
190 Pace H. W. Hertzberg, I & II Samuel (OTL; London: SCM, 1964), 160. Hertzberg argues that the
words ‘in Israel’ are significant, but there would be no reason to be an important family ‘in Israel’ for
a prestige marriage; they are a conventional distraction. An overly literalist understanding of David’s
words ignores normal variety of expression. Consider, for example, the convention of British
understatement, or the Spanish phrase ‘haré todo lo posible’, which is usually understood to mean the
opposite.
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David’s words as a conventional expression of refusal means this rendering is
problematic.191 The difficulty with the adversative is that Saul’s action is cast adrift
from its narrative context. It is preferable to translate יְִהַיו ‘and so’, thus McCarter: ‘So
at the time to give…’,192 a temporal reference that presumably refers to the promise of
his daughter’s hand in marriage to the slayer of Goliath.193
Verse 21 states Saul wanted to offer Michal in marriage for the same reason he
offered Merab, to entrap David. This time, however, the opportunity Saul sees to use his
daughter as bait arises because ‘Michal loved David’. Fokkelman attends to the
‘theological’ importance of her love, claiming that its repeated mention “occurs almost
as a foreign body or disturbance between the lines concerning Saul’s misery. This
repetition makes her love something worth mentioning as an independent entity.”194 I
concur that mention of Michal’s love only makes sense if it is a ‘foreign body’, a factor
which explains the otherwise inexplicable. The ethnographic data presented above
shows why this could be so. First, love is not normally the basis for marriage. Indeed,
taking it into account, as Saul does, could be interpreted as a risky move that potentially
damages kin relations and undermines social hierarchy. Second, a family with a stock of
symbolic capital would be expected to arrange prestige marriages. It is instructive to
consider the effect upon daughters of this sort of union. Bernard Batto’s study shows
that becoming the wife of an ancient Near Eastern king for diplomatic purposes could
be risky. He describes how one Inib-šarri bewails her condition as a ‘political’ wife who
did not receive due respect because her husband wished to assert his political
191 NRSV is followed by e.g. Klein, 1 Samuel, 184; Fokkelman, Crossing, 231.
192 McCarter, 1 Samuel, 301. Cf. MNK 333.
193 Because Clines takes verse 19 as adversative he asks why Saul had to marry Merab to Adriel, for, he
supposes, David could have been sent on missions against the Philistines even as the king’s son-in-
law, cf. “Michal Observed,” 27. My interpretation does not create this problem, for Merab had to be
married to someone, and since David refused Saul’s offer, or, at least, was taken to have refused it,
another marriage had to be arranged.
194 Fokkelman, Crossing, 243. There is a debate about whether political or romantic love is in view in 1
Samuel, see Peter Ackroyd, “The Verb Love—’āhēb in the David-Jonathan Narratives—A Footnote,”
VT 25 (1975): 213–14; Ada Taggar-Cohen, “Political Loyalty in the Biblical Account of 1 Samuel
XX-XXII in the Light of Hittite Texts,” VT 55 (2005): 251–68; J. A. Thompson, “The Significance of
the Verb Love in the David-Jonathan Narratives in Samuel,” VT 24 (1974): 334–38; idem, “Israel’s
Lovers,” VT 27 (1977): 475–81. I see no reason why both aspects should not be present, even though
the political seems to dominate, see Susan Ackerman, “The Personal is Political: Covenantal and
Affectionate Love (’āhēb, ’ahăbâ) in the Hebrew Bible,” VT 52 (2002): 437–58; P. J. J. S. Els,
“בהא,” NIDOTTE 1.277–99. The moral issue lies in the fact that love implies partiality, which can
lead to ‘moral danger’, see Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett, “Friendship and Moral Danger,” JP
97 (2000): 278–96. My argument for the priority of the good means, pace Cocking and Kennett, that
this risk should not be framed in terms of a conflict between abstract principle and personal loyalty,
but between the moral goods of loyalty to different people, cf. EN 1164b22–1165a33; 1160a5.
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independence.195 Sarah Melville states that despite “lively communication via mess-
engers and embassies, once a woman married a foreign king, she was not able to remain
in close contact with her original family”. 196 It is probable, therefore, that royal
daughters were wary of consenting to matrimony with foreigners.197 This may explain
the attraction of someone in a position like David’s. Cyrus Gordon discusses the
Egyptian romance of Sinuhe, concluding it was
not uncommon to welcome desirable foreigners (like Sinhue) as sons-in-
law. But in such cases, the husband joined the bride’s family; and, if he
eventually returned to his homeland, he could not force his wife to leave
her father’s domain. Such a marriage gave the groom practical
opportunities, but socially the wife was protected; for she, her children
and property could not be removed.198
These sources suggest David was a potentially sound choice of husband for a ‘princess’
like Michal.199 Regardless of what prompted her love—something about which the text
is profoundly silent200—Saul could easily have surmised that Michal would be prepared
to be married to David: she, at least, would not create an insurmountable hurdle to his
stratagem.201
Saul’s negotiations with David once again produce a conventional excuse, but
this time he is not dissuaded. Using intermediaries, which, as we have seen, is standard
practice in the arrangement of prestige marriages, Saul rejoins that 100 Philistine
foreskins will suffice as bride-price, with the intention that David be killed in the
process of collecting them. David’s opinion of the matter is a little less clear. The fact
that Michal loved David was told to Saul ִָוניְֵּעב ָרב ָּדַה ַׁרִּשַיו, is mirrored by the phrase
195 Treatment of another’s daughter married to cement a treaty was a proxy for the current status of the
alliance, cf. Bernard Batto, Studies on Women at Mari (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1974), 37–40. Further discussion of Zimri-Lim’s daughters can be found in Daniel Bodi, The Michal
Affair: From Zimri-Lim to the Rabbis (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2005), 64–87.
196 Sarah Melville, “Royal Women and the Exercise of Power in the Ancient Near East,” in A Companion
to the Ancient Near East (ed. D. C. Snell; Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 219–28, quote 225.
197 On the necessity of consent see Marsman, Women in Ugarit and Israel, 52–53, 70–72. Another of
Zimri-Lim’s daughters seems to have suffered similarly for she complains ‘My father and lord
(himself) installed me on (this) queen’s throne!’, Batto, Women at Mari, 42.
198 Cyrus Gordon, “The Marriage and Death of Sinuhe,” in Love and Death in the Ancient Near East:
Essays in Honor of Marvin H. Pope (ed. J. H: Marks & R. M. Good; Guilford: Four Quarters
Publishing Company, 1987), 43–44, quote 44. That is, removed without her family’s consent. Sinhue
eventually turns his property over to his sons and leaves. Note that David and Michal lived near her
father’s house following their marriage, cf. 1 Sam 19.11.
199 And a father-in-law like Saul, although it seems likely that Saul did not envisage David being able to
survive the ordeal of providing 100 Philistine foreskins.
200 Cf. Clines, “Michal Observed,” 32–37.
201 Michal’s love also accounts for her preference of David later in the passage, but this is something Saul
does not anticipate.
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ִדוָד ֵיניְֵּעב ָרב ָּדַה ַׁרִּשַיו.202 The contrast is the motivation for the men’s satisfaction:
Saul was pleased he had thought of a way of disposing of David, David of becoming the
king’s son-in-law. Many scholars note that his enthusiasm has nothing to do with
Michal, although this does not mean she was merely instrumental to David’s political
ambitions.203 The text links his pleasure to the prospect of avenging the king’s enemies;
any other interpretation is a secondary elaboration beyond the text. In any case, he loses
no time in delivering twice the required number of bloody tokens before the deadline,204
thus obliging Saul to marry Michal to him. This reading accounts for all the textual data
enumerated above and, importantly, enables similar elements to be interpreted in the
same way.
Throughout 1 Samuel 18 Michal is mute. It is Saul’s voice that is heard as he
uses the opportunities afforded by his daughters’ marriages to pursue his own ends.
Saul’s agency, however, receives a sharp riposte from the narrator in verse 28, when he
202 Cf. verses 20 and 26. This expression is idiomatic, cf. Hannes Olivier, “ׁרשי,” NIDOTTE 2.563–68,
especially 565; pace Bodi, Michal Affair, 16–22.
203 While concern with marriage in the books of Samuel is not limited to political alliances it is connected
to monarchical legitimacy. Matitiahu Tsevat’s study of non-descendents succeeding to thrones in
Ugarit and Israel leads him to conclude that “the temporal, protological, and quasi-legal order is:
marriage—kingship…and not kingship—marriage, which would merely be a special case of
inheritance”, “Marriage and Monarchical Legitimacy in Ugarit and Israel,” JSS 3 (1958): 237-243,
quote 242. This may lie behind Ishbaal’s challenge to Abner (2 Sam 3.7), Nathan’s affirmation that
David had received his master’s wives (2 Sam 12.8. Tsevat understands ‘and thus gave you the house
of Israel and Judah’. Whether David did marry any of Saul’s wives is debated, cf. Andersen, 2
Samuel, 162–63; Driver, Notes, 291–92), Ahithophel’s advice to Absalom (2 Sam 16.21. Ahithophel
advises Absalom to enter his father’s concubines ‘and all Israel will hear ִּכךִיבָא־תֶא ָּתְׁשַאְִבנ־יָ ’.
Since, according to Tsevat, all other cases of the verb ׁשאב in Samuel (1 Sam 13.4; 27.12; 2 Sam 10.6)
epitomise political challenge, he translates this that ‘you have challenged your father’ cf. Tsevat,
“Monarchical Legitimacy,” 242–3 for discussion and comparison with ancient sources. He concludes:
“Taking תשאבנ as what it is, a term in the field of government and politics, we recognize that it is
precisely the public appropriation by Absalom of part of David’s harem that is the decisive act in the
plot and the fanfare to rally and reassure his followers”), and Adonijah’s request for Abishag (1 Kgs
2.13–25. Cf. also the case of Aribalbu’s brother detailed by Tsevat. There are exceptions to the
conferment of kingship through marriage, e.g. Gen 36.31–9 and the history of Northern Kingdom).
Thus, without undermining the role of Jonathan in the transfer of kingship to David, the fact that
David is married to Michal does give his claim to the Northern throne a validity it would otherwise
have lacked.
204 1 Sam 18.26: םִיָּמַיה ּואְלָמ ֹאְלו. Note another contrast between Saul and David in verses 19 and 27:
Saul failed to fulfil his obligations by the appointed time; David completed his mission before time.
On the number in 1 Sam 18.27 MT reads 200; LXX 100. Although NRSV; McCarter, 1 Samuel, 316
follow LXX the harder reading is to be preferred, so Fokkelman, Crossing, 242 (who discusses a
number of duplications in the passage); Hertzberg, Samuel, 162. I disagree with Driver that ְ ַיוַּמּםואְל
supports reading 100 foreskins since the author could simply be emphasising the fact that a full set of
200 was presented to Saul and not that David “completed the tale of them [ie. the 100 in verse 25] to
the king”, Notes, 154. Emphasis original; cf. NRSV ‘were given in full number’. That 200 was double
Saul’s demand demonstrates David’s valour (or that of his friends), and makes the theological point
that while Saul intended that David be harmed, actually he is doubly successful because, as the next
verse makes explicit, ‘the LORD was with David’.
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records that ‘the LORD was with David, and that Saul’s daughter Michal loved him’. 205
What this means for the relationship between father and daughter becomes clear in 1
Samuel 19.
The discussion of anthropological evidence concerning a daughter’s loyalty
leads one to suppose that she would normally be loyal to her father and his house for
many years after her marriage. Many commentators, assuming modern Western notions
of family dynamics, fail to perceive that Michal’s fidelity to her husband would be very
unlikely in any clash of obligations. Even Philbeck’s assertion that “Michal’s support of
her husband is not to be taken for granted. Marriages in important families were often
arranged for political purposes in ancient Israel, and intrigue was commonplace,” only
moves part of the way towards my interpretation.206 I propose that implied readers
would assume that normal practice for a woman like Michal faced with the dilemma of
facilitating her husband’s escape or siding with his father-in-law would be to opt for her
father. Any other course of action would leave her, already isolated in her husband’s
household, without support from her natal kin.207
At this point one could ask whether Michal is in fact an agent in her own right—
can she act on her own account?; must she adhere to the cultural schema? Cheryl Exum
opines that Michal is always ‘acted upon’ and that the text never allows her an agency
of her own. She is ‘hemmed in’ by the narrative because “the scenes where she is a
205 NRSV, following MT; LXXB reads καὶ πα̑ς Ισραηλ ἠγάπα αὐτόν; LXXL reads that both Michal
and all Israel love David, cf. Bernard Grillet and Michel Lestienne, Premier Livre des Règnes (Bd’A
9.1; Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1997), 316; McCarter, 1 Samuel, 321. Driver posits that LXX “states
the ground for Saul’s greater dread” whilst the MT merely repeats verse 20, Notes, 155. Similarly,
David Clines suggests that it is “virtually certain” לוׁאש־תב לכימו is an orthographical error for  יכו
לאׁרשי־לכ because otherwise the emphatic ‘saw and knew’ is redundant, since Saul already knew
Michal loved David, “X, X BEN Y, BEN Y: Personal Names in Hebrew Narrative Style,” VT 22
(1972): 266–87, especially 270. However, the MT yields exegetical results unavailable to those who
emend according to LXXB, so Fokkelman, Crossing, 243.
206 Ben Philbeck, “1-2 Samuel” in 1 Samuel-Nehemiah (BBC 3; ed. C. J. Allen; Nashville: Broadman
Press, 1970), 13–145, quote 60. Additional intratextual evidence for my interpretation includes Ps
45.10[11]. Pedersen asserts that it “is only at a royal wedding that it can be said to a bride: Forget also
thine own people and thy father’s house”, Israel, 68. It is much better, however, to take the phrase as
an exhortation directed towards the bride precisely because the father’s house was where her loyalties
would have laid.
207 Cf. 1 Sam 1.8; Judges 11.1–7. The protecting function could be reversed, cf. 1 Kgs 1.12. The
continuing importance of the mother’s ָבא תֵּיב is also discernable in Judges 9.1 and 2 Sam 14.9. In
the latter case Bendor suggests that the “reason for the wording of the exoneration is that the beit ’ab
into which she married will no longer exist, and she therefore swears by the beit ’ab from which she
came”, Social Structure, 79. I think it is better to suppose that the woman’s protestation is evidence
for her continued loyalty was to her father’s house, that is what gives her words their force.
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subject are surrounded by scenes in which she is ‘acted upon’.”208 Exum supposes that it
is her gender that inhibits her choosing between conflicting loyalties. In Bakhtinian
terms she has no voice. But, regardless of other scenes, this view contradicts the
emphasis upon Michal’s agency in 1 Samuel 19.11–17. Rather than hemming Michal in
by writing out her agency it is essential to investigate the meaning of her actions.
In the final form of the narrative the conjunction of spear throwing, and David’s
evasion, flight and escape is deliberate. The slightly breathless nature of the narrative
may reflect David’s own state as he arrives home with Saul’s henchmen hot on his
heels. The house surrounded, verse 11b states that ‘David’s wife Michal told him…’.
This simple introductory phrase contains two pieces of information. First, Michal is
described as David’s wife. David Clines analyses the use of biblical name styles,
concluding that some forms have particular significance for narrative meaning.209 With
respect to this text, however, I cannot agree with Clines that styling Michal ‘David’s
wife’ indicates to readers that she is behaving as they would have expected her to do as
his wife.210 Quite the contrary, the author titles her thus because Michal’s warning to
David is startling: as David’s wife she would not be expected to warn him of Saul’s
actions. Readers are now learning what ‘loving David’ means, and why Saul had good
grounds for being afraid. Second, ‘Michal told David’. ‘Telling’, דגנ, is important for
the development of the plot in chapter 19.211 When Saul speaks with his son about
killing David, Jonathan tells, דגנ, David to be on his guard. The same verb is used when
he promises to obtain further details of Saul’s intentions and, having negotiated David’s
return to court, when Jonathan tells him of Saul’s decision. In the context of our
passage, therefore, ‘telling’ has echoes of the conflict between David and Saul. How
will Michal respond?
In complete contrast to those who see a hemming in of Michal, the author
repeatedly highlights Michal’s agency in the next verses. Her actions are given
208 Exum, Tragedy, 84. See also Esther Fuchs, Sexual Politics in the Biblical Narrative: Reading the
Hebrew Bible as a Woman (JSOTSup 310; Sheffield: Sheffield University Press, 2000), 140.
209 Clines, “Personal Names,” 266–87.
210 Cf. Clines, “Personal Names,” 269, 272. Clines argues that the normal form of identification for a
married woman was ‘X wife of Y’. Marsman’s assessment of literary and epigraphic evidence from
Israel and Ugarit, however, shows that kings married their daughters to both other regents and high
ranking officials within their own courts, and that if a woman’s father was more powerful than her
husband she sometimes used the style X bt Y for formal identification, Women in Ugarit and Israel,
643–58, 702, 717, 722.
211 Cf. 1 Sam 19.2, 3, 7, 11, 18, 19, 21.
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prominence by her being the subject of a string of verbs: Michal tells, lets down, takes,
lays, puts and covers. Patently, the writer employs literary repetition to underscore
Michal’s status as an acting subject. Given the context I suggest her actions are not
trivial but momentous; and her initiative is important theologically because it is
unexpected: another sign that God is on David’s side.
When Saul discovers that David has escaped he confronts his daughter, asking
why Michal has contravened father—daughter solidarity. But in another twist to the tale
Michal uses this very conception as the basis for her excuse. At the beginning of this
chapter I asked whether Saul might have had grounds for supposing that Michal should
not have deceived him. An affirmative answer to this question is suggested by the
anthropological resources surveyed above. On the basis of the narrator’s evaluation in 1
Samuel 18.28–29 and his dialogue with Jonathan in 1 Samuel 19.1–7, however, one
may surmise that Saul’s suspicions have been aroused. But although Michal’s deception
is patent to readers it is important to recognise Saul’s view of the matter could not be so
categorical. The genius of Michal’s use of the teraphim is that its role in healing rituals
means both her ruse with the dummy and reply to the messengers were ambiguous.212
Indeed, the messengers’ credulity is evidence for this ambiguity.213 Michal plays upon
multiple ways of interpreting her action. 214 While Saul charges Michal with
responsibility for David’s escape and of violating the cultural schema, Michal shifts the
blame onto David, alleging that he threatened to kill her. In doing so she uses shared
understandings of familial loyalty, specifically, the schema of father—daughter loyalty,
and the perception that women, regardless of their marital status, comprise part of a
family’s symbolic capital. Bourdieu elaborates upon the latter point:
The patrimony of the lineage, symbolized by its name, is defined not
only by possession of its land and its house, precious and therefore
vulnerable assets, but also by possession of the means of protecting them,
212 Cf. Rouillard and Tropper, “TRPYM”.
213 Given the absence of detail in the Samuel narrative one can only conjecture, but a plausible scenario
is: (1) the teraphim were employed in healing rituals; (2) the first time they were sent the messengers
saw them from a distance, at which point Michal told them David was sick (if they did not see the
dummy, or if Michal did not expect them to want to see it, it would have been unnecessary); (3) the
messengers believed Michal because it appeared she was telling the truth; so (4) they returned to Saul
empty handed, possibly because of sensibilities about disturbing a ritual in progress; but (5) Saul had
no such qualms and resends the messengers ִדו ָּד־תֶא תֹואְרִל, the sick man rather than the teraphim
(the Hebrew emphasises David not the messengers’ seeing, pace NRSV ‘to see David for
themselves’); so (6) the real situation is discovered.
214 For this reason I do not agree that Saul let himself be deceived, cf. Bodi, Michal Affair, 27. In my
view the text does not discredit Saul in this way, but by contrasting his actions with David’s
dependence upon God—because Michal’s actions were so unexpected.
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that is, its men, because land and women are never regarded as simple
instruments of production or reproduction, still less as chattels or
‘property’. An attack on these material and symbolic assets is an attack
on their master, on his nif, his potency, his very being as defined by the
group.215
Her construction of David as threatening Saul’s ֵּביבָא ת is an attempt to bring accepted
norms onto her side of the argument.216 Using social-science enables one to comprehend
how she does this: family solidarity for a newly married woman means loyalty towards
her father’s house, for she is hardly a member of her husband’s household.217 Thus it is
entirely plausible to implied readers that Saul believes Michal’s assertion of unwilling
complicity, and that her husband could act against her. Any such action would also be
construed as an attack of her father’s household, specifically its honour. Michal,
therefore, cleverly manipulates received understandings of acceptable social practice in
order to change Saul’s conception of her actions from betrayal to innocent, wounded
party. And in doing so she puts the ball back in Saul’s court for, she asserts, it is his
failure to protect her that left her with no choice. Michal’s excuse, therefore, is an
example of the employment of cultural categories to (re)construct kin relations for
individual ends.
Saul’s voice in 1 Samuel 19.11–17 is consistent. He starts with a strategy to
eliminate David and does not deviate from this objective. His direct speech to Michal
asks why she has deceived him and thwarted his plans. Against those who argue Michal
is ‘hemmed in’ I assert that she has a voice. It comprises positive support of David and
deception of Saul. Because it is unexpected within the social milieu that forms the
background to implied readers’ understandings her voice is prominent. The author
presents a richly portrayed narrative: in the dark of the night he directs a spotlight onto
Michal and holds it upon her as she ‘speaks’ in favour of David. However, whilst
readers are allowed to observe all the action, Saul possesses only partial insight, and to
him the meaning of her agency is uncertain. His inability to perceive correctly in the
half-light of ambiguity makes it possible for the author to have Michal manipulate
215 Bourdieu, Logic, 189. Emphasis original.
216 Cf. Bourdieu’s observations about the manipulation of cultural categories, discussed above.
217 David Jobling argues that David did not love Michal, and asks: “If David had gone about the court
behaving like an ecstatic newly wed would Saul have been prepared to believe that David would
threaten Michal’s life under any circumstances?” David Jobling, 1 Samuel (Berit Olam; Collegeville:
Liturgical Press, 1998), 152. I agree with Jobling that David did not waltz about as star-struck lover,
but this is beside the point—he would never have been expected to.
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cultural categories to produce a new interpretation of her actions for Saul’s
consumption. I will argue later that this move enables the writer to make a theological
point regarding moral choices in situations of value conflict. However, Michal’s
mendacity is itself a moral problem for many commentators. Given that readers of the
Old Testament usually suppose that lying falls short of morally upright behaviour it is
necessary to consider further the ethics of lying and deception.
5.4 LYING AND DECEPTION
I have argued that the moral dilemma facing Michal is most appropriately
understood in terms of conflicting moral goods. Abraham Cowley anticipated modern
interpretations that suppose the clash is between Michal’s untruth and Saul’s intention
to kill David:
To unjuſt Force ſhe oppoſes juſt deceit.
She meets the Murd’erers with a vertuous Ly,
And good deſſembling Tears; May he not Dy.218
The interpretation of Saul’s violence, however, suggests such an understanding may be
challenged, for if the force is not unjust, then one can also question where that leaves
the contrast with the lie. In this section I will approach the issue by looking first at the
Old Testament’s prohibition upon telling untruths.
5.4.1 ‘You shall not bear false witness’
The ninth commandment is an obvious place to start.219 It is widely thought that
it is not a blanket interdiction of lying, but concerns false charges against a neighbour in
a judicial setting.220 We may follow Anthony Phillips in supposing that there is no
material difference between the versions of the commandment in Exodus and
218 Abraham Cowley, Davideis (London: Henry Herringman, 1681), 15. Emphasis and spelling original.
219 According to the Jewish and Reformed order; the Roman Catholic tradition numbers it eighth. On the
Decalogue in general see: William Brown, ed., The Ten Commandments: The Reciprocity of
Faithfulness (LTE; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2004); Brevard Childs, The Book of Exodus:
A Critical, Theological Commentary (OTL; Louisville: Westminster. 1974), 385–439; Jochem
Douma, Los Diez Mandamientos: Manual para la vida cristiana (trans. J. M. Blanch; Grand Rapids:
Libros Desafío, 2000); Walter Harrelson, The Ten Commandments and Human Rights (Macon:
Mercer University Press, 1997); Anthony Phillips, Ancient Israel’s Criminal Law: A New Approach to
the Decalogue (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970), 37–152; J. J. Stamm and M. E. Andrew, The Ten
Commandments in Recent Research (SBT2; 2nd ed; London: SCM Press, 1967); Moshe Weinfeld,
Deuteronomy 1–11: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 5; New York:
Doubleday, 1991), 242–75. For a negative assessment of the connections between the Decalogue and
the rest of the Old Testament see Rodd, Glimpses, 77–93.
220 Note the use of the noun דע, ‘witness’, and verb הנע, ‘testify’, cf. Phillips, Criminal Law, 142.
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Deuteronomy, and that both intend to cover both lying words and deception more
widely. 221 The purpose of the commandment was to guard “the basic right of the
covenant member against the threat of false accusation”.222 In his comments upon this
stipulation, however, Allan Harman speaks of ‘the sanctity of truth’, arguing that the
command commends a general prohibition upon lying.223 Although I doubt that this text
can carry quite so much freight, other references do condemn lying and commend its
avoidance. Kirkpatrick claims
Scripture affirms the universal duty of Truth without any exception…nor
can it be understood to sanction breaches of this general law by recording
them without disapproval. It is left to the casuist to justify a falsehood or
an act of deception.224
Evidence for a general prohibition upon lies might be found, for example, in Leviticus
19.11, which states ‘you shall not steal, nor deal falsely, nor lie to one another’,225
Leviticus 19.16, which refers to lying in contexts beyond the legal setting,226 and in
Job’s protestation of his not having practiced falsehood and deceit.227 Proverbs 12.19
contrasts truthful lips that endure forever with the transience of a lying tongue, a
difference echoed in other parts of the Old Testament.228 Furthermore, Proverbs 6.16–
19 makes it quite clear that God abhors lies. Scholars of an earlier generation contended
Old Testament truth is not propositional but relational; not to do with adhering to an
221 Ex 20.16 reads רקש, ‘deception’, whilst Deut 5.20 has אוש, ‘vanity’. Phillips rejects the attempt to
identify a wider prohibition in the latter and a stricter indictment limited to lying as “much too subtle”,
since the Exodus text “simply refers to what the witness does, namely causes deception…[whilst
Deuteronomy] seeks to stress what the witness is, that is a worthless, empty man”, Criminal Law, 142.
222 Childs, Exodus, 424. Note that since evidence in judicial proceedings was not given under oath the
ninth commandment is not concerned with perjury, cf. Phillips, Criminal Law, 147–48. Truthful
testimony is a concern throughout the Old Testament: Num 35.30; Deut 19.15; 1 Kgs 21; Ps 27.12, as
it is in the ANE: CH 3, 11, cf. ANET 166.
223 Allan Harman, “Decalogue (Ten Commandments),” NIDOTTE 5.513–19, especially 518; cf. Ex 23.1–
3; Deut 17.6; 19.15–21; 22.13–21.
224 Kirkpatrick, Samuel, 173
225 M. A. Klopfenstein comments that “[e]n Lv 19,11 no se sabe si se habla, en sentido moral amplio, de
comportamiento desleal o, en sentido jurídico estricto, de comportamiento contrario al derecho; los
verbos paralelos «robar» y «encubrir» (→kh š) en Lv 19,11 y el paradigma de Lv 5,21–24 favorecen
más bien el primero, que podría indicar concretamente un falso testimonio con la finalidad de
encubrimiento”, “רׁקש šqr Engañar,” DTMAT 2.1265–76, quote 1269.
226 According to Childs this demonstrates “an early concern within Israel to protect the reputation of
one’s fellow against any abuse, such as idle rumours, which would cause him injury”, Exodus, 425; cf.
Hos 4.2.
227 Cf. Job 31.5; Georg Fohrer, “The Righteous Man in Job 31,” in Essays in Old Testament Ethics (ed. J.
L. Crenshaw and J. T. Willis; New York: Ktav, 1974), 1–22, especially 14. On models of the moral
individual in the Old Testament see Wright, Old Testament Ethics, 368–78. These contrast with
examples of lying by evil people, cf. Ps 5.9; 58.3; 109.2; 144.8, 11; Isa 32.7.
228 Note the strong contrasts between truth and lies (Ps 52.1–7; Isa 59.12–15; Jer 7.9; Hos 7.3), God’s law
and lies (Ps 119.29, 64, 104, 128, 163; Prov 30.8; Isa 59.12–15; Hos 4.2; 10.12–13; Mic 6.12; Amos
2.4), and the identification of idols with falsehood (Isa 44.20; Jer 13.25; 16.19; 51.17; Hab 2.18).
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abstract principle, but about being dependable and steadfast.229 The basis for this claim
was etymological: both תֱֶמא and ָהּנוֱמא are derived from ַָמאן , “which in its simple
stem means to be steady, to be firm”.230 Kaiser concludes his survey with this polemical
assertion:
If truth telling was valued so highly in the courts that the perjurer was to
be punished without pity, could it be esteemed any less in situations
outside of the courtroom? Since truth ultimately was grounded in no one
less than the God who was truth, all interpretations that would raise
caveats and equivocations of one sort or another, outside a proper
definition for truth or lying, must come to terms not with a system of
God, but with a personal accounting to the true and living Lord.231
Kaiser’s claim chimes with Augustine’s influential treatise that lying is deviance from
proper standards of truthful speech.232 According to Augustine, because the soul is
worth more than the body lies are not permitted even to save a life.233 Regardless of
229 Cf. M. E. Andrew, “Falsehood and Truth,” Interpretation 17 (1963): 425–38, especially 434;
Muilenburg, Way of Israel, 16–17; Elizabeth Achtemeier, “Righteousness in the OT,” IDB 4.80–85;
Edmond Jacob, Théologie de l’Ancien Testament (Neuchatel: Éditions Delachaux et Niestelé, 1968),
141–42: “’emunah et ’emeth définissent à la fois la fidélite et la véracité de Dieu et la foi de
l’homme”. YHWH is a God of truth (Ps 31.6) and faithfulness (Deut 32.4), he is just and right (Deut
32.4; Ps 92.16; 119.137; 145.17) and without iniquity (Deut 32.4; Ps 92.16). Explicit statements that
God does not lie are found in Num 23.19; 1 Sam 15.29. Jimmy Roberts highlights the importance of
righteous practice if one wishes to receive the truth from YHWH, The Bible and the Ancient Near
East: Collected Essays (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2002), 131; cf. 2 Sam 22.26–27; Ps 18.26–27.
230 Edward Ramsdell, “The Old Testament Understanding of Truth,” JR 31 (1951): 264–73, quote 264;
cf. Kaiser, Toward, 223. Such arguments have been contested, most famously by James Barr, The
Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford: OUP, 1961; repr. London: SCM Press, 1983), 161–205.
This does not mean, however, that it is any easier to justify deception, on which see Eugene Carpenter
and Michael Grisanti, “המר,” NIDOTTE 3.1122–24; M. Kartveit, “המר,” TWOT 8.500–504. המר is
found eight times in OT: Gen 29.25; Josh 9.22; 1 Sam 19.17; 28.12; 2 Sam 19.26[27], Prov 26.19 [for
which BDB gives ‘beguile, deceive, mislead’]; Lam 1.19 and 1 Chr 12.17 [for which BDB gives ‘deal
treacherously with, betray’].
231 Kaiser, Toward, 228.
232 C. mend. 4; cf. De mend. Augustine thought that lying is worse than other forms of deception because
it involves asserting something that one knows to be false, cf. Jonathan Adler, “Lying, Deceiving, or
Falsely Implicating,” JP 94 (1997): 435–52. For an exposition of Augustine and representative later
authorities see Paul Griffiths, Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity (Grand Rapids: Brazos,
2004).
233 De mend. 8. Augustine distinguishes between hiding the truth and lying, but maintains that one cannot
justify lying even if it is more certain of success, cf. C. mend. 23. For Aquinas on lies see Summa II-II
q.109–110; it is merely a venial sin, Summa II-II q.110 a.3–4. Kant also maintained a rigorous posture
against lies: “Truthfulness in statements which cannot be avoided is the formal duty of an individual
to everyone, however great may be the disadvantage accruing to himself or to another”, Immanuel
Kant, “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives,” in Critique of Practical Reason and
Other Writings in Moral Philosophy (ed. and trans L. W. Beck; Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1949; repr. in Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life 2nd ed.; New York:
Vintage, 1999), 267–72, quote 268. However, Kant’s duty is an unconditional duty to humanity, not
towards the individual with whom one is relating, and although he calls truth-telling ‘sacred’, his view
of the deity is not that of the Old Testament.
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whether lies are rejected outright or otherwise justified,234 this tradition has proved
enduring, so that truth and lying are mutually exclusive.235
The Old Testament, however, contains a number of accounts of lying that do not
seem to condemn it as a deviant practice. John Ottwell lists cases of deception by men
in the Old Testament, including Abraham tricking Pharaoh, Jacob and Laban’s mutual
deceit, Saul’s attempts to kill David, the latter’s murder of Uriah, and Joab’s ruse using
the woman of Tekoa. 236 Female deceivers include Rebekah, Tamar, the Hebrew
midwives, Rahab, Deborah, and Michal. 237 YHWH is occasionally implicated in
deception, either personally or by approving those who engage in the practice.238 In
234 It is unsurprising that the rigorist position has been challenged. In the words of Duns Scotus: “It is less
bad to take away true opinion from one’s neighbor, or to be the occasion of generating false opinion in
him, than to take away his bodily life. Indeed, there is scarcely a comparison.” Quoted in Thomas
Williams, “Lying, Deception, and the Virtue of Truthfulness: A Reply to Garcia,” FP 17 (2000): 242–
48, quote 245. An approach commended by some is the ‘mental reservation’, in which deception is
effected by omitting some of the truth. Another approach, which does not cause the same disquiet
about the ethics of manipulating the message, is to assert that a lie is only such if the recipient has the
right to the truth. Originally adopted by Grotius, the major 20th century exponent of this position was
Paul Ramsey, cf. Grotius, Law of War and Peace, 258–61; Paul Ramsey, “The Case of the Curious
Exception,” in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics (ed. P. Ramsey and G. H. Outka; London: SCM,
1968), 67–135. Ramsey maintains that rules prohibiting lying are always to be obeyed, but defines a
lie as “withholding the truth from someone to whom the truth is due”. Bok protests that Ramsey’s
definition ignores the question of what it means to have a right to truthful information, Lying, 15.
Here, the reflections of Dietrich Bonhoeffer are illuminating. He distinguishes between God’s truth,
grounded in love, and Satan’s truth, which hates creation. “It is only the cynic who claims ‘to speak
the truth’ at all times and in all places to all men in the same way, but who, in fact, displays nothing
but a lifeless image of the truth….He wounds shame, desecrates mystery, breaks confidence [and],
betrays community in which he lives.” Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (ed. E. Bethge; trans. N. H. Smith;
New York: MacMillan, 1955), 326–27, quote 328. Interestingly, Bonhoeffer considered that when
things that belong to one ‘order’ or sphere of life are used in another—he provides the example of a
child being asked about private family matters in a public classroom—then lying is inevitable. Thus
truth-telling, according to Bonhoeffer, must account for a person’s relationships in order to identify to
whom one is obliged to reveal ‘the truth’. Craig Hovey highlights the importance of perception, for
even if a rule relating to specific people (e.g. family) is to be followed, moral action “depends upon
seeing truthfully those relationships for what they are”, “Putting Truth To Practice: MacIntyre’s
Unexpected Rule,” SCE 19 (2006): 169–86, quote 183; cf. Alisdair MacIntyre, “Truthfulness, Lies,
and Moral Philosophers: What Can We Learn from Mill and Kant?,” Tanner Lectures on Human
Values, 1994.
235 Paul Horwich summarises this position: “if we can understand why truth is valuable, we can thereby
explain why lying is wrong”, “The Value of Truth,” Noûs 40 (2006): 347–60, quote 348.
236 John Otwell, And Sarah Laughed: The Status of Women in the Old Testament, (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1977), 108; Gen 12.10–20; 20; 26.1–11; 30.25–43; 1 Sam 18.17–27; 2 Sam 11.6–
25; 2 Sam 14.1–21. Note the definition of deception provided by Williams: “Deception takes place
when an agent intentionally distorts, withholds, or otherwise manipulates information reaching some
person(s) in order to stimulate in the person(s) a belief that the agent does not believe in order to serve
the agent’s purpose”, Michael Williams, Deception in Genesis: an investigation into the morality of a
unique Biblical phenomenon (SBLit 32; New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 3. For other instances of
deception in 1 Samuel see 10.15–16; 16.2–5; 18; 21; 23; 25.
237 Gen 27–28; 38; Ex 1; Josh 2; Judg 4–5; 1 Sam 19; cf. Toni Craven, “Women who Lied for the Faith,”
in Justice and the Holy (ed. D. A. Knight and P. J. Paris; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 35–49.
238 Ex 3.18–20; 1 Sam 16.1–5; 1 Kgs 22.2–23; Jer 4.10; Ezek 14.9. On whether God is a liar see the
exchange between Barr and Moberly: Walter Moberly, “Did the Serpent get it Right?,” JTS 39 (1988):
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terms of lies more narrowly Eerdmann identifies lies of necessity,239 lies of sport,240 and
shameful and hurtful lies.241 However, it is one thing to identify cases of lying and
deception, another to think that the Old Testament presents them as normative.
There are three typical approaches to this question. The first is to attempt to
excuse the text, justifying the cases of lying as exceptions that do not undo or relativise
what are supposed to be the proper standards of Old Testament morality. The most
consistent proponent of this approach is Kaiser. He is concerned to protect the
truthfulness of God, claiming that “divine approval of an individual in one aspect or
area of his life does not entail and must not be extended to mean that there is a divine
approval of that individual in all aspects of his character or conduct”.242 So although
Rahab lied and is later commended she is not commended for lying per se, rather for
protecting Israel’s spies: it is her faith in YHWH that is in view.243
A second approach, at the other end of the spectrum, posits that there is
absolutely no theological difficulty with deceptive practices. Although he restricts his
study to Genesis, Richard Freund perceives no attempt on the part of biblical authors to
sanitise characters’ actions with respect to lying and deception, concluding that “a
standard of absolute truthfulness does not seem to be a major issue in the Hebrew
Bible”.244 Similarly, Daniel Friedmann claims “[g]uile was regarded as a praiseworthy
talent, legitimate in the attainment of just ends”.245
The first two approaches are relatively infrequent and most commentators seek
1–27; James Barr, “Is God a Liar? (Genesis 2–3)—And Related Matters,” JTS 57 (2006): 1–22;
Walter Moberly, “Did the Interpreters get it Right? Genesis 2–3 Reconsidered,” JTS 59 (2008): 22–
40. Craven notes that both Deborah and Jael’s roles in the war were akin that of a Canaanite goddess,
thus presenting YHWH as one who controlled even foreign deities. Furthermore, she suggests that
Judg 5.2–31 are “a poetic recognition that YHWH…caused Jael to act. If so, then this perhaps oldest
of biblical texts testifies to God’s responsibility for and sanction of a woman’s lie”, Craven, “Women
Who Lied,” 43; cf. Peter Craigie, “Deborah and Anat: A Study of Poetic Imagery (Judges 5),” ZAW
90 (1978): 374–81, especially 374; Glen Taylor, “The Song of Deborah and Two Canaanite
Goddesses,” JSOT 23 (1982): 99–108.
239 Ex 1.19; Gen 20.2; 26.7; Josh 2.6.
240 Gen 42.9; 27.15; Judg 9.8.
241 Cf. Eerdmann, Samuel, 256.
242 Kaiser, Toward, 270–71
243 Cf. C. mend. 32: “God did good to the Hebrew midwives, and to Rahab the harlot of Jericho, this was
not because they lied, but because they were merciful to God’s people” Thus Rahab is to be imitated
in everything except her lying, cf. C. mend. 34. Augustine, surprisingly, does not mention Michal.
244 Richard Freund, “Lying and Deception in the Biblical and Post-Judaic Tradition,” SJOT 5 (1991): 45–
61, quote 45.
245 Daniel Friedmann, To Kill and Take Possession: Law, Morality and Society in Biblical Stories
(Peabody: Hendrickson, 2002), 66. He argues that only the slyness of the serpent is condemned; all
other cases are “treated with tolerance and even admiration”.
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reasons for occurrences of lying and deception in the Bible. A source critical
explanation is proposed by Caird, who supposes that Michal ‘untrustworthiness’ is due
to an early source. 246 More recent interpretations, however, posit theological
explanations. Esther Fuchs, for instance, supposes the accounts of women’s deception
are included to smear their reputations and diminish the credibility of their
perspectives.247 Horn Prouser, though, carefully refutes Fuch’s argument, showing that
deception is not employed by women because they presented as inherently more
duplicitous, but because they are disadvantaged people.248 She avers that “in biblical
narrative lying is not considered a moral issue of absolutes. Rather, deception is
considered an acceptable and generally praiseworthy means for a weaker party to
succeed against a stronger power.”249 An ancient audience, she argues, would have
appreciated rather than condemned quick-thinking deception. Michael Williams rejects
this conclusion, highlighting a number of different perspectives upon lying.250 He finds
that deceptive acts are positively evaluated in Genesis. In the Deuteronomistic History
deception against Israel is always viewed negatively;251 deception of Israelites by other
Israelites is sometimes evaluated negatively,252 and at other times positively;253 and
deception of others by Israelites is evaluated positively.254 In short, it seems that within
Genesis deception is acceptable to right a previous wrong, and within the historical
narratives if “the deceptive behavior serves to protect, preserve, or restore the well-
being of members of this group or the group as a whole, it is positively evaluated”.255
246 Caird, Samuel, 987.
247 Esther Fuchs, “ ‘For I Have the Way of Women’: Deception, Gender, and Ideology in Biblical
Narrative,” Semeia 42 (1988): 68–83; idem, “Who Is Hiding the Truth? Deceptive Women and
Biblical Androcentrism,” in Feminist Perspectives on Biblical Scholarship (ed. A. Y. Collins;
Missouls: Scholars Press, 1985), 137–44.
248 Horn Prouser, “The Truth about Women and Lying,” JSOT 61 (1994): 15–28, especially 27.
249 Prouser, “Women and Lying,” 15.
250 Cf. Williams, Deception in Genesis, 5. Note also Wenham’s remarks: “Witty and perceptive as these
observations may be about early Israelite attitudes, they do not represent those of the implied author of
Genesis, who sets these episodes in contexts which may clear both his own and God’s displeasure at
these lies”, Story, 76. Regardless of the view one takes of Wenham’s assertion regarding the Genesis
stories, it is not the case that Michal’s lie is undermined by a negative tenor in the narrative context.
251 Cf. Williams, Deception in Genesis, 60.
252 Cf. Josh 7.19–21; 1 Sam 28.3–12; 2 Sam 3.27; 20.8–10; 4.5–12; 12.14; 13; 15.1–12; 1 Kgs 21.1–14.
253 Cf. 1 Sam 19.11–17 (note, though, that Williams does not say how or where Michal’s action is
positively evaluated, cf. Williams, Deception in Genesis, 62); 2 Sam 15.32–37; 16.15–17.16; 2 Kgs
9.22; 10.30.
254 Ex 1.15–20; Josh 2.1–21; 6.22–25; Judg 3.12–30; 5.17–22; 5.24–27. A review of the ANE evidence
of deception between the gods, between gods and people and between humans leads Williams to
suggest that it is evaluated negatively when between people but that there was an acceptance or even
admiration of deception by gods, cf, Deception in Genesis, 151–91.
255 Williams, Deception in Genesis, 221. ANE evidence also points to negative evaluation of intra-group
deception, cf. Williams, Deception in Genesis, 223.
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This echoes Craven’s view that women’s lies are endorsed because they are on the side
of God and his people,256 a claim that begs the question of who constitutes the people of
God; of who is an ‘insider’ and who an ‘outsider’. John Pilch thinks that it is not so
much the people of God as the family that comprises the key group, and that individuals
justifiably lie to protect ‘family honour’.257 “The truth of the honor of any family is
much more important than factual truth”.258
The last two interpretations of Old Testament lies set them in the context of a
clash of moral goods and commitments. Peter Barnes’s careful assessment of Rahab’s
lie makes the same point: “Truth-telling takes place in concrete situations, and can never
be treated as though it occurs in a vacuum”.259 He supposes that a commitment to
YHWH means Rahab’s lie was no sin. In order to understand whether Michal’s
deception can be similarly interpreted I turn now to consider anthropological
perspectives upon lying.
5.4.2 Lying—Anthropological Perspectives
In a classic essay published at the beginning of the 20th century Georg Simmel
claimed that the important point about a lie is not that the other possesses false
information—that is merely error—but that “the person deceived is held in
misconception about the true intention of the person who tells the lie. Veracity and
mendacity are thus of the most far-reaching significance for the relations of persons
with each other.” 260 Although the paucity of anthropological studies of lying and
deception has been lamented,261 those that exist differ from philosophical or theological
appraisals in that they do not view lying as deviant but as a social phenomenon replete
with meaning. Herzfeld explains that “they may offend the moral sensibilities of some
observers, but, when used consistently, they reflect moral valuations in which we may
find explanations for what strike us, but do not strike our informants, as irrational
256 Cf. Craven, “Women Who Lied,” 48.
257 John Pilch, “Lying and Deceit in the Letters to the Seven Churches: Perspectives from Cultural
Anthropology,” BTB 22 (1992): 126–35, especially 129.
258 Pilch, “Lying and Deceit,” 130. Emphasis original. He identifies seven kinds of deception and lies:
concealment of failure; concealment of unintentional failures; false imputation; avoiding quarrels;
attaining material gain; mischief; defence of kin.
259 Peter Barnes, “Was Rahab’s Lie a Sin?,” RTR 54 (1995): 1–9, quote 9.
260 Georg Simmel, “The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies,” AJS 11 (1906): 441–98, quote
445. My emphasis.
261 John Barnes, A Pack of Lies: Towards a Sociology of Lying (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 8–9.
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practices”.262
Gilsenan argues that the practice of lying in the Lebanese community he studied
was “a fundamental element not only of specific situations and individual actions, but of
the cultural universe as a whole”.263 As such, lying has to be learnt. Julian Pitt-Rivers
notes the importance of socialisation. He calls the Andalusians ‘accomplished liars’,
“for it requires training and intelligence to distinguish rapidly when the truth is owed
and when it is to be concealed”.264 It is important to realise that the prevalence of lying
does not indicate debased morality. The same author observes
it is logical rather than paradoxical that the Andalusians should be people
profoundly concerned with the truth and with the true state of the
heart…When knowledge is something to give or to deny you become
concerned with its exact worth.265
Gilsenan elaborates that the “lie is a technique for the restriction of the social
distribution of knowledge over time, and is thus ultimately woven into the system of
power and control in society”. 266 Although this can be true in modern industrial
societies,267 the most detailed ethnographies are from societies where people live very
closely together so that there are few real secrets.268 In such a community, claims Ursula
Sharma, “a sense of personal integrity and privacy is maintained less through the use of
space than through the use of information”.269 Because deception creates ambiguity and
262 Herzfeld, Anthropology, 110.
263 Michael Gilsenan, “Lying, Honor, and Contradiction,” in Transaction & Meaning: Directions in the
Anthropology of Exchange and Symbolic Behaviour (ed. B. Kapferer; Philadelphia: American
Anthropological Association, 1976), 191–219, quote 191.
264 Julian Pitt-Rivers, The People of the Sierra (2nd ed.; Chicago / London: University of Chicago Press,
1971), xvi. Note the importance of embodiment: the quote continues “and to acquire conscious control
over facial expression is an ability which takes practice from childhood”. See also Barnes, Pack of
Lies, 8; Banfield, Moral Basis, 148.
265 Pitt-Rivers, People of the Sierra, xvii.
266 Gilsenan, “Lying, Honor, and Contradiction,” 191.
267 De Certeau speaks of la perruque, ‘wig’, to highlight the way in which the practices of those with less
power seek to use their (disadvantaged) situation for their own benefit, for example, the worker
creates opportunities to do his own work during ‘company time’ or using ‘company resources’, cf.
Everyday Life, 24–28.
268 Cf. Juliet du Boulay, “Lies, mockery and family integrity,” in Mediterranean Family Structures. (ed.
J. G. Peristiany; CSSA 13; Cambridge: CUP, 1976), 389–406; Els van Dongen, “Theatres of the Lie:
‘Crazy’ Deception and Lying as Drama,” A&M 9 (2002): 135–51; Jana Fortier, “The Arts of
Deception: Verbal Performances by the Rāute of Nepal,” JRAI 8 (2002): 233–57; Gilsenan, “Lying,
Honor, and Contradiction”.
269 Ursula Sharma, “Trust, Privacy, Deceit and the Quality of Interpersonal Relationships: ‘Peasant’
Society Revisited,” in An Anthropology of Indirect Communication (ed. J. Hendry and C. W. Watson;
London / New York: Routledge, 2001) 115–27, quote 122. Note, pace Sharma, that this need not be
linked to ideas of limited good.
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thus social distance Gilsenan is able to assert that lying “is vital to the life of this
society—indeed, lying makes it possible”.270
Lying can be used both to deceive and to reveal deeper truths. Jana Fortier
describes how the Rāute adopt strategies of verbal evasion and deceit when in contact
with Nepali agriculturalists in order to create social space for their nomadic practices.
The main means by which this is achieved is through uklān, rhyming proverbs, which
are performed in order both to entertain and mislead.271 Similarly, in the psychiatric
ward studied by van Dongen the very space and structure of the ward induced lying.
Competition for staff time, disillusionment with years of care and no prospect of ‘a
cure’, tensions between medical staff, psychologists and nurses, and the very art of the
‘lying truths of psychiatry’,272 all provided an arena in which lying was a rational
strategy for creating personal space. Lying is therefore a means of resisting the
environment and even exaggerated lies, which are obviously false, may be admired
because they show a person is unwilling to succumb to reality.273 On the other hand,
sometimes lies can be told in order to ascertain the truth, for example, to catch another
liar. Gilsenan recounts how a particularly depraved member of the community
pretended to become a disciple of a visiting sheikh in order to test whether he possessed
the powers he claimed. The whole group, normally warily suspicious of this individual,
went along with the deception, thus exposing the visitor’s assertion of supernatural
insight as a lie.274
The relationship between truth and deception can be complex. Van Dongen
asserts that in the context of a mental health ward, “it did not make sense to look for the
truth…nobody would make a deep search for the truth, simply because all were aware
270 Gilsenan, “Lying, Honor and Contradiction,” 211. Emphasis original. Cf. du Boulay, Portrait of a
Greek Mountain Village (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 405–406; Joy Hendry, “To Wrap or Not to
Wrap: Politeness and Penetration in Ethnographic Inquiry,” Man NS 24 (1989): 620–35.
271 Cf. Fortier, “Arts of Deception,” 233–34. Fortier (or rather, as she acknowledges, her ‘research
assistant’, Bishnu) recognises that most proverbs were used to disguise the situation of the Rāute,
these were ‘fake’ proverbs, since they “did not describe Rāute experiential knowledge”. Other
proverbs were revelatory of Rāute perspectives. “ ‘Real’ proverbs are voiced only during moments of
exceptional conversational conflict, effectively pulling off the elegant mask of the performance to
reveal the sweating actor underneath”, Fortier, “Arts of Deception,” 237.
272 T. Sasz, “The Lying Truths of Psychiatry,” JLS 3 (1986): 121–39.
273 Cf. van Dongen, “Theatres of the Lie,” 145–46. Such lies are ‘grotesque’ in Bakhtin’s sense of
ridiculous and world reversing. Note also Abu-Lughod’s accounts of women maintaining the socially
expected stance that they had no interest in their husbands and had thus fought him off on their
wedding night, even though the tent walls had told a different story, Veiled Sentiments, 48. Van
Dongen points to other uses of the lie: to joke, be polite, or because of a feeling of affection.
274 Gilsenan, “Lying, Honor and Contradiction,” 206–10; cf. Herzfeld, Anthropology, 65.
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that there was more at stake than simple truth.”275 Part of what is at stake is ongoing
relations between people as autonomous individuals. Bella DePaulo and Deborah Kashy
conclude their empirical study of the differences in patterns of lying between close and
more distant relationships by suggesting that truth can be more prejudicial than lies,
with the result that “close relationships may be breeding grounds for deceit”.276 This
conclusion appears to clash with the notion that marriages and friendships, for example,
are arenas of trust and transparency. Barnes’ comments, however, are instructive:
An absence of mutual trust may lead to an abundance of lies, each party
trying to deceive the other, but the presence of trust does not necessarily
result in an absence of lies. In intimate face-to-face relations the shared
expectation of mutual trust may lead to collaboration between, or more
likely connivance by, liars and dupes in order to maintain the plausibility
of a lie, as well as the plausibility of continuing trust. When this happens
it is no longer obvious who is deceiving whom.277
In any case, when people live in close proximity, promoting misinformation by lying, or
attempting to control access to information through secrecy, can only have the effect of
delaying people’s eventual understanding. The hope is that by the time all are appraised
of an event and the lie ‘uncovered’ it is sufficiently overshadowed by the individuals’
entanglement in other, more immediate considerations. 278 That this is so indicates
people know they should not lie or, to express the matter more precisely, that ‘truth’ is
also a moral good. Campbell states that a “head of family who was sincere (εἰλικρινής),
or without cunning words (ντόμπρος), would be considered foolish and neglectful of
his duty. This is not to say that the Sarakatsani fail to understand the virtues of truth and
sincerity…”.279
275 Van Dongen, “Theatres of the Lie,” 141. He notes the exception of when a patient harmed another.
276 Bella DePaulo and Deborah Kashy, “Everyday Lies in Close and Casual Relationships,” JPSP 74
(1998): 63–79, quote 77. Overall, people more often lied to those in casual rather than close
relationships. See also Craig Palmer, “When to Bear False Witness: An Evolutionary Approach to the
Social Context of Honesty and Deceit Among Commercial Fishers,” Zygon 28 (1993): 455–68.
277 Barnes, Pack of Lies, 23. There may be ‘norms’ of cooperation in deception. For example, a lie told
only once or twice may not be considered as such: “Among the Navajo the fourth time a lie is
repeated it becomes deceitful”, Barnes, Pack of Lies, 67.
278 Cf. Sharma, “Trust, Privacy, Deceit,” 122. Stanley Brandes’ cynicism may be typical: “It is simply
assumed that if a person can get away with it, he will engage in almost any activity to further his own
well-being regardless of how his actions affect others”, Migration, Kinship and Community: Tradition
and Transition in a Spanish Village (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 149. On the other hand,
Alexandra Agenti-Pillen describes the how deception can be immediately followed by disclosure, both
to flirt and to avoid conflict with more the powerful by “a type of trial-and-error communication”,
“Obvious Pretence: For Fun or For Real? Cross-Cousin and International Relationships in Sri Lanka,”
JRAI NS 13 (2007): 313–29, quote 321.
279 Campbell, Honour, Family, and Patronage, 283.
156
Edward Banfield glossed the prioritisation of family interest as ‘amoral
familism’.280 Herzfeld refrains from nuancing his rejection of Banfield’s thesis: “Lies…
may be a legitimate defense of a kin group’s interests, and dismissing such a perspective
as ‘amoral familism’…is a piece of self-contradictory nonsense that blithely ignores its
fundamentally ethical focus”. 281 Herzfeld’s point is that Banfield only looks to
deceptive behaviour in isolation, failing to include in his appraisal the social and moral
good of ‘the family’ itself. This good is protected both by lying, and maintaining a
reputation for lying and dirty tricks. 282 Du Boulay’s typology of lies distinguishes
between defensive and offensive mendacity. Defensive lies conceal a person’s
deficiencies with respect to social norms and thus are prevalent in situations of
competing obligations in which it is impossible to meet all expectations, to conceal
family behaviour, or to defend kin or friends. Offensive lies, for example, false
accusations, are told in order to smear another’s character and to create mischief.283 All
of these strategies can be employed to draw a veil around family activities.
Many early ethnographies constructed a sharp divide between those who could
be trusted and those who could not; between those to whom the truth might be disclosed
and outsiders from whom family secrets should be concealed.
Secrecy erects a barrier around the members of the family and their
intimate relations. The family secrets, whether they have significant
content or not, are relevant, simply because they represent something
which is denied to other people who are not members of the group.284
The act of lying itself helps create group identity. Pitt-Rivers’ monograph shows how
lying to outsiders both hides divisions within the community and performatively
reduces these divisions as those on the ‘inside’ are able to ‘read’ the lie more easily than
those on the ‘outside’. 285 Fissures within the family group, however, point to the
weakness of a simple ‘them’ versus ‘us’ view of the matter. People lie to family group
members in order not to offend or to avoid appearing not to fulfil obligations to kin.286
280 “It is not too much to say that most people of Montegrano have no morality except, perhaps, that
which requires service to the family”, Moral Basis, 134.
281 Herzfeld, Anthropology, 110.
282 Cf. Sharma, “Trust, Privacy, Deceit,” 121.
283 Du Boulay, Portrait, 399–404. Peristiany speaks of “the defensive use of deception and the offensive
use of ridicule”, “Introduction,” 23.
284 Campbell, Honour, Family, and Patronage, 192.
285 Cf. Pitt-Rivers, People of the Sierra, 8–10, 29–30; A. P. Cohen, The Symbolic Construction of
Community (London: Routledge, 1985), 89, 110–11.
286 Cf. Barnes, Pack of Lies, 70.
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Individual social goals are thus as important as group concerns, although these may
often coincide. Pitt-Rivers describes “a kaleidoscope of changing relationships” that
depend upon context. He continues by observing that the individuals he studied “faced
choices of allegiance and defined themselves by the attitudes they adopted. They were
not simply members of a given tribe and tribal segment.”287
In Chapter 3 I used Rapport’s work to highlight both the importance of
individual agency for practice, and the ubiquity of ambiguity in social interaction. The
latter causes problems, for people cannot be certain that their trust and confidence is
rightly placed, a situation only exacerbated when lying and deception are common
features of social intercourse. To ameliorate uncertainly, when an interlocutor wishes to
be taken seriously explicit markers are employed to warrant veracity, for example, ‘on
my honour’.288 The latter is a type of oath, an appeal to a higher good or god to
guarantee the truthfulness of the affirmation. Although oaths can form part of ordinary
speech, more formal oath taking in sacred places can be used to validate protestations of
innocence. Herzfeld’s study of oath taking among Cretan shepherds involved in cycles
of reciprocal sheep rustling illustrates its social function.
The practice of resolution by oath permits a face-saving avoidance of
further conflict in the name of higher truths, but this implies precisely the
opposite of ingenuous trust: it furnishes a ritualised means of letting a
rival escape further retributions without necessarily changing one’s mind
about his guilt. The invitation to take the oath comes invested with a
guarantee that the matter will end there. The very sanctity of the process
is what protects the lie that it may—and, in general estimation, often
does—conceal.”289
And even if the truth should come to light, “[m]ere evidence cannot gainsay an oath’s
holy authority and it is both blasphemous and a heinous solecism to suggest that it
might”.290 This does not lead to easy demands that others swear, for obliging another to
do so means one cannot refuse to take an oath in return as a gesture of one’s own
commitment to restoring goodwill. The accuser, for example, may have to swear that
287 Pitt-Rivers, People of the Sierra, xix. My emphasis. Cf. Sharma, “Trust, privacy, deceit,” 121:
“Family honour is not irrelevant in Ghanyari, but personal reputation can be distinguished from it to a
large extent”.
288 Cf. Gilsenan, “Lying, Honor and Contradiction,” 199, 215; Barnes, Pack of lies, 21.
289 Michael Herzfeld, “Pride and Perjury: Time and the Oath in the Mountain Villages of Crete,” Man NS
25 (1990): 305–22, quote 311.
290 Herzfeld, “Pride and Perjury,” 312.
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the animals are missing.291
We have seen that attention to the social dynamics of lying does not preclude
appreciation of truthfulness. But nor is it the case that family well-being and truth are
the only moral goods. Many studies of the Mediterranean identify ‘honour’ as another,
perhaps the key, value. Although space precludes extensive discussion of ‘honour and
shame’, it is necessary to ask how ‘honour’ relates to the ostensively dishonourable
practice of lying. Bourdieu comments that the “ethos of honour is fundamentally
opposed to a universal and formal morality which affirms the equality in dignity of all
men and consequently the equality of their rights and duties”.292 The reason for this is
that a universal duty to be truthful curtails a person’s autonomy, which is the essence of
honour.293 The obligation to speak truthfully for a person who adheres to the ‘honour
code’, therefore, is situational: deception is perfectly acceptable as long as one deals
with people to whom there are no duties of honour. Strangers would be such
individuals. Thus to “lie is to deny the truth to someone who has the right to be told it
and this right exists only where respect is due”.294 The moral obligation to tell the truth,
then, derives from a prior commitment to individuals. This explains how an honourable
man may be faithful and truthful to some yet not be dishonoured by practising deceit.
Of course, omnipresent ambiguity means a person’s intentions are never transparent, so
it is always possible to question whether a statement did in fact commit the honour of
the speaker. Where no oath or other marker removes this doubt and the intentions of the
interlocutor were misinterpreted the dupe, and not the deceiver, is humiliated.295 Pitt-
Rivers concludes that according to the ‘honour code’ “it is lack of steadfastness in
intentions which is dishonouring, not misrepresentation of them”.296 The implications
for someone who sticks doggedly to the truth, the “pathologically honest”,297 are patent:
“Adami, ‘a good man,’ is a term of moral approval but not of prestige. It relates to
personal characteristics but not to social rank, save insofar as it is frequently followed
291 Cf. Herzfeld, “Pride and Perjury,” 313.
292 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Sentiment of Honour in Kabyle Society,” in Honour and Shame: The Values of
Mediterranean Society (ed. J. G. Peristiany; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 191–242,
quote 228.
293 See Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments, 79; Pitt-Rivers, “Honour,” 33.
294 Pitt-Rivers, “Honour,” 33.
295 Cf. Pitt-Rivers, “Honour,” 33.
296 Pitt-Rivers, “Honour,” 32; cf. Phillip Esler, “Making and Breaking an Agreement Mediterranean
Style: A New Reading of Galations 2:1 – 14,” BI 3 (1995): 285–314.
297 Barnes, Pack of Lies, 21.
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by mishin, ‘poor chap’.”298 In a similar vein Sharma notes that truthful ‘simplicity’ is
only advantageous “when allied to a genuine otherworldly piousness [sic], a reputation
for utter moral rectitude”.299 If this is unattainable then a tendency towards truthfulness
will probably result in others taking advantage.
A final area of anthropological research into the lie is the literature on
‘tricksters’. Robert Pelton’s description of the African trickster Ananse points to the
essence of these characters: “Tricksterlike, Ananse speaks the truth by dissembling”.300
Lawrence Sullivan summarises a trickster as “a type of mythic figure distinguished by
his skill at trickery and deceit as well as by his prodigious biological drives and
exaggerated bodily parts”.301 He or she is both comic and amoral, occasionally human,
but often animal. Above all the trickster parodies pretension. Cristiano Grottanelli
identifies essential traits of lowliness, rule breaking in tragic yet comical ways, and
sacredness.302 Pelton cautions against two prominent approaches to tricksters: splitting
the trickster’s contradictions up into different beings, and accepting the ambiguities but
explaining them away.303 Similarly, Ellen Basso argues against the common approach
of distinguishing tricksters from ordinary people, instead proposing that they are
‘flawed cultural heroes’ with whom people identify, at least in part.304 She comments
that the
very attributes that make such tricksters inventive heroes and clownish
fools in the first place are, after all, natural necessities of human
intelligence, operating in practical concrete, face-to-face relations that
people negotiate all the time, sometimes with considerable immediacy.305
She records numerous Kalapalo oral narratives, concluding that these “stories about
deceit are especially concerned with people’s action qualified by feelings: about how
298 Gilsenan, “Lying, Honor and Contradiction,” 215.
299 Sharma, “Trust, Privacy, Deceit,” 121.
300 Robert Pelton, The Trickster in West Africa: A Study of Mythic Irony and Sacred Delight (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980), 2.
301 Lawrence Sullivan, “Tricksters,” ER 15.45–46, quote 45. See also Paul Radin, The Trickster: A Study
in American Indian Mythology (New York: Schocken Books, 1976).
302 Cf. Cristiano Grottanelli, “Tricksters, Scape-Goats, Champions, Saviors,” HR 23 (1983): 117–39,
especially 120. Note his definition of a trickster: “a breaker of rules who is funny because he is
lowly”.
303 Pelton, Trickster, 6.
304 Ellen Basso, In Favor of Deceit: A Study of Tricksters in an Amazonian Society (Tuscon: University
of Arizona Press, 1987), 3–8. Stanley Diamond contrasts the trickster with Job in “Introductory Essay:
Job and the Trickster,” in The Trickster: A Study in American Indian Mythology (ed. P. Radin; New
York: Schocken Books, 1976), xi-xxii. Diamond contrasts Job’s possession of clearly demarcated
conceptions of good and evil with the trickster’s embrace of the ambivalence and tragedy of real life.
305 Basso, In Favor of Deceit, 8.
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enacted emotions give meaning to particular contexts, relationships, and goals”.306 The
tales examine issues from various points of view, for example, the consequences of
being either too sceptical or overly trusting, and seek to stimulate and engage the
emotions. A key theme is how the trickster uses duplicity in the context of unequal
power relations to reverse socially expected outcomes. Thus Basso states that “Kalapalo
deceit has less to do with truth or falsehood than with enactment of an illusionary
relationship”.307 It is this reversal of the social order that Grottanelli highlights as the
social ‘meaning’ of tricksters, since they demonstrate “the power of breaking
boundaries, of getting away with it, and of achieving salvation through sin”.308
The trickster motif views lying very differently from the Augustinian tradition
that has informed much European thinking. It points to the truth of Barnes’ comment
that “[s]ocieties vary not only in their recognition of the ubiquity of lying and other
modes of deceit but also in the way in which they evaluate different kinds of lies”.309
The account of Michal’s lie hails from a very different social setting to that of
contemporary Western readers; how might it be understood?
5.4.3 Understanding Michal’s Lie
So far I have not attempted to define lying. This apparent lacuna has enabled me
to refrain from excluding material pertinent to this study on the basis of a potentially
erroneous classification.310 Nevertheless, an adequate definition will aid interpretation
of Michal’s actions and words. Augustine’s definition of lying views it as the stating of
one thing while thinking another, with the intent to deceive.311 Many commentators
follow him in distinguishing between deception and the narrower practice of lying.
Sissela Bok describes deception as communicating messages that are intended to lead
others to believe what we ourselves do not hold.312 A lie is a subset of deception, “an
intentionally deceptive message in the form of a statement”. 313 According to this
306 Basso, In Favor of Deceit, 351.
307 Basso, In Favor of Deceit, 3.
308 Grottanelli, “Tricksters,” 139.
309 Barnes, Pack of lies, 66.
310 I find support for my approach in Sissela Bok’s study: “I take it for granted that people ought to be
free to use any definition of lying as they want, so long as they make clear which one they have in
mind and so long as they do not use it to blind themselves to the moral dimensions of what they say
and do”, Bok, Lying, xxv.
311 C. mend. 23.
312 Bok, Lying, 13.
313 Bok, Lying, 15. Emphasis original.
161
definition there are two important components to a lie: the intention to deceive, and the
verbal statement. Regarding the first element there is little discussion.314 About the
necessity of ‘stating’ the lie, however, there is considerable debate.315 In their typology
of deceit Roderick Chisholm and Thomas Feehan maintain that ‘stating’ or ‘saying’
should not be interpreted narrowly to mean only something that is verbally asserted, but
that it should also include a nod or other conventional sign.
What distinguishes lying as such from the other types of intended
deception is the fact that, in telling the lie, the liar ‘gives an indication
that he is expressing his own opinion.’ And he does this in a special
way—by getting his victim to place his faith in him. The sense of to
‘say’, therefore, in which the liar may be said to ‘intend to say what is
false’ is that of ‘to assert’.316
An assertion is confirming the truth of what is communicated in spite of actually
communicating what one believes to be false.317 Thus lies are frequently considered
worse than other forms of deception because “is assumed that, if a person L asserts a
proposition p to another person D, then D has the right to expect that L himself believes
p”.318
This moves the question on, for now the issue is not simply whether someone
intends to deceive and does so by saying something, but whether in any specific case
they do, or do not, assert the truth of what they communicate. Thomas Carson supposes
that the use of language involves an implicit promise to tell the truth, affirming that
“making a statement (ordinarily) involves warranting that what one says is true”.319
However, Maria Bettetini correctly observes that this “confunde el compromiso
implícito a utilizar las palabras y las frases según la gramática y el léxico compartido,
314 Note that it is not the veracity of the statement that is at stake, i.e. it is possible to lie yet state a fact, or
not lie yet communicate a falsehood: the key issue is intention.
315 For contrasting views see, e.g., J. L. A. Garcia, “Lies and the Vices of Deception,” FP 15 (1998):
514–37; Williams, “Reply to Garcia,” 242–48. Compare: “Lying is asserting what one does not think
true. Asserting is a speech act, so only speech acts can be lies”, Garcia, “Lies,” 515; with “a
commitment not to lie is compatible with all sorts of low cunning, dissimulation, hypocrisy,
conniving, suppression of truth, and the like. To describe as honest someone who is habitually
motivated to act in any of those ways seems clearly mistaken”, Williams, “Reply to Garcia,” 246. I
concur with Barnes that it “is a strange view of morality that justifies deception but cringes at lying”,
“Rahab’s Lie,” 9. Bernard Williams speaks of ‘fetishising [verbal] assertion’, Truth and Truthfulness:
An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 107–110.
316 Roderick Chisholm and Thomas Feehan, “The Intent to Deceive,” JP 74 (1977): 143–59, quote 149.
Emphasis original.
317 In their typology of deception Chishom and Feehan classify lying as “always involv[ing] the intent of
what we have called ‘positive deception simpliciter’ [i.e. to add to another’s beliefs something false]”,
“Intent to Deceive,” 153. Emphasis original.
318 Chisholm and Feehan, “Intent to Deceive,” 153. Emphasis original.
319 Thomas Carson, “The Definition of Lying,” Noûs 40 (2006): 284–306, quote 292.
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con la convención de decir la verdad y no engañar”.320 Although the ethnographic data
above leads one to be sceptical of Carson’s claims that the default situation of most
intercourse is that statements will be true, his emphasis upon the importance of the liar
‘warranting’ the lie is helpful.321 Carson commends a definition of lying as involving a
warrant because it explains why there is often dispute about whether a statement is a
lie.322 Furthermore,
it makes sense of the common view that lying involves a breach of trust.
To lie…is to invite others to trust and rely on what one says by
warranting its truth, but, at the same time, to betray that trust by making
false statements that one does not believe.323
In courtrooms witnesses are required explicitly to state that they warrant the truth of
what they affirm. In everyday interaction the warranting of an affirmation is usually
implicit, which means it can be ambiguous and open to manipulation. We have seen that
in societies in which people assume others’ statements will quite often not be true,
especially when dealing with unknown or casual acquaintances, there is tremendous
ambiguity, requiring special speech markers explicitly to warrant veracity, although
even then truthfulness does not necessarily follow. Furthermore, interlocutors are not
obliged to recognise a warrant, indeed they may manipulate expectations for their own
idiosyncratic ends. Nevertheless, it does seem to be reasonable to suppose that the
“wrongness or culpability of a lie is determined, in part, by the strength with which it is
warranted to be true”.324
There are two instances of lying in 1 Samuel 19.10–17. In the first case Michal
precedes her lie by disguising a teraphim. Regardless of the significance of this item325
it is essential to the efficacy of her lie. The anthropological material pointed to the
ubiquity of lying as a defensive measure in societies where the family is central. Given
320 Maria Bettetini, Breve historia de la mentira: De Ulises a Pinocho (CT; trans P. Linares; Madrid:
Ediciones Cátedra, 2002), 52.
321 Cf. Carson, “Definition of Lying,” 295–98. In a footnote Carson recognises that the presumption of
implicit warranty is not universal, quoting Barnes, Pack of Lies, 70, who in turn cites Gilsenan,
“Lying, Honor, and Contradiction”. I do not accept Carson’s assertion that the “villagers Barnes
describes have different understandings about when statements are warranted to be true than people in
most other societies”, “Definition of Lying,” 305.
322 Carson’s definition is: “A person S tells a lie to another person S1 iff: 1. S makes a false statement x
to S1, 2. S believes that x is false or probably false (or, alternatively, S doesn’t believe that x is true),
3. S states x in a context in which S thereby warrants the truth of x to S1, and 4. S does not take
herself to be not warranting the truth of what she says to S1”, “Definition of Lying,” 298.
323 Carson, “Definition of Lying,” 302.
324 Carson, “Definition of Lying,” 302
325 See note 6, above.
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the importance of kin in the Old Testament, attention to how mendacity functions in
ethnographic accounts can suggest a new interpretation of Michal’s words and actions.
It was observed that because people are sceptical of the claims of others, they tend not
to have confidence in their affirmations unless accompanied by a marker of intention.
The data surveyed indicated that oaths were one way in which an individual’s true
purposes can be revealed. In our text, though, Michal does not warrant her assertion that
David is ill in this way. Instead, the narrative takes great pains to describe her
preparation of a dummy comprising teraphim and pillow of goat’s hair.326 I will argue
below that there is a theological motive for prolonging the focus upon the teraphim, but
the ruse itself also serves as a warrant for Michal’s words. The messengers may have
thought that Saul’s daughter would ‘naturally’ have sided with her father against David,
yet readers may suspect that the very fact they have been sent on this mission could
have sown seeds of doubt in their minds so that they distrusted Michal’s assertion. Yet a
dummy purporting to be David or one associated with a healing ritual—it is not
necessary to choose between these options—pointed to the truth of her claim that David
was sick: she warranted her assertion. On the definition above, Michal lied.
To readers, Michal’s other statement in 1 Samuel 19.11–17 is obviously a lie;
but Saul cannot be so certain. Although her claim that David threatened to kill her is not
explicitly warranted one may suppose that the context of Michal and Saul’s relationship
as father and daughter constitutes a type of implicit warrant. Indeed, I argued above that
the very nature of Michal’s affirmation plays upon this supposition. One could ask why
Saul, who obviously considers himself deceived in the matter of the teraphim, should
think that her words are any more reliable. Jonathan Adler comments that when people
betray another by lying, “although full trust may have been sacrificed sufficient trust
may remain”. 327 The ambiguity of the situation and the understanding of ‘natural’
326 The translation of םִּיִזעָה רִיבְּכ is contested. LXX reads בכד , ‘liver’, for ריבכ, and Josephus
subsequently portrays Michal as putting a throbbing goat’s liver into the bed to give the impression
that David was gasping in his illness, Ant. 6.217. Since םִּיִזעָה signifies goats’ hair (Ex 25.4) and the
cognates הָרָבְכ, ‘sieve’ (Amos 9.9), and רַּבְכִמ, ‘network’, (Ex 27.4; 38.4; 2 Kgs 8.15), it is probable
that םִּיִזעָה רִיבְּכ is something woven from goat’s hair. Thus, “un tresse en poils de chèvre”, de Vaux
Samuel, 103, cf. Rouillard and Tropper, “TRPYM,” 343–46. Smith however, contends that וַיתֹׁשֲאַרְמ
means ‘at his head’ (cf. 1 Sam 26.7; 1 Kgs 19.6), which “would not naturally be used of a net put over
the head”, Samuel, 180, thus a pillow or blanket, pace McCarter, 1 Samuel, 326, who suggests the
article indicates ‘a certain tangle’, cf. GKC 125r. Caird strikes the right note: “The phrase pillow of
goat’s hair is a conjectural translation of unintelligible Hebrew. We have accordingly to accept with
resignation the fact that we do not know the nature of either of the objects which Michal used for her
deception”, Samuel, 987. Emphasis original.
327 Adler, “Lying,” 441.
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loyalties mean Saul’s apparent acceptance of Michal’s second lie is understandable. In
any case, drawing upon the anthropological data, one could surmise that both he and she
may be viewed as not desiring to validate the truth of the matter for the sake of their
continuing relationship.
On the definition above it is clear that Michal does indeed lie, twice. However, it
is one matter to analyse whether Michal dissembles, another to think that there are cases
in which lies are acceptable or, specifically, that Michal’s deception might be justified.
On the rigorist view, they are not, since even the prospect of David’s death would not
justify her dissembling as she stated David’s infirmity. Given that the author does not
indicate any sort of mental reservation, it is appropriate to think that her lie is justified
only if Michal did not have the obligation to reveal the truth to either the messengers or
Saul. The accounts of deception in the Old Testament would tend to indicate that lying
occurs to those outside the ‘in-group’. The commentators noted above assume that the
group is both static and known, viz. either Israel or the family. Although many
ethnographies also point to lying in service of the family or village, they also highlight
that groups are not fixed but fluid, and that individuals use situational ambiguity to
define and redefine their relationships with others.328 For this reason truthfulness is not
expected unless explicitly warranted, and even then lying is only condemned if a
person’s intentions are unambiguous. Although I have argued that Michal’s lie to the
messengers was warranted by the teraphim dummy, the polysemous nature of symbols
means that the warrant could be misinterpreted. By resending the messengers, Saul
indicates that he suspects as much, and when the matter is laid bare these suspicions are
confirmed. The anthropological perspectives adduced above suggest that the issue for
them would not have been the lie as such, but her choice of David. This is confirmed in
the text, where both Saul and Michal assume that the fundamental question is one of
loyalty not mendacity, for it is not the lie but the change in loyalty that is challenged.
Both father and daughter understand that Michal’s loyalty is revealed by her lie. But
then, as I explained above, Michal lies again. This time she uses cultural categories to
redefine her loyalty as being to Saul. Only readers, however, know this is what she
does: whilst Saul can accept her words as a reaffirmation of his daughter’s loyalty to the
family, readers can perceive her true allegiance.
328 Cf. Herzfeld, Poetics of Manhood, 76.
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A final consideration is whether Michal’s lying and disloyalty to Saul signifies
that she is a trickster figure. Ann Engar claims that many Old Testament women
demonstrate their faith in God by engaging in trickery. “Though deceit has connotations
of wrong doing, the trickery of each woman is seemingly blessed by God and brings
about his will”.329 Michal certainly fulfils the criteria for a trickster adduced by Naomi
Steinberg: she is socially disruptive and operates from a position of comparative
weakness.330 However, Michal is not a comic figure, a defining feature of virtually all
tricksters. This is important, for not every liar is a trickster.331 Furthermore, although
Michal does appear to resist expectations of loyalty to her father, she is not a model of
resistance to David; indeed, if she were, the author’s theological point would be
undermined.332 Given the absence of a number of defining attributes of tricksters it
seems best to view Michal simply as a woman who lied to her father. By doing so
Michal crosses from the category of loyal family member to outsider or, at least, to
some sort of ambiguous, indeterminate state ‘between’ categories, a place where she
remains for the remainder of her textual life.
To conclude, Michal’s ‘voice’ tells lies. But by lying she reveals that she has
chosen loyalty to David over Saul. Although modern interpreters are scandalised more
by her mendacity than her choice of allegiance, I have suggested that ancient implied
readers would have viewed the matter the other way around. Her lie was merely an
incidental consequence of her prior choice to be loyal to David. Michal’s voice, then,
speaks of the priority of loyalty to God’s annointed. Saul’s question, the only time he
utters anything in this pericope, speaks of the priority of family loyalty. The key
theological question concerns which of the text’s voices is affirmed by the author.
329 Ann Engar, “Old Testament Women as Tricksters,” in Mapping of the Biblical Terrain: The Bible as
Text (BR 33; ed. V. L. Tollers and J. Maier; Lewisberg: Bucknell University Press, 1990), 143–157,
quote 143. The purpose of women’s trickery is defence of Israel or family.
330 Naomi Steinberg, “Israelite Tricksters, Their Analogues and Cross-cultural Study,” Semeia 42 (1988):
1–13; cf. Susan Niditch, “Samson As Culture Hero, Trickster, and Bandit: The Empowerment of the
Weak,” CBQ 52 (1990): 608–24; idem, Tricksters and Underdogs: A Prelude to Biblical Folklore
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987); Melissa Jackson, “Lot’s Daughters and Tamar as Tricksters,”
JSOT 26 (2002): 29–46. Steinberg also notes, however, that biblical tricksters are human, not demigod
or animal; and that whilst non-biblical trickster tales deal with macrocosmic issues of human
boundaries the Bible’s stories touch upon the microcosm of daily life, cf. “Israelite Tricksters,” 9.
331 Cf. Edwin Good, “Deception and Women: A Response,” Semeia 42 (1988): 117–32, especially 120–
21.
332 For the view that David himself is a trickster see Raymond-Jean Frontain, “The Trickster Tricked:
Strategies of Deception and Survival in the David Narrative,” in Mapping of the Biblical Terrain: The
Bible as Text (BR 33; ed. V. L. Tollers and J. Maier; Lewisberg: Bucknell University Press, 1990),
170–192.
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5.5 MICHAL’S VOICE APPROVED
I have suggested that Saul’s voice would have resonated with cultural mores and
that despite his murderous intentions readers would have expected Michal to remain
loyal to her father. Right from the very beginning of the pericope, however, readers are
led to mistrust Saul’s voice. The narrative uses a variety of devices to undermine his
perspective and promote an alternative ethic.
5.5.1 A House, in the Night
One of Mikhail Bakhtin’s central concepts for literary interpretation is the
chronotope, 333 an intersection of time and place that cannot be reduced to either.
According to Bakhtin
[i]n the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are
fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were,
thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise space
becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and
history.334
The significance of this for narrative is that events are organised by the chronotope, “it
is the place where the knots of narrative are tied and untied”,335 an image that readers
utilise in their interpretation.
The initial action in our passage occurs at night. In biblical narratives the night is
an occasion of danger and uncertainty, a time to attack, 336 when protection is
required,337 when death may visit338 and when a negative assessment of even righteous
acts is expected.339 In short, the night is the archetypal time for wickedness.340 But these
allusions by no means exhaust the significance of Saul’s sending messengers to the
house at night. This particular space—time combination or chronotope is pregnant with
negative associations that count against Saul’s voice. Apart from Joshua’s spies’
333 Cf. “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel,” in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays
(ed. M. Holquist; trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist; Austin: Texas University Press, 1981), 84–258.
334 Bakhtin, “Chronotope,” 84.
335 Bakhtin, “Chronotope,” 250.
336 E.g. Josh 8.3; Judg 7.9; 9.32–34; 16.2; 1 Sam 14.36; 2 Kgs 6.14; 8.21.
337 E.g. Ex 13.22; 1 Sam 25.16.
338 E.g. Ex 11.4; 12.29–30; 2 Kgs 19.35.
339 E.g. Gen 19.34; Judges 6.27; 1 Sam 15.11, 16; 28.8.
340 Cf. Ps 17.3: ‘If you try my heart, if you visit me by night, if you test me, you will find no wickedness
in me; my mouth does not transgress’. The night can also be the time for provision, cf. Num 11.9 and
visions from God, cf. Gen 20.3; 26.24; 40.5; 46.2.
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sojourn at Rahab’s house, mentioned below, the two other Old Testament instances of
people laying siege to a house at night compromise Saul’s voice by alluding to the most
depraved iniquity.341 Lot’s invitation to the angels in Sodom and Gomorrah presents the
house as a place of refuge and succour in contrast with the dangers of spending the
night in the village square.342 But even before the family and guests had retired to sleep
Lot’s house was surrounded by agitating townsmen, and only divine intervention saved
Lot and his visitors from being abused. The parallels with 1 Samuel 19 are patent, as
Figure 4 reveals.
FIGURE 4 – Parallels between Genesis 19 and 1 Samuel 19
Genesis 19 1 Samuel 19
A man in his house: Lot David
Accompanied by: Lot’s family and angels Michal
House besieged by: Townsmen of Sodom Saul’s Messengers
Deliverance by: Angels Michal
In both cases the threat to the house and its occupants is removed by someone else in
the man’s house, the angels in Genesis 19 and Michal in our passage. The comparison
between the men of Sodom and Saul’s messengers, who fulfil exactly the same role in
each case, clearly portray Saul in a negative light, and partly assuage doubts concerning
Michal’s behaviour.
The second instance of the chronotope occurs in Judges 19. A man of Gibeah
invites a Levite stranger to spend the night in his house rather than in the square.343
Again, the house was surrounded by ‘wicked men’ demanding that the man be handed
over to them for sexual gratification, and once again the owner of the house confronted
them, offering his virgin daughter in lieu.344 This time there are no structural parallels to
the angels in Genesis 19 to strike the assailants blind; and the Levite expelled his
concubine to endure their abuse. Although the text does not say that the men of Gibeah
341 In a less threatening situation Abraham’s servant, on his mission to find a wife for Isaac, asks
Rebekah if there is room at her house to stay, cf. Gen 24.23.
342 Gen 19.1–8. Two recent interpretations that compare day and night in this passage are Robert
Letellier, Day in Mamre, Night in Sodom: Abraham and Lot in Genesis 18 and 19 (Leiden: Brill,
1995) and Brian Doyle, “ ‘Knock, Knock, Knockin’ on Sodom’s Door’: the Function of תלד/חתפ in
Genesis 18–19,” JSOT 28 (2004): 431–48.
343 Judg 19.20.
344 This horrifying thought is probably meant to signify that the host was beyond reproach with respect to
fulfilling his duties of hospitality, since there is no reason to assume this offer would not have been
equally as shocking to ancient readers as modern ones. For a detailed exegesis of this passage see
Trible, Texts of Terror, 65–91.
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wanted to kill the host or Levite stranger,345 Judges 19 displays the same chronotope of
the house at night. Their perversities are not attributed to Saul, but the fact that his
hometown was Gibeah directly links his actions in 1 Samuel 19 and the men of Gibeah
in the Judges account.346
To conclude, by setting David’s escape from Saul in a house, in the night, the
author undermines Saul’s voice, however much it may have chimed with contemporary
morals.
5.5.2 Sending and Being Sent
Another way in which the writer of Samuel subverts Saul’s voice is by
highlighting the decreasing efficacy of Saul’s commands as the narrative progresses.
This is particularly true of his sending. Whilst Saul is the subject of חׁלש in verses 11,
14 and 15, his messengers’ mandate “shrinks into an anticlimax”.347 At first Saul sends
messengers to kill David. Even before Michal’s ruse has been discovered, however, the
narrative hints at a diminution of Saul’s kingly power: חְַׁלִּשַיו...ִדו ָּד־ֶתא תַַחקָל , he
sends messengers to fetch David.348 Nor is this the end of the process. The messengers,
thinking Michal remained loyal to Saul as discussed above, accepted her lie as an
adequate excuse. Saul, not so easily deflected—and possibility alerted by his prior
apprehensions concerning Michal and Jonathan’s advocacy of David—sends again.
This time, however, חְַׁלִּשַיו...ִלתֹואְרִדו ָּד־תֶא  , he merely sends messengers to see
David. Ironically, David is absent during most of Saul’s decreasingly efficacious
sending—to kill, then to fetch, and finally to see. Only the reader, with Michal and the
narrator, knows this; Saul remains in not so blissful ignorance,349 a sardonic comment
upon the pretensions to kingly control symbolised by his sending messengers. 350
Furthermore, some commentators suggest that ‘brought up’ indicates Saul’s house was
345 Although cf. Judg 20.5 where the Levite embellishes the narrative report in Judg 19 by suggesting that
he was threatened with death.
346 Cf. Wenham, Story, 70–71. Note also that the concubine was from Bethlehem, David’s hometown.
347 Fokkelman, Crossing, 265.
348 The differences in vocabulary are one reason for rejecting David Tsumura’s proposal that there was
only one sending, i.e. verse 11 = verse 14, The First Book of Samuel (NICOT; Grand Rapids /
Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2007), 494.
349 Fokkelman, Crossing, 258.
350 That it is typical of kings to oblige others to do their bidding is further evidenced by David’s sending,
חׁלש, of messengers to inquire about and then fetch Bathsheba, cf. 2 Sam 11.1–3.
169
on the height of Gibeah.351 This supposition can be juxtaposed with an observation by
Gilsenan to intensify Saul’s bathos. Gilsenan refers to a powerful lord whose
domain lies beneath his gaze and he is the focus of men’s regard; he is
the centre of a landscape formed and given meaning by the controlling
force of his possession. This visual/spatial perspective is crucial both to
the fantasy and the actualities of power, to the fantasy as part of the
actualities of power.352
The lord both sees and is seen to see, a construction of reality represented by the
location and design of his palace: an imposing edifice high upon the hill overlooking his
domains, and with large windows in which he can sit in order to be observed by others
as he fulfils the obligations of his position, including that of appearing to take his ease.
If Saul’s palace is indeed on the hill it, too, could reflect a construal of his kingship as
‘feudal’ control, not only by Saul himself but his subjects. They would observe the
sending of messengers and interpret this action as an indication of his authority. By
doing so, of course, they inscribe Saul’s authority in themselves.
By verse 16 David, however, has vanished from sight. Saul is wholly thwarted
and left to ponder his political impotence. His only recourse is to challenge his
daughter, although even then his vocabulary implicitly recognises that he has failed:
whereas the NRSV glosses ‘let my enemy go’ he accuses Michal both of deceiving him
יִחְּלִַּׁשַתו, and of sending David. The author has Michal rub more salt into his wounds
with her reply: ‘He said’, with the emphatic pronoun, ּאוה, ְּלַׁשִינִח , ‘send me’.353 There
is no direct speech by David in the pericope, yet even his ‘reported’ discourse, in his
absence, is utterly effective. Whilst Saul struggles yet fails to effect his commands
employing significant military resources, David’s single word and the assistance of a
woman354 achieve his objective.
The following verses hint at divine working behind David’s escape, since when
Saul once again sends messengers to capture David in Naioth in Ramah they fall into a
prophetic frenzy. After sending messengers three times with the same result he himself
travels to Naioth. Yet Saul is not only unable to control the messengers but is also
351 Eerdmann, Samuel, 252; Kirkpatrick, Samuel, 172.
352 Gilsenan, Lords, 34; cf. also 3–22, which imagines how a great lord seated in his palace fits into a
wider narrative concerning the exercise of power.
353 Piel imperative with suffix. NRSV translates ‘let me go’, which disguises the irony.
354 NB this is simply a comment upon the mores of ancient manly honour.
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subject to a similar experience.355 This is a far cry from Saul’s initial experience of
sending. In 1 Samuel 11.7 and 13.2, for example, his command was devastatingly
effective. The turning point seems to come in 1 Samuel 15.20, where Saul’s view is that
he has walked in the ways God has sent him.356 Samuel, however, hears not obedience
but the bleating of sheep and rejects Saul as king.357 From this point Saul’s sending is
ineffective, except when it is to promote David.358 The contrast between the two men
could not be sharper, and points to the writer’s subversion of Saul’s voice.
An intra-textual allusion to חׁלש in Joshua 2.1–22 supports this interpretation.
The parallels between the passages are remarkable and I think it probable that the author
of 1 Samuel 19.10–17 had access either to the Rahab text or the underlying traditions,
which he used to inform the Michal narrative. Although the events described in each
passage are distinctive the structural and verbal connections are obvious. First, both
start with a woman in a house, who is accompanied by men whom she will eventually
lead to safety. Second, the threat to Joshua’s spies commences when the king of Jericho
sends (the same verbal root, חׁלש, as when Saul sends) for Rahab.359 Third, the time of
the subsequent action is night; and, fourth, the initiative comes from the women. Fifth,
both Rahab and Michal lie to their king’s messengers.360 Sixth, as Michal takes, חקת,
the teraphim in order to simulate David’s sleeping body,361 Rahab takes, חקת, the men
in order to hide them.362 Seventh, the means of escape is through the window. The
author of Joshua concludes the account of the spies’ escape with the phrase ַוְּלְַּׁשתֵח ם
ַוֵּ יּ וֵכל , ‘she sent them away and they departed’. Thus, eighth, just as the king of Jericho
355 1 Sam 19.18–24.
356 Note the use of the verb חׁלש: ַּב ךֵלֵָאוְָהוְהי ִיַנחָלְׁש־ֶׁרשֲא ךֶר ֶּדְ
357 1 Sam 15.26. Note the irony: ָהוְהי לֹוק (what Saul hears, 1 Sam 15.20) with ןאֹּ ַצה־לֹוק... לֹוְקו
רָקָּבַה (what Samuel hears in v. 14).
358 1 Sam 16.19–20, 22; 18.5. In contrast, David’s sending is successful, cf. 1 Sam 25.14; 26.4; 2 Sam
2.5; 3.14; 9.5; 10.2, 7; 11.1, 3–4, 6, 14, 27; 13.7; 18.12; 19.11. In the Bathsheba episode, which uses
חׁלש extensively, the problem is not with his ability to command, rather the view that he himself is
above moral norms. Although I suggested above that some ethnographies point to an expectation that
‘great lords’ will ‘abuse’ their position, as a sign of their power, the Old Testament’s view of such
excesses is uniformly negative, cf. Deut 17.14–20; 1 Sam 8.6–18; 2 Sam 12. The latter perspective is
clear also in 1 Sam 22.11, Saul’s only ‘successful’ post-rejection sending—for the priests of Nob in
order to have them massacred.
359
ָבחָר־לֶא ֹוחיְִרי ךֶלֶמ חַלְִּׁשַיו
ְ Josh 2.3.
360 The imperative at the end of her speech (Josh 2.5), ּ ופְדִר (3rd person masculine plural), indicates that
she speaks to the king’s messengers rather than him personally—like Saul he does not deign to visit
himself.
361
םִיפָרְּתַה־תֶא לַכִימ לַקִַּתו 1 Sam 19.13.
362
םִׁיָשֲנאָה ֵיְׁנש־ֶתא חָ ּׁשִאָה הַּקִַּתו Josh 2.4.
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sent in vain but Rahab sent successfully, so with king Saul and Michal; and, finally, the
verb להך is employed by the writer of Samuel to conclude the ‘David’s escape’ portion
of the narrative in verse 12.363
What do these intra-textual allusions mean for the interpretation of 1 Samuel 19?
Obviously, the meaning of the Rahab text is quite different, yet the close parallels point
to the real possibility that readers were meant to connect the two narratives. The King of
Jericho represents the land to be conquered and Joshua’s spies the precursors of the
rightful heirs to the territory, which will be given by God.364 The king is duped by
Rahab, despite his best attempts at ‘sending’, and she lowers the escapees through a
window so that they are able to get away. In the Samuel narrative Michal replaces
Rahab as the cunning woman who deceives a king. It is probably significant that the
allusion is to the king of Jericho for it portrays Saul as the king to be defeated by
miraculous means. And David, like the spies, the inheritor of the king’s kingdom.
To conclude, Saul’s voice is further undermined by his inability efficaciously to
send, something highlighted in 1 Samuel 19. It is a reminder of a theological point made
repeatedly in Samuel that exercise of power depends not on human will alone but divine
providence.
5.5.3 Teraphim
The most commentated topic in our passage is the identity of the teraphim.
Despite the stalwart efforts of exegetes, however, the meaning of both םיִפָרְַּתה and
םִּיזִָעה ריְִּבכ remain opaque.365 In short, there is little to profit in discussing the precise
identity of the objects Michal employed for her ruse. Nevertheless, I suggest that the
author highlights her use of teraphim to subvert Saul’s voice.
The teraphim appear to link Michal with Rachel, both daughters loyal to their
husbands over their fathers.366 Bodner elaborates that Genesis 31 and 1 Samuel 19
363 The whole phrase reads: ֵטלִָּּמַיו חַרְּבַיו ךֶּלַיוְ . The additional words function as a bridge between the
statement in verse 10, ִּ ַיוטֵלָּמ , and the conclusion in verse 18 that employs the identical phrase,
טֵלִָּּמַיו חַרְּבַיו.
364 See the dialogue between Rahab and the spies in verses 9–14. For discussion of the differences
between the two passages see André Caquot and Philippe du Robert, Les Livres de Samuel (CAT VI;
Genève: Labor et Fides, 1994), 233.
365 See notes 6 and 334, above.
366 So, e.g., Alter, Art, 120; Klein, 1 Samuel, 197.
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“feature angry father-in-laws (Saul and Laban), younger daughters (Michal and
Rachel), fugitive husbands (David and Jacob) and deceptive idols”.367 Although these
texts may constitute a common type-scene368 this does not seem to me to be the key to
understanding the writer’s emphasis upon Michal’s use of teraphim.369 The only other
reference to this object in the books of Samuel is in 1 Samuel 15.23, a chapter central to
the author’s whole thesis. The narrative commences when Saul is charged to attack and
utterly destroy, םרח, Amalek. 370 The text highlights the partial fulfilment of his
commission: ‘Saul and the people spared Agag, and the best of the sheep and of the
cattle and of the fatlings, and the lambs, and all that was valuable, and would not utterly
destroy, םרח, them; all that was despised and worthless they utterly destroyed, םרח’.371
In the next verse YHWH himself declares to Samuel that Saul’s disobedience means he
regrets making him king; and Samuel journeys to confront Saul. Τhe latter protests that
he has been obedient, and that the spoil was brought back ‘to sacrifice, חבז, to the
LORD your God in Gilgal’.372 Niditch notes, however, that from “zĕbāhîm, sacrifices of
the sort Saul mentions[,] one makes a feast and enjoys eating meat from the sanctified
flesh. That devoted to destruction is not to be shared with God in any sense.”373 Thus
Saul’s response provokes Samuel to pronounce:374
Has the LORD as great delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices (חבז),
as in obeying the voice of the LORD?
Surely, to obey is better than sacrifice (חבז)
and to heed than the fat of rams.
Then comes an explicit reference to teraphim: םיִפְָרּתו ֶןוְָאו יִֶרמ ֶםֶסק־תאַּטַה יִּכ
367 Keith Bodner, National Insecurity: A Primer on the First Book of Samuel (Toronto: Clements, 2003),
140. Emphasis original.
368 Alter’s concept, cf. Art, 47–62.
369 Although the similarity of structure is suggestive, since “[d]ans ces parallèles, Saül tient le role de
Laban, le personage négatif de Gn 29-31”, Grillet and Lestienne, 1 Règnes, 314. There is certainly
intertextuality, although I doubt whether one text is a commentary on the other, as claimed by Craig
Y. S. Ho, “The Stories of the Family Troubles of Judah and David: A Study of the their Literary
Links,” VT 44 (1999): 514–31.
370 On םרח in general see, e.g., J. P. U. Lilley, “Understanding the Herem,” TynBul 44 (1993): 169–77;
Jackie A. Naudé, “םרח,” NIDOTTE 2.276–77; Niditch, War, 28–77.
371 1 Sam 15.10.
372 1 Sam 15.21, cf. 15.15. On the ban as sacrifice see Niditch, who notes that 1 Samuel 15 “evidences
two sorts of tension: the tension between the ideology of statecraft and the ban—or perhaps between
more or less rigorous interpretations of the ban—and the tension between the ban as sacrifice and the
ban as rooting out of that which is unclean and sinful”, War, 28–55, quote 61.
373 Niditch, War, 62; cf. Richard Averbeck, “חבז,” NIDOTTE 1.1066–73.
374 The change from narration to succinct verse highlights the climatic nature of Samuel’s words, cf.
Fokkelman, Crossing, 98. For the same reason Klein suggests they may have been preserved
independently of the narrative, 1 Samuel, 152.
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רַצְַפה, ‘for rebellion [is] [the] sin of divination, presumption [is] vanity and
teraphim’.375 Here Saul’s disobedience is classified as rebellion, in turn described as the
sin of divination. It is juxtaposed with presumption,376 Saul’s pushiness to get things
done his way.377 The piling up of the negative characterisations of rebellion, idolatry,
and presumption, all associated with the concrete physical object teraphim, produces the
sensation of a wave whose crest tips over and crashes down as Samuel declares God’s
rejection of Saul in the next verse: ‘Because you have rejected the word of the LORD,
he has also rejected you from being king’.
Many commentators, obviously at a loss to explain the significance of the
teraphim, think that they cast a negative shadow over Michal. Bergen declaims that in
“the present compelling scene and without the intrusion of a didactic commentary, the
writer suggests that Michal was as much a spiritual rebel as her father” and that
“whereas Michal trusted in a teraphim to save David, David trusted in the Lord”.378 I
doubt that this is the issue. Bergen’s citation of Psalm 59 does not inform the first
element of his contention; and the more moderate positions of others, for example,
Klein’s suggestion that the teraphim were Michal’s, not David’s, are without textual
375 Smith comments that this “verse is obscure, and the versions do not give much help”, Samuel, 138. I
follow the MT; for discussion of the LXX see Grillet and Lestienne, 1 Règnes, 279–80. Regarding the
first clause: NRSV, on the basis of presumed parallelism with verse 22, compares the seriousness of
rebellion and divination. Others define rebellion as the sin of divination (e.g. Smith, McCarter), or
suggest rebellion ‘is like’ (Klein), ‘is as’ (Eerdmann) divination. On the order of subject and predicate
in nominal clauses see WO’C 130, and the literature cited there. Regarding the second clause: I take
the subject to be ַרצְפַה, cf. WO’C 591. Driver proposes that “the fundamental idea of ֶןָוא is
apparently what is valueless and disappointing”, Notes, 127. Emphasis original. It denotes, according
to context, either calamity, naughtiness or worthlessness, the latter in reference to idols, cf. Isa 66.3;
Zech 10.2, where םִיפָרְּתַהֶןָואּ־ורְּב ִּד  . I translate it ‘vanity’, cf. Klein. On the meaning of ַרצְפַה see
below.
376
רַצְפַה is the pausal form of an absolute hiphil infinitive with substantival force, cf. Driver, Notes, 127.
רצפ means to urge or press upon (Gen 19.3, 9; 33.11; Judg 19.7; 2 Kgs 2.17; 5.16); the hiphil, which
is unique, appears to mean ‘display pushing’ or, in the nominal infinitive, ‘forwardness’,
‘presumption’, cf. Klein, 1 Samuel, 145; McCarter, 1 Samuel, 263; pace Smith who translates it
‘obstinacy’ on the basis that a “too insistent [en]treaty of God was not Saul’s fault”, Samuel, 139. He
overlooks the fact that there is no need for God to be involved here: the charge is that Saul was too
insistent or presumptuous on his own account. Smith attempts to find an alternative reading that could
be parallel to יִרֶמ yet corrupted to ַרצְפַה. LXX reads ἐπάγουσιν, ‘they urge on’, leading him to
suggest וציפה, but McCarter doubts if this is original, being a change “which could have arisen from
the reading of MT in the third century B.C. when r and w were especially easily confused”, 1 Samuel,
263.
377 On the latter as a good charaterisation of Saul cf. 1 Sam 14.24–46; 15.13, 15, 20. I think it is
pushiness rather than a concern with ‘ritual action without obedience’, as claimed by Fokkelman,
Crossing, 100. Cf. Evans who notes that one of Samuel’s central themes is the contrast between
‘grasping’ after power and offering support from a position of weakness, Samuel, 9–10.
378 Robert Bergen, 1, 2 Samuel (NAC 7; Nashville: Broadman and Holman, 1996), 208.
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support.379 Instead I contend that the teraphim symbolise both Saul’s rejection of God
and God’s rejection of him as ruler. Observing that the teraphim of 1 Samuel 15.23
form the link between Samuel’s declaration that God prefers obedience to sacrifice,
precisely in contradistinction to Saul’s priorities, and the final rejection of Saul as king
has tremendously important ramifications for their significance in Michal’s ruse. In the
drama of chapter 19 the teraphim remind readers that although Saul appears to act as
king, the days of his reign are numbered. Their prominence in the narrative is clearly
intended to subvert the authority of Saul’s voice: however acceptable it may have
seemed to his contemporaries, it is a vain rebellion against God.
5.5.4 Michal’s characterisation
At this stage in the narrative Michal is a presented by the author as a reliable
character.380 Although her literary persona is flat rather than rounded two ‘character
traits’ can be identified. 381 First, Michal is Saul’s ‘youngest daughter’. 382 In Old
Testament narrative such apparently brief descriptors or epithets are significant. 383
Sternberg explains that in general “the epithet is a ticking bomb, sure to explode into
action in the narrator’s (and God’s) own good time”.384 He observes that “a woman
described as good-looking will sooner or later become an object of love or lust”.385 This
may well explain why Michal is not described in these terms, for her role in the
narrative is to exercise decisive agency, for good or ill, not simply to be an object of
desire.386 That Michal is described as the youngest, therefore, is theologically important
since it is a sign of favour.387 A second feature of Michal’s character is revealed by the
author’s description of her inner thoughts in the repeated statement that ‘Michal loved
David’.388 Regardless of whether this refers to a political or emotional disposition it is
379 Klein, 1 Samuel, 197.
380 So also Ellen White, “Michal the Misinterpreted,” JSOT 31 (2007): 451–64, especially 456.
381 For this distinction see Bar-Efrat, Narrative Art, 90. Bar-Efrat identifies the following methods of
characterisation in Biblical narrative: outward appearance, inner personality, and indirect
characterisation by speech. Alter suggests characterisation is revealed by a scale from actions or
appearance through direct speech to the narrator’s explicit statement, cf. Art, 117.
382 1 Sam 14.49.
383 According to Steinberg the Old Testament resorts to explicit characterisation only when in “pure
ideological narrative”, Sternberg, Poetics, 328.
384 Sternberg, Poetics, 339.
385 Sternberg, Poetics, 339.
386 Whilst, for example, Abigail is, cf. 1 Sam 25.3; Adel Berlin, “Characterization in Biblical Narrative:
David’s Wives,” JSOT 23 (1982): 69–85.
387 Cf. Benjamin, Gen 44–45; Jothan, Judg 9.5; and David himself, 1 Sam 16.11.
388 1 Sam 18.20, 28.
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clear that Michal is on David’s side. 389 By highlighting this allegiance the author
prepares readers to listen to Michal’s voice rather than Saul’s.
However, the interesting and theologically important facets of Michal’s
characterisation do not lie in her ‘character traits’ but in the way she is used. In other
words, “[c]haracter is something that the author tends toward speaking with rather than
speaking about”. 390 This Bakhtinian mode of thinking views characterisation as
occurring on the boundaries of interaction, and since characters’ voices engage in
dialogue their characterisation is not fixed but changeable. Michal is a good example of
changing characterisation, although the way in which it occurs safeguards the author’s
preference for Michal’s voice over Saul’s in 1 Samuel 19 and David’s over Michal’s in
2 Samuel 6. This is crucial, for when Michal acts in the latter passage she is not
portrayed positively but as a despiser of David’s antics before the ark of God. 391
Nevertheless, I do not think the final negative verdict upon Michal expressed in the
damning phrase ‘And Michal the daughter of Saul had no child to the day of her death’
should be viewed as encapsulating the whole of Michal’s characterization.392 The reason
is that Michal ends her textual days in barren disgrace for despising David.393 As Alter
notes, a “theologically minded reader, and certainly any advocate of the divine right of
the Davidic dynasty, is invited to read this statement as a declaration that Michal was
389 Robert Lawton argues that the Merob—Leah parallelism highlights David’s lack of love for Michal,
“David, Merob, and Michal,” CBQ 51 (1989): 423–25. See also Jobling’s comment:
“Ominously…there is no mention of any reciprocating love on David’s side...A reader who pursues
the story of Michal to its end will doubt that David ever had any love for her.” Samuel, 151. These
authors make much of David’s supposed emotional detachment, concluding that he views his
marriage to Michal as merely instrumental, which is viewed as a bad thing, cf. Alter, Art, 121. I do not
think it is especially significant that Michal’s love is not recorded as being requited, since my
discussion of marriage, above, points to the inappropriateness of conceiving of ancient Near Eastern
political marriages in primarily emotional terms; and if the love here is essentially political, then the
ideological nature of the history of David’s rise means it is obvious that only love for the Davidic
dynasty will be highlighted.
390 David McCracken, “Character in the Boundary: Bakhtin’s Interdividuality in Biblical Narratives,”
Semeia 63 (1993): 29–42, quote 36. McCracken identifies five features of the Bakhtinian interdividual
character: (1) character is relatively free from objective authorial determination; (2) character exists in
relation with others; (3) character is presently real to readers, thus forming a dialogic with them; (4)
characterisation aims to provoke a response, not merely describe; and (5) character exists in discourse,
it is not simply described by an omniscient narrator.
391 2 Sam 6.12–23. The notes about her marriage to David and enforced remarriage do not refer to
Michal’s agency, cf. 1 Sam 25.43–44; 2 Sam 3.12–16.
392 2 Sam 6.23. Pace Alter, Art, 123: “by suppressing any causal explanation in his initial statement of
Michal’s scorn [the author] beautifully suggests the “overdetermined” nature of her contemptuous ire,
how it bears the weight of everything that has not been said but obliquely intimated about the relations
between Michal and David”.
393 2 Sam 6.16.
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punished by God for her presumption in rebuking His anointed king”.394 The narrative
has stressed the holiness of the ark and the logistical steps taken by the king to placate
God following the death of Uzzah.395 This is the context for the presentation of David
and Michal according to their reactions to the entrance of YHWH’s ark into Jerusalem.
David dances, shouts, sacrifices, blesses and distributes food. Liturgically correct and
bountifully generous he contrasts with Saul, who could not seem to sacrifice properly,
and took rather than gave.396 But Michal ‘daughter of Saul’—it is highly significant that
her lineage is highlighted every single time her name is mentioned in this passage397—is
said to despise David in her heart. This is ominous not only because David was
worshipping YHWH, but also because readers may hear intra-textual resonances within
the books of Samuel. The word despise, הזב, is used by God to make the theologically
important point that ‘those who honour me I will honour, and those who despise me
shall be treated with contempt’.398 Furthermore, Michal is in the same category as the
‘worthless fellows’ who despised Israel’s first king, and the Philistine who despised
David.399 All of these despisers receive a riposte, by being rejected, shown to be wrong,
or killed. Michal is condemned to die without having produced life. However, whilst in
all these examples the pairing despiser—opponent is a proxy for the pairing despiser—
YHWH, this is not the case in 1 Samuel 19.400 There she is on God’s side, as 1 Samuel
18.28 makes explicit: ‘for the LORD was with David and Saul’s daughter Michal loved
him’.401 Following Bakhtin, we can see that it is the interaction of David and Michal
that determines her characterisation: Michal is portrayed positively when she supports
David, and negatively when she despises him. In 1 Samuel 19.11–17, therefore, her
voice is to be preferred over Saul’s.
It is suggestive to interpret Michal’s characterisation as a process of being
stripped of agency. In her analysis of Grimm’s Fairy Tales Ortner discerns a difference
between the portrayal of men and women, boys and girls. She argues that “female
characters had to be made passive, weak and timorous, that is a recognition that agency
394 Alter, Art, 123.
395 2 Sam 6.1–15.
396 Saul, as king, is the quientessential ‘taker’ as Samuel threatened he would be, 1 Sam 8.11–17; Samuel
himself did not take, 1 Sam 12.3.
397 2 Sam 6.16, 20–21, 23. In verse 21 David contrasts himself and ‘your father’.
398 1 Sam 2.30.
399 Cf. 1 Sam 10.27; 17.42.
400 Eli’s sons—YHWH; ‘worthless fellows’—Saul (who was chosen by God); Philistine—David (who
comes in the name of the living God).
401 My translation.
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in girls had to be unmade”.402 Thus girls who exercise agency are punished, either by
not maturing into adults or by passing through trials to undo learned agency.
If any sort of agency must be punished, even for “good” girls, the
punishment is even worse for “bad” female characters, witches, and
wicked stepmothers. These women are highly agentic—they have
projects, plans, plots. Needless to say, they all come to terrible ends.403
It is important to observe, however, that Michal’s lot derives not from her agency with
respect to letting David go, but because she despises him for his conduct at the parade.
Whereas she acts contrary to societal expectations in her loyalty to David and deception
of Saul, in 2 Samuel 6 she is concerned to uphold proper standards of decency,
protesting that David has acted shamefully in full view of the maids. It is precisely the
concern for such ‘norms’ that receives David’s heated reply that he will degrade himself
yet further because he was dancing ‘before the LORD’. The condemnation of her
defence of societal values where they conflict with honouring YHWH lends further
support to her counter-cultural action in letting David go. The final snuffing out of
Michal’s agency, which would seem to fit Ortner’s appraisal of other morality tales, is
given a theological rationale in David’s retort. He declares that he danced ‘before the
LORD, who chose me in place of your father and all his household, to appoint me as
prince of Israel, the people of the LORD’.404 David makes explicit that Michal pertains
to the rejected house of Saul. And the narrator makes sure that the legitimacy of David’s
claim to the kingship is unquestioned by observing that ‘Michal the daughter of Saul
had no child to the day of her death’.405 To conclude, both Michal’s characterisation in 1
Samuel and the contrast with the more negative presentation in her final appearance
show that her voice as she facilitates David’s escape is approved by the author.
5.6 CONCLUSION: LOYAL LYING
Many commentators do not remark upon 1 Samuel 19.10–18a in detail, perhaps
402 Ortner, Making Gender, 9. Emphasis original.
403 Ortner, Making Gender, 10. One difference between these fairy tales and the Old Testament,
therefore, would seem to be that in the latter not every woman comes to a sticky end, e.g. Deborah,
Judg 4–5; Ruth; Hannah, 1 Sam 1–2.10, Abigail, 1 Sam 25.
404 2 Sam 6.21.
405 2 Sam 6.23. In the absence of male heirs transmission of the patrimony to the grandsons was through
daughters, cf. the daughters of Zelophedad, Num 27.1–7; 36.1–11. Both biblical and ANE sources
point to the desirability of the daughter’s husband having some relationship to the patriarch. Ben-
Barak notes an adoption certificate from Nuzi obliging the adopted son to marry one Gilimninu,
Zafrira Ben-Barak, “Inheritance by Daughters in the Ancient Near East,” JSS 25 (1980): 22–33,
especially 23. Since the adopted son was to receive the adopted father’s estate the interest was clearly
in her descendants, thus the scheme of inheritance is: father—daughter—inheriting grandsons.
178
considering it an insignificant component of the overall narrative. Those that do tend to
concentrate on exculpating Michal’s lie. Very few notice a conflict of values involving a
decision concerning family loyalty. Juxtaposing the passage with anthropological data,
however, has offered a new way of interpreting this text that shows it to be surprisingly
‘heavy’ with meaning. To conclude my interpretation I return to the key aspects of the
practice of the ethics of kinship identified at the end of Chapter 3, viz. the existence of
multiple, contradicting and potentially mutually exclusive moral goods in the text, the
variety of perception of any particular situation or action, and the necessarily personal,
and thus open, nature of practice, which nevertheless can exhibit regularity.
The textual voices of Michal, David and Saul point to several moral goods, not
all of which can be achieved in the situation described by the author. The good of life is
prominent because of the threat to David. Yet the good of family loyalty, with all that
this implies in terms of continuance of the father’s house and lineage, which itself is a
guarantor of life and a source of protection, is also present. Truth telling, which for
modern commentators is the moral good most obviously betrayed, also competes with
the need to protect the family, and the benefits of dominating or eliminating enemies.
And amongst these moral goods, unknown to characters but revealed to readers, is God.
He has spoken his rejection of Saul and already arranged for the anointing of David.
As one may expect given my discussion of variety of perception, these goods
and the appropriate way of resolving their conflict are viewed differently by each
character. Furthermore, the perceptions themselves are sometimes opaque and
uncertain. David seems not to appreciate his situation until Michal informs him that
unless he saves himself he will be killed. Perhaps he cannot envisage Saul actually
prosecuting nihilistic violence. I have suggested that it was quite logical that the king,
meanwhile, would not have assumed that husband and wife were ‘one flesh’ with a
natural tendency to act together against the wife’s father should the situation demand,
but that Michal would turn David over at first light. Readers perceive that Saul acts in
line with societal expectations in terms of the practice of violence, his marriage
strategies and in his assumption that Michal should tell him the truth. When Saul acts
within the narrative his agency conforms to the cultural schema regarding the moral
goods in conflict. Michal, however, acts in extraordinary ways, bucking the
expectations of ‘structure’.
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It is in the description of Michal’s perceptions that the theology of the books of
Samuel takes over. In the programmatic hymn of praise at the beginning of the
composition Hannah declares that
the pillars of the earth are the LORD's,
and on them he has set the world.
He will guard the feet of his faithful ones,
but the wicked shall be cut off in darkness;
for not by might does one prevail.
The LORD! His adversaries shall be shattered;
the Most High will thunder in heaven.
The LORD will judge the ends of the earth;
he will give strength to his king,
and exalt the power of his anointed.406
Hannah attributes to YHWH the power to turn the world upside down, to reverse the
status of the powerful but wicked, and the poor but faithful. For that reason, she
declaims, God’s anointed will be protected. Against all probability as far as implied
readers are concerned—and this is the crucial point—Michal perceives the clash of
moral goods in culturally unexpected ways, and prioritises David’s life over loyalty to
her father. The chapter’s epigraph points to this understanding of the narrative: the
author told ‘the truth’ that the pillars of the earth, the way the world works, are subject
to God’s rule.407 But he did so using the unpalatable truth of a lie. In the case of modern
readers this is the point that causes ethical problems; to ancient implied readers, I have
argued, the lie was merely symptomatic of Michal’s (dis)loyalty.
Walter Brueggeman claims that this narrative is devoid of God. “We are treated
to calculating human actions that do not conform to our expectations. Something is
deeply awry when a future king must crawl through a window, when the wife of a
coming king must lie to the father who is still king.”408 Yet this pessimistic evaluation is
not quite correct. 1 Samuel 19.11–18a constitutes a key moment for David, Saul and
Michal. For David, because he is in a corner and his life is threatened. For Michal,
406 1 Sam 2.8–10.
407 In this light, some scholars have portrayed Saul’s fighting against his destiny as ‘tragic’, e.g. David
Gunn, The Fate of King Saul: An Interpretation of a Biblical Story (JSOTSup 14; Sheffield: Sheffield
University Press, 1980), 78–83; Exum, Tragedy, 16–42; Edwin Good, Irony in the Old Testament
(Sheffield: Almond Press, 1981), 56–80. For a detailed response see Peter Williams, “Is God Moral?:
on the Saul Narratives as Tragedy,” in The God of Israel (UCOP 64; ed. R. P. Gordon; Cambridge:
CUP, 2007), 175–89. Note especially William’s observation that Saul is an agent: he is not simply
trapped by fate. See also Sam Dragga, “In the Shadow of the Judges: The Failure of Saul,” JSOT 38
(1987): 39–46; Lee Humphreys, “The Tragedy of King Saul: A Study of the Structure of 1 Samuel 9-
31,” JSOT 3 (1978): 18–27.
408 Walter Brueggemann, First and Second Samuel (Interpretation; Louisville: John Knox, 1990), 144
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because she must decide, perhaps unwittingly, between two anointed kings. For Saul,
because he is about to eliminate his rival. And for God, because his anointed is in
mortal danger. At this moment, Michal lets David down through a window, thus
thwarting Saul’s attempt to have him brought up to death.409 Some commentators are
unhappy with her actions, arguing that “[a]lthough imperfect moral conduct may
subserve the interests of God’s servants, it nevertheless is dishonouring to them”.410
Michal’s configuration of the conflicting moral goods, however, is endorsed by the
author’s approval of her voice. In the conclusion I shall briefly discuss the implications
of this sanction.
409 Cf. Fokkelman, Crossing, 267.
410 R. Payne Smith and C. Chapman, 1 Samuel (PC; ed. H. D. M. Spence and J. S. Snell; London: Kegan
Paul & Co, 1881), 366.
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Conclusion: Michal,
Contradicting Values
‘Who is the greatest Italian painter?’
‘Leonardo de Vinci, Miss Brodie.’
‘That is incorrect. The answer is Giotto,
he is my favourite.’
– Muriel Spark, The Prime of Miss Jean
Brodie1
In order to elucidate the significance of the moral dilemma facing Michal this
dissertation has constructed an interdisciplinary conversation between Old Testament
studies, anthropology and ethics. I have argued that her conundrum is best explicated by
attending to the moral goods that feature in the biblical narrative, but that these can only
be adequately comprehended when the social world of authors and implied readers is
understood. To achieve this I have examined anthropological resources relating to
practices of enmity, affinity and mendacity, asking how these might inform the
interpretation of characters’ heteroglossic voices. The approval of some voices as they
present particular configurations of moral goods reveals the author’s theological
affirmations. In adopting this innovative methodology I have refrained from simply
assuming the superiority of my interpretation à la Miss Brodie. Instead, I have sought to
commend my interpretative understandings with discussion of how they account for the
textual data and why they would have resonated with ancient implied readers. To
conclude, I suggest answers to the research questions enunciated at the beginning of the
thesis.
First, what are the moral conflicts faced by actors in these narratives? Rather
than assume the appropriateness of intuitive responses from modern Western readers I
have demonstrated that reading with anthropology reveals the multifaceted nature of the
conundrum confronting Michal. Attention to the contested nature of anthropology has
served as a caution against importing the supposedly ‘assured results’ of ethnographic
1 The epigraph is from Muriel Spark, The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (London: Penguin, 1961), 11.
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investigation into biblical studies in the form of a models of social or moral action. The
attention to particularity as well as generality has revealed that the truth of Michal’s
utterances in 1 Samuel 19.11–18a is neither the only nor most important moral issue. In
this particular case, I have argued, family loyalty is more prominent. Furthermore, it has
been possible to observe that habitual constructions of moral goods are not simply
accepted but used by both Michal and Saul to justify their choices—my interpretation of
characters’ practices demonstrates how cultural ‘norms’ can be manipulated in
ambiguous situations.
Second, how are the conflicts of moral values resolved? All the characters in my
selected narrative do something: faced with a moral conundrum they decide upon a
particular course of action. These choices comprise the ‘resolution’ of the value clashes
in the selected biblical texts. Michal tells David his life is in danger, lets him down
through the window, confects a dummy with the teraphim, and dissembles to both Saul
and his messengers. Saul’s narrative voice, however, is consistent in his attempt to
resolve the situation according to ‘cultural norms’.
The third question concerns not the characters’ resolutions of their respective
dilemmas, but the author’s evaluation of their choices. It is noteworthy that the author
does in fact construct a conflict of values and does not simply assert the hegemonic
schema. Saul’s voice, which coheres with what, I have argued, implied readers would
have accepted, is discredited. Michal’s unexpected perspective, however, is approved. If
the moral dilemma which faces Michal is conceived in terms of contradicting voices
that conflict, then her voice, which speaks into this situation, contradicts societal norms
unexpectedly to assert fidelity to David, YHWH’s anointed.
This leads directly to the final question, concerning why these assessments
matter. McCarter outlines seven ways in which the ‘History of David’s Rise’ justifies
the political legitimacy of David’s kingship in theological terms.2 The incidents
involving Michal fit into this apology by showing how power comes to him: David does
not grasp it. Whilst David’s marriage to Michal does not confer the kingship upon
David, her choice to facilitate David’s escape speaks of loyalty to this king: if Michal
chose David, so should readers. The other side of the coin is the ‘negative’ assertion
2 Cf. McCarter, “Apology,” 499–502. See also Frank Frick, “Cui Bono? — History in the Service of
Political Nationalism: The Deuteronomistic History as Political Propaganda,” Semeia 66 (1994): 79–
92.
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concerning the validity of societal norms when these conflict with loyalty to David’s
house. Just as Michal in preferring David also rejected not only Saul but also the
dominant schema of a morality that prioritised family loyalty and filial obedience, so
readers should remember that loyalty to YHWH’s anointed—and his successors—is
paramount. This is the central concern of the narrative.
These ‘political’ affirmations are set in the context of a wider assertion
concerning YHWH’s agency. As Fokkelman remarks, “it is not at all self-evident that
the hero’s career will terminate in succession to the throne”, or that “power falls into
David’s lap like a ripe apple”.3 That David does become king is the result of God’s
work. This discovery might lead us from questions about why these narratives did
matter, to another: why do they matter? Some commentators are troubled that the books
of Samuel fail explicitly to condemn ‘questionable’ morality. Gordon observes that
“they often stop short just where we might expect a word of censure or a moralizing
tailpiece”, and he feels compelled to exculpate his lack of attention to their present
relevance by assuring readers that he, too, is “ ‘against’ murder, duplicity and all their
evil cronies”.4 When considered in the context of competing moral goods, however, the
matter is not so black and white, for the interpretative issues concern which goods are
preferred in cases when attaining them all is impossible. In such situations narratives
can play an important role in moral formation. They can certainly do so by
exemplifying virtues or principles. However, a more significant way is by engaging
readers in the moral dilemma itself, thus training the moral faculties of readers, both by
analogy (‘this is what to do, or not do, if you find yourself in a similar situation’) and by
refining appreciation of the ethical goods and their relations to each other.5 Given the
author wishes to justify a novel solution to the moral dilemmas themselves, one that the
implied readers would have found counterintuitive, this is an essential didactic move.
Augustine supposed that a moral community is one that shares common objects of
3 Fokkleman, Crossing, 313. On the various ways in which David’s kingship is justified in 2 Samuel
see Whedbee, “House of David,” 148–49. Exum states that “the theological problem of the transfer of
kingship from Saul to David is resolved in Jonathan”, Exum, Tragedy, 75. It is important to observe,
however, that David doesn’t receive the crown from either of Saul’s children, but is only recognised
as leader of a united ‘kingdom’ after an extended period of conflict concluded when Abner facilitates
the transfer of Israel’s loyalty from Ishbaal to David, 2 Sam 3.1–10. Whilst it is obvious that the
narrative concerns the legitimacy of the Davidic monarchy I do not think the question is as simple as a
transfer of the right to succeed Saul; the matter is at once more subtle and more persuasive.
4 Gordon, Samuel, 9. See also Cartledge, Samuel, 248–49.
5 Cf. Parry, Story, 4; John Barton, “Introduction,” in Understanding Old Testament Ethics: Approaches
and Explorations (Louisville: Westminster / John Knox Press, 2003), 1–11, especially 10.
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love.6 As texts shared by today’s readers the relevance of the Samuel narratives extends
beyond their initial audience and individuals to the formation of contemporary reading
communities. How they might do so is a separate question beyond the scope of the
present discussion. What can be affirmed, however, is that studies such as the present
one, whose methodology is in principle transferable to any other biblical narrative,
provide new interpretative understandings that may help bridge the “troublesome gap”7
between biblical scholarship and ethics.
6 Cf. Civ. 19.24. For discussion see Oliver O’Donovan, The Common Objects of Love: Moral Reflection
and the Shaping of Community (Grand Rapids / Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2002), 20–24.
7 Ogletree, Use of the Bible, xi.
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APPENDIX A
Crime and Punishment in the Book of the Covenant (Ex 20.1–23.33)
Punishment Crime
Death
Ex 21.12 Mortal assault
Ex 21.15 Striking parents
Ex 21.16 Kidnap
Ex 21.17 Cursing father or mother
Ex 21.29 Of ox owner if ox has a history of goring and kills man or
woman (plus stoning of ox)
Ex 22.18 Of female sorcerer
Ex 22.19 Bestiality
‘Devoted to destruction’ Ex 22.20 Idolatry
Ransom
Ex 21.30 Of ox owner’s life (in lieu of capital punishment) if ox has a
history of goring and kills man or woman / boy or girl (plus
stoning of ox)
Release of slave as a free
person
Ex 21.11 Denying first (slave) wife marital rights
Ex 21.26 Assault of slave leading to loss of eye, as compensation
Payment of bride price,
marriage to virgin
Ex 22.16 Seduction of unengaged virgin
Compensatory fine /
Restitution
Ex 21.19 Assault leading to loss of productive time whilst recuperating
Ex 21.22 Miscarriage as result of injury to third party with no further
injury
Ex 21.33 If animal falls into uncovered pit
Ex 22.12 Animal stolen whilst in safekeeping
Fixed fine Ex 21.32 Payment of 30 shekels of silver by ox owner if ox has a historyof goring and kills a male or female slave (plus stoning of ox)
Deterrent fine
Ex 22.1 Theft of livestock subsequently killed or sold: 5 oxen per
stolen ox; 4 sheep per stolen sheep; thief sold into slavery if
unable to pay.
Ex 22.7 Theft of livestock subsequently found in thief’s possession:
double value of theft.
Ex 22.9 Theft in case of disputed ownership determined by ‘coming
before God’ [some sort of lot?]; double value of disputed item
‘Eye for eye, etc.’ Ex 21.22 Miscarriage as result of injury to third party with further injury
Stoning of ox, with
prohibition on sale of meat
Ex 21.28 Goring to death of man or woman
Bloodguilt Ex 22.3 Bludgeoning to death of thief caught breaking and enteringafter sunrise (no bloodguilt if killed before sunrise)
No punishment specified Ex 21.20 Slave-owner killing slave [Capital punishment assumed fromcontext?]
No punishment Ex 22.11 Animal killed, injured or carried off unseen whilst insafekeeping, provided guardian makes oath before the LORD
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APPENDIX B
Crime and Punishment in the Holiness Code (Lev 17.1–26.46)
Punishment Crime
Death through burning
Lev 21.9 For prostitute who is daughter of priest
Lev 20.13 Marrying a woman and her mother (punishment for all
parties)
Death
Lev 20.2 Giving offspring to Molech
Lev 20.9 Cursing father or mother
Lev 20.10 Adultery (punishment for both parties)
Lev 20.11 Sex with father’s wife (punishment for both parties)
Lev 20.12 Sex with daughter-in-law (punishment for both parties)
Lev 20.13 Homosexual sex (punishment for both parties)
Lev 20.16 Woman who practises bestiality (punishment for both parties)
Lev 20.27 For male or female medium or wizard
Lev 24.16, 23 Blasphemy (punishment for both Israelite and alien)
Lev 24.17 Murder
Cut off from God’s
presence
Lev 22.3 If any of Aaron’s priestly descendents approach sacred
donations whilst in state of uncleanness
Cut off from the people
Lev 17.4, 9 Sacrifice not at entrance to tent of meeting
Lev 18.29 Sexual relations prohibited in Lev 18.6 – 19.23
Lev 19.8 Eating sacrificed meat on third day
Lev 20.17 Incest (punishment for both parties)
Lev 20.18 Sleeping with a woman during her menstruation (punishment
for both parties)
‘Bear their guilt’ Lev 17.15 Not cleansing themselves after eating animal with blood
Guilt offering of ram Lev 19.21 Sexual relations with slave woman
Restitution Lev 24.18, 21 Killing of animal
‘Eye for eye, etc.’ Lev 24.19-20 Maiming of person
20% fine Lev 22.14 If person eats sacred food destined for priests
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APPENDIX C
Crime and Punishment in the Deuteronomic Code (Deut 12.1–26.19)
Punishment Crime
Total destruction of town Deut 13.15 Idolatry (punishment for whole town)
Death
Deut 17.5 Idolatry
Deut 17.12 Disobeying judicial decision
Deut 18.20 False prophet
Deut 21.18 Rebellious son
Deut 22.21 Non-virgin bride
Deut 22.22 Adultery (punishment for both parties)
Deut 22.24 Seduction of engaged woman in city (punishment for both
parties)
Deut 22.25 Seduction / rape of engaged woman in countryside
(punishment for man only)
Deut 24.7 Kidnap
‘Eye for eye…’ Deut 19.19 False witness
Freedom for slave wife Deut 21.14 Dishonouring unwanted slave wife
100 shekels to father /
forfeit right to divorce
Deut 22.19 Slandering woman’s presumed virginity
50 shekels to father /
enforced marriage without
right to divorce
Deut 22.29 Seduction / rape of unengaged woman if caught in flagrenti
Shaming Deut 25.9 Refusal to perform Levirate duties
Removal of hand Deut 25.12 Woman who defends husband in fight by grabbing hisopponent’s genitals
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APPENDIX D
Kinship relations in 1 & 2 Samuel
Perhaps [we] can try to imagine societies in which descent-groups are the
basic political, religious, economic and possibly territorial units: not
firms, or associations, or parties, or industries, or classes, or sects and
denominations, but groups of people related to each other through
common descent…So far removed is such a state of society from our
own experience that a leap of the imagination is needed in order even to
begin to understand it.1
This Appendix demonstrates the importance of dynastic descent in 1 and 2 Samuel by
presenting all kinship relations mentioned explicitly in the books of Samuel using
anthropological kinship diagrams. Relationships merely implied, or mentioned in other
sources but not 1 & 2 Samuel, are indicated by ‘?’.
One problem with such representations is that they are static; relevant changes to these
relationships, for example, through separation and remarriage, are discussed in the main
text. Another problem is that they view the family group from a particular perspective.
For this reason, with the exception of Saul and David’s kin groups, which are discussed
more fully in the thesis, each diagram is based upon the ego mentioned in the portion of
the biblical text where the family is described: thus, for example, Samuel’s family is
described apart from Elkanah’s. Nevertheless, in order to give an idea of descent lines,
as represented in the text, related families are described consecutively.
Robert Wilson argues that genealogies must be understood according to their political,
religious and domestic functions, and that “all the versions of a genealogy may be
accurate in the light of their functions”.2 In my opinion all the genealogies in the books
of Samuel are ‘political’. I disagree with Wilson that “if a society has a monarchical
form of government, the political system is not likely to be organized along kinship
lines, and for this reason segmented genealogies do not usually have political
functions”,3 since monarchs can use relationships between families for their own ends—
which is very much the case in 1 & 2 Samuel. On the apparently impressive feat of
reciting up to eleven generations of descent note the comment by Emrys Peters that this
is similar to a British person recalling the details of his address. “The elaboration of a
genealogical apparatus of this sort, a lineage system, does not rest on the chance of
individual’s powers of recall or names from the distant past. If memory comes into the
matter at all, it is highly contemporaneous, for the names of dead ancestors survive in
the daily lives of the people, who use them to serve as ready references for a limited and
definable number of social relationships.”4
1 Fox, Kinship and Marriage, 52.
2 Robert Wilson, “Old Testament Genealogies in Recent Research,” JBL 94 (1975): 169–89, quote 186.
For general discussion of biblical genealogies, including history of interpretation and historicity, see
Gary A. Rendsburg, “The Internal Consistency and Historical Reliability of the Biblical Genealogies,”
VT 40 (1990): 185–206; Juan Manuel Tebes, “ ‘You Shall Not Abhor an Edomite, for He is Your
Brother’: The Tradition of Esau and the Edomite Genealogies from an Anthropological Perspective,”
JHS 6 (2006); Robert Wilson, “Genealogy, Genealogies,” ABD 2.929–32.
3 Wilson, “Old Testament Genealogies,” 181
4 Emrys Peters, “Aspects of affinity in a Lebanese Maronite village,” in Mediterranean Family
Structures (ed. J. G. Peristiany; Cambridge: CUP, 1976), 27–79, quote 31.
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KEY:
 Male  Female  Ego
= Marriage | Descent Sibling relationship
? Not mentioned in text of Samuel  Deceased
ELKANAH’S FAMILY
1 Sam 1.1–4, 20; 2.21
? =  Zuph
|
? =  Tohu
|
? =  Elihu
|
Penniah  =  =  Hannah
| |
| | | | | | | | | |
Sons and Daughters  ..  ..  ..   Samuel  
SAMUEL’S FAMILY
1 Sam 8.1–2
? = 
|
| |
Joel   Abijah
ELI’S FAMILY
1 Sam 1.3; 4.19–21
? = 
|
| |
Hophni   Phinehas
AHIJAH’S FAMILY
1 Sam 14.3
?5 = Phinehas
|
| |
Ichabod   Ahitub = ?
|

5 It is not clear whether Ichabod and Ahitub were brothers or half brothers, cf. 1 Sam 4.20–21.
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AHIMELECH’S FAMILY
1 Sam 22.9, 11, 12, 20
? =  Ahitub
|
| |
Ahijah   Ahimelech6 = ?
|
| | | |
 Abiathar  ‘other sons’, cf. verse 20
ABIATHAR’S FAMILY
2 Sam 8.177; 15.27
? =  Ahimelech
|
? =  Abiathar
|
 Jonathan
ZADOK’S FAMILY
2 Sam 8.17; 15.27
? =  Ahitub8
|
? =  Zadok
|
 Ahimaaz9
ABINADAB’S FAMILY
1 Sam 7.1; 2 Sam 6.3
? =10
|
| | |
Eleazar  Uzzah11Ahio
6 Some commentators identify Ahijah with Abimelech on the basis that the former avoids suggestion of
Molech and both have fathers named Ahitub, see e.g. Smith, Samuel, 105. However, they could just as
well be brothers, as here, cf. Klein, 1 Samuel, 135, who notes other priestly siblings: Hophni and
Phinehas, and Ahitub and Ichabod.
7 Whilst according to this text Zadok and Ahimelech are high priests, the list of officials at 2 Sam 20.23
has Zadok and Abiathar, the pair also recorded in 2 Sam 15:24, 27, 29, 35; 17:15; 19:11; 20:25; 1 Ki.
2:35; 4:4; 1 Chr. 15:11. The only other instances of ‘Zadok and Ahimelech’ occur in 1 Chr 18:16;
24:6, thus I follow many commentators in emending this verse to read ‘Abiathar, son of Ahimelech’,
e.g. Gordon, Samuel, 246 pace Anderson, 2 Samuel, 137, who lets the text stand without resolving the
issue, and Hertzberg, Samuel, 292, who follows Wellhausen in arguing that the verse does not refer to
Zadok’s father, which has no textual support.
8 For discussion of Zadok’s ancestry and the relation to the genealogies in Chronicles see Gordon,
Samuel, 246; Hertzberg, Samuel, 293–94.
9 For a list of other descendents cf. 1 Chr 9.10–11.
10 The name Abinadab is also ascribed to one of David’s brothers (1 Sam 16.8; 17.13) and a son of Saul
(1 Sam 31.2).
11 For discussion and rejection of the proposal identifying Uzzah with Eleazar, plus other suggestions
regarding the sons’ identities, see Anderson, 2 Samuel, 102–103; Gordon, Samuel, 232.
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SAUL’S FAMILY
1 Sam 9.1–2; 10.15; 13.22; 14.49–51; 18.19, 27; 31.2; 2 Sam 2.8–12; 3.15; 4.4; 9.12;
21.8
? = Aphiah
|
? =Becorath
|
? =  Zeror
|
? =  Abiel12
|
| |
? =  Kish ? = Ner13
Ahimaaz  = ? ? =Aiah
| |
Ahinoam  =  =14 Rizpah  Abner
15 |
| |
Mephiboseth  Armoni
? =Barzillai
|
 Jonathan = ?  AbinadabIshviMalchishua  Merab = Adriel 16 = Michal
|
| | | | |
? = Mephibosheth  5 sons
|
Mica
12 Cf. Klein, 1 Samuel, 86.
13 Abner (defective, the full spelling in 1 Sam 14.50, ֵרנִיבֲא, is a hapax legomenon, cf. McCarter, 1
Samuel, 254) is described as ‘son of Ner’ in 1 Sam 14.50; 26.5, 14; 2 Sam 2.8, 12; 3.23, 25, 28, 37; 1
Kgs 2.5, 32; 1 Chr 26.28. According to the genealogies in 1 Chr 9.36; Josephus, Ant. 6.129–30 Abner
and Saul are cousins; in 1 Chr 8.33; 9.39, however, Abner is Kish’s brother, and thus Saul’s uncle. 1
Sam 14.50 is not decisive since either Abner or Ner could be the antecedent of ּדדֹו . In the latter case
Ner must be inserted between Abiel and Kish in this genealogy, but see 1 Sam 9.1; in the former, the
position adopted here, ֶּבן must be emended to ְּבֵינ in 1 Sam 14.50, so Josephus, cf. Klein, 1 Samuel,
142; Driver, Notes, 121.
14 Rizpah is refered to as concubine in 2 Sam 3.7; 21.8, 10–11.
15 The names and number of Saul’s children are uncertain because of discrepancies between the five
biblical lists, cf. McCarter, 1 Samuel, 256:
1 Sam 14.49 Jonathan, Ishvi, Malchishua
1 Sam 31.2 = 1 Chr 10.2 Jonathan, Abinadab, Malchishua
1 Chr 8.33; 9.39 Jonathan, Malchishua, Abinadab, Eshbaal
In addition 2 Sam 2–4 mentions that ‘Ishbosheth (NRSV: Ishbaal) son of Saul’ was installed as crown
prince by Abner. For text critical issues and Qumran evidence regarding ‘Ishvi’ see McCarter, 1
Samuel, 254. I concur with the majority of commentators that Ishvi = Eshbaal = Ishbosheth (=
Ishbaal). Abinadab could be excluded from the list in 1 Sam 14 because he was the son of another
wife, although probably not Rizpah since this does not fit with 2 Sam 21.8, pace Bergen, Samuel, 162.
The exclusion of Ishbosheth from the second list is because he was not killed at Gilboa.
16 Michal is married both to David and Paltiel (or Palti), cf. 1 Sam 18.27; 25.44; 2 Sam 3.14–15.
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DAVID’S FAMILY
1 Sam 16.5–11; 17.12–13; 18.27; 22.3; 25.44; 26.6; 2 Sam 2.2, 18; 3.2–5; 5.13–16; 14.27; 17.25; 21.21; 23.24
Jesse= ? = Nahash17
| |
| | | | | | | | | |
 EliabAbinadab ? = Shammah ? Nethanel ? Raddai ? Ozem ?18  (=) ?19 = Zeruiah Ithra the  = Abigail
| (Shimei) | Ishmaelite
| | | | |
Jonathan20 Jonadab  Joab Abishai Asahel Amasa
=Michal21 = Ahinoam22 = Abigail =Maacah =Haggith = Abital =Eglah = Bathsheba = Other
of Jezreel | wives &
| | | | | concubines
 Amnon Chileab ?=Absalom Adonijah  Shephatiah  Ithream SolomonShammuaShobab Nathan
| (Shimea)
| | | |23
    Tamar
| | | | | | | | | | |
 Ibhar  Elishua  Nepheg  Japhia  Elishama  Eliada  Eliphelet ? Nogah ? Eliphelet More sons  Tamar
& daughters
17 The identity of Nahash and his/her relationship to Jesse, and hence of Abigail and Zeruiah to David, is opaque. It is possible that Nahash is a female name and that she was
another of Jesse’s wives. More probably Nahash is male, meaning Zeruiah and Abigail were David’s half-sisters though his mother, cf. 2 Sam 17.24–27; 1 Chr 2.16.
Nahash is possibly to be identified with the King of the Ammonites, cf. Richard Nelson, “Nahash,” ABD 4.996; Philip Davies, and John Rogerson, The Old Testament
World (2nd ed.; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 27–29. If so, then an additional descendent, Haram, should be added to the kinship diagram, 2 Sam 10.2.
18 Jesse presents seven sons to Samuel before introducing David, cf. 1 Sam 16.11; 17.12–13. 1 Chr 2.13–15, however, enumerates David as the seventh.
19 From Bethlehem, 2 Sam 2.32.
20 MT; LXX of 2 Sam 21.21 reads ‘Jonadab’.
21 Michal was given to David in marriage, then to Paltiel, before David reclaimed her, cf. 1 Sam 18.27; 25.44; 2 Sam 3.12–16.
22 The only other Ahinoam mentioned in the Old Testament is Saul’s wife. I do not accept the proposal that Saul’s Ahinoam is to be identified with Ahinoam of Jezreel, nor
that Abigail, widow of Nabal, was David’s half sister, pace Jon Levenson and B. Halpern, “The Political Import of David’s Marriages,” JBL 99 (1980): 507–11.
23 Absalom’s monument (2 Sam 18.18) is erected because he did not have offspring, which appears to contradict 2 Sam 14.27, although they could have predeceased him.
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PALTIEL’S FAMILY
2 Sam 3.14–15
? =  Laish
|
Paltiel  =  Michal
RIMON’S FAMILY
2 Sam 4.2, 5
? = 
|
| |
Rechab  Baanah
WOMAN OF TEKOA’S (IMAGINARY) FAMILY
2 Sam 14.5–7
תיֵּבבָא 
 = ?
ַה־ַלכהָחָּפְׁשִּמ |
 = 
|
| |
 
FATHER—SON RELATIONSHIPS
Father—son relationship where the father is the referent:
? = 
|

King Toi father of Joram 2 Sam 8.10
Zeba’s 15 sons 2 Sam 19.17
Barzillai—Chimham24 2 Sam 17.27; 32–34, 39; 21.8
Father—son relationship where the son is the referent: the father’s name is patronymic:
? = 
|

Jehosphaphat son of Ahilud 2 Sam 8.16; 20.24
Benaiah son of Jehoiada 2 Sam 8.18; 20.23; 23.22
Hanun son of Nahash 2 Sam 10.1–2
Abimelech son of Jerubaal 2 Sam 11.21
Shimei son of Gera 2 Sam 16.5; 19.18
Sheba son of Bichri 2 Sam 20.1–2, 6–7, 10, 13, 21–22
Elhanan son of Jaare-oregim 2 Sam 21.19, 21
Elhanan son of Dodo 2 Sam 23.24
24 Father—son relationship only implied in 2 Samuel, but cf. Jos, Ant 7.275.
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Ira son of Ikkesh 2 Sam 23.26
Heleb son of Baanah 2 Sam 23.29
Ittai son of Ribai 2 Sam 23.29
Sons of Jashen 2 Sam 23.32
Jonathan son of Shammah 2 Sam 23.32–33
Ahiam son of Sharar 2 Sam 23.33
Eliphelet son of Ahasbai 2 Sam 23.34
Eliam son of Ahithophel 2 Sam 23.34
Igal son of Nathan 2 Sam 23.36
Three generations as patronym:25
? = 
|
? = 
|

Hadadezer son of Rehob of Zobah 2 Sam 8.3, 12
Eleazar son of Dodo son of Ahohi 2 Sam 23.9
HUSBAND—WIFE RELATIONSHIPS
Husband—wife relationships only (without reference to wider kin group):
 = 
Nabal—Abigail 1 Sam 25
Uriah—Bathsheba 2 Sam 11
Man at Bahurim—his wife 2 Sam 17.18–19
Late husband’s name used instead of patronym:
 =  = 
Nabal—Abigail 1 Sam 30.5; 2 Sam 2.2; 3.3
25 Note that some of the two generation references ‘X son of Y’ also add a geographical or tribal reference
that is not included in the above lists.
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